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A robust deception-free coalition formation model

Published: 14 March 2004 Publication History

Abstract

We study two properties of coalition formation algorithms, very important for their application in real-life scenarios: robustness and tolerance to some agent misbehaviors. The study is performed for a previously proposed coalition formation model-based upon game theory for a class of task-oriented problems that guarantees an optimum task allocation and a stable (fair) profit division. The results show acceptable behavior and performance.

References

[1]
Belmonte, M. V., Conejo, R., Pérez-de-la-Cruz, J. L. & Triguero, F. A. Stable and Feasible Payoff Division for Coalition Formation in a Class of Task Oriented Domains. In Meyer, J. J. and Tambe, M. E. (eds.): LNAI 2333, intelligent Agents VIII: Agents Theories, Architectures and Languages. 324--334, 2002.
[2]
Rosenschein, J. S., and Zlotkin, G. Rules of Encounter. MIT Press, 1994.
[3]
Kahan, J., and Rapaport, A. Theories of Coalition Formation. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1984.

Cited By

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  • (2013)Cooperative games and multiagent systemsThe Knowledge Engineering Review10.1017/S026988891300010628:4(381-424)Online publication date: 3-May-2013
  • (2007)Who Works Together in Agent Coalition Formation?Proceedings of the 11th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XI10.1007/978-3-540-75119-9_17(241-254)Online publication date: 19-Sep-2007
  • (2006)COALITIONS AMONG INTELLIGENT AGENTS: A TRACTABLE CASEComputational Intelligence10.1111/j.1467-8640.2006.00273.x22:1(52-68)Online publication date: 16-Feb-2006

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  1. A robust deception-free coalition formation model

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    Published In

    cover image ACM Conferences
    SAC '04: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM symposium on Applied computing
    March 2004
    1733 pages
    ISBN:1581138121
    DOI:10.1145/967900
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 14 March 2004

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    Author Tags

    1. Multi-Agent Systems
    2. coalitions
    3. game theory
    4. task-oriented domains

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    SAC04
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    SAC04: The 2004 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
    March 14 - 17, 2004
    Nicosia, Cyprus

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    Overall Acceptance Rate 1,650 of 6,669 submissions, 25%

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    Cited By

    View all
    • (2013)Cooperative games and multiagent systemsThe Knowledge Engineering Review10.1017/S026988891300010628:4(381-424)Online publication date: 3-May-2013
    • (2007)Who Works Together in Agent Coalition Formation?Proceedings of the 11th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XI10.1007/978-3-540-75119-9_17(241-254)Online publication date: 19-Sep-2007
    • (2006)COALITIONS AMONG INTELLIGENT AGENTS: A TRACTABLE CASEComputational Intelligence10.1111/j.1467-8640.2006.00273.x22:1(52-68)Online publication date: 16-Feb-2006

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