On the optimal allocation of students when peer effect works: Tracking vs Mixing

No 07.14, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: The belief that the behaviour and outcomes of compulsory school students are affected by their peers has been important in shaping education policy. I analyze two polar education systems -tracking and mixing- and propose several criteria for their comparison. The system that maximizes average human capital, I find, depends crucially on the level of complementarity between peer effects and individuals' ability. I also find that when mean innate ability is much higher among the rich than among the poor, the system that best maximizes average human capital is mixing. However, there is no unanimity in the overall population so as to which system to choose.

Keywords: Peer effects; Tracking; Mixing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-hrm and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0714.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: On the optimal allocation of students when peer effect works: Tracking vs Mixing (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:07.14

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