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IPC MH GEORGE CASE Presentation1

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MH George vs.

State of
Maharashtra
BACKGROUND:-
THE RESPONDENT WHO WAS A GERMAN NATIONAL FOR BRINGING GOLD TO INDIA WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AS PER THE
SECTION 23(1A)(A) OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS ACT OF 1947 WAS SENTENCED FOR A YEAR; AS HE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE DOING SO WITH
AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT. HE WAS ACQUITTED BY THE HIGH COURT BUT THE STATE MADE A FURTHER APPEAL IN THE SUPREME COURT.
STATUTES & PROVISIONS INVOLVED

 Section 8(1), Section 23 (1-A) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. sec. 168 (8) (1)
of the Sea Customs Act.
FACTS

 The respondent, a German dealer, left Zurich via plane on 27th November 1962 with 34
kilos of gold-covered on his person to be conveyed in Manila. The plane reached in
Bombay on the 28th however, the respondent didn’t leave the plane. The Customs
Authorities analyzed the manifest of the airplane to see if any gold was dispatched by any
traveler, and not finding any entry they entered the plane, looked through the respondent,
recouped the gold, and accused him of an offense under ss. 8(1) and 23(1-A) of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (7 of 1947) read with a notification dated November 8,
1962, of the Reserve Bank of India which was published in the Gazette of India on 24th
November.·The respondent was sentenced by the Magistrate, however, acquitted by the
High Court. A further appeal was made by the state in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES

 Whether the respondent is liable for bringing gold to India under ss. 8(1) and 23(1-A) of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (7 of 1947) which was published in the Gazette of
India on 24th November 1962?
 This appeal raised the question of the scope of the ban forced by the Central Government
and the Central Board of Revenue in the exercise of the powers given to them under
Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (VII of 1947), hereinafter called
the Act, against people transferring restricted articles through India?
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

 Learned Solicitor-General, showing up for the State of Maharashtra, fights that the Act was authorized to forestall
pirating of gold in the light of a legitimate concern for the financial strength of the nation and, in this way, in
translating the significant arrangements of such an Act there is no extension for applying the assumption of
precedent-based law that mens rea is an essential element of the offense.
 The object of the resolution and the compulsory terms of the significant arrangements, the contention continues,
refute any such assumption and demonstrate that mens rea is anything but a fundamental element of the offense.
He further battles that on a sensible development of the second stipulation of the warning dated November 8,
1962, gave by the Board of Revenue, it ought to be held that the general consent for bringing gold into India is
dependent upon the condition set down in the subsequent stipulation and that, as in the present case the gold was
not unveiled in the Manifest, the respondent contradicted the terms thereof and was, in this way, at risk to be
sentenced under the previously mentioned segments of the Foreign Exchange Act. No contention was progressed
before us under S. 168 (8) (1) of the Sea Customs Act and, in this way, nothing need be said about that area.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION

 Mens rea was a fundamental element of the offense charged and as it was not questioned
by the arraignment that the respondent was not mindful of the notification of the Reserve
Bank, he couldn’t saw as liable.
 The notice being just subordinate or assigned enactment could be regarded to be in power
just when it was brought to the notification of people influenced by it and, the second
stipulation in the warning requiring exposure in the show was not pertinent to gold carried
on the individual of a traveler.
JUDGEMENT

 On the question whether mens rea – in the sense of actual knowledge that the act done by the accused was
contrary to the law – is requisite in respect of a contravention of Section 8(1) starting with an initial presumption
in favour of the need for mens rea, we have to ascertain whether the presumption is overborne by the language of
the enactment, read in the light of the objects and purposes of the Act, and particularly whether the enforcement of
the law and the attainment of its purpose would not be rendered futile in the event of such an ingredient being
considered necessary. Where the statute does not contain the word ‘knowingly’, the first thing to do is to examine
the statute to see whether the ordinary presumption that mens rea is required applies or not. When one turns to
Section 8(1) in the present context, one reaches the conclusion that there is no scope for the invocation of the rule
of mens rea. It lays an absolute embargo upon persons who, without satisfying the condition bring or send into
India any Gold, the absoluteness being emphasized by Section 24(1) of the Act, which throws on the accused the
burden of proving that he had the requisite permission. In our opinion, the very object and purpose of the Act and
its effectiveness as an instrument for the prevention of smuggling would be entirely frustrated if a condition were
to be read into Section 8(1) of the Act qualifying the plain words of the enactment, that the accused should be
proved to have knowledge that he was contravening the law before he could be held to have contravened the
provision.

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