Coup d'état

Self coup

Soft coup

A soft coup, sometimes referred to as a silent coup or a bloodless coup, is an illegal overthrow of a government, but unlike a regular coup d'état it is achieved without the use of force or violence.^[31]

Palace coup

A palace coup or palace revolution is a coup in which one faction within the ruling group displaces another faction within a ruling group.^[32] Along with popular protests, palace coups are a major threat to dictators.^[33] The Harem conspiracy of the 12th century BC was one of the earliest attempts. Palace coups were common in Imperial China.^[34] They have also occurred among the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, the Al-Thani dynasty in Qatar,^[35] and in Haiti in the 19th to early 20th centuries.^[36] The majority of Russian tsars between 1725 and 1801 were either overthrown or usurped power in palace coups.^[37]

Putsch

The term putsch ([pʊtʃ], from Swiss German for 'knock'), denotes the political-military actions of an unsuccessful minority reactionary coup.^[38][39] The term was initially coined for the Züriputsch of 6 September 1839 in Switzerland. It was also used for attempted coups in Weimar Germany, such as the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Küstrin Putsch, and Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch.^[40]

The 1934 Night of the Long Knives was Hitler's purge to eliminate opponents, particularly the paramilitary faction led by Ernst Röhm, but Nazi propaganda justified it as preventing a supposed putsch planned or attempted by Röhm. The Nazi term Röhm-Putsch is still used by Germans to describe the event, often with quotation marks as the 'so-called Röhm Putsch'.^[41]

The 1961 Algiers putsch and the 1991 August Putsch also use the term.

The 2023 Wagner Group rebellion has also been described as a putsch.^[42][43]

Pronunciamiento and cuartelazo

Pronunciamiento ('pronouncement') is a term of Spanish origin for a type of coup d'état. Specifically the pronunciamiento is the formal declaration deposing the previous government and justifying the installation of the new government by the golpe de estado. One author distinguishes a coup, in which a military or political faction takes power for itself, from a pronunciamiento, in which the military deposes the existing government and hands over power to a new, ostensibly civilian government.^[44]

A "barracks revolt" or cuartelazo is another type of military revolt, from the Spanish term cuartel ('quarter' or 'barracks'), in which the mutiny of specific military garrisons sparks a larger military revolt against the government.^[45]

Other

Other types of actual or attempted seizures of power are sometimes called "coups with adjectives". The appropriate term can be subjective and carries normative, analytical, and political implications.^[31]

Revolution, rebellion

While a coup is usually a conspiracy of a small group, a revolution or rebellion is usually started spontaneously by larger groups of uncoordinated people.^[49] The distinction between a revolution and a coup is not always clear. Sometimes, a coup is labelled as a revolution by its plotters to feign democratic legitimacy.^[50][51]

Coup trap

The accumulation of previous coups is a strong predictor of future coups,^[11][12] a phenomenon called the coup trap.^[13][14] A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the coup trap and reduces cycles of political instability.^[14]

Regime type and polarization

Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than very authoritarian states or democratic states.^[59] A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.^[60] A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.^[61] A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."^[62] Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.^[63] A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.^[64] A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.^[65] A fifth 2016 study finds no evidence that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does not make other coups in the region likely to follow.^[66] One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.^[67]

In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.^[68][69][70]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.^[14]

A 2019 study found that when a country's politics is polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.^[71]

A 2023 study found that civilian elites are more likely to be associated with instigating military coups while civilians embedded in social networks are more likely to be associated with consolidating military coups.^[72]

Territorial disputes, internal conflicts, and armed conflicts

A 2017 study found that autocratic leaders whose states were involved in international rivalries over disputed territory were more likely to be overthrown in a coup. The authors of the study provide the following logic for why this is:

Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary. The imperative of developing a strong army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation: to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency—the military—that is most likely to threaten their own survival in office.^[73]

However, two 2016 studies found that leaders who were involved in militarized confrontations and conflicts were less likely to face a coup.^[74][75]

A 2019 study found that states that had recently signed civil war peace agreements were much more likely to experience coups, in particular when those agreements contained provisions that jeopardized the interests of the military.^[76]

