Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

skip to main content
10.1145/1807342.1807373acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesecConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

Information aggregation in smooth markets

Published: 07 June 2010 Publication History

Abstract

Recent years have seen extensive investigation of the information aggregation properties of prediction markets. However, relatively little is known about conditions under which a market will aggregate the private information of rational risk averse traders who optimize their portfolios over time; in particular, what features of a market encourage traders to ultimately reveal their private information through trades? We consider a market model involving finitely many informed risk-averse traders interacting with a market maker. Our main result identifies a basic asymptotic smoothness condition on the price in the market that ensures information will be aggregated under a portfolio convergence assumption. Asymptotic smoothness is fairly mild: it requires that, eventually, infinitesimal purchases or sales should see the same per unit price. Notably, we demonstrate that, under some mild conditions, cost function market makers (or, equivalently, market makers based on market scoring rules) satisfy the asymptotic smoothness requirement.

References

[1]
Shipra Agrawal, Erick Delage, Mark Peters, Zizhuo Wang, and Yinyu Ye. A Unified Framework for Dynamic Pari-Mutuel Information Market Design. In Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 255--264, 2009.
[2]
Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley. Rational Expectations and Rational Learning. Game Theory and Information 9307003, EconWPA, July 1993.
[3]
Yiling Chen and David M. Pennock. A Utility Framework for Bounded-Loss Market Makers. In Proceedings of the 23rd Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), pages 49--56, July 2007.
[4]
Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, and Rica Gonen. Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), pages 70--81, 2007.
[5]
Stanko Dimitrov and Rahul Sami. Non-myopic Strategies in Prediction Markets. In Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 200--209, 2008.
[6]
Lawrence R. Glosten. Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable? The Journal of Finance, 49(4):1127--1161, September 1994.
[7]
Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom. Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1):71--100, March 1985.
[8]
Robin Hanson. Combinatorial Information Market Design. Information Systems Frontiers, 5(1):107--119, January 2003.
[9]
Larry Harris. Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners. Oxford University Press, USA, 2003.
[10]
F. A. Hayek. The Use of Knowledge in Society. The American Economic Review, 35(4):519--530, 1945.
[11]
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, and Ciamac C. Moallemi. Information Aggregation in Smooth Markets. Working Paper Series 1581519, SSRN eLibrary, 2010.
[12]
Albert S. Kyle. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica, 53(6):1315--1335, 1985.
[13]
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford University Press, USA, September 2006.
[14]
Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey. Information, Trade and Common Knowledge. Journal of Economic Theory, 26(1):17--27, February 1982.
[15]
Michael Ostrovsky. Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders. In Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 253--254, 2009.
[16]
David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami. Computational Aspects of Prediction Markets. In Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 651--675. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007.
[17]
Roy Radner. Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices. Econometrica, 47(3):655--678, 1979.
[18]
Lones Smith and Peter Norman Sorensen. Informational Herding and Optimal Experimentation. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1552, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, January 2006.

Cited By

View all

Index Terms

  1. Information aggregation in smooth markets

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '10: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
    June 2010
    400 pages
    ISBN:9781605588223
    DOI:10.1145/1807342
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

    Sponsors

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 07 June 2010

    Permissions

    Request permissions for this article.

    Check for updates

    Author Tags

    1. dynamic games
    2. information aggregation
    3. prediction markets
    4. risk aversion

    Qualifiers

    • Research-article

    Conference

    EC '10
    Sponsor:
    EC '10: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
    June 7 - 11, 2010
    Massachusetts, Cambridge, USA

    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)2
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
    Reflects downloads up to 10 Nov 2024

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2018)Convergence within binary market scoring rulesEconomic Theory10.1007/s00199-018-1155-3Online publication date: 11-Oct-2018
    • (2016)An Overview of Applications of Proper Scoring RulesDecision Analysis10.1287/deca.2016.033713:4(223-242)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
    • (2016)Strategic reporting in exponential family prediction markets2016 IEEE MIT Undergraduate Research Technology Conference (URTC)10.1109/URTC.2016.8284063(1-4)Online publication date: Nov-2016
    • (2016)Belief Aggregation with Automated Market MakersComputational Economics10.1007/s10614-015-9514-748:1(155-178)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2016
    • (2015)Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse AgentsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/27163273:4(1-23)Online publication date: 31-Jul-2015
    • (2015)Automated Pricing in a Multiagent Prediction Market Using a Partially Observable Stochastic GameACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology10.1145/27004886:4(1-25)Online publication date: 29-Jul-2015
    • (2015)Market manipulation with outside incentivesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-014-9249-129:2(230-265)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2015
    • (2014)Eliciting Predictions and Recommendations for Decision MakingACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/25562712:2(1-27)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2014
    • (2013)What you jointly know determines how you actProceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce10.1145/2492002.2482592(489-506)Online publication date: 16-Jun-2013
    • (2013)What you jointly know determines how you actProceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce10.1145/2482540.2482592(489-506)Online publication date: 16-Jun-2013
    • Show More Cited By

    View Options

    Get Access

    Login options

    View options

    PDF

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    Media

    Figures

    Other

    Tables

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media