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LogSec: adaptive protection for the wild wild web

Published: 13 April 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Today, a Web browser is a user's gateway to a multitude of Web applications, each with its own balance between confidentiality and integrity versus cross-application content sharing. Modern Web browsers apply the same permissive security policy to all content regardless of its demand for security -- a behavior that enables attacks such as cross-site request forgery (CSRF) or sidejacking. To defend against such attacks, existing countermeasures enforce overly strict policies, which expose incompatibilities with real-world Web applications. As a consequence, users get annoyed by malfunctions. In this paper, we show how browser behavior can be adapted based on the user's authentication status. The browser can enforce enhanced security policies, if necessary, and permit modern communication features, if possible. Our approach mitigates CSRF, session hijacking, sidejacking, and session fixation attacks. We present the implementation as a browser extension, named LogSec, that passively detects the user's authentication status without server-side support and is transparent for the user.

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Cited By

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  • (2020)An OWASP Top Ten Driven Survey on Web Application Protection MethodsRisks and Security of Internet and Systems10.1007/978-3-030-68887-5_14(235-252)Online publication date: 4-Nov-2020

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cover image ACM Conferences
SAC '15: Proceedings of the 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
April 2015
2418 pages
ISBN:9781450331968
DOI:10.1145/2695664
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 13 April 2015

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SAC 2015
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SAC 2015: Symposium on Applied Computing
April 13 - 17, 2015
Salamanca, Spain

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SAC '15 Paper Acceptance Rate 291 of 1,211 submissions, 24%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,650 of 6,669 submissions, 25%

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The 40th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing
March 31 - April 4, 2025
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Cited By

View all
  • (2020)An OWASP Top Ten Driven Survey on Web Application Protection MethodsRisks and Security of Internet and Systems10.1007/978-3-030-68887-5_14(235-252)Online publication date: 4-Nov-2020

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