Cited By
View all- Mikhaylov BCerquides JRodriguez-Aguilar J(2011)Solving Sequential Mixed Auctions with Integer ProgrammingAdvances in Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-642-25274-7_5(42-53)Online publication date: 2011
Sequential mixed auctions
Article No.: 31, Pages 1 - 6
Abstract
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to supply chain formation, we must ensure computational tractability and reduce bidders' uncertainty. With this aim, we introduce Sequential Mixed Auctions (SMAs), a novel auction model conceived to help bidders collaboratively discover supply chain structures. Thus, an SMA allows bidders progressively build a supply chain structure through successive auction rounds. Moreover, the incremental nature of an SMA provides its participants with valuable information at the end of each auction round to guide their bidding. Finally, we empirically show that SMAs significantly reduce the computational effort required by MMUCA at the expense of a slight decrease in the auctioneer's revenue.
References
[1]
Jesus Cerquides, Ulle Endriss, Andrea Giovannucci, and Juan Antonio Rodriguez-Aguilar. Bidding languages and winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In IJCAI, pages 1221--1226, Hyderabad, India, 2007.
[2]
Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, editors. Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, 2006.
[3]
Andrea Giovannucci, M. Vinyals, J. Cerquides, and J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar. Computationally-efficient winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In AAMAS, pages 1071--1078, Estoril, Portugal, May 12--16 2008.
[4]
Noam Nisan. Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions, chapter 9. Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, 2006.
[5]
Juan Antonio Rodriguez-Aguilar, Boris Mikhaylov, and Jesus Cerquides. Sequential mixed auctions for supply chain formation. Technical report, IIIA, 2011. Available at http://mmuca.com/report.pdf.
[6]
Meritxell Vinyals, Andrea Giovannucci, Jesús Cerquides, Pedro Meseguer, and Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar. A test suite for the evaluation of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Journal of Algorithms, 63(1--3):130--150, 2008.
[7]
W.E. Walsh and M. P. Wellman. Decentralized supply chain formation: A market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 19:513--567, 2003.
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- Sequential mixed auctions
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Published In
August 2011
261 pages
ISBN:9781450314282
DOI:10.1145/2378104
Copyright © 2011 ACM.
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 03 August 2011
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ICEC '11
ICEC '11: 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
August 3 - 5, 2011
Liverpool, United Kingdom
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Overall Acceptance Rate 150 of 244 submissions, 61%
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View all- Mikhaylov BCerquides JRodriguez-Aguilar J(2011)Solving Sequential Mixed Auctions with Integer ProgrammingAdvances in Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-642-25274-7_5(42-53)Online publication date: 2011
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