Pool punishments and pool exclusions in spatial public goods games
Pages 110 - 114
Abstract
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of human society and has had a profound impact on biological evolution. However, fostering group cooperation and overcoming the challenges that arise in the process remains a significant challenge. In the Spatial Public Goods Game (SPGG), free-riders (defectors) undermine the benefits of cooperative individuals, leading to a decline in group benefits. To mitigate the problem of first-order free-riding, we introduce two strategies - pool punishments and pool exclusions. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we compared the efficacy of these two strategies in the evolutionary process. Our results indicate that both pool penalization and pool exclusion effectively address the first-order free-riding problem observed in traditional public goods games. However, pool penalization can lead to second-order free-riding, while this problem is alleviated in pool exclusion. Additionally, pool exclusion results in the expulsion of defectors and a substantial increase in overall benefits.
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Published In
February 2023
398 pages
ISBN:9798400700200
DOI:10.1145/3592686
Copyright © 2023 ACM.
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Association for Computing Machinery
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Published: 31 May 2023
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BIC 2023
BIC 2023: 2023 3rd International Conference on Bioinformatics and Intelligent Computing
February 10 - 12, 2023
Sanya, China
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