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Analysis of SSL certificate reissues and revocations in the wake of heartbleed

Published: 21 February 2018 Publication History

Abstract

A properly managed public key infrastructure (PKI) is critical to ensure secure communication on the Internet. Surprisingly, some of the most important administrative steps---in particular, reissuing new X.509 certificates and revoking old ones---are manual and remained unstudied, largely because it is difficult to measure these manual processes at scale.
We use Heartbleed, a widespread OpenSSL vulnerability from 2014, as a natural experiment to determine whether administrators are properly managing their certificates. All domains affected by Heartbleed should have patched their software, revoked their old (possibly compromised) certificates, and reissued new ones, all as quickly as possible. We find the reality to be far from the ideal: over 73% of vulnerable certificates were not reissued and over 87% were not revoked three weeks after Heartbleed was disclosed. Our results also show a drastic decline in revocations on the weekends, even immediately following the Heartbleed announcement. These results are an important step in understanding the manual processes on which users rely for secure, authenticated communication.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)An Internet-Wide View on HTTPS Certificate Revocations: Observing the Revival of CRLs via Active TLS Scans2024 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)10.1109/EuroSPW61312.2024.00038(297-306)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
  • (2024)Trust Issue(r)s: Certificate Revocation and Replacement Practices in the WildPassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-031-56252-5_14(293-321)Online publication date: 11-Mar-2024
  • (2023)QKPT: Securing Your Private Keys in Cloud With Performance, Scalability and TransparencyIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2021.313740320:1(478-491)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
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      Published In

      cover image Communications of the ACM
      Communications of the ACM  Volume 61, Issue 3
      March 2018
      107 pages
      ISSN:0001-0782
      EISSN:1557-7317
      DOI:10.1145/3190347
      Issue’s Table of Contents
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      Published: 21 February 2018
      Published in CACM Volume 61, Issue 3

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      Cited By

      View all
      • (2024)An Internet-Wide View on HTTPS Certificate Revocations: Observing the Revival of CRLs via Active TLS Scans2024 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)10.1109/EuroSPW61312.2024.00038(297-306)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
      • (2024)Trust Issue(r)s: Certificate Revocation and Replacement Practices in the WildPassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-031-56252-5_14(293-321)Online publication date: 11-Mar-2024
      • (2023)QKPT: Securing Your Private Keys in Cloud With Performance, Scalability and TransparencyIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2021.313740320:1(478-491)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
      • (2023)Understanding the Security and Performance of the Web Presence of Hospitals: A Measurement Study2023 32nd International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)10.1109/ICCCN58024.2023.10230186(1-10)Online publication date: Jul-2023
      • (2022)A Secure Two-Tier Domain Verification and Certificate Validation Integrating Intermediate Certificate Authorities and Secure Certificate BoxJournal of Circuits, Systems and Computers10.1142/S021812662350103732:06Online publication date: 14-Nov-2022
      • (2021)An Analysis of Strengths and Weaknesses of TLS Utilization in iOS Applications2021 17th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob)10.1109/WiMob52687.2021.9606413(68-73)Online publication date: 11-Oct-2021
      • (2021)STYX: A Hierarchical Key Management System for Elastic Content Delivery Networks on Public CloudsIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2019.291827818:2(843-857)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2021
      • (2021)Measurement and Analysis of Automated Certificate ReissuancePassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-030-72582-2_10(161-174)Online publication date: 30-Mar-2021
      • (2020)Protecting financial transactions through networks and point of salesJournal of Cyber Security Technology10.1080/23742917.2020.17964744:4(211-239)Online publication date: 29-Jul-2020
      • (2018)Is the Web Ready for OCSP Must-Staple?Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 201810.1145/3278532.3278543(105-118)Online publication date: 31-Oct-2018

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