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Brief announcement: an incentive-compatible capacity assignment algorithm for bulk data distribution using P2P

Authors:

Simon G. M. Koo,

C. S. George Lee,

Karthik KannanAuthors Info & Claims

PODC '05: Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing

Page 127

https://doi.org/10.1145/1073814.1073837

Published: 17 July 2005 Publication History

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Abstract

In recent years, the rapid growth of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks has provided a new paradigm for content distribution. To improve the efficiency of a P2P system, it is important to provide incentives for the peers to participate and contribute their resources. In this work, we address the incentive provisioning problem for distribution of large-volume content in P2P networks, and present a "seeing-is-believing" incentive-compatible mechanism in which a peer will decide how much resources will be assigned to which neighbors based on what it has experienced. The protocol applies a utility-based resource-trading concept where peers will maximize their contributions for a fair or better return, and we show that by adopting this protocol, the system will achieve Cournot Equlibrium. Our protocol is light-weight, completely decentralized, and cheat-proof.

References

[1]

Cohen, B., Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent. In Proc. of the First Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, Berkeley, CA, June 2003.

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[2]

Anagnostakis, K. G. and Greenwald, M. B., Exchange-based Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing. In Proc. of ICDCS '04, pages 524--533, Tokyo, Japan, Mar. 2004.

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[3]

Koo, S. G. M., Rosenberg, C., and Xu, D., Analysis of Parallel Downloading for Large File Distribution. In Proc. of FTDCS 2003, pages 128-135, San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 2003.

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[4]

Luenberger, D. G., Microeconomic Theory. McGraw-Hill, 1997.

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Index Terms

Brief announcement: an incentive-compatible capacity assignment algorithm for bulk data distribution using P2P
1. Computer systems organization
  1. Architectures
    1. Distributed architectures
2. Networks
  1. Network architectures

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Published In

PODC '05: Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing

July 2005

364 pages

ISBN:1581139942

DOI:10.1145/1073814

General Chair:
Marcos Aguilera
HP Labs
,
Program Chair:
James Aspnes
Yale University

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 July 2005

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PODC05

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PODC05: ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

July 17 - 20, 2005

NV, Las Vegas, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 740 of 2,477 submissions, 30%

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