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Showing posts with label Operation Bagration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Operation Bagration. Show all posts

Friday, 15 July 2016

World of Tanks History Section: Breakthrough at Bogushevsk

On June 23rd, 1944, a mad steamroller entered the territory of Belarus. Thundering westward at a speed of twenty kilometers per day, it crushed and ground up German forces in its way. In mere days, Army Group Center was reduced into pitiful shreds. The demolition of German forces was unprecedented, to the point where the Western Allies were doubting Soviet reports. The only solution was to gather up foreign correspondents and hold the famous prisoner of war march. 19 German generals and 45,000 soldiers and officers became a convincing confirmation of the Red Army's success. But where did this skepticism come from?

There was a good reason for it. The winter of 1943-44 was an endless string of positional battles and unsuccessful offensives. The situation at the front was compared to the meat grinder at Verdun. Only in April of 1944 did spring rasputitsa force both sides to take a break. That is when plans for Operation Bagration took shape, envisioning simultaneous penetration of enemy defenses in six places, with surrounding and destruction of flanking groups at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and further destruction of Army Group Center. One of the first obstacles on the way to Vitebsk was a small Belorussian village called Bogushevsk.

Thursday, 7 July 2016

World of Tanks History Section: Nighttime Storm Over Senno

On the second day of Operation Bagration, June 25th, 1944, the Red Army took the Bogushevsk settlement, located between Vitebsk and Orsha. As a result, the Germans lost a vital stronghold. Soviet command sent Major-General N.S. Oslikov's motorized cavalry group into the breach. The group was tasked with developing the Red Army's offensive towards Senno and Lepel, with the eventual exit to Berezina river.

Senno was the next German stronghold in line. The city was an important transportation hub, and the Germans organized many warehouses with fuel, ammunition, and supplies in the vicinity. Senno was a very tempting target for the Red Army.

Friday, 6 June 2014

Second Front

The Allied landings in Normandy 70 years ago were the product of many months of training, practicing, and strategizing, but what a lot of people don't know is that they were the product of years of political pressure from the USSR to open a second front. Such requests started as far back as 1941. Here are fragments of a letter from Stalin to Churchill dated July 18th, less than a month into the war:

"...I think that the position of both the Soviet Union and Great Britain will improve with a second front against Hitler in the West (north France) and the North (Arctic). A front in France will not only pull away forces from the East, but will prevent an invasion of England. Such a front will be met with agreement from both the British Army and the population of England. I can imagine the difficulty of such a front, but despite them, it should be created for the benefit of our joint affairs and England herself. It is easiest to form such a front now, when Hitler's forces are distracted in the East and he has not yet had time to fortify newly occupied positions.

A front in the North is even easier. Only air and sea forces will be needed, without a landing of infantry or artillery. You will be supported by Soviet land, sea, and air forces. We would welcome a light British division or Norwegian volunteers in northern Norway in order to incite a rebellion against Hitler."
RGASPI 558-11-255

Churchill does not agree.

 RGASPI 558-11-255

Churchill is quite light on the promises. A ship and maybe a fighter squadron. No second front is coming in 1941.

Nevertheless, Stalin tries again in September.

"...The Germans consider threats from the West a bluff, and continue to transfer their forces Eastward unpunished, convinced that there is no front in the West, and never will be. 
...
I think there is only one way out of this situation: the opening of a second front in the Balkans or in France, capable of pulling 30-40 German divisions from the East, simultaneously providing the USSR with 30,000 tons of aluminium, by the start of October and a minimum monthly aid of 400 planes and 500 tanks (small or medium). 

