research-article

Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets?

Authors:

Matt Backus,

Thomas Blake,

Dimitriy V. Masterov,

Steven TadelisAuthors Info & Claims

WWW '15: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on World Wide Web

Pages 88 - 96

https://doi.org/10.1145/2736277.2741690

Published: 18 May 2015 Publication History

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Abstract

A common complaint about online auctions for consumer goods is the presence of ``snipers,'' who place bids in the final seconds of sequential ascending auctions with predetermined ending times. The literature conjectures that snipers are best-responding to the existence of ``incremental" bidders that bid up to their valuation only as they are outbid. Snipers aim to catch these incremental bidders at a price below their reserve, with no time to respond. As a consequence, these incremental bidders may experience regret when they are outbid at the last moment at a price below their reservation value. We measure the effect of this experience on a new buyer's propensity to participate in future auctions. We show the effect to be causal using a carefully selected subset of auctions from eBay.com and instrumental variables estimation strategy. Bidders respond to sniping quite strongly and are between 4 and 18 percent less likely to return to the platform.

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Cited By

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Tsvetkova MYasseri TPescetelli NWerner T(2024)A new sociology of humans and machinesNature Human Behaviour10.1038/s41562-024-02001-88:10(1864-1876)Online publication date: 22-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02001-8
Zakonnik ŁCzerwonka PZajdel R(2022)Online Auctions End Time and its Impact on Sales Success – Analysis of the Odds Ratio on a Selected Central European MarketFolia Oeconomica Stetinensia10.2478/foli-2022-002922:2(246-264)Online publication date: 20-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.2478/foli-2022-0029
März ALachner MHeumann CSchumann Jvon Wangenheim F(2022)How you Remind Me! The Influence of Mobile Push Notifications on Success Rates in Last-Minute BiddingJournal of Interactive Marketing10.1016/j.intmar.2020.08.00254:1(11-24)Online publication date: 31-Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intmar.2020.08.002
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets?
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

WWW '15: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on World Wide Web

May 2015

1460 pages

ISBN:9781450334693

General Chairs:
Aldo Gangemi
National Research Council, Italy & Paris 13 University-CNRS, France
,
Stefano Leonardi
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
,
Alessandro Panconesi
Sapienza University of Rome, Italy

In-Cooperation

SIGWEB: ACM Special Interest Group on Hypertext, Hypermedia, and Web

Publisher

International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee

Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland

Publication History

Published: 18 May 2015

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WWW '15

Sponsor:

IW3C2

WWW '15: 24th International World Wide Web Conference

May 18 - 22, 2015

Florence, Italy

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WWW '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 131 of 929 submissions, 14%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,899 of 8,196 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

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Tsvetkova MYasseri TPescetelli NWerner T(2024)A new sociology of humans and machinesNature Human Behaviour10.1038/s41562-024-02001-88:10(1864-1876)Online publication date: 22-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02001-8
Zakonnik ŁCzerwonka PZajdel R(2022)Online Auctions End Time and its Impact on Sales Success – Analysis of the Odds Ratio on a Selected Central European MarketFolia Oeconomica Stetinensia10.2478/foli-2022-002922:2(246-264)Online publication date: 20-Dec-2022
https://doi.org/10.2478/foli-2022-0029
März ALachner MHeumann CSchumann Jvon Wangenheim F(2022)How you Remind Me! The Influence of Mobile Push Notifications on Success Rates in Last-Minute BiddingJournal of Interactive Marketing10.1016/j.intmar.2020.08.00254:1(11-24)Online publication date: 31-Jan-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intmar.2020.08.002
Chen YCramton PList JOckenfels A(2021)Market Design, Human Behavior, and ManagementManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2020.365967:9(5317-5348)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3659
Backus MBlake TMasterov DTadelis S(2021)Expectation, Disappointment, and Exit: Evidence on Reference Point Formation from an Online MarketplaceJournal of the European Economic Association10.1093/jeea/jvab033Online publication date: 23-Jul-2021
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab033
Helm CHerberger TTyrell M(2021)Demand dynamics across secondary German Book markets: an information aggregation and synthetization approachInformation Systems and e-Business Management10.1007/s10257-021-00512-9Online publication date: 15-Feb-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10257-021-00512-9
Zhang XShan STang SZheng HZhao BLee DSastry NWeber I(2018)Penny Auctions are PredictableProceedings of the 29th on Hypertext and Social Media10.1145/3209542.3209576(123-127)Online publication date: 3-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209542.3209576
Kim SKim S(undefined)Development of a Spectrum Auction Policy for International Mobile Telecommunications in South Korea Under Agent-Based SimulationSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4064478
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064478
Alvarez FGarcia-Hiernaux ASartarelli M(undefined)Online Auction Markets Before and During the LockdownSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3915922
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915922

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