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Common p-belief and uncertainty

Published: 25 June 2007 Publication History

Abstract

This note generalizes the notion of common p-beliefs to situations of ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty. When players have multiple prior beliefs, we show that Aumann's no-agreement theorem can be approximated. We also provide conditions under which purely speculative trade does not occur in the presence of ambiguity when players preferences are complete or incomplete.

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TARK '07: Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
June 2007
296 pages
ISBN:9781450378413
DOI:10.1145/1324249
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 25 June 2007

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TARK '07 Paper Acceptance Rate 32 of 100 submissions, 32%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 177 submissions, 34%

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