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Why lawyers are nice (or nasty): a game-theoretical argumentation exercise

Published: 08 June 2009 Publication History

Abstract

This contribution introduces a novel approach to study legal interactions, legal professions, and legal institutions, by combining argumentation, game theory and evolution. We consider a population of lawyers, having different postures, who engage in adversarial argumentation with other lawyers, obtaining outcomes according the existing context and their chosen strategies. We examine the resulting games and analyse the evolution of the population.

References

[1]
P. M. Dung. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, and n-person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77: 321--57, 1995.
[2]
Regis Riveret, Henry Prakken, Antonino Rotolo, and Giovanni Sartor. Heuristics in argumentation: A game-theoretical investigation. In Computational Models of Argument. Proceedings of COMMA-08, Amsterdam, 2008. IOS.
[3]
Regis Riveret, Nino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Henry Prakken, and Bram Roth. Success chances in argument games: A probabilistic approach to legal disputes. In Arno R. Lodder, editor, Proceeding of Legal Knowledge and Information Systems - JURIX 2007, pages 99--108. IOS, Amsterdam, 2007.
[4]
Michel Rudnianski. Deterrence typology and nuclear stability: A game theoretic approach. In Defence Decision Making, pages 137--68. Springer, Heidelberg, 1991.
[5]
Jörgen Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT, 1995.

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ICAIL '09: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
June 2009
244 pages
ISBN:9781605585970
DOI:10.1145/1568234
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 08 June 2009

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Author Tags

  1. argumentation
  2. evolution
  3. game theory

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  • Research-article

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ICAIL '09

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ICAIL '09 Paper Acceptance Rate 22 of 58 submissions, 38%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 69 of 169 submissions, 41%

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  • (2018)A Deontic Argumentation Framework Based on Deontic Defeasible LogicPRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/978-3-030-03098-8_33(484-492)Online publication date: 24-Oct-2018
  • (2013)Vagueness in lawProceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law10.1145/2514601.2514628(207-211)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2013
  • (2012)AI and LawAgreement Technologies10.1007/978-94-007-5583-3_13(199-207)Online publication date: 28-Nov-2012
  • (2010)Lower Bounds on Argument Verification in Computational DialecticProceedings of the 2010 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 201010.5555/1860828.1860872(463-474)Online publication date: 5-Aug-2010

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