research-article

TOUCAN: A proTocol tO secUre Controller Area Network

Authors:

Giampaolo Bella,

Gianpiero Costantino,

Ilaria MatteucciAuthors Info & Claims

AutoSec '19: Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Automotive Cybersecurity

Pages 3 - 8

https://doi.org/10.1145/3309171.3309175

Published: 13 March 2019 Publication History

Abstract

Modern cars are no longer purely mechanical devices but shelter so much digital technology that they resemble a network of computers. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) need to exchange a large amount of data for the various functions of the car to work, and such data must be made secure if we want those functions to work as intended despite malicious activity by attackers. TOUCAN is a new security protocol designed to be secure and at the same time both CAN and AUTOSAR compliant. It achieves security in terms of authenticity, integrity and confidentiality, yet without the need to upgrade (the hardware of) existing ECUs or enrich the network with novel components. The overhead is tiny, namely a reduction of the size of the Data field of a frame. A prototype implementation exhibits promising performance on a STM32F407Discovery board.

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Digital Library

Cited By

Shang CCao JLiu JZhang YNiu BLi H(2024)CEAMP: A Cross-Domain Entity Authentication and Message Protection Framework for Intra-Vehicle NetworkIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems10.1109/TITS.2023.333982125:7(6780-6795)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2023.3339821
Wei HAi QZhai YZhang Y(2024)Automotive Security: Threat Forewarning and ECU Source Mapping Derived From Physical Features of Network SignalsIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems10.1109/TITS.2023.332189625:3(2479-2491)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2023.3321896
Lu RXie GLi RXu WLei J(2024)TrinitySec: Trinity-Enabled and Lightweight Security Framework for CAN-FD CommunicationIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2023.331490821:4(2704-2719)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3314908
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Index Terms

TOUCAN: A proTocol tO secUre Controller Area Network
1. Security and privacy

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

AutoSec '19: Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Automotive Cybersecurity

March 2019

55 pages

ISBN:9781450361804

DOI:10.1145/3309171

Program Chairs:
Ziming Zhao
Rochester Institute of Technology, USA
,
Qi Alfred Chen
University of California, Irvine, USA
,
Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University, USA, and Samsung Research, South Korea

Copyright © 2019 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 13 March 2019

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CODASPY '19

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SIGSAC

CODASPY '19: Ninth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy

March 27, 2019

Texas, Richardson, USA

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Citations

Cited By

Shang CCao JLiu JZhang YNiu BLi H(2024)CEAMP: A Cross-Domain Entity Authentication and Message Protection Framework for Intra-Vehicle NetworkIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems10.1109/TITS.2023.333982125:7(6780-6795)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2023.3339821
Wei HAi QZhai YZhang Y(2024)Automotive Security: Threat Forewarning and ECU Source Mapping Derived From Physical Features of Network SignalsIEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems10.1109/TITS.2023.332189625:3(2479-2491)Online publication date: Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TITS.2023.3321896
Lu RXie GLi RXu WLei J(2024)TrinitySec: Trinity-Enabled and Lightweight Security Framework for CAN-FD CommunicationIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2023.331490821:4(2704-2719)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3314908
Hu XHuang GNing YWang LSuo JOta KZhang J(2024)A Lightweight and Confidential Communication Scheme for On-Vehicle ECUsIEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking10.1109/MNET.2024.336594638:3(34-40)Online publication date: 20-Feb-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/MNET.2024.3365946
Serag KBhatia RFaqih AOzmen MKumar VCelik ZXu DCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)ZBCANProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620623(6893-6910)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620623
Yoshizawa TSingelée DMuehlberg JDelbruel STaherkordi AHughes DPreneel B(2023)A Survey of Security and Privacy Issues in V2X Communication SystemsACM Computing Surveys10.1145/355805255:9(1-36)Online publication date: 16-Jan-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3558052
Sun HLuo WWeng JLiu ZLi M(2023)ECQV-GDH-Based Group Key Exchange Protocol for CAN BusIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology10.1109/TVT.2023.327787572:10(12857-12872)Online publication date: Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2023.3277875
Wu WDai JHuang HZhao QZeng GLi R(2023)A Digital Watermark Method for In-Vehicle Network Security EnhancementIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology10.1109/TVT.2023.324718072:7(8398-8408)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2023.3247180
Popa LJichici CAndreica TMurvay PGroza B(2023)Impact of Wiring Characteristics on Voltage-based Fingerprinting in Controller Area Networks2023 IEEE 17th International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics (SACI)10.1109/SACI58269.2023.10158572(000231-000236)Online publication date: 23-May-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/SACI58269.2023.10158572
Lai CWang XZheng D(2023)A PUF-based Authentication and Key Distribution Scheme for In-Vehicle NetworkICC 2023 - IEEE International Conference on Communications10.1109/ICC45041.2023.10279633(1591-1596)Online publication date: 28-May-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC45041.2023.10279633
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