Article

Multi-component contingent auction (MCCA): a procurement mechanism for dynamic formation of supply networks

Authors:

Arie SegevAuthors Info & Claims

ICEC '03: Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 78 - 86

https://doi.org/10.1145/948005.948016

Published: 30 September 2003 Publication History

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a procurement mechanism for selecting optimal supplier combination when the suppliers have interoperability and cost dependency issue. The proposed mechanism, named Multi-Component Contingent Auction(MCCA), guarantees that the outcome is the combination of the suppliers with the minimum total cost who can work together. The core of the MCCA is a special form of bid: contingent bid. Contingent bids provide the suppliers with a way to express incompatibility and cost dependency. Suppliers can also implement a package bid by submitting multiple contingent bids. Therefore, the MCCA can be considered as a super set of the combinatorial auction.A major problem in the MCCA is the number of computations required for winner determination. We propose a winner determination algorithm that alleviates this computational burden and compare its performance with the depth-first tree search algorithm.

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Cited By

Barker JFinnie G(2010)The Next Generation Demand Network in Quick Response Systems: Intelligent Products, Packet Switching and Dynamic InformationInnovative Quick Response Programs in Logistics and Supply Chain Management10.1007/978-3-642-04313-0_12(243-263)Online publication date: 8-Jan-2010
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04313-0_12
Ahn HLee H(2004)An Agent-Based Dynamic Information Network for Supply Chain ManagementBT Technology Journal10.1023/B:BTTJ.0000033467.83300.c022:2(18-27)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2004
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1023/B%3ABTTJ.0000033467.83300.c0

Multi-component contingent auction (MCCA): a procurement mechanism for dynamic formation of supply networks
1. Applied computing
  1. Enterprise computing

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences

ICEC '03: Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce

September 2003

528 pages

ISBN:1581137885

DOI:10.1145/948005

General Chair:
Norman Sadeh
Carnegie Mellon University
,
Program Chairs:
Mary Jo Dively
Esq. Carnegie Mellon University
,
Robert Kauffman
University of Minnesota
,
Yannis Labrou
Fujitsu Laboratories
,
Onn Shehory
IBM Research Labs, Israel
,
Rahul Telang
Carnegie Mellon University
,
Lorrie Cranor
AT&T

Copyright © 2003 ACM.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 30 September 2003

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Cited By

Barker JFinnie G(2010)The Next Generation Demand Network in Quick Response Systems: Intelligent Products, Packet Switching and Dynamic InformationInnovative Quick Response Programs in Logistics and Supply Chain Management10.1007/978-3-642-04313-0_12(243-263)Online publication date: 8-Jan-2010
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04313-0_12
Ahn HLee H(2004)An Agent-Based Dynamic Information Network for Supply Chain ManagementBT Technology Journal10.1023/B:BTTJ.0000033467.83300.c022:2(18-27)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2004
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1023/B%3ABTTJ.0000033467.83300.c0

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