Prescription For Social Dilemmas

Satoshi Fujii
Prescription
for Social
Dilemmas
Psychology for Urban, Transportation,
and Environmental Problems
Prescription for Social Dilemmas
Satoshi Fujii
Prescription for Social

Dilemmas
Psychology for Urban, Transportation,
and Environmental Problems
123
Satoshi Fujii
Department of Urban Management
Kyoto University
Kyoto
Japan
ISBN 978-4-431-55617-6 ISBN 978-4-431-55618-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55618-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016945778
© Springer Japan 2017

Translation from the Japanese language edition: Syakaiteki Jirenma no Syohousen: Toshi, Kotsu, Kankyo
Mondai no Shinrigaku by Satoshi Fujii © Nakanisyiya Syuppan 2003. All Rights Reserved.
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Preface to the English Translation
Since its original publication in Japan in 2003, I have used Prescription for Social
Dilemmas: The Psychology of Urban, Transportation, and Environmental
Problems in my applied (or public) psychology and global survivability university
classes for both undergraduate and graduate students. This book has also been read
by Japanese researchers, students, and practitioners interested in both scientific and
practical aspects of social dilemmas.
Meanwhile, several of the economic and social problems related to social
structure discussed in the book have become even more serious. Indeed, the global
economic crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 resulted in
the EU debt crisis in 2009 and the Chinese stock market crash in 2015. Such global
economic crises have produced political unrest throughout the world, leading to
serious (sometimes armed) conflict between different ethnic, national, and religious
groups.
However, a cooperative effort that involved people, companies, and states
throughout the world, aimed at redistributing their resources through various means
including economic investment and consumption rather than saving them for
themselves, would prevent deflation. What actually happens, however, is that these
actors operate according to self-interest and keep their income, an approach that
will never prevent deflation. Thus, although only a few economists, practitioners,
and politicians grasp its significance, the global economic crisis presently afflicting
people all over the world is typical of a social dilemma, one that involves conflict
between individual rationality and collective rationality. It is important that people
realize that cooperation can alleviate or eliminate this crisis (see Fujii, 2005,
Beyond Global Capitalism, in Springer).
We are now also suffering from major natural disasters, including the Indian
Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the Great
East Japan Earthquake in 2011. The damage done by such disasters can be mini-
mized if people in areas at risk for disasters are sufficiently cooperative, because
cooperation is essential for the establishment of regional resilience in the wake of
v
vi Preface to the English Translation
disasters, and for recovery from the damage inflicted by disasters (see Fujii, 2004,
Kyojinka: Building National Resilience, in Aspect).
Thus, the global problems we are currently facing are not restricted to issues that
have long been recognized, such as global warming or the population explosion and
poverty in developing countries, but include the global economic crisis and major
natural disasters. From a theoretical perspective, these can be viewed as social
dilemmas. In this era of serious global crises arising from worldwide social
dilemmas, we need prescriptions for how to solve problems.
This realization led me to publish this book in English in the hope it will
contribute to solving not only global problems but also domestic problems, such as
those affecting urban areas, transportation, and local environments. Although I
updated parts of the book as I translated it into English, especially the section
addressing work to be done in the future, most sections are left intact, as the theory
and empirical data originally presented remain relevant and helpful for under-
standing both the theoretical and practical aspects of social dilemmas.
This book provides a theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic treatment of social
dilemmas. Most books treating social dilemmas are not monographs but are pro-
ceedings or omnibus volumes composed of chapters written by different
researchers. Few monographs about social dilemmas have been published, and
those few only cover with basic theories and empirical findings. This book, by
contrast, is a monograph by a single author and provides a complete coverage from
basic theories in Part I to applied theories and pragmatic solutions for urban,
transportation, and environmental problems in Parts II and III. While previously
published books on social dilemmas are written for researchers in the field, the
present volume is written not only for social dilemma researchers but for a wider
variety of readers including practitioners in environmental psychology, trans-
portation psychology and travel behavior, and urban planning and transportation.
Furthermore, the theory and prescriptions for social dilemmas can also contribute to
efforts to solve a wide variety of real problems, including economic deflation,
global economic crisis, and establishment of regional or national resilience in the
context of many kinds of risk.
This work effectively provides a bridge between basic behavioral scientists,
applied behavioral scientists, and practitioners. With this useful source, basic sci-
entists will understand how to apply their scientific knowledge to the real-world and
also will encounter new scientific problems that should be solved scientifically.
Applied researchers and specialists will become familiar with new solutions
through basic research on social dilemmas and will be made aware of new prag-
matic problems that should be solved with a practical approach.
I would like to thank Mr. Yutaka Hirach of Springer Japan for assistance in the
publication of this English translation, and also to express deep thankfulness to
Prof. Tommy Gärling and Prof. Anders Biel in the department of psychology in
Göteborg University for their special comments for the book before its publication.
At my home in Murasakino, Kyoto, Japan Satoshi Fujii

January 2016
Preface to the First Edition in Japanese
in 2003
There are many academic disciplines such as psychology and engineering, in which
over the centuries our predecessors have made tremendous efforts to further human
knowledge. When we consider this point, one question naturally comes to mind:
why have humans dedicated such a vast amount of time and effort to academic
studies? From among the many reasons, in general, two basic motivations stand
out; one is “curiosity” and the other is “practicality”. Broadly speaking, it seems
that academic studies driven by curiosity are often referred to as “science”, while
those with an underlying expectation of practical results are classified as
“engineering”.
However, is it really possible to separate science and engineering?
The only way to explain why we possess this trait called “curiosity” is, if we
consider it from the evolutionary point of view, because curiosity had a practical
function to enhance our adaptation to our environment. It is also safe to say that in
order to gain practical knowledge, it is important to freely observe the world with a
spirit of curiosity. Thinking this way, as summed up in the phrase “scientific
technology”, we find that all academic studies were once included in the framework
of philosophy, and our “body of knowledge” may be an indivisible, coherent whole,
in which case it may not be a substantially meaningful effort to separate science and
engineering. It may just be that a particular body of knowledge is viewed as
scientific when it arouses curiosity, while the same body of knowledge may be
referred to as engineering if it brings about practical results. This book “Prescription
for Social Dilemma: The Psychology of Urban, Transportation, and Environmental
Issues”, is firmly based on the above recognition of science and engineering being
two sides of the same coin.
This book first considers that at the root of almost all social problems in real
society, there lies a “social dilemma” of “whether to behave selfishly, or to behave
cooperatively in consideration of others and the future”. We presuppose that a key
to solving various social problems can only be obtained by taking into account,
whether intentionally or not, the structure of a social dilemma. Then, by simulta-
neously taking an “engineering” approach to solve problems, and exploring the
vii
viii Preface to the First Edition in Japanese in 2003
“scientific” understanding of a phenomenon, we present a multi-faceted approach to

discuss the “theories and methods” to solve social dilemmas.
Part I discusses the structure of social dilemmas and basic theories for solving
them. Part II discusses “psychological strategies” which expect behavior change not
through working on the “environment of behavior” but rather on each person’s
“awareness”, thereby aiming at the solving of social dilemmas. Lastly, Part III
discusses “structural strategies” that aim at solving social dilemmas by working on
the “environment of behavior”. Especially, in the final Part III, we discuss several
collateral discussions centered upon the “problem of social acceptance (agreement
formation) of a policy” which occurs when implementing a structural strategy.
Having this structure, the book targets students and researchers in fields such as
social psychology related with social dilemmas; it also aims to be of use to students,
researchers, and administrators in fields dealing with actual social problems, in such
fields as transportation, urban life, the environment, and politics, in which the term
“social dilemma” had not previously been explicitly used.
By targeting such a wide range of readers, this book may cause some readers to
have the impression the book is too practical, or conversely it deals too much with
the scientific understanding of phenomenon”. However, for readers who find it too
practical, please bear in mind the undeniable fact that:
“The only reason why research on social dilemmas is conducted so widely is because social
dilemmas are an important social problem requiring practical solutions.”
And for the reader who finds too much scientific understanding, we would like
them to recall another undeniable fact that
“There is no way to solve an actual social problem without properly and scientifically
understanding the phenomenon.”
Whichever camp any reader may belong too we would suggest the following
reading schemes. For the reader concerned about the amount of practical material
please focus on
• Chapter 4 to 6, and Chapter 9 or 11 that especially discuss the theoretical
structure of social dilemmas.
For the reader concerned about the amount of scientific material please focus on
• 3-1 of Chapter 3
And then read through
• Chapter 7 and 8 that discuss the practical aspects of “psychological strategies” in
a social dilemma, or
• Chapter 11 that mainly discuss the “problem of accepting a policy and the
problem of forming social agreement”.
I am not confident how much my book is harmonized as a coherent “body of
knowledge”, yet I would be extremely happy if this book provides a trigger to help
configure such a body of knowledge that arouses both curiosity and practicality, and
Preface to the First Edition in Japanese in 2003 ix
that it may become one of many efforts contributing to the field of solving social
dilemmas.
I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who helped me bring
this book to completion. I would never have been able to write this book if I had not
had the opportunity to study in the research group of Prof. Tommy Gärling at the
University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The fruits of joint research with Prof. Gärling
provided the whole base of this book, and implications obtained through joint
research and discussions with colleagues such as Prof. Anders Biel, Mathias
Gustafsson, Daniel Eek, and Cecilia Jakobsson Bergstad are important catalysts.
Also, joint research with Prof. Kazuhisa Takemura of Waseda University, who
stayed in Gothenburg around the same time, forms a central part of the discussion
on the decision making frame; an essential part of the text.
Meanwhile, as I named this book a “prescription”, I was able to clearly structure
it as a tool to solve problems, thanks to my experience of academic training for
problem solving through writing my bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral theses under
the guidance of Prof. Yasunori Iida and Prof. Ryuichi Kitamura of Kyoto
University. In addition, I received many important insights that helped nourish this
book, from daily seminars and discussions with Prof. Tetsuo Yai, Prof. Takayuki
Ueda, Ass. Prof. Yasunori Muromachi, and Ass. Prof. Daisuke Fukuda of Tokyo
Institute of Technology, and from workshops and joint research with Prof. Kazuhiro
Arai, Prof. Kaori Karasawa, Prof. Toshiko Kikkawa, Prof. Kazuya Nakayachi, Prof.
Susumu Nishibe, and Ass. Prof. Motoki Watabe. Moreover, Mr. Fumihiro Hara and
Ms. Ayako Taniguchi of Hokkaido Development Engineering Center gave me
valuable comments and readily provided me with their documents.
This book refers to many joint research projects I have conducted at the Tokyo
Institute of Technology and Kyoto University, and all of them were realized for the
first time with the cooperation of professors such as Prof. Ryuichi Kitamura, as well
as many graduates. Furthermore, based on the rough draft of this book, I gave
seminars at Fujii Laboratory (as of 2003), with Mr. Masashi Yanagida, Mr. Go
Hagihara, Mr. Yutaka Takasu, Mr. Hiroki Matsuyama, Mr. Yusuke Someya, Mr.
Yoshifumi Tanikawa, and Ms. Yoko Suzuki, through which I obtained helpful
ideas and concepts.
Lastly, I was able to publish this book thanks to the efforts of Mr. Yoshitaka
Shishikura of Nakanishiya Shuppan, and the support of my family, Maoko, Sakura,
Taishi, and Masashi. In addition there are countless people who helped me with
direct and indirect support. To all of them I would like to express my sincere
gratitude from the bottom of my heart.
Thank you very much.
At my home in Suginami, Tokyo, Japan Satoshi Fujii

July 2003
Contents
Part I Theories for Social Dilemmas

1 What Are Social Dilemmas? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Social Dilemmas in Daily Life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Theoretical Definitions of Social Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Pragmatic Definition of Social Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Various Types of Social Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Commons Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Public Goods Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Social Trap and Social Fence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6 Chicken Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7 Step-Level Dilemma and Volunteer’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 Strategies for Solving Social Dilemmas: Structural Strategy
and Psychological Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Structural Strategy and Psychological Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Three Psychological Factors of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4 Theory for Behavior Modification Process for Cooperation . . . . . . 29
4.1 Process Model of Behavior Modification for Cooperation . . . . . 29
4.2 Formation of Behavioral Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Formation of Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Formation of Implementation Intention
Based on a Behavioral Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 34
4.5 Habits Obstructing Behavior Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 36
xi
xii Contents
4.6 Realization of Behavior Change: Formation of Habitual

Cooperative Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.7 Habitual Cooperative Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Part II Psychological Strategy

5 Correction of Cognition: Providing Objective Information . . ..... 45
5.1 Behavior Change by Providing Objective Information . . ..... 46
5.2 Deluded Belief of a Noncooperator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 46
5.3 Providing Objective Information Regarding the Decision
to Obtain a Driver’s License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 52
5.4 Providing Objective Information on the Cooperation
of Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 57
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 62
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 62
6 Facilitating Experience: Attitude Change Through Experience
Solicited by Temporary Structural Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 65
6.1 Sustainable Change Through Temporary Structural Change:
Simulation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 66
Positive Analysis on Cognition and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . ... 69
Positive Analysis on Attitude, Habit, and Behavior . . . . . . ... 73
6.4 Applying Temporary Structural Change to Pragmatic
Administrative Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 81
7 Basic Theory and Technique of Communication: Changing
Attitude and Behavior Through Verbal Communication . . . ..... 83
7.1 Relationship Between the Recipient and the Sender
of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 86
7.2 One-Sided Presentation and Two-Sided Presentation. . . . ..... 88
7.3 Presence of Specific Information Needed
for Behavior Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 93
7.4 Conclusion: Conditions Determining Success and Failure
of the Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8 Case Studies on Communicative Strategies to Change Attitudes
and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.1 Case Studies of the Collective Advice Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
8.2 Countermeasures of Psychological Reactance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.3 Travel Feedback Programs (TFP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
8.4 Case Studies of the Behavior Plan Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Contents xiii
8.5 Activation of Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Part III Structural Strategy

9 Merits and Demerits of the Structural Strategy:
Its “Indispensable Negative Impact” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
9.1 Bad Apple Effect: Doubt Toward a Psychological Strategy . . . . 138
9.2 Solving a Social Dilemma Through an Equilibrium Solution
Shift: Overcoming the Bad Apple Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
9.3 Darwin’s Dilemma: Limitations of a Psychological Strategy . . . 148
9.4 “Side Effects” of a Structural Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
9.4.1 Desirable Side Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
9.4.2 Undesirable Side Effects: The Problem
of a Decision Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
9.4.3 Undesirable Side Effect:
Issue of Intrinsic Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
10 Higher Order Social Dilemma in Response to a Structural
Strategy: Public Acceptance, Public Opinion, Volunteers,
and Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
10.1 Second-Order Public Goods Dilemma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
10.2 Public Acceptance Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
10.3 Spiral of Silence in the Public Acceptance Dilemma. . . . . . . . . 175
10.4 Volunteer’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
11 Public Acceptance of Structural Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
11.1 Infringement on Freedom and Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
11.2 Distributive Fairness and Expectation on Increasing Public
Benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
11.3 Procedural Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
11.4 Participation in Administration and Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
11.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
12 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Appendix: Scale of Each Psychological Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Part I
Theories for Social Dilemmas
• Many social problems can be conceived of as social dilemmas (Chap. 1).

• The definition of a social dilemma in real society is proposed as follows (Chap. 1).
A social dilemma is a social situation in which a person has to make a choice
between a defective behavior and a cooperative behavior. Defective behavior
contributes to increasing private benefit (or self-interest) in the short term, with a
consequent decrease to public benefit (or public-interest) in the long term.
Cooperative behavior contributes to increasing public benefit in the long term,
with a consequent decrease to private benefit in the short term.
• Several representative types of social dilemmas are introduced (Chap. 2).
• Strategies to solve social dilemmas can be categorized as either a structural or a
psychological strategy. A structural approach attempts to induce people’s coop-
eration by changing the environmental factors surrounding the behavior, while a
psychological strategy relies on people’s spontaneous cooperation by acting on
the psychological factors (Chap. 3).
• Most of the conventional political measures taken to solve social dilemmas in the
real world have been structural strategies such as improvements to taxation, law,
and physical systems. In contrast, not enough discussion on psychological
strategies has been undertaken to date, and there is now a need to examine those
psychological strategies that are both effective and realistic (Chap. 3).
• When considering the psychological strategies, it is necessary to take into account
three key psychological factors: knowledge, trust, and moral obligation (Chap. 3).
• In order to solve social dilemmas in real society, it is important to distinguish
defective behaviors performed out of habit, and to understand the processes of
behavior change and habit change. Based on this understanding, a process model
for behavior change is proposed (Chap. 4).
Chapter 1
What Are Social Dilemmas?
1.1 Social Dilemmas in Daily Life
Simply stated, social dilemmas underpin almost all social problems.

