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Trust Issue(r)s: Certificate Revocation and Replacement Practices in the Wild

  • Conference paper
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Passive and Active Measurement (PAM 2024)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14538))

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Abstract

Every time we use the web, we place our trust in X.509 certificates binding public keys to domain identities. However, for these certificates to be trustworthy, proper issuance, management, and timely revocations (in cases of compromise or misuse) are required. While great efforts have been placed on ensuring trustworthiness in the issuance of new certificates, there has been a scarcity of empirical studies on revocation management. This study offers the first comprehensive analysis of certificate replacements (CRs) of revoked certificates. It provides a head-to-head comparison of the CRs where the replaced certificate was revoked versus not revoked. Leveraging two existing datasets with overlapping timelines, we create a combined dataset containing 1.5 million CRs that we use to unveil valuable insights into the effect of revocations on certificate management. Two key questions guide our research: (1) the influence of revocations on certificate replacement behavior and (2) the effectiveness of revocations in fulfilling their intended purpose. Our statistical analysis reveals significant variations in revocation rates, retention rates, and post-revocation usage, shedding light on differences in Certificate Authorities’ (CAs) practices and subscribers’ decisions. Notably, a substantial percentage of revoked certificates were either observed or estimated to be used after revocation, raising concerns about key-compromise instances. Finally, our findings highlight shortcomings in existing revocation protocols and practices, emphasizing the need for improvements. We discuss ongoing efforts and potential solutions to address these issues, offering valuable guidance for enhancing the security and integrity of web communications.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    From our data, Microsoft has only issued certificates to themselves or affiliated organizations, such as MSN or Skype etc.

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Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by the Wallenberg AI, Autonomous Systems and Software Program (WASP) funded by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

    David Cerenius, Martin Kaller, Carl Magnus Bruhner & Niklas Carlsson

  2. University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada

    Martin Arlitt

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  1. David Cerenius
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  2. Martin Kaller
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  3. Carl Magnus Bruhner
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  5. Niklas Carlsson
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Correspondence to Carl Magnus Bruhner .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Philipp Richter

  2. Hasso Plattner Institute, Potsdam, Germany

    Vaibhav Bajpai

  3. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

    Esteban Carisimo

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Cerenius, D., Kaller, M., Bruhner, C.M., Arlitt, M., Carlsson, N. (2024). Trust Issue(r)s: Certificate Revocation and Replacement Practices in the Wild. In: Richter, P., Bajpai, V., Carisimo, E. (eds) Passive and Active Measurement. PAM 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14538. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56252-5_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56252-5_14

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