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Hit by the Bus: QoS Degradation Attack on Android

Published: 02 April 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Mobile apps need optimal performance and responsiveness to rise amongst numerous rivals on the market. Further, some apps like media streaming or gaming apps cannot even function properly with a performance below a certain threshold. In this work, we present the first performance degradation attack on Android OS that can target rival apps using a combination of logical channel leakages and low-level architectural bottlenecks in the underlying hardware. To show the viability of the attack, we design a proof-of-concept app and test it on various mobile platforms. The attack runs covertly and brings the target to the level of unresponsiveness. With less than 10% CPU time in the worst case, it requires minimal computational effort to run as a background service, and requires only the UsageStats permission from the user. We quantify the impact of our attack using 11 popular benchmark apps, running 44 different tests.} The measured QoS degradation varies across platforms and applications, reaching a maximum of 90\% in some cases. The attack combines the leakage from logical channels with low-level architectural bottlenecks to design a malicious app that can covertly degrade Quality of Service (QoS) of any targeted app. Furthermore, our attack code has a small footprint and is not detected by the Android system as malicious. Finally, our app can pass the Google Play Store malware scanner, Google Bouncer, as well as the top malware scanners in the Play Store.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)An Empirical Study of Performance Interference: Timing Violation Patterns and Impacts2024 IEEE 30th Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS)10.1109/RTAS61025.2024.00033(320-333)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
  • (2024)A Systematic Deconstruction of Human-Centric Privacy & Security Threats on Mobile PhonesInternational Journal of Human–Computer Interaction10.1080/10447318.2024.236151941:2(1628-1651)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
  • (2022)PolyRhythm: Adaptive Tuning of a Multi-Channel Attack Template for Timing Interference2022 IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS)10.1109/RTSS55097.2022.00028(225-239)Online publication date: Dec-2022
  • Show More Cited By

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cover image ACM Conferences
ASIA CCS '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
April 2017
952 pages
ISBN:9781450349444
DOI:10.1145/3052973
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 02 April 2017

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Author Tags

  1. QoS attack
  2. mobile malware
  3. mobile security
  4. performance degradation

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ASIA CCS '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 67 of 359 submissions, 19%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 418 of 2,322 submissions, 18%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)An Empirical Study of Performance Interference: Timing Violation Patterns and Impacts2024 IEEE 30th Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS)10.1109/RTAS61025.2024.00033(320-333)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
  • (2024)A Systematic Deconstruction of Human-Centric Privacy & Security Threats on Mobile PhonesInternational Journal of Human–Computer Interaction10.1080/10447318.2024.236151941:2(1628-1651)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2024
  • (2022)PolyRhythm: Adaptive Tuning of a Multi-Channel Attack Template for Timing Interference2022 IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS)10.1109/RTSS55097.2022.00028(225-239)Online publication date: Dec-2022
  • (2019)Tail Amplification in n-Tier Systems: A Study of Transient Cross-Resource Contention Attacks2019 IEEE 39th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS)10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00152(1527-1538)Online publication date: Jul-2019
  • (2018)MASCATProceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy10.1145/3176258.3176316(377-388)Online publication date: 13-Mar-2018
  • (2018)Towards Dynamic Execution Environment for System Security Protection Against Hardware Flaws2018 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)10.1109/ISVLSI.2018.00107(557-562)Online publication date: Jul-2018

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