Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

skip to main content
10.1145/2229012.2229071acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesecConference Proceedingsconference-collections
abstract

Coalitional bargaining in networks

Published: 04 June 2012 Publication History

Abstract

We analyze an infinite horizon, non-cooperative bargaining model for a general coalitional formation framework. In each period of the game an opportunity for a feasible coalition to form arises according to a stochastic process, and a randomly selected agent in the coalition makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Agents that reach an agreement exit the game and are replaced by clones. We characterize the unique stationary payoff by a convex program. We examine the implications of this characterization when the feasible coalitions are determined by an underlying network. We show how an agent's payoff is related to the centrality of his position in the network.

Cited By

View all

Index Terms

  1. Coalitional bargaining in networks

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '12: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
    June 2012
    1016 pages
    ISBN:9781450314152
    DOI:10.1145/2229012
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

    Sponsors

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 04 June 2012

    Permissions

    Request permissions for this article.

    Check for updates

    Author Tags

    1. bargaining
    2. network games

    Qualifiers

    • Abstract

    Conference

    EC '12
    Sponsor:
    EC '12: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
    June 4 - 8, 2012
    Valencia, Spain

    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

    Upcoming Conference

    EC '25
    The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    July 7 - 11, 2025
    Stanford , CA , USA

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)1
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
    Reflects downloads up to 23 Feb 2025

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all

    View Options

    Login options

    View options

    PDF

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    Figures

    Tables

    Media

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media