Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
The Swing Voters Curse in Social Networks. (2017). Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Büchel, Berno ; Buechel, Berno.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:fem:femwpa:2017.05.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 3

Citations received by this document

Cites: 20

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Instrument-based estimation with binarized treatments: Issues and tests for the exclusion restriction. (2018). Huber, Martin ; Andresen, Martin Eckhoff.
    In: FSES Working Papers.
    RePEc:fri:fribow:fribow00492.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Deliberative Structures and their Impact on Voting under Economic Conflict. (2018). Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Gerhards, Leonie ; Brandts, Jordi.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:1022.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Should Jurors Deliberate?. (2017). Guha, Brishti.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:79876.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. (1997): “Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information,” Econometrica, pp. 1029–1058.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. (1998): “Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting,” American Political Science Review, pp. 23–35.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  3. Austen-Smith, D., and J. S. Banks (1996): “Information aggregation, rationality, and the Condorcet jury theorem,” American Political Science Review, 90(01), 34–45.

  4. Austen-Smith, D., and T. J. Feddersen (2006): “Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules,” American Political Science Review, 100(02), 209– 217.

  5. Battaglini, M. (2016): “Public Protests and Policy Making,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

  6. Battaglini, M., R. B. Morton, and T. R. Palfrey (2010): “The swing voter’s curse in the laboratory,” The Review of Economic Studies, 77(1), 61–89.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  7. Carpini, M. X. D., F. L. Cook, and L. R. Jacobs (2004): “Public deliberation, discursive participation, and citizen engagement: A review of the empirical literature,” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 7, 315–344.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  8. Coughlan, P. J. (2000): “In defense of unanimous jury verdicts: Mistrials, communication, and strategic voting,” American Political Science Review, 94(02), 375–393.

  9. Crawford, V., and J. Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–51.

  10. Elbittar, A., A. Gomberg, C. Martinelli, and T. R. Palfrey (2014): “Ignorance and bias in collective decisions,” Discussion paper, California Institute of Technology.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  11. Feddersen, T., and W. Pesendorfer (1996): “The swing voter’s curse,” American Economic Review, pp. 408–424.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  12. Gerardi, D., and L. Yariv (2007): “Deliberative voting,” Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1), 317–338.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  13. Goeree, J. K., and L. Yariv (2011): “An experimental study of collective deliberation, ” Econometrica, 79(3), 893–921.

  14. Grosser, J., and M. Seebauer (2016): “The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study,” Games and Economic Behavior, 97, 205–226.

  15. Kawamura, K., and V. Vlaseros (2016): “Expert Information and Majority Decisions, ” Discussion paper, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  16. Levy, G., and R. Razin (2015): “Correlation Neglect, Voting Behavior, and Information Aggregation,” American Economic Review, 105(4), 1634–45.

  17. Lu, L., Y. C. Yuan, and P. L. McLeod (2012): “Twenty-five years of hidden profiles in group decision making a meta-analysis,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16(1), 54–75.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  18. McLennan, A. (1998): “Consequences of the Condorcet jury theorem for beneficial information aggregation by rational agents,” American Political Science Review, 92(02), 413–418.

  19. Morton, R. B., and J.-R. Tyran (2011): “Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees,” Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 485–509.

