default search action
Alon Eden
Person information
- affiliation: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Refine list
refinements active!
zoomed in on ?? of ?? records
view refined list in
export refined list as
2020 – today
- 2024
- [j4]Alon Eden
, Michal Feldman
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. Math. Oper. Res. 49(2): 653-674 (2024) - [i22]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. CoRR abs/2402.12017 (2024) - [i21]Ilan Reuven Cohen, Alon Eden, Talya Eden, Arsen Vasilyan:
Plant-and-Steal: Truthful Fair Allocations via Predictions. CoRR abs/2406.07024 (2024) - 2023
- [c22]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. FOCS 2023: 148-163 - [c21]Xintong Wang
Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study. WWW 2023: 3592-3602 - [i20]Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Platform Equilibrium: Analayzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. CoRR abs/2309.08781 (2023) - [i19]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan:
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. CoRR abs/2310.00958 (2023) - 2022
- [j3]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. Theory Comput. 18: 1-33 (2022) - [c20]Yiling Chen, Alon Eden, Juntao Wang
Cursed yet Satisfied Agents. ITCS 2022: 44:1-44:1 - [c19]Alon Eden, Kira Goldner
Private Interdependent Valuations. SODA 2022: 2920-2939 - [i18]Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes:
Using Reinforcement Learning to Study Platform Economies under Market Shocks. CoRR abs/2203.13395 (2022) - [i17]Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Darshan Chakrabarti, Matthias Gerstgrasser, Vincent Li, David C. Parkes:
Learning Stackelberg Equilibria and Applications to Economic Design Games. CoRR abs/2210.03852 (2022) - 2021
- [j2]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. 69(1): 188-206 (2021) - [c18]Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo:
Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms. AAAI 2021: 5219-5227 - [c17]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran:
PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. AAAI 2021: 5321-5329 - [c16]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. SOSA 2021: 107-110 - [i16]Yiling Chen, Alon Eden, Juntao Wang:
Cursed yet Satisfied Agents. CoRR abs/2104.00835 (2021) - [i15]Alon Eden, Kira Goldner, Shuran Zheng:
Private Interdependent Valuations. CoRR abs/2111.01851 (2021) - 2020
- [c15]Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. WINE 2020: 206-219 - [i14]Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR abs/2002.06863 (2020) - [i13]Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo:
Reinforcement Learning of Simple Indirect Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2010.01180 (2020) - [i12]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran:
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. CoRR abs/2011.00498 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [b1]Alon Eden:
Aspects of Mechanism Design: Correlation, Coordination, Competition and Pricing. Tel Aviv University, Israel, 2019 - [j1]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. Theory Comput. Syst. 63(7): 1470-1498 (2019) - [c14]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. APPROX-RANDOM 2019: 7:1-7:23 - [c13]Ilan Reuven Cohen, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, Lukasz Jez:
Dynamic Pricing of Servers on Trees. APPROX-RANDOM 2019: 10:1-10:22 - [c12]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. EC 2019: 19-20 - [c11]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-min greedy matching. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS 2019: 10:1 - [i11]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. CoRR abs/1903.08384 (2019) - 2018
- [c10]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub:
Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. ESA 2018: 27:1-27:14 - [c9]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. EC 2018: 369 - [i10]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. CoRR abs/1803.05501 (2018) - [i9]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub:
Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents. CoRR abs/1804.03244 (2018) - [i8]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. CoRR abs/1804.06637 (2018) - [i7]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner:
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. CoRR abs/1806.03865 (2018) - 2017
- [c8]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra
Pricing Social Goods. ESA 2017: 35:1-35:14 - [c7]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. SAGT 2017: 29-40 - [c6]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing social goods. NetEcon@EC 2017: 10:1 - [c5]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC 2017: 323 - [c4]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC 2017: 343 - [i6]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing Social Goods. CoRR abs/1706.10009 (2017) - 2016
- [c3]Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. EC 2016: 383-400 - [c2]Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi:
Lottery Pricing Equilibria. EC 2016: 401-418 - [i5]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR abs/1612.04746 (2016) - [i4]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR abs/1612.08821 (2016) - 2015
- [c1]Ilan Reuven Cohen, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, Lukasz Jez:
Pricing Online Decisions: Beyond Auctions. SODA 2015: 73-91 - [i3]Ilan Reuven Cohen, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat, Lukasz Jez:
Pricing Online Decisions: Beyond Auctions. CoRR abs/1504.01093 (2015) - [i2]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Truthful Secretaries with Budgets. CoRR abs/1504.03625 (2015) - [i1]Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. CoRR abs/1511.05646 (2015)
Coauthor Index
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
Unpaywalled article links
Add open access links from to the list of external document links (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of unpaywall.org to load hyperlinks to open access articles. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Unpaywall privacy policy.
Archived links via Wayback Machine
For web page which are no longer available, try to retrieve content from the of the Internet Archive (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of archive.org to check for archived content of web pages that are no longer available. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Internet Archive privacy policy.
Reference lists
Add a list of references from ,
, and
to record detail pages.
load references from crossref.org and opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the APIs of crossref.org, opencitations.net, and semanticscholar.org to load article reference information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Crossref privacy policy and the OpenCitations privacy policy, as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
Citation data
Add a list of citing articles from and
to record detail pages.
load citations from opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of opencitations.net and semanticscholar.org to load citation information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the OpenCitations privacy policy as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
OpenAlex data
Load additional information about publications from .
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of openalex.org to load additional information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the information given by OpenAlex.
last updated on 2024-10-07 01:25 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by: