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Quantifying Loss in Automated Market Makers

Published: 07 November 2022 Publication History

Abstract

We consider the market microstructure of automated market making and, specifically, constant function market makers (CFMMs), from the economic perspective of passive liquidity providers (LPs). In a frictionless, continuous-time Black-Scholes setting and in the absence of trading fees, we decompose the return of an LP into a instantaneous market risk component and a non-negative, non-decreasing, and predictable component which we call "loss-versus-rebalancing'' (ŁVR, pronounced "lever''). Market risk can be fully hedged, but once eliminated, ŁVR remains as a running cost that must be offset by trading fee income in order for liquidity provision to be profitable. ŁVR is distinct from the more commonly known metric of "impermanent loss'' or "divergence loss''; this latter metric is more fundamentally described as "loss-versus-holding'' and is not a true running cost. We express ŁVR simply and in closed-form: instantaneously, it is the scaled product of the variance of prices and the marginal liquidity available in the pool. As such, ŁVR is easily calibrated to market data and specific CFMM structure. ŁVR provides tradeable insight in both the ex ante and ex post assessment of CFMM LP investment decisions, and can also inform the design of CFMM protocols. For a more complete version of this paper, please refer to https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.06046.pdf.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)Private, Anonymous, Collateralizable Commitments vs. MEV2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)10.1109/ICBC59979.2024.10634377(521-527)Online publication date: 27-May-2024
  • (2023)The Case for Stochastically Dynamic AMMsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4422654Online publication date: 2023
  • (2023)An Automated Market Maker Minimizing Loss-Versus-RebalancingMathematical Research for Blockchain Economy10.1007/978-3-031-48731-6_6(95-114)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2023

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    DeFi'22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security
    November 2022
    80 pages
    ISBN:9781450398824
    DOI:10.1145/3560832
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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    Published: 07 November 2022

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    Author Tags

    1. automated market makers
    2. blockchain
    3. decentralized finance
    4. mathematical finance
    5. portfolio management
    6. trading and market microstructure

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    View all
    • (2024)Private, Anonymous, Collateralizable Commitments vs. MEV2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)10.1109/ICBC59979.2024.10634377(521-527)Online publication date: 27-May-2024
    • (2023)The Case for Stochastically Dynamic AMMsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4422654Online publication date: 2023
    • (2023)An Automated Market Maker Minimizing Loss-Versus-RebalancingMathematical Research for Blockchain Economy10.1007/978-3-031-48731-6_6(95-114)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2023
    • (undefined)Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Execution and SpeculationSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4144743

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