To begin with, let us consider a typical example of illegal parking on a street in
an urban area. For each individual, parking without paying for the parking ticket is
a reasonable and rational choice. However, if everyone makes such a reasonable
choice, the road will be full of parked cars, leading to serious congestion. As a
result, everyone will feel a high degree of dissatisfaction. To sum up, in the issue of
parking, there exists a dilemma in which the attempt of each person to gain a greater
advantage results in a greater disadvantage to each person.
Another dilemma is found underlying the population issue. For instance, when
we look at the population explosion of developing countries, we find a tendency in
families to increase the amount of available labor by having more children.
Therefore, for each household, there is a great benefit in raising more children.
However, if all households follow this practice and have as many children as they
can, the population explodes, giving rise to serious problems such as a lack of
resources and a food crisis. In contrast, in developed countries, each household is
required to expend considerable time, money, and effort to raise children who are
able to cope with a highly complicated society. Therefore, each household can
decrease its investment in cost and effort by limiting the number of children.
However, if all households limit their number of children in order to minimize cost
and effort, it enhances the decline in the birthrate, leading to a sudden decrease in
population. Just as a population explosion has its problems, a sudden decrease in
population causes serious social problems, such as the lack of an adequate labor
force and an aging society. In either case, whether it is a population explosion or a
declining birth rate, the population issue has the dilemma that the rational choice of
individuals causes irrational consequences, which are to the disadvantage of
everyone.
© Springer Japan 2017 3

S. Fujii, Prescription for Social Dilemmas, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55618-3_1
4 1 What Are Social Dilemmas?
As a more macroscale problem, there is the issue of the global environment. If

every individual on the planet turns up the air conditioning and rides in their car for
the sake of a more convenient and comfortable lifestyle, the consequent vast
amounts of exhaust emissions will lead to global warming. The increase of such
gases in the atmosphere gives rise to the greenhouse effect and an increase in air
temperature; such an increase will cause a variety of harmful effects and inflict
serious damage on people in every corner of the world.
In contrast to such obvious macroscale problems, micro-dilemmas also lurk in
our daily life. For example, let us imagine you work in a small department in a
company with several colleagues. As long as someone other than yourself works
hard in your office, it is O.K. if you do not work so hard. This is because even if you
slack off, it will not have a tremendous effect on the overall performance of the
organization itself, nor lead to a decrease in your income. Therefore, as an indi-
vidual, it is rational not to work so hard. However, if everyone thinks rationally and
everyone slacks off, the output of the department will decline dramatically, even
resulting in its possible closure. If we expand this rationality across the whole
company organization, it would mean company bankruptcy, and everyone losing
their job.
Similar problems are observed in many other areas of life, such as the problem of
cleaning your local residential area, or of using mobile phones in trains, or the
problem of maintenance and management of an apartment in a block.
A common attribute of such situations is the existence of a behavior which is not
desirable in terms of its long-term social impact, but is desirable from the standpoint
of short-term individual benefit. In the above office case, from the standpoint of the
short-term individual benefit, it is beneficial not to work so hard, but from the
long-term and social point of view, it is undesirable not to work hard. Likewise,
using your air conditioning and car as much as you like is beneficial from the
standpoint of short-term individual benefit, but it is not beneficial from the
long-term, social point of view.
Now, if you consider daily life, it is easy to understand that many people tend to
think as follows when confronted with a situation or dilemma:
I’m not supposed to do it, but it shouldn’t be a big problem if I’m the only one doing it.
People who think this way engage in socially undesirable behavior without
feeling so guilty. If the individual finds their attitude becomes acceptable to the
majority, their thinking evolves into
Well everyone does it,
and they continue to engage in socially undesirable behavior with even less feelings
of guilt.
If this is repeated, they start to think
I know it’s not good, but I can’t stop it so easily.
If many people repeat such socially undesirable behavior, even if the impact of
each small behavior on society is trivial, the accumulation of many tiny actions
1.1 Social Dilemmas in Daily Life 5
grows to have massive negative consequences for society as a whole. Of course,

some people may think differently
I know each behavior may not have much impact on society as a whole. But I shouldn’t do
what I’m not supposed to do, even if everyone else does it.
Such individuals are behaving sincerely and honestly. However, if the majority
of society is insincere and dishonest and continues to engage in socially undesirable
behavior, such an attitude is likely to have a negative effect on honest people too. In
other words, it would seem that honesty does not pay.
As the above examples clearly demonstrate social dilemmas in everyday life are
extremely common. They exist both latently and patently in many areas of our life
and are easy to understand in terms of daily behavior.
1.2 Theoretical Definitions of Social Dilemma
So far, social dilemma has been explained without any specific definition, and only
by giving a general image to the word “dilemma.” We will now attempt to define
the term social dilemma.
Social dilemma has been dealt with by various social sciences, such as psy-
chology, sociology, and economics, and it has been defined in a variety of ways
and, sometimes explained using different terms (e.g., Dawes 1980; Komorita 1994;
Messick and Brewer 1983; Schelling 1978; Yamagishi 1986, 1989). Such defini-
tions are roughly analogous, but to be precise, they differ slightly according to the
emphasis of each researcher. The following section introduces some of the defi-
nitions, and finally proposes a broad definition of social dilemma suited for applied
research.
To begin with, Dawes who first defined social dilemma (Dawes 1980) described
in his essay that social dilemma is a social situation in which the following two
conditions are met (Definition A).
(a) the social payoff to each individual for defecting behavior is higher than the
payoff for cooperative behavior, regardless of what the other society members
do, yet
(b) all individuals in the society receive a lower payoff if all defect than if all
cooperate.
For instance, suppose that you wish to speak on a mobile phone in a train. In
such a case, if your attitude is “I’m using it because I want to,” your satisfaction
(which can also be restated as benefit or convenience) will be large. What is more,
this applies not only to a case in which no one else is using a phone, but also to a
situation where everyone else is using a mobile phone; in this case, you still gain
from using your own. In other words, you gain by using the mobile phone
regardless of the behavior of others. This is Condition 1. On the other hand, if
everyone starts using the mobile phone in a train in accordance with such reasoning,
the carriage will become too noisy for you to enjoy a nap for instance, and you will
be subjected to constant nuisance. In the end, everyone feels more comfortable in a
train where people abide by a rule not to use mobile phones, rather than in a train in
which people use them selfishly. This is Condition 2. In this example, using a
mobile phone is the defective behavior, whereas inhibiting its use is the cooperative
behavior.
Next, let us assume that you are on holiday and trying to decide whether to visit
a sightseeing spot by using your car or by taking the public bus. If you go by car,
you can depart and return whenever you like, even with small children and elderly
people, or with a lot of luggage. If you go by bus, you must make allowances for
children and the elderly and minimize your baggage. You have to adjust your
departure and return time to the bus timetable. If it rains, or if the day is hot or cold,
the bus trip becomes even more inconvenient. What is more, you need to consider
extra time waiting for the bus, so the total traveling time of a bus becomes longer
than that of a car. Thus, a car is more convenient than a bus, regardless of how the
road is congested. This is Condition 1.
However, suppose that everyone thinks this way and takes their car rather than
the bus. In this case, the demand for the bus drops significantly, and if this con-
tinues for several years, the bus route may be scrapped for economic reasons
(regrettably, such cases are increasing since bus transport has been recently liber-
alized). In such circumstances, if you are unable to use a car, there is no way you
can visit the sightseeing spot. Needless to say, since everyone uses their car, there
will be heavy congestion on the way to the sightseeing spot. Not only yourself, but
everyone will suffer from the congestion. This is Condition 2. The reason why
Condition 2 occurs is because if a person uses their car, not a bus, the road becomes
more congested and the income of the bus company decreases; all this happens
because of this one car. Of course, the effect is trivial. But although it is tiny, it is
indeed a “nuisance” to others, and as the old saying goes “many a little makes a
mickle*” and the end result is a huge loss to society. *Many littles make much; or
many small actions accumulate into a big effect.
1.3 Pragmatic Definition of Social Dilemma
In order to make our later discussion easier, let us define the following two terms
here tentatively (although I will redefine defective behavior and cooperative
behavior more strictly later).
Defective behavior or defection:
a behavior that contributes to increasing private benefit (or self-interest), while
decreasing public benefit.
Cooperative behavior or cooperation:
a behavior that contributes to increasing public benefit (or collective-interest),
while decreasing private benefit.
Using these terms, Definition A defines social dilemma as
1.3 Pragmatic Definition of Social Dilemma 7
A situation in which the private benefit is larger if one chooses a defective behavior
regardless of the actions of others (Condition 1), but when everyone chooses a defective
behavior, the private benefit of each person becomes smaller than when everyone chooses a
cooperative behavior (Condition 2).
In the previous case of mobile phones in a train, the behavior to use a mobile
phone is defection, and inhibiting its use is cooperation. In the case of choosing the
means of transportation to a sightseeing spot, using a car is defection, and using the
public transportation is cooperation. In the issue of population explosion mentioned
in the beginning, giving birth to more children is defection, and limiting the number
of children to a certain level is cooperation.
Now, in the above definition, cooperation and defection are defined in a way that
there exists a conflict between the public benefit and the private profit. Therefore, if
using these terms, Definition A can be restated simply as follows:
A situation in which a person has to make a choice between cooperation (that contributes to
increasing the public benefit) and defection (that contributes to increasing the private
benefit).
This definition can also be rephrased as follows:

A situation in which cooperation and defection are in a state of discord.
For instance, in an ideal market economy, if producers aim to maximize their

profit, and consumers aim to maximize their benefit, the market mechanism makes
the market status optimal (i.e., Pareto optimal status). Namely, it is a status in which
no one can improve the Pareto status, or no one can increase one’s profit without
inflicting loss on others. In such an ideal market, defection that contributes to
increase the private benefit coincides with cooperation that contributes to increase
the public benefit. Therefore, a social dilemma does not exist. However, the opti-
mization behavior of each entity (that is, maximization of consumer benefit and
maximization of producer profit) does not always lead to the optimal status of the
market in reality. In such a situation, a behavior optimal for each person (defection)
is in discord with a behavior desirable for the market as a whole (cooperation), and
a choice has to be made between them. Thus, such a market can be regarded as
being in a state of social dilemma. Incidentally, the science of economics describes
this situation as a “failure of the market.” Additionally, the negative impact inflicted
to the public benefit by defection is almost equivalent to the concept of external
diseconomy.
When considering social dilemmas in reality, there is often a delay in time before
any defective behavior incurs a negative public impact (Joireman et al. in press).
For instance, in the issue of the global environment, it takes many decades before
the excessive use of automobiles and air conditioning significantly affects global
warming. If you regard the negative impact of defection to the public benefit as “a
little,” it takes time until everyone understands that they have accumulated enough
to make “a mickle.” That is, it requires a long period of time until “many a little
makes a mickle.”
Additionally, a social dilemma caused by a political problem often accompanies

a delay in time. For example, let us think about introducing a policy to charge car
users in order to solve the problem of congestion (i.e., a road pricing policy or
congestion charge). In this case, there is a choice for a car user to agree or disagree
with the policy. They may disagree to the introduction of the policy from the
viewpoint of private benefit, since it requires extra expenditure. But if the policy is
not introduced since everyone is opposed to it, the problem of road congestion will
not be solved.
On the other hand, if the policy is introduced (which requires a certain amount of
payment by drivers), each person may be inhibited from using their car, and the
road congestion issue may be solved. Then, even if the cost paid by a driver
increases, the benefit of the policy for the driver may well outweigh such a cost. In
this case, disagreeing to the policy may be desirable from the short-term viewpoint
of private benefit. However from the long-term viewpoint of public benefit, it is
more desirable to agree to it.
Namely, there exists a social dilemma in which agreement is cooperation and
disagreement is defection. Incidentally, the discussion so far on the “road con-
gestion problem” is also an issue of social dilemma concerning the usage of
automobiles. In order to distinguish it from the “issue of social acceptance of a
policy for solving the road congestion problem” mentioned just now, the former is
sometimes referred to as the first-order dilemma and the latter the second-order
dilemma (Yamagishi 1986). Its detail will be discussed in PART III. Going back to
the main subject, even if people express agreement to the policy by a majority vote
in a legally binding poll, it takes a certain period of time until the policy is intro-
duced and its effect observed. To conclude, regarding social dilemmas on political
issues (or the second-order social dilemmas), the consequences of peoples’ actions
become apparent with a delay in time.
If you consider the issue of time delay as it occurs in social dilemmas in reality,
it should be wise before defining social dilemma to clarify the time effect in the
definition of cooperation and defection as follows:
Defective behavior or defection: a behavior that contributes to increasing the
private benefit in the short term, while decreasing the public benefit in the long
term.
Cooperative behavior or cooperation: a behavior that contributes to increasing
the public benefit in the long term, while decreasing the private benefit in the short
term.
Now, take a look at Fig. 1.1. The vertical axis of this diagram shows the time
base (time axis). And the horizontal axis expresses the social distance. As shown in
this diagram, people who engage in a defective behavior only take into account the
benefit of the area around the point of origin (Yourself and Present) of this graph. In
other words, defection is a behavior in which they consider only their own
short-term benefit. In contrast, people who engage in a cooperative behavior take
1.3 Pragmatic Definition of Social Dilemma 9
Time Scope of benefit considered

Future for cooperation
Present
Social distance
Comp lete other Yourself Complete other
Scope of benefit
considered for defection
Fig. 1.1 Scope of benefit considered for cooperation and defection
into account not only their own benefit but also that of others with whom they may
not have much personal involvement. Moreover, they also consider not only the
short-term but also the long-term benefit.
Having said that, this book defines a social dilemma as a social situation in
which an individual has to make a choice between defection and cooperation as
defined with the time axis described above. In sum, social dilemma is defined as
follows.
Social dilemma: a social situation in which a choice has to be made between a

behavior that contributes to increasing the private benefit in the short term
while decreasing the public benefit in the long term (defection) or a behavior
that contributes to increasing the public benefit in the long term, while
decreasing the private benefit in the short term (cooperation).
The first argument of this book is that when an attempt is made to solve social
issues such as the problems of transportation, environment, and population, it is
wise to recapture those issues based on this definition of social dilemma. Moreover,
as it is self-evident from the definition of cooperation and defection shown in
Fig. 1.1, it is important to solve social dilemmas by finding a way to change the
mindset of individuals who consider only factors around the point of origin as
shown in Fig. 1.1 and encourage them to start considering wider, long-term social
aspects. Based on such concepts, this book aims to explore theoretical, empirical,
and practical methods of encouraging people to engage in cooperative behaviors
and thus contribute to the solving of social dilemmas.
References
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.

Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1994). Social dilemmas. Madison, WI: Brown and Benchmark.
Messick, D. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A Review. In L. Wheeler &
P. Shaver (Eds.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 11–44). Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Microbehaviors and macrobehavior. New York: W.W. Norton.
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The structural goal/expectation theory of cooperation in social dilemmas.
In E. Lawler & B. Morkovsky (Eds.), Advances in Group Processes (Vol. 3, pp. 52–87). JAL:
Greenwich, CT.
Yamagishi, T. (1989). Main theoretical approaches of social dilemma study. Japanese
Psychological Review, 32(3), 161–194. (in Japanese with English abstract).
Chapter 2
Various Types of Social Dilemma
In order to examine the pragmatic methods of solving social dilemmas, it is

important to understand the logical structure of dilemmas that underpin actual
real-life problems. To this end, and also to facilitate the basic understanding of
social dilemmas, the categories and types of representative social dilemmas will be
reviewed in the following section. Incidentally, note that these categories are not
exclusive to each other, but include areas of overlap. Moreover, refer also to
Komorita and Parks (1994) and Yamagishi (1989) for more detailed descriptions on
the categories of these dilemmas.
2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma (or PD game) is perhaps one of the simplest ways to
express a social dilemma.
Two friends are arrested, and as prisoners they are kept in solitary confinement;
periodically they are interrogated separately; they have no way of communicating
with each other. Their interrogator then puts a proposal to them: “If you confess that
your buddy is the ringleader, then you will be regarded as his sidekick and will
receive a short sentence. The jail terms are 15 years for the ringleader, and one year
for the sidekick. But if both of you confess that the other is the ringleader, then we
regard both of you as equally guilty, and you will be imprisoned for 10 years.
However, if both of you keep silent, you will be imprisoned for 3 years”. The
interrogators offer is shown in Fig. 2.1. Then, each prisoner may assess their sit-
uation as follows:
What happens if my buddy is tempted by the interrogator’s proposal and makes a con-
fession? If I then confess, it means that as both of us have confessed, since there is no
ringleader or sidekick, we will both receive 10 years in jail. If I do not confess, I will be
regarded as the ringleader anyway and will receive the heavier penalty of 15 years. That
means it is better for me to make a confession.