Without these two types of aid, the USSR will either face defeat or will be weakened to the point of inability to provide aid to its allies in the fight with Hitlerism."
 RGASPI 558-11-255

Churchill replies by telegram (sadly, no original):

"There is no possibility of British action in the West (aside from by air) that would pull the German forces from the East before winter. Equally, there is no possibility of a second front in the Balkans without help from Turkey...Action can lead only to an expensive fiasco, which will aid only Hitler.
...
We are prepared to send you half of what you request monthly, with the hope that the United States will cover the other half.
...We will gladly pressure Finland within our power, including immediate notification that we will declare war if they pass their old borders. We will ask the USA to take all possible steps to influence Finland.
September 5th, 1941."
RGASPI 558-11-255

Skip ahead a year, to August of 1942, and a scathing memorandum.

"As a result of an exchange of opinions in Moscow on August 12th of this year, I have established that the Prime Minister of Great Britain considers the second front in Europe impossible for 1942. As you are aware, the arrangement for a second front was made in 1942 when Molotov visited London, and reflected in an Anglo-Soviet communique, published on June 12th of this year.

It is also known that this front in Europe would divert the Germans from the Eastern Front to the West. A serious resistance to the fascists would ease the load on the Soviet-German front in 1942.
It is understood that Soviet command planned its summer and fall movements with the assumption that a second front would open in the summer of 1942. It is easy to see that the refusal of the Great British government delivers a hit to the morale of Soviet society, who hoped to see a second front, makes the position of the Red Army more difficult, and risks plans of the Soviet High Command.

I do not have to tell you that the difficult for the Red Army created by this refusal will not doubt negatively impact the position of England and all other Allies.

My colleagues and I are of the opinion that conditions in 1942 are favourable for the creation of a second front in Europe, as nearly all German forces, including their best forces, are distracted in the East, leaving an insignificant amount of poor soldiers in Europe. It is unknown if 1943 will be similarly favourable, which is why we consider 1942 to be the perfect opportunity for a second front. Sadly, I was unable to convince the Prime Minister of this, and Mister Harriman, the representative of the President of the United States, agreed with mister Prime Minister.

I. Stalin. 
August 13th, 1942."
RGASPI 558-11-257

1943 does not promise much more for a second front either. If anything, it's the opposite.

"From the above, I can tell that missions scheduled for February in Tunis are now delayed until April. I do not need to say how undesirable this is. At this time, when the Soviet armies are still capable of a wide offensive, Anglo-American activity in North Africa is most necessary. Pushing Hitler from our front and from Tunis will benefit us both, and accelerate your planned operations in Sicily and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

As for a European front, specifically in France, that is scheduled by you for August-September. I think that the current situation demands bringing these deadlines closer in order to open the Western front as early as possible. It is important to not delay an offensive until the second half of the year and let the enemy recuperate, but strike in spring, or in early summer. 

According to reliable sources, since December (when Anglo-American forces stopped for some reason) transferred 27 divisions to the Soviet-German front, including 5 tank divisions. As a result, instead of helping the Soviet Union by drawing forces away from its front, you helped Hitler, who could reinforce his armies due to the weakening of the Anglo-American operations in Tunis.
...
V. Molotov
February 16th, 1943"
RGASPI 558-11-365




RGASPI 558-11-262

A little more accomplishments on the Allied side this time, but the result is still the same: no second front, and no "results before the end of the year that will give you substantial relief and satisfaction".

Relief and satisfaction finally come in 1944.

 RGASPI 558-11-267

No posturing, no empty promises, no flowery language. Just one brief paragraph, but a paragraph that meant more to the Red Army than endless stacks of paper.

In response, Molotov sends a telegram to the embassy.

"I received a personal letter from Kerr containing a message from Churchill to comrade Stalin, dated June 5th. This letter described the Allied captured of Rome and battles in Italy. The same letter revealed that the Allies will begin Operation Overlord on June 6th.

Send Churchill the following message from comrade Stalin through Iden.

Secret and personal from the Premier I.V. Stalin to the Prime Minister Churchill

I received your message regarding Operation Overlord. It cheers us up and makes us confident of further success. 

