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Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility. (2008). Evans, Robert ; Reiche, Snje.
In: Economics Letters.
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:611-614.

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Cited: 5

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Cites: 6

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations received by this document

  1. On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games. (2020). Heumann, Tibor.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:90:y:2020:i:c:p:109-118.

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  2. Pooling hawks and doves: Interim-efficient labor contracts for other-regarding agents. (2016). Daske, Thomas.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc16:145951.

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  3. Optimal auction design under non-commitment. (2015). Skreta, Vasiliki.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pb:p:854-890.

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  4. Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment. (2014). Beccuti, Juan.
    In: Diskussionsschriften.
    RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1401.

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  5. Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment. (2013). Skreta, Vasiliki.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ste:nystbu:13-08.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Bester, H. ; Strausz, R. Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the single agent case. 2001 Econometrica. 69 1077-1098

  2. Bester, H. ; Strausz, R. Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case. 2000 Economics Letters. 69 165-171

  3. Crawford, V. ; Sobel, J. Strategic information transmission. 1982 Econometrica. 50 1431-1451

  4. Dasgupta, P. ; Hammond, P. ; Maskin, E. The implementation of social choice rules. 1979 Review of Economic Studies. 46 185-216
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  5. Dewatripont, M. Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contracts. 1989 Quarterly Journal of Economics. 104 589-619

  6. Laffont, J.-J. ; Tirole, J. The dynamics of incentive contracts. 1988 Econometrica. 56 1153-1175

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  2. An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation. (2013). Schmidt, Robert ; Pollrich, Martin ; Stiel, Caroline.
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  5. A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts. (2011). Sun, Ching-jen.
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  9. Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights. (2009). Bester, Helmut.
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  10. Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions. (2009). Troeger, Thomas ; Mylovanov, Tymofiy ; Troger, Thomas.
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  11. The French first employment contract: efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?. (2009). Genç İleri, Şerife ; Bac, Mehmet ; GENC, SERIFE .
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  12. The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector. (2009). MARTIMORT, David ; IVALDI, Marc ; Gagnepain, Philippe.
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  46. Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle. (2003). Strausz, Roland.
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