12 2 Various Types of Social Dilemma
Choices o f Prisoner A
Keep silent Make a confession
(cooperation) (defection)
Choices 3 years (R) 1 year (T)

of Keep silent
Prisoner
(cooperation ) 3 years (R) 15 years (S)
B
15 years (S) 10 years (P)

Make a
confession 1 year (T) 10 years (P)
(defection)
Fig. 2.1 Example of the game matrix of prisoner’s dilemma and its basic structure
On the other hand, what happens if my buddy does not make a confession? If I confess, I
will be the sidekick and my buddy the ringleader, and I will be imprisoned for only a year.
However, if I do not confess, it means that both of us are keeping quiet, which means
imprisonment for 3 years. So it is better for me to make a confession. At the end of the day,
whether or not my buddy confesses, it is always better for me to confess.
Of course, it is not only this prisoner who thinks in this way, if his counterpart is
also rational enough, he will also come to the same conclusion that it is better to
make a confession. If both make a confession, their term of imprisonment will be
10 years.
If both do not confess and keep quiet their term of imprisonment will only be
3 years each.
In sum, the prisoner’s dilemma game is a game with the following profit
structure: if each prisoner gives priority to their own private benefit and thinks
rationally about making a confession, the result is a decrease in the private benefit
of each. In contrast, if each prisoner does not give priority to their own private
benefit and stays quiet, the result is an increase in the private benefit of each.
Incidentally, there are four letters R, P, T, and S inserted in Fig. 2.1 to explain
the general profit structure of the prisoner’s dilemma game. They stand for the
weight of the punishment as in
R = Reward
P = Punishment
T = Temptation
S = Suckers’ payoff
Having provided the profit structure as such, the game is defined as the pris-
oner’s dilemma game if the following two conditions are met.
2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma 13
Condition 1: T < R < P < S

Condition 2: 2R < (T + S)
Of course, the inequality signs should be opposite, if it expresses not the weight
of punishment but the size of profit. Additionally, if you consider the sum of the
two prisoners’ profit the latter Condition 2 shows that the most rational situation is
when both keep quiet.
2.2 N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma
The social dilemma already explained as Definition A in this book is actually based
on the definitions of n-person prisoner’s dilemma. It expands the way of thinking of
the prisoner’s dilemma game to include three or more participants. When Dawes
proposed the concept of social dilemma, he defined it as the situation of n-person
prisoner’s dilemma (Dawes 1980). Thus, the definition of social dilemma in this
book which attempts pragmatic solutions is an expansion of the definition given by
Dawes. Although the later-mentioned public goods dilemma, commons dilemma,
social trap, and social fence are included in the definition of social dilemmas in this
book, but not in that of Dawes.
In n-person prisoner’s dilemma, people must make a choice between cooperation
and defection. And the profit gained by choosing a cooperative behavior and a
defective behavior changes according to the number of cooperators, namely, how
many out of n persons is choosing the cooperative behavior, as shown in Fig. 2.2.
However, despite the number of cooperators, you still gain higher profit if you take
the defective behavior rather than choosing the cooperative behavior.
Benefit
Each person’s
benefit when Each person’s benefit when
everyone cooperated Benefit of noncooperator everyone cooperated = C n
= Cn
Benefit of cooperator
Each person’s
benefit when
everyone did not
cooperate = D 0
The number of cooperators

0 1 n-1 n
persons person persons persons
Fig. 2.2 Benefit structure of n-person prisoner’s dilemma

This is shown in Fig. 2.2 by the way that the profit function of a noncooperator
is located higher than that of a cooperator. Incidentally, this is equivalent to
Condition 1 in Definition A. However, each person’s profit is higher when
everyone is the cooperator, compared to when everyone is the noncooperator. This
relationship is shown as Cn > D0 in Fig. 2.2. This is equivalent to Condition 2 in
Definition B. If these conditions are met, such a social situation is defined as the n-
person prisoner’s dilemma. In this dilemma, if people aim to increase their private
benefit, everyone becomes a noncooperator, according to the above Condition 1. As
a result, the level of each person’s profit becomes lower than when everyone is
choosing the cooperative behavior, according to Condition 2. A situation inclusive
of such a dilemma is deemed as n-person prisoner’s dilemma.
2.3 Commons Dilemma
This is a social dilemma pointed out by Hardin in his essay “Tragedy of the
Commons” published in the magazine Science (Hardin 1968). It illustrates the
“Tragedy of the Commons” as follows; Suppose that a pasture is shared by several
shepherds. Each shepherd lives by raising sheep, and can decide the number of
sheep in their flock. Now, imagine that there is a rational shepherd who wishes to
maximize his profit. He will try to increase the number of sheep as much as
possible, since he can obtain a greater amount of milk and wool. Likewise, if all
shepherds are rational, they will all try to increase the number of sheep as much as
they can. However, the amount of grass provided by the pasture is limited.
Therefore, all the sheep will die before the next spring comes. And all shepherds
will totally lose their livelihoods.
After all, given the limited resources, if everyone is sufficiently self-centered and
rational, the sustainability of society as a whole will be lost. Hence the commons
dilemma is also known as the resource dilemma. Another name for this dilemma is
the take-some game, since it is a game to take some amount from a specific
resource.
2.4 Public Goods Dilemma
Let us think of a typical example of public goods, such as a bridge or a road, which
offer equal convenience to everyone in society. In order to supply such public goods
to society, a certain amount of cooperation by people is needed, such as the
agreement to pay taxes or use a particular system. Namely, in this case it requires
“an action to pay some of the cost out of one’s own pocket.” However, whether or
not the public goods are actually supplied, it is more beneficial for each individual
not to engage in such cooperative behavior, i.e., “not to pay out of one’s own
pocket.” It is because if other people are offering enough of the needed cooperative
2.4 Public Goods Dilemma 15
behavior to provide the public goods, your own cooperation or defection does not
matter to ensure the supply of the public goods.
In other words, each person faces a temptation “to free ride on the cooperative
behavior of others.” Such a situation is also referred to as the “the free rider problem
of public goods” (Olson 1965) which is often discussed as problematic in the field
of public economics. If everyone is tempted to free ride, in the end the public goods
will not be supplied. However, if each person cooperates for the sake of a certain
public consideration, even if some cooperation ends up wasted, the public goods
will still be supplied, and everyone will be able to receive benefit. Incidentally, in
contrast to the commons dilemma, the public goods dilemma is a game to explore
how much of each individual’s resources are to be provided to the public. Thus it is
also known as a give-some game.
2.5 Social Trap and Social Fence
The social trap is a kind of social dilemma proposed by Platt (1973). Its definition is
a situation in which conducting a certain behavior (defection) contributes to
increasing the private benefit in the short term, but not conducting the behavior
(cooperation) contributes to the higher benefit in the long term. The simplest form
of social trap is demonstrated by someone on a diet. The person has to make a
choice between eating or not eating that cake; they are tempted to increase their
private benefit in the present by eating the cake, or to refrain from eating the cake to
achieve the long-term goal of the diet. In this case, if you succumb to your desire to
eat the cake your attempt to diet will fail. Of course, such a social trap for only a
single person is usually not defined as a social dilemma, but for example, the global
environment issue mentioned in Sect. 1.3 above can also be defined as a social
trap. That is to say, if each person uses their car frequently since they are so
convenient, global warming will be the result in the long term. In this case, con-
tinuing to use cars without considering the long-term impact can be said to be a
form of the “social trap.”
Now, the characteristic of a social trap is that it emphasizes the time axis. That is,
in the many dilemmas discussed up to now, such as n-person prisoner’s dilemma, it
is possible to define cooperation without consideration for future public benefit.
However, the social trap defines cooperation as considering the future benefit, as
shown in Fig. 2.3.
Platt also proposed the social fence as a counterpart to the social trap; in the
social fence a certain behavior brings about a higher profit in the long term, but its
execution is accompanied with a loss in the short term. For example, it is not much
fun to study for an exam, but if you do, you can get a better grade; for an individual
such a situation is a social fence. By the same token, in the problem of accepting a
road pricing policy that imposes car usage charges, if you are short-term-sighted,
Time
Future Scope of benefit considered for cooperation
in a social trap/social fence
Scope of benefit considered for cooperation

in n-person prisoner’s dilemma
Present Social distance

Complete other Yourself Complete other
Fig. 2.3 Example of scope of benefit considered in cooperation of social trap/social fence and n-
person prisoner’s dilemma. Note The scope of benefit shown here is just an example. In n-person
prisoner’s dilemma, it is also possible to define cooperation considering the time axis. Likewise, in
a social trap, it also is possible to define cooperation considering the presence of others in a wider
scope. This figure expresses that “in n-person prisoner’s dilemma, the time axis does not always
need to be considered,” and “in a social trap/social fence, many individuals (or people other than
yourself) do not always need to be considered.”
you will tend to disagree as it incurs a cost. But even taking into account the
additional cost, if the policy is accepted, congestion will be mitigated, which brings
about long-term benefit. From this point of view, the issue of accepting a road
pricing policy can be regarded as a social fence.
2.6 Chicken Dilemma
This is a social dilemma with the structure of the chicken game in game theory. The
chicken game resembles the prisoner’s dilemma game, but the difference is that
when both parties choose a defective behavior, each person’s profit becomes
minimal. In other words, if one follows the definition in Fig. 1.1, the prisoner’s
dilemma game is in a relationship of
Temptation [ Reward [ Punishment [ Sucker’s payoff
But instead of this relationship, if the following relationship is realized, it is

called a chicken game.
Temptation [ Reward [ Sucker’s payoff [ Punishment
Incidentally, this inequality sign is based on defining each variable as a profit.

What is shown by this relational expression of profit is that if others are choosing a
cooperative behavior, the larger private benefit is provided if you choose a defective
2.6 Chicken Dilemma 17
behavior, but if others are choosing the defective behavior, the larger private benefit
is provided if you choose the cooperative behavior. Hence the chicken game has a
characteristic that a choice to bring about the larger private benefit depends on the
action of the counterpart. This is the difference between the prisoner’s dilemma in
which a larger private benefit is provided if you choose a defective behavior,
regardless of the action of the other party. Therefore, in the chicken’s dilemma,
even for an individual who aims to maximize their self-centered benefit, the
expectation of what behavior others choose will have a great impact on one’s own
behavior.
2.7 Step-Level Dilemma and Volunteer’s Dilemma
This refers to a type of social dilemma with a structure in which each individual’s
benefit declines sharply when the ratio of cooperators in society falls beneath a
certain level. Many of the commons and public goods dilemmas are step-level
dilemmas. For example, let us think of a public goods dilemma where a bridge is to
be constructed by donations from residents in a village. If the donations reach the
required amount, the bridge will be built. If this happens, all residents can receive
the benefit of the bridge. However, if the donations are below the amount, the
bridge will not be built, and the village will not benefit from the bridge. Similarly,
let us consider road congestion. In general, road congestion occurs when the
demand for transportation exceeds the capacity of a certain stretch of road.
Naturally if demand is lower than the road capacity, congestion does not occur. If
congestion occurs, there will be a sharp increase in traveling time. Even in a section
of road which you can drive through in just 5 min before congestion, once the road
is congested, it may take more than 20, or even 30 min to escape the traffic jam. In
this way, the step-level dilemma has a profit structure in which the profit received
by an individual changes rapidly and discretely, such as a bridge can or cannot be
constructed, or congestion does or does not occur.
The volunteer’s dilemma is a special type of the step-level dilemma (Diekmann
1985). It is a dilemma with a profit structure in which each individual’s profit
changes rapidly depending on whether there is one cooperator or not. Many helping
behaviors have a step-level dilemma structure. The most representative example is
whether someone helps a person who has collapsed in a crowded place. In this case,
only one individual needs to offer help, but if no one steps forward, the person may
die. Other cases are whether someone cleans a public area such as a park or a school
research lab, or who is taking the leadership in organizing a festival or a sports
event. They can all be regarded as the volunteer’s dilemma, since they are all
situations in which if there is just one volunteer, the public benefit increases greatly.
References

Diekmann, A. (1985). Volunteer’s dilemma. Journal of conflict resolution, 29, 605–610.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1994). Social dilemmas. Madison, WI: Brown and Benchmark.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28, 641–651.
Yamagishi, T. (1989). Main theoretical approaches of social dilemma study. Japanese
Psychological Review, 32(3), 161–194. (in Japanese with English abstract).
Chapter 3
Strategies for Solving Social Dilemmas:
Structural Strategy and Psychological
Strategy
3.1 Structural Strategy and Psychological Strategy
Many researchers focusing on social dilemmas have constantly sought for clues to
answer such questions as
What should be done to solve social dilemmas?
Or
How can we encourage people’s cooperation in a social dilemma situation?
Moreover, to date, research has focused on the two kinds of factors determining
people’s cooperation: external environmental factors and internal psychological
factors. Hence strategies to cope with dilemmas have often been categorized into
the following two types (Dawes 1980; Messick and Brewer 1983; Umino 1990;
Yamagishi 1986; Van Vugt et al. 1996; and refer to the Appendix Text 1.
Structural Strategy
To change the actual social structure generating the social dilemma through
strategies such as imposing legal regulations to prohibit a defective behavior,
decreasing the individual benefit of the defective behavior, or increasing the indi-
vidual benefit of a cooperative behavior.
Psychological Strategy or Behavioral Strategy
To facilitate spontaneous cooperation without changing the social structure, but
instead by directly approaching and making use of the personal psychological
factors which determine the individual behavior, such as belief, attitude, ascribed
responsibility, trust, moral obligation, and conscience.
Namely, among factors that determine people’s behavior, the structural strategy
solicits cooperation by changing environmental factors, while the psychological
strategy (or behavioral strategy) expects to solicit spontaneous cooperation by
approaching people’s internal psychological factors. Incidentally, Fig. 3.1 shows

20 3 Strategies for Solving Social Dilemmas …
Structural Environmental
strategy factor
Cooperation
Psy chological
strategy Psychological
(behavioral strategy) factor
Fig. 3.1 Structural strategy and psychological (behavioral) strategy
the basic overview of each strategy, and Fig. 3.2 illustrates the types of each
strategies.
For example, let us think of a social dilemma involving car usage and the
transportation problem (Fujii et al. 2001a; Gärling and Sandberg 1997; Garvill
1999; Joireman et al. 1997; Van Vugt 1996a, b). As the simplest form of social
dilemma in transportation, suppose that using cars is defection, and using buses is
cooperation. Namely, cars take people directly to destinations without the worry of
weather conditions, yet if many people use them, the road will soon be full of cars,
resulting in road congestion. As a result, it will require a longer time for people to
arrive at their destinations, regardless of whether they are using cars or buses. On
the other hand, if many people use buses, the road will not be congested, and the
time required to reach the destination will be shorter for both those using cars and
those using buses.
Now, aiming to solve this situation of social dilemma is to consider how to
encourage car users to switch to public transportation. In order to achieve that goal,
past conventional transportation policies have often applied the following methods.
[Pull policy]
• Increase the frequency of buses
• Improve the condition of bus stops (including station squares) to facilitate
smoother bus travel
• Adjust the signals at crossings to prioritize buses
• Decrease the bus fares, etc.
[Push policy]
• Impose charges for car usage on car users (road pricing)
• For each driver, allocate driving and non-driving days according to the car
number plate (number plate system), etc.
The pull policy here refers to a policy that aims to facilitate a cooperative
behavior (i.e., bus usage). The push policy refers to a policy to switch individuals
from choosing a defective behavior (i.e., car usage) to cooperative behavior by
disturbing the defection (Vlek and Michon 1992). This is easily described in terms
of the carrot and the stick, the pull policy encourages cooperation using the carrot,
and the push policy facilitates cooperation using the stick. Incidentally,
3.1 Structural Strategy and Psychological Strategy 21
Solutions of social dilemmas
Structural strategy
Pull method
Method to increase self-centered benefit of cooperation
Push method
Method to decrease self-centered benefit of defection, or to prohibit defection
Psychological strategy
Method of providing objective information

