Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts
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- Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts
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- Chair:
- Kevin Leyton-Brown,
- Program Chair:
- Jason D Hartline,
- Program Co-chair:
- Larry Samuelson
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
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- Extended-abstract
Funding Sources
- Israel Science Foundation
- NSF Grant SES
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