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A Reputation Revision Mechanism to Mitigate the Negative Effects of Misreported Ratings

Published: 03 August 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Reputation systems aggregate the ratings provided by buyers to gauge the reliability of sellers in e-marketplaces. The evaluation accuracy of seller reputation significantly impacts the sellers' future utility. The existence of unfair ratings is well-recognized to negatively affect the accuracy of reputation evaluation. Most of the existing approaches dealing with unfair ratings focus on filtering/discounting/aligning the possible unfair ratings caused by malicious attacks or subjective difference. However, these approaches are not effective against unfair ratings in the form of misreporting (e.g., a well-behaving buyer misjudged a seller and provided a negative rating to a transaction which deserves a positive one, and the buyer is willing to revert the misreported negative rating). In this case, how should the buyer undo the damage caused by such misreported ratings and help the seller recover utility loss? In this paper, we propose a reputation revision mechanism to mitigate the negative effects of the misreported ratings. The proposed mechanism temporarily inflates the reputation of the misjudged seller for a period of time, which allows the seller to recover his utility loss caused by the misreported ratings. Extensive realistic simulation based experiments demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.

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cover image ACM Other conferences
ICEC '15: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Electronic Commerce 2015
August 2015
268 pages
ISBN:9781450334617
DOI:10.1145/2781562
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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  • KRF: Korea Research Foundation

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 03 August 2015

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Author Tags

  1. Mechanism
  2. Misreport
  3. Reputation
  4. Revenue

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ICEC '15

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ICEC '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 39 of 55 submissions, 71%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 150 of 244 submissions, 61%

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