Expect to modify a behavior towards cooperation through provision of objective
information.
Method of facilitating experience
Expect to modify a behavior towards sustainable cooperation through facilitating
experience of cooperation. “Temporary structural change” is one of the examples.
Communication method
Expect to modify a behavior towards cooperation through communication more
than provision of objective information, often involving a combination of the
following four methods.
Request method: Request to conduct a cooperative behavior.
Advice method: Advise how to conduct a cooperative behavior.
Feedback method: Measure people’s behavior and feed it back to them as

information. By setting the goal (goal-setting method) at the same time,
further effects can be expected.
Behavioral plan method: Request to make and write down a behavioral plan
of a cooperative behavior.
Fig. 3.2 Categories of solutions of social dilemmas. Note Refer to PART II for the details of the
psychological strategy in the diagram. Regarding the structural strategy, the example of the pull
and push policies in the field of transportation described in the main text, have been generalized
into the pull and push methods in the diagram
psychological research on transportation behavior has amply demonstrated that

these policies are all effective to bring about behavioral change (c.f. Everett and
Watson 1987). In actual transportation policy, it is also widely known under the
name of Travel Demand Management, or TDM.
Now, whether it is a push or pull policy, the above-mentioned transportation policies
all address only the environmental factors that determine the transportation behavior.
The frequency of buses, the structure of bus stops, crossings with signals, bus fares, car
costs, and the legal aspects of the number plate system are all environmental factors.
There are also various psychological factors influencing the choice of trans-
portation behavior. Thus, it should also be possible to incorporate various psy-
chological strategies into transportation policies. However, at least with the present
transportation administration, it seems that such an approach is not applied very

often. Of course, we have seen campaign policies involving psychological strate-
gies, such as the “Not My Car Day” which aims to mitigate car congestion by
promoting one day a month through TV and newspapers to encourage motorists not
to use their car. Although several cities have tried this approach, no sustainable
effect has been reported. Other campaign policies have been discussed and actually
some have even been added to the policy menu, but at least in Japan no case so far
has been effectively conducted with sufficient budget and planning.
From this perspective, one can say that at least in the transportation plan, most
policies adopted in the past for solving the problem of the transportation dilemma
were structural strategies.
Yet this tendency is not limited to just the social dilemma around the usage of
automobiles and public transportation. For instance, regarding strategies taken by
the administration on the problem of illegal parking of cars or bikes, although some
campaign policies used TV commercials and ads, most of the budget was allocated
to structural strategies such as constructing a system to control illegal parking, or
the creation of more parking lots. Similarly, in the population issue social dilemma,
the main discussion is often about policies such as giving tax incentives to stop the
birth rate falling, or decreasing expenses or giving subsidies for delivery of a baby.
In this way, the present situation is that most of the actual policies are structural
strategies, and even when a psychological strategy is adopted, it is limited within the
scope of a “campaign,” and generally has not yet permeated sufficiently throughout
society.
Direct reasons for this situation may be as follows.
1. Actual administrators have little knowledge on psychological strategies which
have been scientifically proven to be effective.
2. Therefore, they simply conduct the campaign policies without having enough
logical proof. But because they do not have the scientific backup, policy effects
remain limited. This further leads to the assessment by administrators that the
so-called campaign policies are not effective.
3. On the other hand, the fact that people’s behaviors change by altering the
taxation or legal system is self-evident and just plain common sense, so it does
not require scientific examination to verify such effects, as indeed, they have
been proved to be effective in reality.
4. However, it often requires enormous expenditure to conduct effective structural
strategies such as constructing a new railway line to avoid the transportation
dilemma, or developing a new type of energy to avoid the dilemma of the global
environment.
5. Based on these reasons, most of the budget and human resources are then
allocated for structural strategies, leaving little for the effective deployment of
psychological strategies.
If most policies for coping with social dilemmas taken by the typical adminis-
tration in real society are based on structural strategies for the above reasons, in
3.1 Structural Strategy and Psychological Strategy 23
order to cope with social dilemmas more effectively with a limited budget and
human resources, it could be more productive to focus efforts based on the fol-
lowing approach. Namely, to continue examining structural strategies that have
been discussed repeatedly in the past with the addition of logically examining and
thoroughly analyzing the potential impact of any effective psychological strategies.
The first argument of this book suggests that it is effective to recapture various
social issues in reality as social dilemmas, in order to consider how best to solve
them. Now, the second argument of this book states that it is essential to logically,
empirically, and practically examine actual ways to deploy psychological strategies.
Now, in order to actually consider psychological strategies, what psychological
factors should we focus on?
3.2 Three Psychological Factors of Cooperation
Among the many psychological factors which may facilitate cooperation, Dawes
who clearly defined social dilemma indicated that the following three are especially
important (Dawes 1980):
knowledge,
trust, and
moral obligation.
Here, the overview of these three psychological factors will be introduced.
(1) Knowledge
If a person choosing a defective behavior does not know that their action is
defective, they will not begin choosing a cooperative behavior, unless there is a
change in the structure of the dilemma. The prerequisite for facilitating spontaneous
cooperation is to possess knowledge of exactly what is cooperation and what is not.
Now, in order to understand one’s own behavior in the framework of cooperation or
noncooperation, the individual needs at least to have “knowledge of the long-term,
social consequence of what seems to be the most rational behavior when consid-
ering only their own short-term, current benefit.” Making use of Fig. 1.1, not only
considering the short-sighted benefit of yourself (around the point of origin) but
also the overall benefit in the long-term, social aspect, and to have knowledge on
the character of such benefit, are the prerequisites to understand your own activity
within the framework of whether your behavior is cooperation or defection.
(2) Trust
In social dilemmas, each person’s benefit depends largely on the behavior of
others. If you are choosing a cooperative behavior while all the others are choosing
a defective behavior, you fall into a situation of “honesty doesn’t pay,” in which
you are the only one who gains an extremely small benefit. Namely, in order to
avoid the situation of “honesty doesn’t pay,” and still choose a cooperative
behavior, it is necessary that others also choose the cooperative behavior. In such
case, since everyone gains an equal benefit, people do not feel so dissatisfied even if
they do not get an especially high benefit through the defective behavior that “steals
a march on others.” Thus, if each person anticipates that other people also choose a
cooperative behavior, in other words, if they trust others, each person’s possibility
of choosing a cooperative behavior increases. To put it the other way around, in a
situation without mutual trust, it is difficult to hope for spontaneous cooperation.
In this way, trust plays an important role in facilitating cooperation in social
dilemmas. However, it has an independent effect from the benefit structure of social
dilemmas. It is because people have the tendency to do a certain behavior for the
simple reason that many others are doing it too. In general, this predisposition is
called the conformity effect. For example, simply because many others are
describing a short stick as long, one tends to change one’s perception and describe a
clearly short stick as long (Asch 1951). Just by knowing that many people are
supporting a certain policy, one tends to also support it (Jakobsson et al. 2000; Fujii
et al. 2001b).
From this reason, people’s spontaneous cooperation is facilitated by trusting that
“others should also be choosing the cooperative behavior.” In fact, initial research
on social dilemmas reported that there was a strong positive correlation between
knowledge concerning the rate of cooperation by others (trust) and people’s
cooperation (Tyszka and Grzelak 1976; Dawes et al. 1977; Marwell and Ames
1979).
However, if people are purely selfish, “trust” should have a negative, rather than
positive, correlation with cooperation. This is because if others choose the coop-
erative behavior, the attraction of choosing a defective behavior becomes even
greater. Namely, the more others are cooperative, there is an increased possibility to
activate the self-centered motivation of gaining a high benefit only for yourself by
“stealing a march on others,” as mentioned earlier.
This can also be referred to as the “incentive to free ride on public goods” noted
previously in the public goods dilemma. In fact, in the field of public economics,
there is an assumption that people often “free ride on public goods” (Olson 1965).
However, as mentioned above, since it is empirically proven that there is a positive
correlation between trust and cooperation, it means that people are not so purely
selfish as assumed in the public economics. What is more, it means that the moral
obligation described next is an important factor to determine a behavior.
(3) Moral obligation
In a large-scale social dilemma, there is no big difference to the public benefit
whether a single person chooses a cooperative behavior or a defective behavior. For
example, in the situation that millions of cars are emitting CO2, even if a single
person refrained from driving their car, the total exhaust of CO2 from cars would
change very little.
3.2 Three Psychological Factors of Cooperation 25
In such a situation, even when one has the awareness of choosing a cooperative
behavior for the long-term, social benefit, one may refrain from doing so since
one’s effort may end up wasted. In other words, in the situation of a large-scale
social dilemma, the altruistic motivation to be helpful to others or society does not
have a strong direct effect on cooperation. Moreover, the larger the scale of the
dilemma becomes, the smaller any effect gradually becomes (Lynn and Oldenquist
1986). Incidentally, this point is expanded in Appendix Text 2 at the end of this
chapter. Especially for the relationship between altruistic motivation and moral
obligation, refer to Appendix Text 3.
However, those with a moral obligation above a certain level may conduct a
cooperative behavior even if it is not so useful for society. Similarly, such a person
may choose a cooperative behavior even if they do not trust others and know that
“honesty doesn’t pay.” Moral obligation is the will to try to match one’s behavior to
the norm that they believe desirable (e.g., social norm).
Therefore, if a person has a moral obligation and thinks that they should choose
a cooperative behavior, they conduct cooperation regardless of the behavior of
others, even if there is a possibility that honesty does not pay, and even if it seems
that their behavior may not be that useful for society as a whole. In other words,
moral obligation is the spirit to habitually conform to the personal norm, irre-
spective of any selfish benefit to oneself or altruistic benefit to others. Therefore, in
a society with high moral standards that reflect social norms, as long as people have
knowledge of what is cooperation, social dilemmas do not occur in principle.
Hence, it is extremely important for solving social dilemmas that moral obligation
exists in individuals as a psychological factor, and that the social norm exists in
society for individuals to internalize as their own personal moral obligation.
[Appendix Text 1] Psychological (behavioral) strategy and structural
strategy.
The term psychological strategy/structural strategy has been used in various
ways until now. For instance, Yamagishi (1986) showed that there are structural
factors and individual factors in soliciting cooperation, and that it is required to
approach these factors in order to solve dilemmas. Also, Van Vugt et al. (1996b)
categorized them as the individual psychological approach and the structural
approach, Messick and Brewer (1983) as the strategy of influence on individual
choice and the strategy of structural change, Umino (1990) as the solution to
approach structural factors and the solution to approach individual factors, and
Dawes (1980) as a strategy of changing payoff and the strategy to influence utility
that incorporates altruism, social norm, or conscience, respectively. This book
adopts the terms “structural strategy” for a strategy that aims to solve social
dilemmas through influencing environmental factors, and “psychological strategy”
or “behavioral strategy” for a strategy that expects to encourage people’s behavior
towards cooperation by approaching individual psychological factors.
[Appendix Text 2] Effectiveness and ineffectiveness of altruistic motivation.
There are several cases in which altruistic motivation is clearly effective. For
instance, the spirit of altruism or the volunteer spirit plays an extremely important
role in the volunteer’s dilemma that has a profit structure in which the public benefit
greatly increases when there is one cooperator in society, rather than none
(Dieckmann 1985). The typical examples are when a lone individual is collecting
garbage to keep a public area clean and tidy, or someone helps a person who has
collapsed in a crowded place. As discussed in the main text, however, in a social
dilemma represented with the profit structure represented by n-person’s prisoner’s
dilemma, the role played by the altruistic spirit declines as the scale of the dilemma
becomes larger. Therefore, in the large-scale social dilemmas in reality that are the
target of this book, the role played by the altruistic spirit decreases.
Yet if people are rational enough, altruistic motivation may solicit cooperation
even in a case of large-scale social dilemma. For instance, the CO2 exhaust emitted
using a car on a certain day is an extremely miniscule contribution to global
warming, so in the normal cognitive information processing, it would be assumed
that “the increase of the average global temperature is 0 degree.” However, if we
calculate it truly rationally and objectively, even if it is an extremely small amount,
it is not 0 degree, and it has a consequence of “the increase of the average global
temperature by 10−n degrees.” Additionally, this temperature increase will have a
certain impact on everyone on this planet. In other words, taking even just one car
journey has the “impact for one person caused by the increase of the average global
temperature by 10−n degrees times the population on earth.” If a rational altruist
considers the cost to others calculated as above (or in comparison with the con-
venience gained through their use of a car, if the cost is larger), they will stop using
cars (Parfit 1984). However, the discussion of Lynn and Oldenquist (1986) and that
of this book is based on the premise that it is difficult for people to exhibit such
rationality. Yet there is still room for discussion concerning whether it is completely
impossible or not; this discussion will be saved for another time.
There are several points to be considered regarding altruistic motivation. Other
than the above, there are various factors which may be a very important discussion
point for solving dilemmas, such as the difference between altruistic motivation
concerning close relatives and that for non-close relatives, the selfish aspect of
altruistic motivation whether it is intentional or unintentional (such as “compassion
is not for other people’s benefit”), and the origin of altruistic motivation. As
mentioned already, however, it must be clearly noted that in large-scale dilemmas,
it is not enough to expect people’s cooperation with altruistic motivation only, and
as the scale of a dilemma becomes larger, the importance of moral obligation
increases in comparison with the altruistic motivation.
[Appendix Text 3] A rational altruist and a moralist.
Since moral obligation is the sense of compliance to the social norm, it should be
clearly distinguished from altruistic motivation. Strictly speaking, altruistic moti-
vation is not included in moral obligation. However, it is only formally, and not
essentially, that altruistic motivation is not included in moral obligation. It is
because the social norm that the moral obligation aims to conform with is always
3.2 Three Psychological Factors of Cooperation 27
“socially desirable.” Hence the desirable behavior defined by the social norm is in
the direction to increase the sum of the benefit caused by various consequences of
the behavior (namely, the public benefit). Therefore, although it may not be based
on clear altruistic motivation, the behavior conducted with moral motivation
coincides with that of the rational altruist discussed in Appendix Text 2. Social
norm is not necessarily a collection of meaningless rules made to test our loyalty
(Parfit 1984).
The difference between a rational altruist and a moralist is as follows. The former
decides the optimal action from the standpoint of public benefit through intentional
information processing, and attempts to conduct the action intentionally. On the
other hand, the moralist conducts habitually (or even unconsciously) the set of
optimal actions discovered in the process of social selection. Incidentally, this book
as well as Dawes (1980) does not reject the effectiveness of the rational altruist, but
stresses not to forget the effectiveness of the moralist. The reason is that it is difficult
not only for the general public but also for the specialists in this field to imagine that
the perfect rationality required by a rational altruist can be obtained in reality that
often. It could be also noted that some moralists might be able to conduct behaviors
in a rational manner, well aware that a certain act goes against, or is in line with his
or her values, but they can be regarded, in definition, not only as moralists but also
as rational altruists in definition.
Finally, it should be emphasized that both the rational altruist and moralist are
non-selfish persons. Namely, they are not individuals who consider the benefit
found only around the point of origin in Fig. 1.1. A rational altruist takes into
account the benefit to all areas in Fig. 1.1. A moralist takes into account the social
norm set by a separate standard, regardless of the benefit shown in Fig. 1.1. Of
course, a moralist should believe that such a social norm eventually leads to the
increase in the benefit of all areas in Fig. 1.1. In any case, it is hopelessly difficult to
solve social dilemmas for selfish people without “public spirit” (Fujii 2001).
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Chapter 4
Theory for Behavior Modification Process
for Cooperation
4.1 Process Model of Behavior Modification

for Cooperation
The reason why the three psychological factors, knowledge, trust, and moral
obligation explained in the previous chapter facilitate people’s cooperation is
because a social dilemma has its own unique benefit structure. That is to say,
because there exists a social situation which involves such relationships with others
as competition and cooperation, these three factors can facilitate people’s cooper-
ation. Namely, they are the knowledge concerning such a social situation, trust as
an expectation concerning the behaviors of others, and moral obligation which
regulates cooperation as desirable in such a social situation. Therefore, these psy-
chological factors are expected to facilitate cooperation both in social dilemmas in
reality and in experiments on dilemmas virtually created in a lab, as long as there is
a benefit structure underlying the social dilemma. However, in social dilemmas in
reality, just appealing to these psychological factors is not enough to actually make
people choose a cooperative behavior and thus solve a social dilemma.
It is because the occurrence of a social dilemma problem in reality means
nothing else but the fact that people are currently engaging in a defective behavior
“as a habit.” Solving social dilemmas always requires a process to dissolve a
defective habit and create a cooperative habit (Fujii et al. 2001).
For instance, the problem of each social dilemma is exposed quite simply in the
following way, in the social dilemma of transportation, many drivers continue to
use cars every day, and in that of illegal parking, many of them continue to park
illegally; in the social dilemma of the global environment, many people continue to
use electricity or dispose of garbage without consideration to the environment. In
other words, in many social dilemmas in reality, people continue to conduct
habitual defection (Fujii et al. 2001). Therefore, in order to solve social dilemmas in
the real world, it is indispensable to logically and empirically understand the pro-
cess of changing people from engaging in habitual defection to habitual

