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Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

Published: 13 July 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Over 13 months in 2016-17 the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted an "incentive auction" to repurpose radio spectrum from broadcast television to wireless internet. The result of the auction was to remove 14 UHF-TV channels from broadcast use, sell 70 MHz of wireless internet licenses for $19.8 billion, and create 14 MHz of spectrum for unlicensed uses. With fewer UHF channels remaining for TV broadcast, the TV spectrum was also reorganized. Each station was either "repacked" in the leftover channels or voluntarily sold its broadcast rights, either going off the air or switching to a different band. The volunteers received a total of $10.05 billion to yield or exchange their rights and make repacking possible.
This paper uses a computational lens to revisit part of the incentive auction design: the descending clock "reverse" auction used to procure broadcast rights. We investigated the quantitative significance of various aspects of the design by running extensive simulations, leveraging a reverse auction simulator and realistic models of bidder values. Because the incentive auction design was both novel and extremely complex [1], it was not possible to thoroughly consider every potential design variation before the auction was run. Our goal is to understand how well the auction design performed after the fact, particularly asking which elements of the design were most important and which variations of the design might have led to even better outcomes.

References

[1]
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, and Ilya Segal. 2017. Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 114, 28 (2017), 7202--7209. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1701997114
[2]
Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal. 2020. Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 128, 1 (2020), 1--31. https://doi.org/10.1086/704074

Cited By

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  • (2023)Reallocative Auctions and Core SelectionSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4450987Online publication date: 2023
  • (2023)Breaking the traditional: a survey of algorithmic mechanism design applied to economic and complex environmentsNeural Computing and Applications10.1007/s00521-023-08647-135:22(16193-16222)Online publication date: 20-May-2023

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
EC '20: Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 2020
937 pages
ISBN:9781450379755
DOI:10.1145/3391403
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 13 July 2020

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Author Tags

  1. deferred acceptance auction
  2. incentive auction
  3. market design
  4. reverse clock auction
  5. simulation
  6. spectrum auction

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EC '20
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EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
July 13 - 17, 2020
Virtual Event, Hungary

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Reallocative Auctions and Core SelectionSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4450987Online publication date: 2023
  • (2023)Breaking the traditional: a survey of algorithmic mechanism design applied to economic and complex environmentsNeural Computing and Applications10.1007/s00521-023-08647-135:22(16193-16222)Online publication date: 20-May-2023

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