Popular opposition and regional rebellions

Research suggests that protests spur coups, as they help elites within the state apparatus to coordinate coups.^[77]

A 2019 study found that regional rebellions made coups by the military more likely.^[78]

Economy, development, and resource factors

A 2018 study found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries".^[79] The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.^[79]

A 2020 study found that elections had a two-sided impact on coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy. During periods of economic expansion, elections reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, whereas elections during economic crises increased the likelihood of coup attempts.^[80]

A 2021 study found that oil wealthy nations see a pronounced risk of coup attempts but these coups are unlikely to succeed.^[81]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th century study found that coup frequency does not vary with development levels, economic inequality, or the rate of economic growth.^{[14][contradictory]}

Coup-proofing

In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.^[15] It may also involve frequent salary hikes and promotions for members of the military,^[82] and the deliberate use of diverse bureaucrats.^[83] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring.^[84][85] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,^{[86][16][87][17][88][89][18]} and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.^[90] One reason why authoritarian governments tend to have incompetent militaries is that authoritarian regimes fear that their military will stage a coup or allow a domestic uprising to proceed uninterrupted – as a consequence, authoritarian rulers have incentives to place incompetent loyalists in key positions in the military.^[19]

A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.^[91] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.^[91]

According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.^[92] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.^[93] Coup-proofing is more likely in former French colonies.^[94]

A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.^[95] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler".^[96]

In their 2022 book Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way found that political-military fusion, where the ruling party is highly interlinked with the military and created the administrative structures of the military from its inception, is extremely effective at preventing military coups. For example, the People's Liberation Army was created by the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War, and never instigated a military coup even after large-scale policy failures (i.e. the Great Leap Forward) or the extreme political instability of the Cultural Revolution.^[97]

Democracy and level of repression

This section needs to be updated. (December 2024)

Since the end of the Cold War, coups have become rarer, and more likely to be followed by democratization. Coups still often simply replace one autocracy with another one (with the new autocratic regime usually more repressive, in an attempt to prevent another coup) or have no effect on regime type.^{[4][5][99][100][101][102][98]}

This does not mean that coups now cause democratization. A country might have been just as likely (or more likely) to democratize without a coup. Cold-War era coups, on average, destroyed more democracy than they created,^{[citation needed]} and coups still increase the chance of a new autocratic regime and increased repression.

As of 2017^[update], there was debate about whether coups in autocracies should now be considered to promote democratization, on average, or if countries' chances of democratization are still unchanged or worsened by coups (since democratization can take place without a coup). One reason for the increase in the chance of democratization is that a higher proportion of coups (half of post-Cold-War coups) now take place in democracies (a higher percentage of countries are also now democracies). Democratic countries often rebound from coups quickly, restoring democracy, but coups in a democracy are a sign of poor political health, and increase the risk of future coups and loss of democracy. The dataset is small, so statistical significance varies depending on the model used, as of 2017^[update]; debate will end if data on more coups makes the pattern clear.^{[4][5][99][100][101][102][98]}

The post-Cold-War increase in the chances of post-coup democratization may partly be due to the incentives created by international pressure and financing.^[5][4] US law, for instance, automatically cuts off all aid to a country if there is a military coup.^[103] According to a 2020 study, "external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival."^{[quantify][104]}

But coup conspirators also increasingly say that they chose a coup to save their country from the autocratic incumbents. Successful conspirators may hold free and fair elections simply because they think it is a good idea.^[5] A desire for economic growth and legitimacy have also been cited as motivations for democratization.^[99]

Ethics

This section may be unbalanced towards certain viewpoints. (December 2024)

It is widely considered wrong to use a risky coup to change a democratic government, because one could use a legal election instead.