30 4 Theory for Behavior Modification Process for Cooperation
cooperation. Moreover, examining effective policies to bring about such behavior

modification and habitual change should be positioned as a central political issue.
Among the research on behavioral modification (Geller et al. 1982) and habitual
change (Dahlstrand and Biel 1997), this book proposes a behavior modification
process for cooperation by centering on the behavior model based on the Attitude
Theory of Ajzen and Fishbein (Ajzen 1985, 1991; Ajzen and Fishbein 1977, 1980;
Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), combined with several causal hypotheses (c.f. Fujii
2001a), (refer to Fig. 4.1).
In what follows, each psychological factor and causal relationship of the
behavior modification process model in Fig. 4.1 is explained.
Influenced by the cognition

of the behavior’s Defective
Attitude consequence (belief) habit
“I like cooperative behavior”
Effect of self-centered
motivation
Dissolving the habit

Personal norm Old-habit effect
“High evaluation when I
choose a cooperative
behavior”
Social Implementation
pressure Behavioral intention intention Implementation of
Let’s choose a “Let’s choose a
cooperative behavior”
cooperative behavior cooperation
Control when, where, and how”
effect
Perceived behavioral Automatic
control implementation
It is difficult/easy to choose
the cooperative behavior” Forming a habit
Cooperative
habit
Effect of social
motivation
Three psychological
factors of
cooperation
Knowledge, trust, and Describe its activation process by Norm
Positive impact
moral obligation Activation Theory (refer to Diagram 4-2) Negative impact
Fig. 4.1 Process model of behavior modification for cooperation. This process model is a logical
model integrating the following theories: Theory of Planned Behavior by Ajzen and Fishbein,
Interpersonal Behavior Theory by Triandis, the habit effect logically presumed by Verplanken
et al., the role of implementation intention presumed by Gollwitzer, the effect of moral obligation
presumed in Norm Activation Theory by Schwartz, and the effect of trust and knowledge
presumed by Dawes. Several researchers proposed the logical expansion of the Theory of Planned
Behavior. For instance, Bamberg and Schmidt (2003) discussed the integration of Theory of
Planned Behavior, Interpersonal Behavior Theory, and Norm Activation Theory. Verplanken and
Aarts (1999) discussed the relationship between the Theory of Planned Behavior and the habit
effect. Gärling and Fujii (2003) discussed the relationship between the Theory of Planned Behavior
and implementation intention. The model shown in this figure is described in a way that includes
all of these logical expansions. Incidentally, although it can be logically presumed that knowledge
and trust influence the behavioral intention, there is not enough empirical information to ascertain
whether it has a direct or indirect impact (through either of the attitude, personal norm, or
perceived behavioral control), or if both of them are also possible. For convenience, this figure
describes only the direct impact on the behavioral intention
4.2 Formation of Behavioral Intention 31
4.2 Formation of Behavioral Intention
In social dilemmas in reality, in order to make a noncooperator conduct a coop-

erative behavior spontaneously, the individual has to form at least the behavioral
intention that intends to conduct the cooperative behavior. Behavioral intention is a
psychological factor in the form of “I think I will do this,” or “I intend to do this”
assumed in the theories of Ajzen and Fishbein (such as the Theory of Planned
Behavior and Theory of Reasoned Action). Its characteristic is that it includes not
only the strength of the motivation regulated by the attitude towards the target
activity or the level of social desirableness, but also the commitment to the exe-
cution of the action (or the determination, to speak of extremes) (Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975). They reviewed various research at the time on the relationship
between the attitude (for instance, the emotional preference towards executing a
certain behavior) and the behavior. They indicated anew that people often do not
conduct a behavior despite having a positive attitude about it, and conversely, they
often conduct a behavior despite having a negative attitude about it. In addition, it is
not enough only to consider the attitude when predicting a behavior. As a psy-
chological factor that mediates attitude and behavior, they logically presumed the
behavioral intention.
Now, behavioral intention is influenced by various factors. First, it is influenced
by the above-mentioned attitude, as it is clear from the historical background of
how the term was first proposed. Attitude refers to psychological tendency that is
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor
(Eagly and Chaiken 1993, pp. 1–2). Put simply, attitude is a subjective tendency of
like and dislike for a certain target. Additionally, attitude is influenced by belief
(otherwise, perception or cognition). With regards to a cooperative behavior such as
using public transportation or separating garbage, the attitude towards the behavior
will become positive if the behavior is not uncomfortable, does not have too high a
cost, and if it is emotionally rewarding to do. Since attitude includes the personal
emotion of likes and dislikes, it can be said that the effect of attitude influencing the
intention of conducting cooperation coincides with the effect of people’s
self-centered motivation.
Besides attitude, the Theory of Planned Behavior of Ajzen and Fishbein pre-
sumes that the personal norm and perceived behavioral control are the two other
factors that influence the behavioral intention. Personal norm refers to “evaluation
by important others on the consequences arising from the execution of a target
behavior.`` In the case of using a car, for instance, it means the evaluation made by
one’s family or friends on one’s usage of a car. While attitude is a psychological
factor reflecting self-centered and private motivation, the personal norm is a psy-
chological factor reflecting social motivation, or social pressure.
On the other hand, perceived behavioral control is the “assumption concerning
how easy it is to execute the behavior.” The higher an assumption of easiness, the
easier the behavioral intention is formed. In contrast, the lower an assumption (i.e.,
if it is regarded as difficult), the weaker the intention becomes. Such effect of
perceived behavioral control expresses the effect of the condition of limitation on

the behavior. Generally speaking, perceived behavioral control also reflects the
“actual” behavioral control to a certain degree. And if the actual behavioral control
is higher, the percentage of its success also becomes higher. Therefore, the per-
ceived behavioral control has an apparent positive impact on the execution of the
behavior itself.
The above-mentioned attitude, personal norm, and perceived behavioral control
are the preceding factors of behavioral intention presumed in the Theory of Planned
Behavior of Ajzen and Fishbein. They reflect self-centered motivation, social
pressure, and the effect of any behavioral limit. However, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, cooperation in social dilemmas is strongly related not only to
these psychological factors, but also with social motivation. Of course, social
pressure represented by the personal norm in the Theory of Planned Behavior is a
kind of social motivation, but the model of Ajzen and Fishbein does not consider
other social motivations such as moral obligation, altruistic motivation, and con-
science. Therefore, in considering cooperation in social dilemmas, it is essential to
assume the three psychological factors (moral obligation, trust, and knowledge)
claimed by Dawes as the preceding factors of behavioral intention, as expressed in
Fig. 4.1.
4.3 Formation of Moral Obligation
As already stressed in the previous chapter, moral obligation is extremely important

in solving social dilemmas based on psychological strategies. Therefore, under-
standing how moral obligation is activated is also very important in the discussion
of solving social dilemmas. Among the several preceding factors of behavioral
intention, this section thus focuses especially on moral obligation, and discusses
how it is formed.
Norm Activation Theory by Schwartz represents a theory concerning the acti-
vation of moral obligation (Schwartz 1977). It was originally proposed to describe
the psychological process of executing helping behavior or altruistic behavior, such
as assisting a person who has collapsed or rescuing someone drowning. Yet it is
also applied to describe cooperation in various other social dilemmas, such as
involving environmentally friendly behaviors (e.g., Gärling et al. 2003; Stern et al.
1986; Van Liere and Dunlap 1978), garbage recycling (c.f. Thøgersen 1996),
reduction of illegal parking of bicycles (Fujii et al. 2001, 2002), or reduction of car
usage (Taniguchi et al. 2003; Fujii and Taniguchi 2003).
To begin with, in Norm Activation Theory, the first event that triggers coop-
eration is when the awareness of consequence is formed (refer to Fig. 4.2).
Awareness of consequence is the recognition that “cooperation is needed.`` In a case
of an environmentally friendly action, for instance, it is when a person becomes
aware that the global environment is a serious problem. Likewise, in a case of
4.3 Formation of Moral Obligation 33
Awareness of Ascribed Moral obligation

consequence responsibility “A cooperative behavior
“I am responsible to choose a
Cooperation is needed” should be chosen”
cooperative behavior”
Disturbance Disturbance
Recognition of Perceived cost of

non-effectiveness of implementing
cooperation cooperation
Fig. 4.2 Activation of moral obligation based on Norm Activation Theory
helping an injured person, it is when a person realizes that the bleeding person lying
on the floor really requires someone’s help.
Next, in Norm Activation Theory, it is assumed that the second step to realize
cooperation is when ascribed responsibility is activated. Even when the awareness
of consequence is formed, if the individual considers that it is enough that someone
else is offering the cooperative behavior, the individual will not take action. For
instance, some people consider ensuring the global environment is a task for
government and not the citizen, or in the case of the injured person, if they are
likely to be helped by other people, ascribed responsibility is not activated and the
individual may still not choose a cooperative behavior even when there is a high
awareness of consequence. In contrast, a person may choose a cooperative behavior
if they think that cooperation is important, and as there is no one else to offer
cooperation.
Also in research into social dilemmas which does not explicitly consider Norm
Activation Theory, it has been revealed that people behave more cooperatively if
they have a stronger perceived effectiveness (or perceived criticality) of their own
cooperation (Chen et al. 1996; Olson 1965; Strobe and Frey 1982). Interpreting this
finding from the point of view of Norm Activation Theory, it can be stated that “a
prerequisite for forming ascribed responsibility of cooperation is that the person
who recognizes the significance of a dilemma also considers that their own coop-
eration will be effective or necessary to solve the problem. That is why the indi-
vidual’s cognition on the effectiveness of their cooperation has a positive impact on
their cooperation” (c.f. Cremer and Van Dijk 2002).
If the ascribed responsibility is activated as above, it may finally lead to activate
the moral obligation that “a cooperative behavior should be chosen.'' However, even
if the ascribed responsibility is activated, if a person thinks it is difficult or
impossible for them to conduct the cooperative behavior, the moral obligation that
“it should be conducted” is not activated. For instance, if a person finds a child
drowning and there is no one else around, there is a recognition of their respon-
sibility to rescue the child, but if they are a nonswimmer then the moral obligation
that “they should rescue the child” may not necessarily be activated. Of course, the
individual may regret that perhaps they “should” have learned how to swim to be of
use in such an emergency.
In this way, the moral obligation that one should choose a certain cooperative
behavior is activated through the following process:
(1) I think that cooperation is necessary (forming the awareness of consequences)
(2) I think that there is no one else to conduct the cooperative behavior (activation
of ascribed responsibility)
(3) I think that as long as I have the capability to fulfill the ascribed responsibility,
I should do so (activation of moral obligation)
However, there are at least two factors which may disturb this process of acti-
vating moral obligation. First, activation of ascribed responsibility may be disturbed
by the “recognition of the non-effectiveness of my own cooperation” (in common
language, it can also be stated as a feeling of incompetence). Second, activation of
moral obligation may be disturbed by the “estimation of the size of the cost in
conducting the cooperation” (i.e., perceived implementation cost) (refer to
Fig. 4.2). In other words, the “recognition of the positive effectiveness of one’s own
behavior” and the “recognition that the cost of cooperation is small” are factors that
facilitate the process of activating moral obligation.
4.4 Formation of Implementation Intention Based

on a Behavioral Plan
Even if the behavioral intention is formed by activating the various psychological

factors mentioned above, people do not always succeed in executing their behav-
ioral intention. For instance, Sheppard reported that when he examined 87 papers
published at the time, the average correlation coefficient between the intention and
behavior was only 0.53 (Sheppard 1988). This means that roughly speaking, there
is a 50/50 chance of a person actually doing what they intend to do. In the model of
Ajzen and Fishbein, it was assumed that the behavioral intention is an appropriate
preceding factor to predict a behavior, but Sheppard’s report questions the validity
of this assumption.
Based on such understanding, Gollwitzer et al. considered that the discord
between the behavioral intention and the actual behavior is not small. In order to
logically describe how intention is implemented, they categorized intention
regarding behavior into two kinds, namely, the goal intention and the implemen-
tation intention (Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 1987; Gollwitzer 1993, 1996). Also in
this book which proposes a process model of behavior modification for cooperation,
the two kinds of intentions categorized by Gollwitzer are presumed, as with my
joint study with Gärling. Moreover, it is regarded that the goal intention of
Gollwitzer is logically equivalent to the behavioral intention in the model of Ajzen
and Fishbein (Gärling and Fujii 2002). In the following text, the term goal intention
proposed by Gollwitzer will not be used, but instead the term behavioral intention
will be adopted.
4.4 Formation of Implementation Intention Based on a Behavioral Plan 35
Now, Gollwitzer et al. thought that a specific behavioral goal is achieved by

executing a sequential set of several sub goals until the final goal is reached. For
example, in order for a habitual car user (noncooperator) to achieve the behavioral
intention to use public transportation (cooperative behavior), they need to execute a
set of subgoals, in sequence, such as checking the timetable, traveling to the nearest
station, buying a ticket, going to a platform, walking from the station closest to the
destination to the final destination. And in order to execute a specific behavioral
goal, it is necessary to make a behavioral plan of when, where, and how to execute
these sub goals, as well as holding the intention to execute this behavioral plan.
Implementation intention refers to the intention to execute such a detailed behav-
ioral plan.
For that reason, the implementation intention can be formed for the first time by
creating a behavioral plan. Only after forming the implementation intention will the
behavioral intention be conducted as the real action. To put it the other way around,
even in a case when there is a strong behavioral intention to modify your action, it
will not be conducted in reality if (1) you could not make a “behavioral plan”
needed for realizing the behavioral intention, (2) even when the behavioral plan is
made, it is unrealistic and inappropriate, or (3) even when the behavioral plan is
realistic and appropriate, there is not enough intention to execute it (namely,
implementation intention). As Sheppard pointed out, the reason why the test sub-
jects were only successful in fulfilling a little more than half of their intentions is
because they could not execute the behavioral intention for either of these reasons.
The results of other experiments are also in line with the above-mentioned
hypothesis that a behavioral plan is needed for matching intention and behavior. For
example, Gollwitzer and Brandstätter conducted an experiment to ask test subjects
to write essays (Gollwitzer and Brandstätter 1997). They split the test subjects into
two groups, and requested Group A to prepare a behavioral plan on “when and
where” to write the essay. Group B were given no request to prepare a behavioral
plan. As a result, Group A with prepared plans wrote twice as many essays as
Group B with no plan.
Similarly, the fact that requesting a behavioral plan has a great effect on the
execution of a behavior has been repeatedly confirmed in many experiments, such
as reading a novel, taking Vitamin C, answering a survey, purchasing organically
grown food items, and using fixed-route buses (Bamberg 2002a, b; Gillholm et al.
1999; Gillholm et al. 2000; Orbell et al. 1997). Bamberg especially focused on the
correlation between the habitual effect and the implementation intention in envi-
ronmentally friendly behavior. He showed that the effect of habit decreases when
the implementation intention is formed (Bamberg 2002a, b). That is to say, even for
a person with a defective habit who repeats defection automatically, if the imple-
mentation intention on cooperation is formed, they may overcome their defective
habit, and the possibility to conduct cooperation may increase.
Additionally, the above experiments directly facilitate the formation of imple-
mentation intention since experimenters actually request participants to make a
behavioral plan. But in everyday life, the behavioral plan will usually be made on
your own. Focusing on this point, Gärling and Fujii conducted an experiment to
discover those conditions under which people make behavioral plans sponta-
neously. As a result, it was found that there is a higher tendency for people to make
behavioral plans spontaneously, when the behavioral intention is activated (to
realize the behavioral intention), and when the perceived behavioral control is at a
low level (to overcome the difficulty) (Gärling and Fujii 2002).
4.5 Habits Obstructing Behavior Change
As described above, behavior modification to make a noncooperator conduct as a

