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Chapter 9 Central Banks

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CHAPTER 9:

CENTRAL BANKS
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EURO SYSTEM, AND
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS

• The European Central Bank (ECB) came into existence on


June 1, 1998, in order to handle the transitional issues of
the nations that comprise the Eurozone.
• The Eurozone is an economic and monetary union
consisting of the member states of the European Union
(EU) that have adopted the euro as their currency.
• The Eurosystem comprises the ECB and the NCBs of
those EU member states that have adopted the euro.
COUNTRIES COMPRISING THE EU
• Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden
• All of the member states of the European Union have to
comply with a set of economic criteria and legal
preconditions.
• THE GOVERNING COUNCIL is the chief decision-
making body of the ECB responsible for formulating
monetary policy in the euro area.
• It consists of the ECB’s president and vice-president, four
members of the Executive Board as well as the governors of
the 19 National Central Banks of the euro-area countries.
• Its main function is to conduct monetary policy and its
primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro
area.
• THE EXECUTIVE BOARD of the ECB is appointed by the
European Council.
• Decisions of the ECB’s Governing Council are made based on
majority voting.
• While the ECB’s Executive Board members hold permanent
voting rights, governors of NCBs take turns holding voting
rights in the Governing Council on a monthly-rotation basis.
• The Executive Board of the ECB is responsible for the day-to-
day operations and management of the ECB and the
Eurosystem.
• Implements the decisions of the Governing Council by
giving instructions to the corresponding NCBs.
• Comprises the following six members: the president and
the vice-president of the ECB, and four other members
who take decisions in their personal capacity, not as
representatives of a given country or institutions and who
are of high standing and professional experience in the
monetary and/or financial fields.
• THE GENERAL COUNCIL of the ECB, which comprises
the president and the vice-president of the ECB in addition
to the governors of the NCBs of the 28 EU member states.
• To encourage cooperation between the National Central
Banks of the member states of the EU.
• To perform a number of important advisory functions such
as collecting statistical information for the ECB, preparing
the ECB’s annual reports, and standardizing the accounting
and reporting operations of the NCBs.
HOW MONETARY POLICY IS CONDUCTED WITHIN THE ECB

• The three main objectives of the ECB are:


1. To maintain price stability in the economies of the EU;
2. To support the economic policies of the Eurozone nations;
3. To ensure an independent and open market economy .
The ECB endeavors to maintain its independence from
governments.
The Governing Council of the ECB sets the following three key
policy interest rates:
• DEPOSIT FACILITY RATE, which is the rate on tenders to
banks. It is the most important policy rate because it provides the
bulk of liquidity to the banking system and determines how far down
the ECB’s quantitative easing program can push sovereign bond
yields;
• REFINANCING RATE, which is the rate on overnight deposits
with the Eurosystem;
• MARGINAL LENDING FACILITY RATE, which is the rate on
overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem.
• The ECB’s operational framework consists of the
following set of conventional monetary policy
instruments:
1. open market operations;
2. standing facilities to provide and absorb overnight
liquidity (rediscounting rate);
3. minimum or required reserve requirements for
credit institutions.
UNCONVENTIONAL OR NON-STANDARD
MONETARY POLICY MEASURES
1. EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE (ELA)-
provides liquidity and loans exceptionally to solvent
banking and financial institutions that are facing temporary
liquidity problems.
2. QUANTITATIVE EASING, where central banks buy
sovereign bonds and/or other financial assets from
commercial banks and financial institutions to increase
money supply and stimulate the economy.
Examples of Quantitative Easing:
1. ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES (APP)
purchases of public sector securities, private sector bonds, and
asset-backed securities. APP addresses the risks of prolonged
periods of deflation.
2. SECURITIES MARKET PROGRAMME (SMP)
strictly limits purchases of government bonds by the Eurosystem
to secondary markets.
All of these non-traditional monetary policy tools were temporary
and aimed at providing liquidity to financial markets and reducing
pressures on interest rates.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
• One of the largest and most influential central banks in the world
• Is subject to oversight from Congress that periodically reviews its
activities, but its decisions are made totally independent of the
U.S. government.
• Supervises and regulates the nation’s financial institutions and
simultaneously serves as their banker.
• Generates income from services provided to member banks and
from interest earned on government securities, foreign currency
and loans to financial institutions.
COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
• The Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB) which mainly
assumes regulatory and supervisory responsibilities over member
banks.
• The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC): comprises 12
members; decides on the interest rates and monetary policy.
• The 12 Federal Reserve banks that are located in major cities
throughout the nation
• Private U.S. member banks
• The Federal Advisory Council
CENTRAL BANKS AND INDEPENDENCE
• The more independent a central bank the more
effective monetary policy is.
• Two key dimensions of central bank independence:
1. GOAL INDEPENDENCE- encompasses those
institutional characteristics that insulate the central
bank from political influence in defining its monetary
policy objectives.
• 2. INSTRUMENT INDEPENDENCE- refers to
the ability of the central bank to freely implement
policy instruments in its pursuit to meet its
monetary goals.
The degree of independence of central banks
depends largely on the preferences and
circumstances of each nation.
THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE

1. Political business cycle- result of political pressure to boost


output in the short run—mainly before elections—in order to
finance government spending to lower unemployment and
interest rates that have potentially inflationary biases.
• Expansionary monetary policies are reversed after the
election to limit inflation, unnecessarily leading to
macroeconomic instability or booms and busts.
2. The public not only generally distrusts
politicians in regard to making politically
motivated decision, but also due to their lack of
expertise in conducting monetary policy.
3. Politicians can grant more independence to the
central bank in order to avoid public criticism
regarding unpopular macroeconomic decisions.
THE CASE AGAINST INDEPENDENCE
1. Macroeconomic stability can be best achieved if monetary policy
is properly coordinated with fiscal policy.
2. The theory of bureaucratic behavior suggests that the objective
of a bureaucracy is to maximize its own welfare, akin to
consumer’s behavior that aims at maximizing personal welfare.
The central bank can pursue a course of narrow self-interest to
increase its power and prestige at the expense of public interest.

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