  20. Roth, A. E. (1988): The Shapley value: essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Social Media and Democracy. (2022). Heller, Yuval ; Gradwohl, Ronen ; Hillman, Arye.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:113609.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections. (2021). Lauermann, Stephan ; Ekmekci, Mehmet.
    In: ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:080.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. On the drawbacks of large committees. (2017). Hahn, Volker.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0546-6.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. The Swing Voters Curse in Social Networks. (2017). Mechtenberg, Lydia ; Büchel, Berno ; Buechel, Berno.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2017.05.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Unanimous rules in the laboratory. (2017). Malherbe, Frederic ; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol ; Bouton, Laurent.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:179-198.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Epistemic democracy with correlated voters. (2016). Pivato, Marcus.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:69546.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study. (2016). Le Quement, Mark ; Marcin, Isabel .
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_05.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. Mass Media, Instrumental Information, and Electoral Accountability. (2016). Himmler, Oliver ; Bruns, Christian.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_01.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice. (2016). Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Mechtenberg, Lydia.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1613.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information. (2016). Ferrari, Luca.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:157-160.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. On ignorant voters and busy politicians. (2015). Bruns, Christian ; Aytimur, R. Emre.
    In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cegedp:252.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Financial Stability and Monetary Policy. (2015). Bierbrauer, Felix J ; Hellwig, Martin.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_10.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. When Is Voting Optimal?. (2014). Danziger, Leif ; Ben-Yashar, Ruth.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8706.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Voting rules as statistical estimators. (2013). Pivato, Marcus.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:581-630.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections. (2013). .
    In: Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:esx:essedp:733.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?. (2013). Triossi, Matteo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:169-191.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts. (2012). Hahn, Volker.
    In: Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62041.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation. (2012). Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo ; Rivas, Javier.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:lec:leecon:12/16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. On the optimal number of representatives. (2012). Gary-Bobo, Robert ; Auriol, Emmanuelle.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:3:p:419-445.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Knowledge is power: a theory of information, income, and welfare spending. (2011). Rohner, Dominic ; Lind, Jo.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:036.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Scoring rules for judgment aggregation. (2011). Dietrich, Franz.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:35657.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Symmetric and asymmetric committees. (2011). Danziger, Leif ; Ben-Yashar, Ruth.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:440-447.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections. (2011). Hummel, Patrick.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:586-593.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending. (2011). Rohner, Dominic ; Lind, Jo.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:1161.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees. (2010). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
    In: CDMA Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:san:cdmawp:1004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision. (2010). Bierbrauer, Felix ; Sahm, Marco.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:7-8:p:453-466.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. The instability of instability of centered distributions. (2010). Tovey, Craig A..
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:53-73.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Costly information acquisition. Better to toss a coin?. (2010). Triossi, Matteo ; Triossiv, Matteo .
    In: Documentos de Trabajo.
    RePEc:edj:ceauch:267.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. An experimental study of jury deliberation. (2009). Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, ; Yariv, Leeat.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:438.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Pivots versus signals in elections. (2009). Meirowitz, Adam ; Shotts, Kenneth W..
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:2:p:744-771.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Bayesian Learning in Social Networks. (2008). Acemoglu, Daron ; Ozdaglar, Asuman ; Dahleh, Munther A. ; Lobel, Ilan .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14040.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Campaigns as Coordination Devices. (2007). Ekmekci, Mehmet .
    In: 2007 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed007:302.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. The swing voters curse with adversarial preferences. (2007). Kim, Jaehoon ; Fey, Mark.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:135:y:2007:i:1:p:236-252.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Safety Nets Within Banks. (2007). Gruner, Hans Peter ; Felgenhauer, Mike .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6317.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Predicting Committee Action. (2006). Glazer, Amihai.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:irv:wpaper:050621.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Would rational voters acquire costly information?. (2006). Martinelli, Cesar.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:129:y:2006:i:1:p:225-251.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. A theory of voting in large elections. (2006). Patty, John W. ; MCKELVEY, RICHARD D. ; RICHARD D. Mc KELVEY, .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:57:y:2006:i:1:p:155-180.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Generalized means of jurors competencies and marginal changes of jurys size. (2005). Sapir, Luba .
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:83-101.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees. (2005). Berk, Jan Marc ; Bierut, Beata K..
    In: DNB Working Papers.
    RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:027.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. On the Optimality of Decisions. (2004). Bierut, Beata ; Berk, Jan Marc .
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040120.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. The Optimal Design of Fallible Organizations: Invariance of Optimal Decision Criterion and Uniqueness of Hierarchy and Polyarchy Structures. (2004). Koh, Winston ; Winston T H Koh, .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:siu:wpaper:18-2004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Choice Shifts in Groups. (2004). Ray, Debraj ; Eliaz, Kfir.
    In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings.
    RePEc:ecm:nasm04:205.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. INFORMATION AGGREGATION, COSTLY VOTING AND COMMON VALUES. (2003). Lockwood, Ben ; Ghosal, Sayantan.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:670.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. What is special about the proportion? A research report on special majority voting and the classical Condorcet jury theorem. (2003). List, Christian.
    In: Public Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0304004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Committee Design in the Presence of Communication. (2003). Gerardi, Dino ; Yariv, Leeat.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1411.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions. (2003). Jackson, Matthew ; Barberà, Salvador.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:596.03.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules. (2002). Jackson, Matthew ; Barberà, Salvador.
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Eliciting information from multiple experts. (2002). Wolinsky, Asher.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:1:p:141-160.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries. (2001). Martinelli, Cesar ; Duggan, John.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:2:p:259-294.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Strategic Voting and Proxy Contests. (2000). Yilmaz, Bilge .
    In: Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers.
    RePEc:fth:pennfi:05-00.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-03-03 05:11:38 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.