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A Survey of Interdependent Information Security Games

Published: 29 August 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Risks faced by information system operators and users are not only determined by their own security posture, but are also heavily affected by the security-related decisions of others. This interdependence between information system operators and users is a fundamental property that shapes the efficiency of security defense solutions. Game theory is the most appropriate method to model the strategic interactions between these participants. In this survey, we summarize game-theoretic interdependence models, characterize the emerging security inefficiencies, and present mechanisms to improve the security decisions of the participants. We focus our attention on games with interdependent defenders and do not discuss two-player attacker-defender games. Our goal is to distill the main insights from the state of the art and to identify the areas that need more attention from the research community.

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      cover image ACM Computing Surveys
      ACM Computing Surveys  Volume 47, Issue 2
      January 2015
      827 pages
      ISSN:0360-0300
      EISSN:1557-7341
      DOI:10.1145/2658850
      • Editor:
      • Sartaj Sahni
      Issue’s Table of Contents
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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      Publication History

      Published: 29 August 2014
      Accepted: 01 June 2014
      Revised: 01 April 2014
      Received: 01 November 2012
      Published in CSUR Volume 47, Issue 2

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      Author Tags

      1. Interdependent security
      2. externality
      3. security economics
      4. security games

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      • Bolyai Janos Research Fellowship Nr: BO/00273/12

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