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Perfect is the Enemy of Good: Setting Realistic Goals for BGP Security

Published: 15 November 2018 Publication History
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References

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Cited By

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  • (2024)The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): A Survey on Measurements and Future ProspectsIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2023.332745521:2(2353-2373)Online publication date: Apr-2024
  • (2023)On the Effectiveness of BGP Hijackers That Evade Public Route CollectorsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2023.326112811(31092-31124)Online publication date: 2023
  • (2022)The State of the Art in BGP Visualization Tools: A Mapping of Visualization Techniques to Cyberattack TypesIEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics10.1109/TVCG.2022.3209412(1-11)Online publication date: 2022
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cover image ACM Conferences
HotNets '18: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
November 2018
191 pages
ISBN:9781450361200
DOI:10.1145/3286062
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 15 November 2018

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): A Survey on Measurements and Future ProspectsIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2023.332745521:2(2353-2373)Online publication date: Apr-2024
  • (2023)On the Effectiveness of BGP Hijackers That Evade Public Route CollectorsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2023.326112811(31092-31124)Online publication date: 2023
  • (2022)The State of the Art in BGP Visualization Tools: A Mapping of Visualization Techniques to Cyberattack TypesIEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics10.1109/TVCG.2022.3209412(1-11)Online publication date: 2022
  • (2022)AP2Vec: An Unsupervised Approach for BGP Hijacking DetectionIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2022.316645019:3(2255-2268)Online publication date: Sep-2022
  • (2019)Profiling BGP Serial HijackersProceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference10.1145/3355369.3355581(420-434)Online publication date: 21-Oct-2019

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