cooperative behavior is realized only after going through the following process.
That is, (1) the behavioral intention to execute a cooperative behavior is formed
while receiving the impact of several psychological factors such as social moti-
vation (moral obligation, conscience, trust, social pressure, etc.), self-centered
motivation (attitude), and behavioral control (perceived behavioral control), and
(2) a behavioral plan is created to implement the behavioral intention, then the
implementation intention is formed to actually implement the behavior. However,
there is a troublesome psychological factor that disturbs the above process of
behavior modification. That is, “the old-habit effect” of the defective habit.
The defective habit has several old-habit effects that disturb the behavior
modification, as shown in Fig. 4.1. First, the defective habit has a negative impact
on the level of behavioral intention on cooperation. Likewise, it has a negative
impact on the level of the implementation intention. Moreover, it has a negative
impact on the execution of cooperative behavior itself. In the following, each will
be described in detail.
To begin with, while the word habit is used in everyday language, it is also
defined in a variety of ways by many researchers. Here, the definition of
Verplanken and Aarts is adopted, that is “goal-directed automaticity” in imple-
menting the relevant behavior (Verplanken and Aarts 1999). For instance, a person
who has formed a habit of using a car is not someone who chooses their means of
transportation consciously, rather their decision-making is automated (Gärling et al.
2001). Thus, there is only a small possibility for such a person to form a behavioral
intention which requires a certain perceived cost (that is, psychological resistance or
feeling of avoidance) (Verplanken et al. 1999).
Moreover, since a habitual noncooperator does not engage in conscious
decision-making, there is no need for them to have any new information on their
behavior, other than information concerning their usual behavior; hence in reality
they rarely hold the information required to execute cooperation (Gärling et al.
2001; Verplanken et al. 1997). Therefore, it is not easy to form a specific behavioral
plan, and as a result, one cannot form the implementation intention. This is why the
defective habit decreases the level of implementation intention.
Moreover, even if an individual forms the behavioral intention despite the effect
of habit, then manages to make a behavioral plan, and forms the implementation
intention to execute it, those people with a strong defective habit may still
4.5 Habits Obstructing Behavior Change 37
automatically repeat the habitual behavior as usual (c.f. Oullete and Wood 1998;
Matthies et al. 2002). For example, Triandis’ interpersonal behavior theory pre-
sumes that Behavior B is decided by both the behavioral intention and the strength
of habit. Having said that, Triandis logically claims that the stronger the habit
becomes, the lower the impact of behavioral intention on the behavior becomes.
Therefore, it can be said that the defective habit may have a direct negative impact
on the implementation of cooperation through decreasing the “effect of imple-
mentation intention on the behavior.”
In sum, the defective habit has a direct negative impact on the level of the
behavioral intention concerning cooperation, as well as the level of implementation
intention, and the actual behavior itself.
4.6 Realization of Behavior Change: Formation

of Habitual Cooperative Behavior
In this way, in order for a habitual noncooperator to actually implement coopera-

tion, their “defective habit” must be interfered with in various ways (as
decision-making is automated), overcome each aspect, and go through various
psychological processes. However, the final goal of the behavior modification
process is not one-time implementation of the cooperative behavior. Instead, it aims
at making a habitual change in which the defective habit is dissolved, and the
cooperative habit is formed (Dahlstrand and Biel 1997).
First, regarding the formation of a habit, the following fact is known (Ronis et al.
1989; Gärling et al. 2001).
By repeating the same behavior over and over under the same circumstances, the
decision-making is gradually automated, and thereby the habit is formed (Fujii 2002c,
p. 45).
In other words, habit is not easily formed in a short period of time, but it requires
a certain amount of time and effort (that is, the effort to repeat the behavior).
Likewise, it is also considered that it requires a certain amount of time and effort to
dissolve a habit (Ronis et al. 1989).
In order to dissolve a habit, it is necessary to go through the process of forming the habit in
the opposite direction. In order to completely dissolve the habit, it is necessary to inten-
tionally dissolve various decision-making processes that have been automated (Fujii 2002c,
p. 46).
For instance, the habit of using a car is formed as a result of repeatedly using a
car, and it can be said it is a consequence of a constant behavior. In order to dissolve
the habit, it is also required to make a continuous, intentional effort. Therefore, it is
not easy to dissolve a habit that is once formed.
The effect of dissolving and forming a habit described above is expressed in
Fig. 4.1 as a negative impact from “implementation of cooperation” toward the
“defective habit,” and as a positive impact toward the “cooperative habit.” In other
words, by accumulating many repeated implementations of cooperative behavior
one by one, the defective habit is gradually dissolved. At the same time, the
cooperative habit is gradually formed. By repeating this process, people finally
become habitual cooperators.
4.7 Habitual Cooperative Behavior
When a cooperative habit is formed after going through the long process as
described above, it will be implemented automatically, since a habit is goal-directed
automaticity in implementing the relevant behavior as defined by Verplanken and
Aarts. As regards to this point, the behavior of selection based on habit is called a
script-based choice by Gärling et al. (2001). Script refers to a specific information
that is automatically retrieved in order to choose specific behavioral alternative,
when a specific stimulus that is stored in cognitive memory as a pointer to the
alternative, is recognized (Schank 1982; Schank and Abelson 1977). Hence the
script-based choice refers to a situation when a specific stimulus is recognized,
specific information is recalled corresponding to the stimulus, and thus a choice is
automatically made based on that information. For instance, for an individual who
has formed a habit of using a car, when they think “let’s go out,” they automatically
recall information on how to use the car, such as the location of the car keys, the
route to the garage, how to start the engine, etc. Based on such information, they
look for the keys, go out to the garage, start the engine, and drive off; all uncon-
scious behaviors.
In this way, the information on behavior recalled automatically in the
script-based choice is similar to the “the series of behavioral plans needed to
execute a specific behavior goal” in the implementation intention proposed by
Gollwitzer. The difference between them, however, is that the script is automati-
cally recalled and automatically executed, while the behavioral plan of the imple-
mentation intention is intentionally recalled and intentionally implemented.
As described above, once a cooperative habit is formed, the behavioral plan is
stored in the memory as a script, so it is not necessary to intentionally create a
behavioral plan when implementing cooperative behavior, or to intentionally
implement the created behavioral plan. Therefore, in order for a habitual cooperator
to implement a cooperative behavior, it does not even require the behavioral
intention that is supposed to be the preceding factor of the implementation intention.
That is, the habitual cooperator can implement a cooperative behavior with no (or at
least, weak) behavioral intention “to conduct a cooperative behavior,” or the
implementation intention “to conduct a cooperative behavior in such and such way.”
In sum, a habitual cooperator conducts a cooperative behavior just from the
causal relationship described as “automatic implementation” from “cooperative
habit” to “implementation of cooperation” as described in Fig. 4.1. A social
dilemma is truly solved only when such habitual cooperators become the majority
4.7 Habitual Cooperative Behavior 39
in society. For instance, if people use public transportation, separate garbage,

refrain from illegal parking, and conduct energy-saving behavior, all as a matter of
course out of habit, such social dilemmas will disappear so naturally that it is not
even noticed that once there were latent social dilemmas.
That being the case, if we carefully examine habitual behaviors that we conduct
now as a matter of course, and consider another way of behaving that meets
individual rationality; we may unintentionally “discover” latent social dilemmas,
and open up Pandora’s box. Perhaps the reason why people started to undertake
research on social dilemmas today may be because they began to examine old
habits one by one, to pursue behaviors that better match individual rationality.
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Part II
Psychological Strategy
• There are three possible psychological strategies: “providing objective informa-

tion,” “facilitating cooperative experience,” and “communication.”
• Providing objective information (Chap. 5. Method of Providing Objective
Information):
- A noncooperator has a “negative delusion” about engaging in cooperative
behavior.
- By simply providing objective information to correct the negative delusion,
there will be a change in belief, followed by a change in attitude and behavior.
- Similarly, people believe that other people are more defective than they
actually are (that is to say, they expect a lower level of trust than what is
objectively possible).
- Therefore, by simply providing information on the actual cooperation rate,
their trust in cooperation by others will be restored, and the tendency for
people to cooperate will increase. This method is called a “strategy to correct
misunderstandings concerning the cooperation rate of others.”
• Facilitating cooperative experience (Chap. 6. Method of Facilitating Experience):
- A “negative delusion” about cooperation can also be corrected by experi-
encing or being aware of cooperation.
- By simply experiencing cooperation, the effect of simple contact and a
decrease in cognitive dissonance may lead to a positive attitude about coop-
eration. By repeating the behavior, there is the further possibility of habitu-
alizing it.
- One of the ways to facilitate cooperative experience is to implement a “tem-
porary structural change”. In other words, a “temporary” structural change
may lead to a “permanent” change in behavior.
• Communication (Chaps. 7 and 8. Communication Method)
• Behavior may change towards cooperation through language-centered commu-
nication, if the following conditions are met:
- Communicaters have a specific image of a recipient of the communication and
have respect for the person.
44 Part II: Psychological Strategy
- Communicaters consider the possibility of the “psychological reactance” of

the recipient, and try to have two-sided communication when needed.
- The communication is through the methods of offering individual advice or
creating a behavioral plan, the actual way of bringing about the behavior
change should be understood by the recipient.
• As communication techniques, the following four methods are possible:
- Request method (request cooperation)
- Advice method (offer advice on the specific method for bringing about
cooperation; there are two methods: the individual advice method and the
collective advice method)
- Behavioral plan method (if the individual is to carry out a cooperative
behavior, ask how they will actually do it)
- Feedback method (measure people’s cooperation, and give feedback on the
results; there are two methods: the individual feedback method and the col-
lective feedback method. These methods are more effective when combined
with the goal setting method.)
• Travel Feedback Program (TFP) is a specific method to facilitate behavior change
on transportation that introduces several communication techniques, based on the
assumption that there is mutual communication.
• Norm Activation Theory is effective to describe behavior change through com-
munication, it presumes that a cooperative behavior is conducted through a series
of processes such as awareness of consequences, ascribed responsibility, moral
obligation, behavioral intention, and then finally the behavior itself.
Chapter 5
Correction of Cognition: Providing
Objective Information
In the previous chapter, we reviewed several psychological factors regarding the

process of a person choosing a cooperative behavior, and eventually becoming a
habitual cooperator in a real-life social dilemma. The following is a reminder of
those factors:
• Knowledge
• Trust
• Moral
• Beliefs (perception and cognition)
• Attitude
• Personal norm
• Perceived behavioral control
• Behavioral intention
• Implementation intention
• Habit of a cooperative behavior, etc.
When trying to solve a social dilemma using a psychological strategy, these
psychological factors are all subject to examination. For instance, if you provide
information which may make it easier for people to choose a cooperative behavior,
their attitude and perceived behavioral control may change in a positive direction. If
you request people to make a behavioral plan about their cooperation, their
implementation intention may be activated. Selecting a social dilemma on trans-
portation as a subject for discussion, Part II introduces specific methods involving
several psychological strategies, together with logical and empirical arguments for
their effectiveness.

46 5 Correction of Cognition: Providing Objective Information
5.1 Behavior Change by Providing Objective Information
In this chapter, we will discuss the possibility of changing people’s cognition by

only providing objective information. This cognitive change may lead to attitude
modification of cooperation and defection, or influence any beliefs about others’
behavior, namely, facilitate the development of increased trust. As a result, people
may begin to choose a cooperative behavior spontaneously. Let us call such a
strategy, which expects to change cognition, attitude, and behavior through pro-
viding objective information, the “method of providing objective information.”
Of course, if people already have an accurate understanding of the objective
information, it would not change their attitude, trust, or behavior if presented again.
However, if people do not know such objective information, giving them the
information may add a new fact to their memory. Also, if they have a distorted
understanding of the current reality, the objective information may “correct” such
misconceptions (Fujii et al. 2001; Fujii and Kitamura 2003). As a result, it may
encourage people’s cooperation. In this way, the method to solve a social dilemma
by simply providing objective information dealt with in this chapter stands upon the
premise that defective people have formed a negative cognition about cooperation
while having a positive cognition about defection. In this book, such cognition
including misconception is referred to as a “deluded belief,” since it is a type of
cognition that a noncooperator believes regardless of the available objective
information (Nakayama et al. 1999).
In this chapter, we will first present a logical and empirical discussion about
several deluded beliefs of noncooperators, and then discuss the premise that the
provision of objective information may actually change people’s cognition and
behavior.
5.2 Deluded Belief of a Noncooperator
(1) Prediction by simulation analysis

Figure 5.1 is a result of simulation analysis on the cognition of Route 1 and 2 by
drivers who commute daily between Point A and B, in a simple virtual road
network depicted in Fig. 5.2. In this simulation, each driver forms their cognition
on the travel time of each route (cognitive travel time) based on their driving
experience. Also, a driver’s choice of which route to take every day depends on
their cognitive travel time of each route. For instance, if it once took a long time
when drivers use Route 1, they will form the cognition that this route has a long
travel time. Hence the driver may avoid using Route 1 the next day, and use Route
2 instead (Nakayama et al. 1999). Figure 5.1 shows the results of such a simple
simulation. On the first day, all drivers considered that both Route 1 and 2 take
5.2 Deluded Belief of a Noncooperator 47
Cognitive travel time of Route 2

Cognitive travel time of Route 2
Cognitive travel time of Route 1 Cognitive travel time of Route 1
(1) First day (2) 20 days later
Fig. 5.1 Dispersion of cognitive travel time of Route 1 and 2. From Nakayama et al. (1999)
Fig. 5.2 Simple road

network used for simulation Route 1
Point A Point B
Route 2
about 20 min, as shown in Fig. 5.1 (1) on the left (20 min is chosen as a default of
the simulation). However, after 20 days, the cognition of drivers has changed as
shown in (2). The dispersed situation reveals that about half of the drivers consider
the cognitive travel time of Route 2 to be long but Route 1 as short, and vice versa,
the other half considering that Route 2 is short but Route 1 is long. The Route 1
shorter travel time group continues to use Route 1, the Route 2 shorter travel time
group continues to use Route 2. However, the objective travel time was almost the
same for Route 1 and 2. In other words, drivers who habitually use Route 1 believe
that Route 1 is convenient and Route 2 is not, which is an overly negative belief
(negative delusion, Nakayama et al. 1999).
Of course, the above simulation is a fictional result gained under a virtual
situation set with several simplifying assumptions. For this reason, any assessment
of whether this result is realistically adequate should await the verification by
empirical data and theoretical justification.
(2) Logical examination of the simulation result
The result of this simulation analysis implies that the following hypothesis about
people’s behavior and cognition in a social dilemma.
Hypothesis of deluded belief:

A habitual noncooperator forms overly negative beliefs about cooperation, and
overly positive beliefs about defection.
Namely, it is a hypothesis whereby a habitual noncooperator falls into “overly”
thinking there will be no positive results from choosing a cooperative behavior,
therefore it will not be a beneficial choice for them, and defection will be the most
beneficial choice. What is more, since their attitude is formed based on a belief
(refer to Sect. 4.2), a habitual noncooperator forms a negative attitude about
cooperation, and a positive attitude about defection. For example, a person holding
a belief that using the railway takes a long time and is expensive, will develop a
negative attitude about using railways.
When we investigated the simulation, we assumed the following mechanism of
forming a negative belief:
(1) When the number of drivers using Route 1 and 2 are variable, the travel time
will also vary from day to day.
(2) Under a situation of such uncertainty, if a driver happens to use Route 1 on a
day when its travel time was exceptionally long, this person forms the cog-
nition that the travel time for Route 1 is long.
(3) From this experience, drivers who formed such a cognition will subsequently
begin to choose Route 2.
(4) In contrast, if a driver happens to use Route 2 on a day when its travel time
was exceptionally long, this person forms the cognition that the travel time for
Route 2 is long. And they will subsequently begin to choose Route 1.
(5) By repeating the above process of (2) to (4), drivers with the “deluded belief”
that Route 1 is quicker continue to use Route 1, while those with the “deluded
belief” that Route 2 is quicker continue to use Route 2.
To sum up, when someone happens to form a negative cognition about a certain
behavior, only the negative impression remains in their memory, and later on the
person will not choose that behavior. This is one of the mechanisms of how a negative
delusion is formed for those behaviors people do not conduct on a daily basis.
However, when considering the psychological tendency of people in reality, we can
think of other mechanisms which may form negative delusions about those behaviors
people do not conduct on a daily basis. A representative one is Festinger’s classic
theory on cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). Derived from this theory, there is
also a psychological mechanism based on the bias of self-justification (Aronson 1992).
Cognitive Dissonance Theory argues that when an individual has several cog-
nitions, and if there is “dissonance” between them, the person is motivated to
decrease the dissonance. For instance, a habitual noncooperator recognizes that “I
am habitually choosing a defective behavior (Cognition A).” Such cognition is
consonant with, or not contradictory to, the cognition that “choosing a defective
behavior is beneficial for me.” In contrast, there is a dissonant or contradictory
relationship with the cognition that “choosing a cooperative behavior is beneficial
for me (Cognition B).”
The Cognitive Dissonance Theory explains that such an individual is motivated

