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Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts. (2004). Just, Richard ; Huffman, Wallace.
In: Economic Development and Cultural Change.
RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:y:2004:v:52:i:3:p:617-42.

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  1. The roles of risk preferences, selection, and uncertain returns on land contracts. (2023). Zhang, Wendong ; Orazem, Peter F ; Durbahn, Grant ; Lee, Jun Yeong.
    In: Agricultural Economics.
    RePEc:bla:agecon:v:54:y:2023:i:2:p:220-233.

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  2. .

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  3. Agrarian reform and democracy: Lessons from the Philippine experience. (2019). Lanzona, Leonardo.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:99166.

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  4. Farmland rental values in GM soybean areas of Argentina : do contractual arrangements matter ?. (2018). PHELINAS, Pascale ; Choumert-Nkolo, Johanna.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:ird-01875351.

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  5. Adaptation to climate change via adjustment in land leasing: Evidence from dryland wheat farms in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. (2018). McCarl, Bruce ; Zhang, Hongliang ; Mu, Jianhong E.
    In: Land Use Policy.
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  6. RISK†COPING, LAND TENURE AND LAND MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE. (2018). Promsopha, Gwendoline.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
    RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:32:y:2018:i:1:p:176-193.

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  7. Tenure security, social relations and contract choice: Endogenous matching in the Chinese land rental market. (2018). Shi, Xiaoping ; Heerink, Nico ; Liu, H ; Zhou, Y ; Ma, X.
    In: 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia.
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  8. .

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  9. Contractual Farming Arrangements, Quality Control, Incentives, and Distribution Failure in Kenyas Smallholder Horticulture: A Multivariate Probit Analysis. (2016). Kariuki, Isaac Maina ; Loy, JensPeter .
    In: Agribusiness.
    RePEc:wly:agribz:v:32:y:2016:i:4:p:547-562.

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  10. Temporary transfers of land and risk-coping mechanisms in Thailand. (2016). Promsopha, Gwendoline.
    In: Working Papers.
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  11. Conservation Practices and the Growth of US Cash Rent Leases. (2016). Allen, Douglas W ; Borchers, Allison .
    In: Journal of Agricultural Economics.
    RePEc:bla:jageco:v:67:y:2016:i:2:p:491-509.

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  12. Farmland Rental Values in GM Soybean Areas of Argentina: Do Contractual Arrangements Matter?. (2015). PHELINAS, Pascale ; Choumert Nkolo, Johanna.
    In: Working Papers.
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  13. Farmland Rental Values in GM Soybean Areas of Argentina: Do Contractual Arrangements Matter?. (2015). PHELINAS, Pascale ; Choumert-Nkolo, Johanna.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1764.

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  14. An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements. (2011). Qiu, Feng ; Gervais, Jean-Philippe ; Goodwin, Barry K.
    In: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    RePEc:ags:jlaare:119179.

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  15. AGRARIAN LAND TENANCY IN PREWAR JAPAN: CONTRACT CHOICE AND IMPLICATIONS ON PRODUCTIVITY. (2010). Nakabayashi, Masaki ; Arimoto, Yutaka ; Okazaki, Tetsuji.
    In: The Developing Economies.
    RePEc:bla:deveco:v:48:y:2010:i:3:p:293-318.

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  16. Tenancy Contract Choice and Land Improvement Investment for Upland Farming. (2010). Nakajima, Shinsaku .
    In: Japanese Journal of Rural Economics.
    RePEc:ags:jpjjre:242130.

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  17. An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements. (2010). Qiu, Feng ; Goodwin, Barry ; Gervais, Jean-Philippe.
    In: 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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  18. Agrarian Land Tenancy in Prewar Japan: Contract Choice and Implications on Productivity. (2008). Nakabayashi, Masaki ; Arimoto, Yutaka ; Okazaki, Tetsuji.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
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  19. Risk, Transaction Costs, and Geographic Distribution of Share Tenancy: A Case of Pre-War Japan. (2005). okazaki, tetsuji ; Nakabayashi, Masaki ; Arimoto, Yutaka.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
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  20. Risk, Transaction Costs, and Geographic Distribution of Share Tenancy: A Case of Pre-War Japan. (2005). Nakabayashi, Masaki ; Arimoto, Yutaka ; Okazaki, Tetsuji.
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  46. Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping. (2003). Braido, Luis.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1098.

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  47. CHEMICAL AND FERTILIZER APPLICATIONS IN RESPONSE TO CROP INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS MICRO DATA. (2003). Roberts, Michael ; O'Donoghue, Erik ; Key, Nigel.
    In: 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada.
    RePEc:ags:aaea03:21895.

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  48. Why Dowries?. (2003). Siow, Aloysius ; Botticini, Maristella.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:4:p:1385-1398.

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  49. Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities. (2003). Newman, Andrew ; Legros, Patrick.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:ads:wpaper:0030.

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  50. Fixed Rent Contracts in English Agriculture, 1750-1850: A Conjecture. (2001). Stead, David R.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:yor:yorken:05/01.

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