The Soviet summer offensive, agreed upon at the Tehran conference, begins in mid-June on one of the important sections of the front. An overall offensive will be performed by sequentially moving armies to attack. I promise to keep you informed of offensives.  June 6th, 1944."
RGASPI 558-11-267

Stalin is, of course, talking about Operation Bagration, occurring simultaneously with Operation Overlord. This operation involved about the same number of soldiers, and ended in a crushing defeat of Army Group Center, pushing the Germans out of the Baltic, Belarus, and parts of Poland.

Kerr responds.

RGASPI 558-11-267

This map also shows up, unlikely to reveal anything new and shocking, but included for completeness.


On June 10th, there are updates on the situation.

 RGASPI 558-11-267

Molotov was quite happy that the situation developed well.

"I received your letter from June 10th. I thank you for your message. I see your assault was completely successful. My colleagues and myself must admit that there is nothing in the history of wars that comes close in scale, wide scope, and masterful execution. It is well known that Napoleon failed to cross La Manche. The hysterical Hitler, who boasted for two years that he would cross it, never even gathered the courage to make an attempt. Only our allies managed to complete their grandiose plan of a landing across La Manche. History will remember this as an accomplishment of the highest order.
June 11th, 1944"
 RGASPI 558-11-267

Mentions of the situation in Normandy pop up in further correspondence.

 RGASPI 558-11-267

Wednesday, 5 March 2014

World of Tanks History Section: Operation Bagration

At the end of the spring of 1944, the Soviet-German front was relatively quiet. The Germans, having suffered significant losses during the winter, were strengthening their defenses, and the Red Army was gathering forces for another strike.

If you look at a map of combat operations, you can see two indentations in the front. One, on the territory of the Ukraine, south of the Pripyat river. The second, pointing far to the East, in Belorussia, bordering Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This indentation was named the "Belarussian Balcony". After discussion at the end of April, Stavka of the Supreme Command decided to crush it with the entire might of the Red Army. The liberation of Belarus was codenamed "Operation Bagration".

German commanders did not predict these events. Belarus is covered in swamps and forests, with many lakes and rivers, and had a fairly undeveloped network of roads. It was very difficult to use tanks here, from the point of view of Hitler's generals. The Wehrmacht was ready to deflect a Soviet offensive in the Ukraine, and concentrated most of their forces there. For example, Army Group "North Ukraine" had seven tank divisions, and four heavy tank battalions. Army Group Center only had one tank division, two panzergrenadier divisions, and one heavy tank battalion. In total, Ernst Busch commanded 1.2 million men, 900 tanks and SPGs, 9500 cannons and mortars, and 1350 airplanes of the 6th Air Fleet.

The Germans created a fairly powerful echeloned line of defense in Belarus. Fortifications started being built in 1943, frequently based on natural hazards: rivers, lakes, swamps, heights. Cities that were road hubs were declared fortresses. For example, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev, and others were equipped with pillboxes, bunkers, multiple artillery and machine gun positions.

The plan to destroy enemy forces in Belarus involved elements of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Belarussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front. In total, Soviet forces consisted of 2.4 million people, over 5000 tanks, nearly 36 000 cannons and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 16th air armies (over 5000 aircraft). The Red Army had a significant advantage over the enemy.

In order to ensure secrecy, the Red Army put a great deal of effort into masking their movements and misleading the enemy. Units moved at night, maintaining radio silence. During the day, armies camouflaged themselves in forests. Forces were concentrated in the Kishenev direction as a feint. Units not participating in the operation scouted by combat. Trains were loaded with fake tanks and driven out of Belarus. These preparations were effective, but not completely. Prisoners captured on the 3rd Belorussian Front revealed that the Germans were building up their defenses and expected action from the RKKA. Hoever, the time of the attack and the numbers involved were still unknown to them.

Right before the operation, Belorussian partisans performed numerous diversions, severing German supply lines. Over 40 000 rails were destroyed between July 20th and 23rd. While the Germans were heavily impeded by the partisans, the railroads were not critically damaged, according to I.G. Starinov, an authority on scouting and diversionary affairs.