to decrease their experience of dissonance. In order to decrease such a cognitive
dissonance, the person may start to distort Cognition B which is a positive belief
about cooperation so that it will fit Cognition A, which is a belief about their own
behavior. That is, without even realizing it, I may start to think “choosing a
cooperative behavior is not beneficial for me.” In other words, I may “justify”
myself being a habitual noncooperator by unconsciously forming the self-
justification logic that “choosing a cooperative behavior is not beneficial, but
choosing a defective behavior is beneficial for me. That is why I am habitually
conducting a defective behavior.” In this way, a habitual noncooperator forms a
negative belief about cooperation.
(3) Empirical verification of the “hypothesis of deluded belief” (see Footnote 1):
negative belief about cooperation
As described above, the “hypothesis of deluded belief” of a habitual noncoop-
erator is implied from the virtual simulative calculations, as well as from Cognitive
Dissonance Theory. The following introduces the result of positive analysis to
verify the feasibility of the hypothesis of deluded belief (Fujii et al. 2001).
Figure 5.3 is the data obtained from research conducted from November 1 to 8,
1998, targeted specifically at the perception of travel time when the Hanshin
Minutes
Fig. 5.3 Cognitive and actual figure of the travel time of railway commuting by habitual car users.
Note Cognitive travel time: estimated duration of time for commuting by railway, Actual travel
time: the actual duration of time when commuted by railway, Strong-habit driver: commute by car
everyday, Moderate-habit driver: commute by car 80 % or more, Weak-habit driver: commute by
car less than 80 %. The above data processed the figures reported by Fujii et al. (2001)
Expressway Sakai Route was temporarily closed. The research was on drivers who
habitually used this expressway for commuting, but had to (reluctantly) take the
railway instead.
The “Cognitive travel time” referred to in this diagram is a value estimated by
each driver on how long they thought it would take to commute by train; they were
asked just before actually commuting by train. “Actual travel time” is the actual
duration of time it took when they commuted by train. The horizontal axis shows
the name of groups which categorized drivers according to the strength of their
habit: a strong habit refers to drivers commuting by car every day; a moderate habit
refers to drivers commuting by car about 80 % of their commuting days; and a
weak habit refers to drivers commuting by car less than 80 % of their commuting
days.
All groups in this diagram indicate that the cognitive value of the travel time is
longer than the actual travel time. But if we focus on the difference between groups,
in the group of strong-habit drivers, the average cognitive value was actually
5.4 min longer than the actual travel time (= 77.7–72.3), but no such big difference
was found in the other groups.1
This result supports the “hypothesis of deluded belief” concerning a habitual
noncooperator. Namely, in the social dilemma involving a choice of commuting by
public transportation (cooperation) or by car (defection), a habitual noncooperator
(habitual car commuter) has formed a “negative deluded belief” that cooperation
(commuting by public transportation) is overly inconvenient. Additionally, it is
implied that such a negative deluded belief is stronger if the defective habit is
stronger.
Now, let us consider the significance of the fact that strong-habit drivers pre-
dicted the travel time as more than 5 min longer than the actual travel time. You
may think 5 min is trivial, but in matters concerning actual transportation policy it
requires a massive investment to decrease travel time by 5 min. Especially, in an
urban area like Osaka, where the public transportation system as represented by
railways has already been optimized, and it is a Herculean task to further minimize
the travel time. For this reason, it is important to convey objective information to
those who have such a “negative delusion,” to inform them that “the actual travel
time by public transportation is shorter than you think”; simply correcting their
negative deluded belief could have an effect equivalent to reducing the actual
“physical” travel time through vast investment.
(4) Empirical verification of the “hypothesis of deluded belief” (see Footnote 2):
positive belief about defection
The data shown earlier was about habitual noncooperators’ negative beliefs
about cooperation. In the following, we will discuss the effects of positive beliefs on
defection.
1
In a repeated-measurement analysis of variance, the difference between the cognitive value and
the actual value, as well as the difference by group on such differences were significant.
In August 2002, we conducted a simple survey among 60 tourists on Enoshima

Beach in Kanagawa Prefecture (Fujii 2002b). We asked them to answer the fol-
lowing questions:
(1) By what means of transportation did you come to Enoshima Beach?
(2) How much do you think it costs a day to maintain a car?
(3) One out of how many drivers do you think die in traffic accidents?
Based on the hypothesis of deluded belief, it is predicted that, more a person
uses a car on a daily basis, the less their estimation of car maintenance costs will be,
and the more they will recognize the car as a safe mode of transportation. In this
survey, whether one came to Enoshima by car is regarded as a proxy variable of the
frequency of car usage, and thus is used to interpret the results.
First, Fig. 5.4 shows the average value of cognition on the risk of death by a car
accident, stated by different means of transportation. Incidentally, the risk of dying
from a car accident is one out of 300 drivers, based on the annual number of drivers
dying from car accidents, with the assumption of an average driver who drives an
average distance (Fujii et al. 2003). Compared with this objective information,
people estimate the risk of the car as lower than the actual risk, regardless of the
means of transportation. This tendency that people estimate the risk of the car as
overly low is found in much general research on risk cognition (Okamoto 1992).
However, the major significance of this diagram is that those who came by car
regarded it as a considerably safer mode of transportation; in fact their estimate was
almost double the estimate of those who came by other means of transportation.
A similar deluded belief is also found concerning car maintenance costs.
Figure 5.5 states the answers for the question about daily car maintenance costs,
summed by different means of transportation. Incidentally, the actual car mainte-
nance cost per day for a class 1l compact car is approximately 2,000 yen, based on
the calculation of the cost of gas and the expressway for an average travel distance,
Fig. 5.4 Car risk cognition One out of how many persons
by different means of
transportation
Visitors by other Visitors by car

modes than car
Fig. 5.5 Cognition on car Yen

maintenance cost by different
means of transportation
Visitors by other Visitors by car

modes than car
added to the average cost of insurance, inspection, and tax (Fujii et al. 2003).
Figure 5.5 shows that those who came by a means of transportation other than a car
understood car maintenance costs more or less accurately. However, it shows that
those who came by car estimated the car maintenance costs as half the actual cost. It
is considered that those who came by car would probably be using cars more
frequently, so the difference shown in this diagram may not be regarded as small.
In this way, those who came by car have the cognition that the car is an overly
safe and overly cheap mode of transportation.2 These results support the hypothesis
of deluded belief that noncooperators (car users) form positive deluded beliefs
about a defective behavior which they frequently conduct.
Assuming the hypothesis of deluded belief to be true, then it should be possible
that providing objective information may lead to correcting car driver’s cognition,
and encourage their cooperation. Moreover, as shown in the next section, the
empirical research results also support this possibility.
5.3 Providing Objective Information Regarding

the Decision to Obtain a Driver’s License
(1) Deluded belief on the choice to obtain a driver’s license

When considering the social dilemma of transportation, in order to use a car
which is defective travel mode, a person must acquire a driver’s license. For this
2
In an analysis of variance, the tendency of people who came by car overestimating the car as a
safe mode of transportation was not significant. However, the tendency to overestimate it as a
cheap mode of transportation was significant.
5.3 Providing Objective Information Regarding the Decision … 53
reason, the most fundamental choice between defection and cooperation in the
social dilemma of car usage is whether or not to obtain a driver’s license.
In present Japan, most people obtain their driver’s license soon after they reach
the legal driving age. In this situation, the choice whether to obtain a license may be
made with very little thought; this is due to the reason that people often conduct a
behavior just because many others are doing it too. For instance, simply because
many people describe a short line as long, you may also agree it is long (Asch
1951), and simply because many people are bullying a certain individual, you may
also bully that person (Yamagishi 2002). This psychological tendency is strongly
internalized in all people. Generally speaking, such a tendency is called the con-
formity effect, and such behavior is known as frequency-dependent behavior (refer
to Sect. 3.2(2)).
One of the important characteristics of this frequency-dependent behavior is that
people do not carry out sufficient cognitive information processing. In other words,
people do not think very much about their decision, but choose a behavior simply
because many others are doing it.
Now, there are numerous frequency-dependent behaviors that we choose in our
daily life, including the kinds of behavior which have been repeated all over the
world throughout millennia of human history, such as getting married and working.
Yet there also are types of behavior that the majority of society have only suddenly
began engaging in over the past decades. One example is the possession of a
driver’s license as mentioned above. When considering the rate of behavior
implementation, the acquisition of a driver’s license or a car occurs in present day
Japan as frequently as getting a job or getting married. And since an important
characteristic of frequency-dependent behavior is that people do not carry out
sufficient cognitive information processing, it is logically predicted that there is a
possibility that the actual decision-making of whether to “possess a driver’s license
or not” is not well thought out.
What is more in most people’s experience up until the age of eighteen when they
are allowed to possess a license, it is difficult to deny the possibility that much of
the information on cars and car use that non-license holders receive is positive. For
example, as Baudrillard and Steg et al. indicate, there is a possibility that the car has
an image of being convenient and “cool,” and in some cases, it is even adored and
that ownership or the ability to drive a car is a sign of having reached adulthood
(Steg et al. 2001; Baudrillard 1970).
If the above suppositions are correct, it is likely that many people before
acquiring a driver’s license hold a positive belief about cars, while not sufficiently
recognizing any negative beliefs. And mainly because many others have a license,
they too obtain a license without thinking very deeply. In other words, just as a
habitual noncooperator forms a suitable “deluded belief” convenient for the exe-
cution of defection, people before acquiring their driver’s license may be forming a
“deluded belief” convenient for car usage. However, the deluded belief of a habitual
noncooperator has come about as a result of their own learning process and
self-justification, but the “deluded belief” of people before acquiring their driver’s
license is due to the social trend of regarding car usage positively, as indicated by
Baudrillard (1970). Furthermore, as shown in the previous section, people also have
the tendency to significantly underestimate the risk of driving a car. Such wrong
cognition of risk would also be one of the factors leading to the deluded belief
convenient for car usage.
In any case, such a deluded belief may be “corrected” by providing objective
information. And it may actually have an impact on people’s behavior and their
acquisition of a driver’s license.
(2) Change in cognition and behavior through providing objective information
Can we really change people’s cognition and behavior on the acquisition of a
driver’s license by providing objective information on car usage to those who do
not yet have a license? In order to examine this hypothesis, we conducted an
experiment on 178 freshman students in June, 2001 which is almost right after their
entry to university in Japan (Fujii et al. 2003).
In this experiment, we randomly divided participants into the following five
groups, and provided different objective information:
• Control group (35 participants): no information is provided
• Cost-information group (38 participants): information on maintenance and
management costs is provided
• Risk-information group (34 participants): information on the risk of an accident
is provided
• Vacation-information group (35 participants): information on the nuisance
caused by car congestion that occurs over a vacation is provided
• All-information group: all the above three kinds of information is provided
The information was provided to participants by asking them to come to a venue
in the university at a different time for each group; the material was distributed, and
they were asked to read it silently. The time allocated for reading was 3 min for the
cost-information group, risk-information group, and vacation-information group,
and 5 min for the all-information group. The information was summarized briefly in
an A4 size colored-sheet, as described in Table 5.1. As cost information, for
example, maintenance costs for a car per day were given as approximately 2,000
yen. As risk information, it was stated that one out of 300 drivers die from an
accident, and one out of 250 drivers will kill another person(s) by hitting them with
the car. As vacation information, it was reported that those who travelled to a tourist
spot by public transportation spent a happier holiday than those who came by car.
Each item of data was provided with its source. Among these items of information,
it has been shown that for cost information and risk information, normal license
holders (or drivers) form the wrong positive deluded belief, as discussed in the
previous research in Sect. 5.2(4).
We measured cognition on the risk of car usage, cognition of costs, and whether
the participant possessed a license, at two points of time, one right after the above
information was provided, and one six months later in December. The result is
shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1 Overview of the provided information

Cost information
When you possess a car, it costs 1,150 yen per day just to keep it, 1,500 yen per day for
economical use, and 2,000 yen per day for normal use. Even for a Toyota Vitz (950,000 yen)
which is reasonable and fuel efficient, the average total cost from purchase until the end of use
will be approximately 5 million yen. (The information is created based on the figures published
by the National Research Institute of Police Science)
Risk information
If you continue driving a car for 50 years, two out of three drivers will cause an accident with
injury, one out of 100 drivers will cause a fatal accident, 1 out of 300 drivers die from an
accident, and one out of 250 drivers kill someone by driving a vehicle. (The information is
created based on the figures published by The Institute of Public Health, and the General
Insurance Association of Japan)
Vacation information
As a result of the statistical analysis on the large-scale questionnaire research targeted at tourists
in Kyoto City conducted by the city, it was revealed that “due to traffic congestion, those who
went sight-seeing by car have a lower degree of satisfaction compared to those who went by bus
or subway.” (The information is created based on the Report on Kyoto City Holiday Traffic
Research)
As described in this Table, providing information on risk and vacations did not
seem to have an effect on the cognition of risk or enjoyment level. However, the
cost cognition is at a higher level for the cost-information group and all-information
group, both of which received cost information, compared to the control
group. Additionally, it shows that the intention and desire to obtain a driver’s
license continued to be significantly low at the 6-month point after the provision of
the information, for each information group other than the risk-information group
(regarding their desire to obtain a license) and vacation-information group (re-
garding their intention to obtain a license). Moreover, the actual number of people
who obtained the license remained lower for any group who received information,
compared to the control group. The rate of license acquisition for the control group
that did not receive information was 24.1 %, but that of the total of groups that
received information remained at 12.3 %, which is about a half (this difference was
significant by logit regression analysis).
Furthermore, from the follow-up survey held 18 months later, 66.7 % of the
control group had acquired a driver’s license, while 47.1 % for the all-information
group, 50.0 % for the cost-information group, 34.6 % for the risk-information
group, and 29.4 % for the vacation-information group. This verifies that the pro-
viding of objective information continues to influence the behavior of obtaining a
license for a period as long as 18 months after the provision of the information
(Fujii and Takasu 2003).
The above result implies that at least by providing objective information on car
maintenance costs, the cognition of car costs change, and cost resistance increases.
At the same time, the desire to obtain the license, its intention, and the actual
behavior itself were all inhibited. This result supports this book’s hypothesis that
“objective information changes cognition and behavior.”
56
Table 5.2 Cognition, desire, intention, and the rate of license acquisition after six months since providing the information
Control group All-information Cost-information Risk-information Vacation-information
(n = 29) group (n = 35) group (n = 38) group (n = 34) group (n = 34)
Cost cognition 6.66 7.63* 7.58* 6.42 6.35
Risk cognition 27.83 27.29 27.24 26.30 28.12
Enjoyment-level cognition 11.14 12.03 11.32 11.19 10.32
Desire to obtain a licensea 6.09 5.48** 5.47* 5.61 5.32**
Intention to obtain a licensea 6.55 5.97** 5.94* 6.11* 6.23
Number of people who 7 6 6 3* 2**
obtained the license
(Ratio) (24.1 %) (17.1 %) (15.7 %) (9.7 %) (5.9 %)
From Fujii et al. (2003)
Cost cognition: the average of two items such as “using a car is more expensive than using a taxi”
Risk cognition: the average of five items such as the “car is very dangerous,” and “it is possible to be seriously injured while driving”
Enjoyment−level cognition: the average of two items such as “it is enjoyable to travel by car” and “it is enjoyable to drive”
Desire to obtain a license: “do you wish to get a driver’s license?”
Intention to obtain a license: “do you intend to get a driver’s license?”
All above figures are measured in the seven−point scale
*p < 0.10
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
p The result of one−sided t-test on the difference with the control group
a
The average of participants without a license
5 Correction of Cognition: Providing Objective Information
On the other hand, with regards to car risk and the enjoyment level of driving,
we did not find the statistical change in cognition by providing objective infor-
mation. Despite this fact, it still resulted in a change to the intention, desire, and
behavior of obtaining the license. There may be several ways to interpret this result.
At least for the cognition of the enjoyment level, one may consider that although the
cognitive change did not show a statistically significant difference, it still provided a
significant change in the intention and behavior. Alternatively, receiving the
objective information itself may have led the participants to at least contemplate on
whether or not to obtain a license. In other words, the decision-making process of
obtaining a license became more refined (c.f. Fujii and Takemura 2001), and it may
have led to inhibiting the desire, intention, and behavior.
In either case, the above experiment result supports the possibility that those in
the middle of choosing whether to obtain a license may have formed overly positive
deluded beliefs on car usage, and providing objective information may have the
effect of inhibiting the acquisition of a license.
5.4 Providing Objective Information on the Cooperation

of Others
(1) Undervaluation of the cooperation of others

All the deluded beliefs, or cognitive misunderstandings that have been dealt with
in this chapter have concerned “misunderstandings that support the implementation
of defection,” and thus correcting such misunderstanding was expected to
encourage cooperation. However, whether it is the negative cognition about
cooperation or the positive cognition about defection, such cognitive misunder-
standings were always about “what attributes (features) does my behavior have?”
Namely, it was the cognition to regulate the “attitude” about cooperation or
defection. However, “misunderstandings supporting the implementation of defec-
tion” are not only related with attitudes, since people are motivated to decrease their
cognitive dissonance and justify themselves, in various scenarios, and in various
ways (refer to Sect. 5.2(2)).
One of such cognitive misunderstandings may involve “trust.” Beliefs con-
cerning the cooperation of others may be distorted in such a way as to inhibit
cooperation and encourage defection. Namely, if people cannot trust others, and
think that “not many others will be engaging in a cooperative behavior,” their
cooperation will be inhibited by the influence of the behavior of others (conformity
effect) (refer to Sect. 3.2(2)).
When considering misunderstandings concerning the cooperation of others, it is
possible to base a discussion on the psychological tendency for an individual to
hold the belief “I am fairer and more moral, and more correct than others,” as
indicated by Messick et al. (1985). This tendency is also known as the Muhammad
Ali effect after the world famous champion professional boxer (Van Lange 1991);
Cognitively consonant Cognitively consonant
Cognition A: I am Cognition B: Cognition C:

fairer, more moral, Others are not Others are not
and more correct so fair, moral, conducting a
compared to others or correct cooperative
behavior so much
Conformity effect
The tendency of
your own
cooperation
decreases
Fig. 5.6 The causal relationship in which the cognitive misunderstanding on “trust” disturbs the
implementation of your own cooperative behavior
in essence an individual underestimates the fairness and morality of others (refer to

