short-paper

Evolution of Defenses against Transient-Execution Attacks

Authors:

Claudio Canella,

Sai Manoj Pudukotai Dinakarrao,

Khaled N. KhasawnehAuthors Info & Claims

GLSVLSI '20: Proceedings of the 2020 on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI

Pages 169 - 174

https://doi.org/10.1145/3386263.3407584

Published: 07 September 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Transient-execution attacks, such as Meltdown and Spectre, exploit performance optimizations in modern CPUs to enable unauthorized access to data across protection boundaries. Against these attacks, we have noticed a rapid growth of deployed and proposed countermeasures. In this paper, we show the evolution of countermeasures against transient-execution attacks by both industry and academia since the initial discoveries of the attacks. We show that despite the advances in the understanding and systematic view of the field, the proposed and deployed defenses are limited.

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Cited By

Zhang ZBarthe GChuengsatiansup CSchwabe PYarom YCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)Ultimate SLHProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620636(7125-7142)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620636
Fiolhais LSousa L(2023)Transient-Execution Attacks: A Computer Architect PerspectiveACM Computing Surveys10.1145/360361956:3(1-38)Online publication date: 6-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3603619
Milburn ASun KKawakami H(2023)You Cannot Always Win the Race: Analyzing mitigations for branch target prediction attacks2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00046(671-686)Online publication date: Jul-2023
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Index Terms

Evolution of Defenses against Transient-Execution Attacks
1. Security and privacy
  1. Security in hardware
    1. Hardware attacks and countermeasures
  2. Systems security
    1. Browser security
    2. Operating systems security

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Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences

GLSVLSI '20: Proceedings of the 2020 on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI

September 2020

597 pages

ISBN:9781450379441

DOI:10.1145/3386263

General Chairs:
Tinoosh Mohsenin
University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA
,
Weisheng Zhao
Beihang University, China
,
Program Chairs:
Yiran Chen
Duke University, USA
,
Onur Mutlu
ETH Zurich, Switzerland

Copyright © 2020 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Published: 07 September 2020

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Horizon 2020
ARM
Österreichische Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft

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GLSVLSI '20

GLSVLSI '20: Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2020

September 7 - 9, 2020

Virtual Event, China

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Overall Acceptance Rate 312 of 1,156 submissions, 27%

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https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620636
Fiolhais LSousa L(2023)Transient-Execution Attacks: A Computer Architect PerspectiveACM Computing Surveys10.1145/360361956:3(1-38)Online publication date: 6-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3603619
Milburn ASun KKawakami H(2023)You Cannot Always Win the Race: Analyzing mitigations for branch target prediction attacks2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00046(671-686)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00046
Holtryd NManivannan MStenström P(2023)SoK: Analysis of Root Causes and Defense Strategies for Attacks on Microarchitectural Optimizations2023 IEEE 8th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00044(631-650)Online publication date: Jul-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00044
Kuo HChen KLu YWilliams DMohan SXu TBromberg YKermarrec AKozyrakis C(2022)Verified programs can partyProceedings of the Seventeenth European Conference on Computer Systems10.1145/3492321.3519562(283-299)Online publication date: 28-Mar-2022
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Cauligi SDisselkoen CMoghimi DBarthe GStefan D(2022)SoK: Practical Foundations for Software Spectre Defenses2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833707(666-680)Online publication date: May-2022
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Kaiser SHaq MTosun AKorkmaz T(2022)Container Technologies for ARM Architecture: A Comprehensive Survey of the State-of-the-ArtIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2022.319715110(84853-84881)Online publication date: 2022
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Miles SMcDonough CMichael EShankar Kumar VLee J(2022)Simulating Modern CPU Vulnerabilities on a 5-stage MIPS Pipeline Using Node-REDAdvances in Data Computing, Communication and Security10.1007/978-981-16-8403-6_65(707-716)Online publication date: 29-Mar-2022
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Angelou ADadaliaris ADossis MDimitriou G(2021)Branchless Code Generation for Modern Processor ArchitecturesProceedings of the 25th Pan-Hellenic Conference on Informatics10.1145/3503823.3503879(300-305)Online publication date: 26-Nov-2021
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Thoma JFeldtkeller JKrausz MGüneysu TBernstein DBilge LDumitras T(2021)BasicBlocker: ISA Redesign to Make Spectre-Immune CPUs FasterProceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses10.1145/3471621.3471857(103-118)Online publication date: 6-Oct-2021
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