Operation Bagration was carried out in two stages. The first included the Vitebsk-Orshansk, Mogilyev, Bobruysk, Polotsk, and Minsk operations. The Vitebsk-Orshansk operation was carried out by forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian front. The 1st Baltic forces led by General I. Bagramyan struck with the 6th Guards Army and 43rd Army at the joint between Army Groups North and Center in the Beshenkovichi direction. The 4th Shock Army was to advance on Polotsk.

Colonel I. Chernyahovskiy's 3rd Belorussian Front struck at Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and at Borisov with the 11th Guards Army and 31st Army. In order to ensure operational success, these units were backed by N. Oslikovskiy's cavalry-mechanized group (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Cavalry Corps) and P. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army.

After an artillery barrage on June 23rd, the forces of the fronts began their offensive. During the first day, the 1st Baltic Front penetrated 16 kilometers of enemy defenses, aside from the Polotsk direction, where the 4th Shock Army encountered significant resistance, and could not boast exceptional success. The width of the Soviet breakthrough was about 50 kilometers.

The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant success in the Bogushev direction, penetrating a line of defense 50 km wide and capturing three intact bridges over the Luchesa river. The German Vitebsk group was in danger of encirclement. Their commander requested permission to retreat, but since Vitebsk was considered a fortress, the permission was denied.

Through June 24th-26th, Soviet units encircled the forces at Vitebsk and destroyed the division covering the city. Another 4 divisions attempted to break through West, but, aside from several disorganized units, they were unsuccessful. On June 27th, the surrounded Germans surrendered. Over 10 000 German soldiers and officers were captured.

Orsha was also freed on June 27th. Red Army forces broke through to the Orsha-Minsk highway. Lepel was liberated on June 28th. The completion of the first stage of the operation moved the Soviets forward 80-150 km.

The Mogilev operation also began on June 23rd. It was carried out by the 2nd Belorussian Front of General Zakharov. During the first two days, forces moved 30 km forward. After that, the Germans fled across the Dniepr river. They were chased by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27th, Soviet forces crossed the Dniepr and freed Mogilev on the 28th. The German 12th Infantry Division that was defending the city was destroyed. Many prisoners and trophies were captured. The Germans were retreating towards Minsk, chased by ground attack aircraft. Soviet forces marched towards the Berezina river.

The Bobruisk operation was carried out by forces of the 1st Belarussian Front (led by General Rokossovskiy). The front commander ordered a strike in the Rogachev and Parichey direction, with a longer term strike at Bobruysk, with the goal of encircling the Germans in the city and destroying them. After Bobruysk was taken, the forces would move to Puhovichi and Slutsk. The attacking forces were supported by about 2000 aircraft.

The assault was through difficult swamped forests, crossed by many rivers. Soldiers had to be trained to use swamp shoes, cross water hazards using any available means, and build log roads. On June 24th, after a powerful artillery barrage, Soviet units went on the offensive, and penetrated 5-6 km of enemy defenses by mid-day. With the aid of mechanized units, the penetration at individual points reached as far as 20 km.

By June 27th, the Bobruisk group was completely surrounded. 40 000 German soldiers and officers were encircled. Leaving a portion of its forces to deal with the enemy, the front advanced to Slutsk and Osipovichi. The surrounded forces attempted to break out to the north. Near Titovka, a brutal battle took place, during which the Germans, disregarding losses, attempted to penetrate the Soviet lines. Bombers were called in to repel the assault. Over 500 planes bombed the concentration of German forces for an hour and a half.  The enemy abandoned heavy machinery and attempted to break through to Bobruisk, but had no luck. On June 28th, the remainder surrendered.

Bobruisk was taken on June 29th.

By this time, Army Group Center realized its catastrophic situation. German forces took massive losses in both manpower and vehicles. Soviet forces moved up 80-150 kilometers. Army Group Center was in danger of encirclement. On June 28th, Ernst Busch was removed from command, and replaced with Field Marshall Walther Model.

