research-article

Inspiration from the Employee Incentive Preference Survey of Huawei under the Pressure of the US Government

Authors:

Fei Peng,

Thelma D. PalaoagAuthors Info & Claims

ICEME '20: Proceedings of the 2020 11th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics

Pages 167 - 174

https://doi.org/10.1145/3414752.3414792

Published: 18 November 2020 Publication History

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Abstract

To learn about huawei's employees under pressure from the U.S. government, the author investigated huawei employees' satisfaction with huawei's incentive mechanism, especially their preference for incentive factors. The survey found that huawei employees had a high degree of satisfaction with the incentive mechanism of Huawei, but the order of incentive preference changed greatly. The author believes that high-tech enterprises should establish a "one to one" incentive mechanism for their employees and use rules to cope with changes. The concept of "targeted incentive" was proposed. Hope to promote the standardization of incentive mechanism, incentive factors structure. It provides a kind of operation mode for human resource management incentive mechanism construction.

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ICEME '20: Proceedings of the 2020 11th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics

July 2020

312 pages

ISBN:9781450388016

DOI:10.1145/3414752

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 18 November 2020

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ICEME '20: 2020 The 11th International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics

July 15 - 17, 2020

Beijing, China

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An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination

Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions

Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions

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