An efficient fault tolerant cloud market mechanism for profit maximization
Authors: 
Boyu Li, Guanquan Xu, Bin Wu, Yuhan DongAuthors Info & Claims
Pages 169 - 177
Abstract
In support of effectively discovering the market value of resources and dynamic resource provisioning, auction design has recently been studied in the cloud. However, there are limitations due to the inability to accept time-varying user demands or offline settings. These limitations create a large gap between the real needs of users and the services available from cloud providers. In addition, existing auction mechanisms do not consider service interruption due to server failures caused by software or hardware problems. To address the limitations of existing auction mechanisms and to avoid service interruption, this paper targets a more general scenario of online cloud resource auction design where: 1) users can request multiple types of time-varying resources; and 2) at least one server is available for each accepted bid even when one or more servers fail; and 3) profit is maximized over the system execution span. Specifically, we model the profit maximization problem using an Integral Linear Programming (ILP) optimization framework, which offers an elastic model for time-varying user demands. In addition, we design an online, truthful, and time efficient auction mechanism consisting of a price-based allocation strategy and a pricing function. The online allocation strategy allocates multiple types of resource to each user while satisfying the time-varying demands and ensuring at least one server is available for each user in each allocated time slot. Lastly, the efficacy of online auctions is validated through careful theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies.
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Published In
May 2021
254 pages
ISBN:9781450384049
DOI:10.1145/3457388
- General Chairs:
- Maurizio Palesi,
- Antonino Tumeo,
- Program Chairs:
- Georgios I. Goumas,
- Carmen G. Almudever
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Published: 11 May 2021
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- China Scholarship Council
- National Key R\&D Program of China
- National Science Foundation of China
- the Key Research and Development Project of Sichuan Province
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