The Minsk operation began on June 28th.

Forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front approached the Berezina river. Orders from Stavka instructed them to cross the river, go around pockets of resistance, and make a swift attack on Minsk.

On June 29th, advance forces of the RKKA captured landings on the western shore and penetrated 5-10 km into enemy defenses. On June 30th, main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1st, the 11th Guards Army, entered Borisov from the south and south-west, and liberated it by 15:00. On the same day, Begoml and Pleshenitsy were also liberated.

By July 2nd, most avenues of retreat were cut off for the enemy. Vileyka, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, and Krasnoye were liberated. The Germans were cut off from their supply lines.

On the night of July 3rd, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General Chernyahovskiy, ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army (Rotmistrov) to take the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps, attack Minsk from the north and north-west direction, and take it by the end of July 3rd.

At 9 am on July 3rd, Soviet units entered Minsk. 71st and 36th infantry corps of the 31st Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the Guards Tatsin Corps tankers joined the battle. Elements of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front supported the offensive from the south and south-east. Minsk was liberated at 13:00.

As was mentioned above, the biggest hurdle for the Soviet offensive was Polotsk. The Germans turned it into a powerful defensive position, and garrisoned 6 infantry divisions in it. The 1st Baltic Front tasked the forces of the 6th Guards Army and 4th Shock Army with moving in from the south and north-east, and destroying the Germans.

The Polotsk operation began on June 29th. By the evening of July 1st, Soviet units captured the flanks of the German forces, and reached the outskirts of the city. Fierce urban battles lasted until July 4th. That is the day when the city was liberated. Forces of the left flank, pursuing the retreating Germans, traveled 110 km, arriving at the border with Lithuania.

The first stage of Operation Bagration was catastrophic for Army Group Center. The Red Army advanced 225-280 km in 12 days. The German defensive lines had a 400 km wide breach, and nothing to cover it with. Nevertheless, the Germans attempted to stabilize the situation by striking in key directions. Model was building a new line of defense, using up divisions transferred from other parts of the front. However, even the 46 divisions thrown into the catastrophe did not have a significant effect.

On July 5th, the Vilnus operation by the 3rd Belarussian Front began. On July 7th, elements of the 5th Guards Tank Army and 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps reached the city, and began to encircle it. On July 8th, the Germans brought in reinforcements. 150 tanks and SPGs were brought in to break the encirclement. The attempt failed, in no small part thanks to the 1st Air Army, relentlessly bombing the German forces. Vilnus was taken on July 13th, and the surrounded forces were eliminated.

The 2nd Belarussian Front was developing an offensive at Belostok. In order to strengthen the front, General Gorbatov's 3rd Army was sent in. Over 5 days, the Soviet forces moved up 150 kilometers, liberating Novogrudok on July 8th. The Germans gathered forces at Grodno, and the Red Army had to withstand a series of counterattacks. By July 16th, this city was also cleared of Germans. On July 27th, the Red Army liberated Belostok and reached the pre-war borders of the USSR.

The 1st Belarussian Front was tasked with moving around the Brest fortified region, destroying the enemy at Brest and Lublin, and reaching the river Vistula. On July 6th, the Red Army took Kovel, and broke through the defensive lines at Sedltse. Soviet forces traveled over 70 km by July 20th, crossed Western Bug, and reached Poland. Brest was encircled on July 25th, but all enemies were not destroyed there, a portion of them managed to break through. By the beginning of August, the Red Army occupied Lublin and possessed several landings on the west shore of Vistula.

Operation Bagration was a colossal victory for the Soviets. Over two months, all of Belarus, and parts of Poland and the Baltics were liberated. The Germans lost about 400 000 dead, injured, and captured. 22 generals were captured, and 10 more died. Army Group Center was destroyed.

Original article available here.