research-article

Side-channel leakage and trace compression using normalized inter-class variance

Authors:

Jean-Luc Danger,

Sylvain Guilley,

Zakaria NajmAuthors Info & Claims

HASP '14: Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy

Article No.: 7, Pages 1 - 9

https://doi.org/10.1145/2611765.2611772

Published: 15 June 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Security and safety critical devices must undergo penetration testing including Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) before certification. SCA are powerful and easy to mount but often need huge computation power, especially in the presence of countermeasures. Few efforts have been done to reduce the computation complexity of SCA by selecting a small subset of points where leakage prevails. In this paper, we propose a method to detect relevant leakage points in side-channel traces. The method is based on Normalized Inter-Class Variance (NICV). A key advantage of NICV over state-of-the-art is that NICV does neither need a clone device nor the knowledge of secret parameters of the crypto-system. NICV has a low computation requirement and it detects leakage using public information like input plaintexts or output cipher-texts only. It is shown that NICV can be related to Pearson correlation and signal to noise ratio (SNR) which are standard metrics. NICV can be used to theoretically compute the minimum number of traces required to attack an implementation. A theoretical rationale of NICV with some practical application on real crypto-systems are provided to support our claims.

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Cited By

Cheng WGuilley SRioul OCheng WGuilley SRioul O(2024)Attacks on Unprotected DevicesMathematical Foundations for Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Systems10.1007/978-3-031-64399-6_3(25-138)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64399-6_3
Gao SOswald E(2024)A Novel Framework for Explainable Leakage AssessmentAdvances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 202410.1007/978-3-031-58734-4_8(221-250)Online publication date: 1-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58734-4_8
Piacentini IBarenghi APelosi G(2023)A Non Profiled and Profiled Side Channel Attack Countermeasure through Computation Interleaving2023 26th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)10.1109/DSD60849.2023.00103(718-725)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD60849.2023.00103
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Index Terms

Side-channel leakage and trace compression using normalized inter-class variance
1. Computer systems organization
  1. Embedded and cyber-physical systems
    1. Embedded systems
      1. Embedded hardware
  2. Real-time systems
2. Hardware
  1. Very large scale integration design
    1. Application-specific VLSI designs
      1. Application specific integrated circuits

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

HASP '14: Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy

June 2014

89 pages

ISBN:9781450327770

DOI:10.1145/2611765

Conference Chairs:
Ruby Lee
Princeton University
,
Weidong Shi
University of Houston

Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 15 June 2014

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June 15, 2014

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Cited By

Cheng WGuilley SRioul OCheng WGuilley SRioul O(2024)Attacks on Unprotected DevicesMathematical Foundations for Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Systems10.1007/978-3-031-64399-6_3(25-138)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64399-6_3
Gao SOswald E(2024)A Novel Framework for Explainable Leakage AssessmentAdvances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 202410.1007/978-3-031-58734-4_8(221-250)Online publication date: 1-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58734-4_8
Piacentini IBarenghi APelosi G(2023)A Non Profiled and Profiled Side Channel Attack Countermeasure through Computation Interleaving2023 26th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD)10.1109/DSD60849.2023.00103(718-725)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD60849.2023.00103
Cheng WGuilley SDanger J(2022)Information Leakage in Code-Based Masking: A Systematic Evaluation by Higher-Order AttacksIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2022.316791417(1624-1638)Online publication date: 2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2022.3167914
Niknia FDanger JGuilley SKarimi N(2022)Aging Effects on Template Attacks Launched on Dual-Rail Protected ChipsIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2021.308880341:5(1276-1289)Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2021.3088803
Aerabi EHély DBresch CPapadimitriou AFazeli M(2021)CONFISCA: An SIMD-Based Concurrent FI and SCA Countermeasure with Switchable Performance and Security ModesCryptography10.3390/cryptography50200135:2(13)Online publication date: 6-May-2021
https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography5020013
Gao SOswald EYan Y(2021)Neyman’s Smoothness Test: A Trade-Off Between Moment-Based and Distribution-Based Leakage DetectionsIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2021.310857016(4494-4506)Online publication date: 2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2021.3108570
Ouladj MGuilley SOuladj MGuilley S(2021)Foundations of Side-Channel AttacksSide-Channel Analysis of Embedded Systems10.1007/978-3-030-77222-2_2(9-20)Online publication date: 29-Jul-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77222-2_2
Won YSim BPark J(2020)Key Schedule against Template Attack-Based Simple Power Analysis on a Single TargetApplied Sciences10.3390/app1011380410:11(3804)Online publication date: 30-May-2020
https://doi.org/10.3390/app10113804
Zhang H(2020)On the Exact Relationship Between the Success Rate of Template Attack and Different ParametersIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2019.292850615(681-694)Online publication date: 2020
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2019.2928506
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