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13th ACM-EC 2012: Valencia, Spain
- Boi Faltings, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panos Ipeirotis:
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2012, Valencia, Spain, June 4-8, 2012. ACM 2012, ISBN 978-1-4503-1415-2
Technical presentations papers
- Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar, Peter S. Fader:
On aggregation bias in sponsored search data: existence andimplications. 1 - Vibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar:
Optimal bidding in multi-item multi-slot sponsored search auctions. 2 - Ittai Abraham, Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements. 3-16 - Saeed Alaei
, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. 17 - Saeed Alaei
Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocation. 18-35 - Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. 36 - Sanjeev Arora, Rong Ge, Sushant Sachdeva
Finding overlapping communities in social networks: toward a rigorous approach. 37-54 - Eduardo M. Azevedo
Strategyproofness in the large as a desideratum for market design. 55 - Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
On bitcoin and red balloons. 56-73 - Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Dynamic pricing with limited supply. 74-91 - Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme:
Optimal mechanisms for selling information. 92-109 - Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Optimization with demand oracles. 110-127 - Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Robert Kleinberg, Yaron Singer:
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement. 128-145 - Eytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles
Social influence in social advertising: evidence from field experiments. 146-161 - Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu, Edmund M. Yeh:
Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information. 162-178 - Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala
Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities. 179-196 - Craig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view. 197-214 - Aseem Brahma, Mithun Chakraborty
A bayesian market maker. 215-232 - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
Computing dominance-based solution concepts. 233 - Peter Bro Miltersen, Or Sheffet:
Send mixed signals: earn more, work less. 234-247 - John W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas:
The groupon effect on yelp ratings: a root cause analysis. 248-265 - Ioannis Caragiannis
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification. 266-283 - Ioannis Caragiannis
Approximate pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: existence, efficient computation, and structure. 284-301 - Deepayan Chakrabarti
Traffic shaping to optimize ad delivery. 302-318 - Peiji Chen, Wenjing Ma, Srinath Mandalapu, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee, Manfai Yu, Jason Y. Zien:
Ad serving using a compact allocation plan. 319-336 - Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole, Ashish Rastogi:
Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goods. 337-354 - Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Alessandro Panconesi:
How to schedule a cascade in an arbitrary graph. 355-368 - Olivier Compte, Ron Lavi
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. 369 - Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design. 370-387 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yossi Azar:
Asymptotically optimal algorithm for stochastic adwords. 388-404 - Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions. 405-422 - Elad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama
Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles. 423-440 - Fabio Drucker, Lisa Fleischer:
Simpler sybil-proof mechanisms for multi-level marketing. 441-458 - Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock:
A tractable combinatorial market maker using constraint generation. 459-476 - Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers. 477-494 - Federico Echenique
Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents. 495 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski
Clone structures in voters' preferences. 496-513 - Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. 514-531 - Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski:
Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets. 532-549 - Moran Feldman
Interviewing secretaries in parallel. 550-567 - Lisa Fleischer, Yu-Han Lyu:
Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. 568-585 - Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. 586 - Samuel Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe opponent exploitation. 587-604 - Nicola Gatti
A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities. 605-622 - Sharad Goel, Duncan J. Watts, Daniel G. Goldstein
The structure of online diffusion networks. 623-638 - Daniel G. Goldstein
Improving the effectiveness of time-based display advertising. 639-654 - Ramakrishna Gummadi, Ramesh Johari, Jia Yuan Yu:
Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit games. 655 - Sergiu Hart
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. 656 - Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim:
Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular bidders. 657-671 - Nicole Immorlica, Rachel Kranton, Gregory Stoddard:
Striving for social status. 672 - Krishnamurthy Iyer
Information and the value of execution guarantees. 673 - Dietmar Jannach, Zeynep Karakaya, Fatih Gedikli:
Accuracy improvements for multi-criteria recommender systems. 674-689 - Michael J. Kearns, J. Stephen Judd, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Behavioral experiments on a network formation game. 690-704 - John K. Lai, David C. Parkes:
Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions. 705-722 - Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier:
Matching models for preference-sensitive group purchasing. 723-740 - Mohammad Mahdian, Arpita Ghosh, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
To match or not to match: economics of cookie matching in online advertising. 741-753 - Yinon Nahum, David Sarne, Sanmay Das, Onn Shehory
Two-sided search with experts. 754-771 - Thành Nguyen:
Coalitional bargaining in networks. 772 - Thành Nguyen:
Local bargaining and endogenous fluctuations. 773 - Kobbi Nissim
Privacy-aware mechanism design. 774-789 - Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth. 790-807 - David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities. 808-825 - Aaron Roth
Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply. 826-843 - Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Qiqi Yan:
Supply-limiting mechanisms. 844-861 - Tim Roughgarden:
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information. 862-879 - Tuomas Sandholm, Satinder Singh:
Lossy stochastic game abstraction with bounds. 880-897 - Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market user interface design. 898-915 - Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Computing a proper equilibrium of a bimatrix game. 916-928 - Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Bayesian sequential auctions. 929-944 - Jing Wang
Cooperation and assortativity with endogenous partner selection. 945 - Christopher A. Wilkens, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Single-call mechanisms. 946-963 - Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes:
Peer prediction without a common prior. 964-981 - Lirong Xia
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules. 982-999
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