Legal scholar Ilya Somin believes that a coup to forcibly overthrow a democratic government might sometimes be justified. Commenting on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Somin opined,

There should be a strong presumption against forcibly removing a democratic regime. But that presumption might be overcome if the government in question poses a grave threat to human rights, or is likely to destroy democracy itself by shutting down future political competition.^[108]

Counter-coups

According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (2014), it is "fairly rare" for the incumbent government to violently purge the army after a failed coup. If it starts the mass killing of elements of the army, including officers who were not involved in the coup, this may trigger a "counter-coup" by soldiers who are afraid they will be next. To prevent such a desperate counter-coup that may be more successful than the initial attempt, governments usually resort to firing prominent officers and replacing them with loyalists instead.^[109]

Notable counter-coups include the Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 1960 Laotian counter-coup, the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, the 1966 Nigerian counter-coup, the 1967 Greek counter-coup, 1971 Sudanese counter-coup, and the Coup d'état of December Twelfth in South Korea.

A 2017 study finds that the use of state broadcasting by the putschist regime after Mali's 2012 coup did not elevate explicit approval for the regime.^[110]

International response

The international community tends to react adversely to coups by reducing aid and imposing sanctions. A 2015 study finds that "coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction."^[111] Another 2015 study shows that coups are the strongest predictor for the imposition of democratic sanctions.^[112] A third 2015 study finds that Western states react strongest against coups of possible democratic and human rights abuses.^[112] A 2016 study shows that the international donor community in the post-Cold War period penalizes coups by reducing foreign aid.^[113] The US has been inconsistent in applying aid sanctions against coups both during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a likely consequence of its geopolitical interests.^[113]

Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have adopted anti-coup frameworks. Through the threat of sanctions, the organizations actively try to curb coups. A 2016 study finds that the AU has played a meaningful role in reducing African coups.^[114]

A 2017 study found that negative international responses, especially from powerful actors, have a significant effect in shortening the duration of regimes created in coups.^[115]

According to a 2020 study, coups increase the cost of borrowing and increase the likelihood of sovereign default.^[116]

Asia

More information Position, Post-coup leader ...

Position	Post-coup leader	Deposed leader	Country	Event	Date
President	Emomali Rahmon	Rahmon Nabiyev[n 1]	Tajikistan	Tajikistani Civil War	19 November 1992
President of the Supreme Political Council	Mahdi al-Mashat	Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi[n 2]	Yemen	Houthi takeover in Yemen	6 February 2015
Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Administration Council	Min Aung Hlaing	Aung San Suu Kyi	Myanmar	2021 Myanmar coup d'état	2 February 2021

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Africa

More information Position, Post-coup leader ...

Position	Post-coup leader	Deposed leader	Country	Event	Date
President	Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo	Francisco Macías Nguema	Equatorial Guinea	1979 Equatoguinean coup d'état	3 August 1979
President	Yoweri Museveni	Tito Okello	Uganda	Ugandan Bush War	29 January 1986
President	Denis Sassou Nguesso	Pascal Lissouba	Congo	Republic of the Congo Civil War	25 October 1997
President	Abdel Fattah el-Sisi	Mohamed Morsi	Egypt	2013 Egyptian coup d'état	3 July 2013
President	Emmerson Mnangagwa	Robert Mugabe[n 3]	Zimbabwe	2017 Zimbabwean coup d'état	24 November 2017
Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council	Abdel Fattah al-Burhan	Omar al-Bashir	Sudan	2019 Sudanese coup d'état	21 August 2019
Chairman of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People of Mali	Assimi Goïta	Bah Ndaw	Mali	2021 Malian coup d'état	25 May 2021
President	Kais Saied	Hichem Mechichi[n 4]	Tunisia	2021 Tunisian self-coup[n 5]	25 July 2021
Chairman of the National Committee of Reconciliation and Development	Mamady Doumbouya	Alpha Condé	Guinea	2021 Guinean coup d'état	5 September 2021
President of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration	Ibrahim Traoré	Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba	Burkina Faso	September 2022 Burkinabé coup d'état	30 September 2022
President of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland	Abdourahamane Tchiani	Mohamed Bazoum	Niger	2023 Nigerien coup d'état	26 July 2023
Head of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions	Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema	Ali Bongo Ondimba	Gabon	2023 Gabonese coup d'état	30 August 2023

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