Fig. 5.6). It is because, such underestimation is consonant with the cognition that
the individual is fairer, more moral, and more correct than others. And this
underestimation about the fairness of others may lead to the underestimation of the
cooperation of others, and finally lead to decreasing the level or frequency of an
individual’s own cooperation.
As experimental data supporting the above hypothesis, the results of our
experiment involving 178 students at Kyoto University are interesting (Fujii
2002b). In this experiment, we set the following situations as dilemmas:
“Would you betray a friend?”
“Would you give your seat to an elderly person on a train?,” and
“From now on would you cut back on your car use out of consideration for the
environment?”
For each situation, we asked the following two questions:

“What is your answer?”(Yes/No)
“What percentage of the students of Kyoto University answering these questions do you
think would answer “Yes”?”
The latter question is about cognition of the cooperation rate of others. The total
result is shown in Fig. 5.7.
As shown in Fig. 5.7, for both these dilemmas, the average rate of cognition on
the cooperation of others is significantly lower than the actual cooperation rate.
Especially, in cooperation to inhibit car usage for environmental reasons, there is a
5.4 Providing Objective Information on the Cooperation of Others 59
Fig. 5.7 The average on the

cognition of the cooperation
rate of others and the actual
cooperation rate for each
situation (n = 178), (Created
from Fujii 2002a, b)
large gap of approximately 20 %. This result supports the hypothesis that people
have a tendency to think that “others are not carrying out cooperative behaviors
very much.”
Moreover, Fig. 5.8 shows the average of cognition of the cooperation rate of
others for participants who answered they would cooperate (cooperator) and par-
ticipants who answered they would not cooperate (noncooperator). It is clear from
this diagram, noncooperators estimate the cooperation rate of others 15–30 % lower
than that estimated by cooperators. This result supports the hypothesis that “people
choose a defective behavior because they underestimate the cooperation rate of
others”3,4
(2) Effect of providing objective information on the cooperation of others
The above data indicates that people underestimate the cooperation rate of others
and thereby increase their own tendency to engage in defective behavior. But
3
Of course, it is not impossible to regard this result as “simply reflecting the causal relationship
that they estimate the cooperation rate of others as low because they are conducting a defective
behavior.” However, at least, the result does not disconfirm the hypothesis that “they conduct a
defective behavior because they estimate the cooperation rate of others as low.” In order to
examine the direction of causal relationship more carefully, it requires an experiment to empiri-
cally manipulate one side of the equation. But at least from a logical standpoint, we can consider
the possibility of causal relationship on both directions. The causal relationship that “they
underestimate the cooperation rate of others because they take a defective behavior” may be
expected from the side of Cognitive Dissonance Theory. The causal relationship that “they take a
defective behavior because they underestimate the cooperation rate of others” may be expected
from the conformity effect side.
4
From both Figs. 5.7 and 5.8, we can also read the result that “for cooperators, the cognitive
cooperation rate of others does not outstrip the actual rate, but for noncooperators, it is much lower
than the actual rate.” This result supports the existence of the conformity effect, and at the same
time, there is a possibility that it shows the “social intelligence” (Yamagishi 1998) of noncoop-
erators is lower than that of cooperators.
Fig. 5.8 The average on the

cognition of the cooperation
rate of others by different
situation and by
cooperation/defection
(n = 178), (Created from Fujii
2002a, b)
Inhibit from using the car out

Betray a friend Give your seat to
of environmental
an elderly person
consideration
precisely because of this tendency, we may consider the possibility of encouraging

people’s cooperation through providing objective information about the coopera-
tion of others. That is to say, since people underestimate the cooperation of others,
it is considered that by providing objective information of the actual rates of
cooperation of others, they may think as follows:
I always thought that others are not carrying out that much cooperative behavior, but in fact
they are engaging in cooperative behavior quite a lot.
In this way, the objective information may correct people’s misunderstanding on

the cooperation rate of others. And since we have a conformity tendency, such
correction may lead to the cognition of the higher cooperation rate of others, and
thereby facilitate their cooperative tendencies. Focusing on this possibility, the
method to encourage people’s cooperation by providing objective information on
the cooperation of others is called the “strategy to correct misunderstandings
concerning the cooperation rate of others” (Fujii 2002b).
The following experiment data supports the effectiveness of this strategy.
This experiment involved students (collected from Kyoto, Kansai, Nagoya, and
Osaka Sangyo Universities), and concerned the problem of nuisance bike parking;
the following procedure was carried out (Fujii 2002b):
Step 1 We asked the following two questions by email: “Do you try not to park
your bike in a place where it might bother other people?” and
“Approximately what percentage of university students taking part in this
email survey do you think would answer ‘yes’ to the above question?”
(n = 116). The actual cooperation rate calculated from the results of the
first question was 82.8 %, while the average cognitive cooperation rate of
others calculated from the result of the second question was 60.5 %. By
t-test, the average cognitive cooperation rate of others was at a significantly
low level compared with the actual cooperation rate; giving the same data
as described earlier.
5.4 Providing Objective Information on the Cooperation of Others 61
Table 5.3 The average and the standard deviation of the moral obligation and the number of
nuisance parking incidents for a group with the information on the cooperation rate of others, and a
group without the information
Group without the information on the Group with the information
cooperation rate of others (n = 32) on the cooperation rate of
others (n = 44)
Average Standard Average
deviation Standard
deviation
Moral obligation 3.88 [0.75] 4.16 [0.53]
Number of 1.09 [2.04] 0.63 [1.23]
nuisance parking
incidents
(From Fujii 2002a, b)
Step 2 After about two weeks, we sent an email to half of the participants
informing them that 82.8 % (96 out of 116 participants) had answered
“yes” to the first question in Step 1. Incidentally, when doing so, we
randomly extracted half of those who answered “yes” in Step 1 (n = 48)
and half of those who answered “no” (n = 10).
Step 3 About a week later, we sent an email to all participants asking in terms of a
moral obligation, “What do you think of parking bikes in a place that may
bother other people?” There were five possible answers ranging from “It is
not bad at all” to “It is very bad.” We also asked a supplementary question
“How many times did you park your bike in a place that may bother other
people in the past week?” Seventy-six participants replied.
Table 5.3 is the total result of the measured value in Step 3. As shown in this
Table, we find that those who received the information on the actual cooperation
rate of others reported a higher moral obligation, with fewer cases of nuisance
parking.5 This result supports the effectiveness of the strategy to correct misun-
derstandings concerning the cooperation rate of others, which claims that people’s
cooperative tendencies may be facilitated by providing objective information on
cooperation by others.
5
There was no significant difference in the effect of the actual behavior, but with regards to the
moral obligation, the tendency of differences due to different experimental conditions was sta-
tistically shown.
5.5 Conclusion
As seen in this chapter, regardless of whether it is providing objective information

on the service level of public transportation, objective information on the risks or
costs of car usage to pre-drivers, or a strategy to correct misunderstandings con-
cerning the cooperation rate of others, they all prove to be very promising means to
helping encourage people’s cooperation.
Of course, it may not be quite easy to completely solve social dilemmas just by
simply providing such objective information. Especially, among those individuals
who have formed a strong habit, there is a low tendency to take or read the
information despite efforts to provide it, and even if they do receive the information,
they do not easily believe it (Gärling et al. 2001; Verplanken et al. 1997). Therefore,
for individuals with a strong defective habit, even if objective information is pro-
vided, there is a high possibility that they will not accept the information.
Even so, when considering an integrated social policy, it is also true that we may
expect to create a more effective social policy by adding the method of providing
objective information discussed here. For that purpose, it is important to make
efforts to accumulate knowledge on the many different psychological tendencies of
people, and not only consider providing objective information as discussed in this
chapter, but also explore comprehensively combining several of the solutions that
will be discussed in the following chapters.
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2002 October, 47. (in Japanese).
Fujii, S. (2002b). Strategy to correct misunderstandings concerning the cooperation rate of others
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Fujii, S., & Kitamura, R. (2003). What does a one-month free bus ticket do to habitual drivers? An
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Fujii, S., & Takasu, Y. (2003). Communication with non-drivers promotes wise decisions
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Chapter 6
Facilitating Experience: Attitude Change
Through Experience Solicited
by Temporary Structural Change
In daily life, many of us have experienced events similar to the following com-
monplace incidents;
I haven’t had many chances to talk to her, but I happened to meet her on the train, so we
had a chat and I discovered she was quite a nice person. Since then, I see her quite often.
Since the road I usually use was being resurfaced, I tried another route. It was better than
I’d thought and since then, I’ve been using that route.
I had been commuting by car every day, but since it broke down, I had to take the train and
then a bus, but actually I still got to work quite quickly. Since then, I sometimes commute
by train and bus, depending on the situation.
The common factors in all these cases are as follows:

(1) The daily life environment was subject to change.
(2) Due to the change, a new behavior was chosen.
(3) The behavior was quite beneficial.
(4) Since then, the behavior continues to be chosen.
The important point is number “(3) the behavior was quite beneficial”. If the new
behavior “was not as good as expected,” the person may never choose that behavior
again.
Now, let us recall what was demonstrated in the previous chapter with several
examples, that “a habitual noncooperator has a tendency to form negative delusions
about cooperation.” Since the noncooperator has formed negative delusions about
cooperation, if they once choose a cooperative behavior, there may be a high
possibility that they will think: “(3) the behavior was quite beneficial.”
In the previous chapter, a solution was proposed to correct negative delusions
about cooperation by providing objective information. In contrast, what is discussed
here is a solution to correct negative delusions through actual experience. If you
agree with the proverb “seeing is believing,” we may expect a stronger effect when
negative delusions are corrected by providing an actual experience, compared to
correcting by just giving information. In this book, this method which expects a

66 6 Facilitating Experience: Attitude Change …
change in attitude and behavior through experiencing a new behavior is called the
“method of facilitating experience.”
However, the main problem is that a habitual noncooperator is the type of person
who is the farthest away from experiencing cooperation. The habitual noncooper-
ator may not choose a cooperative behavior even once. For example, for anyone
with a strong habit of traveling by car on a regular basis, the idea of using a bus,
even just one single time, may be almost unimaginable. Keeping this point in mind,
the fundamental issue in designing a social policy to solve a social dilemma is to
somehow find a way to create an opportunity for a habitual noncooperator to
conduct a cooperative behavior. One possible way of creating such an opportunity
is the introduction of a temporary structural change, for instance in the above cases
we find “I happened to meet her on the train,” “the road was blocked,” and “the car
broke down.” That is to say, a structural change, however temporary it may be, has
the potential to facilitate a change in a person’s consciousness.
The following sections in this chapter discuss whether a temporary structural
change can change people’s consciousness and behavior, by introducing several
examples.
6.1 Sustainable Change Through Temporary Structural

Change: Simulation Analysis
The following is an example of how a temporary structural change solves each

person’s deluded belief, and thereby greatly changes the collective action of the
whole group.
We conducted a simulation calculation for several days, targeted on a network
with two routes as shown in Fig. 5.2, in which Route 1 and 2 are equal in distance
and have the same capacity of vehicles transported per hour (i.e., traffic capacity).
The calculation was based on the same premises as the case of Sect. 5.2 (1) that
(1) each driver chooses the shortest route according to the expected time of both
routes, and (2) the time expected by each driver is decided by the travel time
experienced by that driver (Fujii et al. 2001).
Fig. 6.1 Change in traffic 200

volume for both routes (From
Fujii et al. 2001)
Traffic volume
150 Route 1 (crowded route)
100 Route 2 (empty route)
50
0 100 200 300 400

Number of days
6.1 Sustainable Change Through Temporary … 67
We made calculations under several preconditions, and Fig. 6.1 shows one of
the results. Although Route 1 and 2 have the same traffic capacity, there are more
drivers who use Route 1, and this is why Route 1 is congested and Route 2 is not
(from now on, the crowded Route 1 will simply be called the “crowded route,” and
the uncrowded Route 2 will be known as the “empty route”). Since both crowded
and empty routes have the same capacity and road distance, generally speaking, the
optimal status of this network would be when both routes are equally used. If one of
the routes is excessively used, it will be heavily congested, and many drivers will
suffer from the nuisance of congestion. On the other hand, if both routes are used
equally, there will not be much congestion on either route. As a result, everyone
will be able to arrive at their destination in an acceptable duration of time.1
Now, we will explore the reason for one route being overly used.
The reason is that each driver formed a deluded belief that “the travel time of the
route I’m taking is shorter than the route I’m not using”, as already discussed in
Sect. 5.2 (1) (refer to Fig. 5.1). Namely, it is because a greater number of drivers
only use the crowded route and think that it is faster than the empty route, compared
with the number of drivers with the opposite cognition who only used the empty
route. Of course, there were other results of calculation in which Route 2 was more
congested instead, or both routes showed the same level of congestion. The cal-
culation result of Fig. 6.1 was chosen at random from these other calculation
results.
The situation depicted in Fig. 6.1 is merely one of a variety of results obtained
by chance through calculation. But there exist several logical ways to solve the
congestion in the crowded route.
First of all, the simplest way to solve the congestion is “to improve the traffic
capacity of the crowded route.” Such a policy is often selected by actual admin-
istrations in real life. It is a simple equation: “this route is crowded, so in order to
solve the crowding, we will improve the road to accommodate more cars.” Of
course, this method may indeed solve the congestion, but realistically, road
improvements require a vast budget, and so it may actually be impossible to
implement. However, from the start, as the empty route still has unused capacity, it
is more efficient if some of the drivers using the crowded route switch to the empty
route. Regardless of this situation, increasing the capacity of the crowded route, will
lead to its users “preferring” the route even more, and their motivation to shift to the
empty route will further decline.
Next, let us consider the ramifications of improving the capacity of the empty
route, and thus increase its popularity with drivers; in real life, transportation
polices have applied this approach. Unfortunately, however, this method has not
proved to be very effective, because the reason why many drivers use the crowded
1
Of course, there are situations when it is a more efficient way of using roads if they are not used
evenly, if certain conditions are met in the relationship between the traffic volume and travel time,
or the relationship of the total number of drivers. Such detail is not dealt with here, but the main
text deals with a situation where a state of equal use of the two routes is the most efficient way of
using the network.
route is the deluded belief that “Route 1 is faster.” And such a deluded belief was
cultivated through their own experience of using the route, therefore, even if the
empty route became faster, if drivers do not have an experience of using it at least
once, they will not know it has become faster. After all, even if the empty route
became faster, the users of the crowded route will still not begin using it.2
Finally, now let us consider the following policy:
Temporarily decrease the transportation capacity of the crowded route.
Even though such a counter-intuitive policy has rarely been applied by actual
transportation administrations, we will explore an actual implementation of this
paradoxical policy as a classic example of a “temporary structural change.”
In this case, with the newly reduced traffic capacity, drivers using the crowded
route cannot fail to recognize that it has suddenly become very slow. Thus at least
some of the drivers of the crowded route may consider the idea of using the
substitute route (Route 2 which is empty at the moment). The important point here
is that “even for a driver who does not use the substitute route when it has become
faster, if the regularly used route becomes just a little slower, they would then
consider using the substitute route.”
Many users will have continued to use the route even though it is actually
crowded, since they believed it is faster. What would they think when they have
taken the opportunity to use the empty route?
“I always thought Route 1 was empty, but my thinking was actually wrong.”
Hence their deluded belief may be corrected through just a one-time experience of
using the empty route. And after that, they may start using Route 2 regularly.
Therefore, it is expected that under the circumstances of each driver forming the
deluded belief that “I am using the faster route,” when the traffic capacity of the
crowded route is temporarily decreased, some of the traffic may be shifted from the
crowded route to the empty one. It is expected that this may correct the uneven use
of the routes, and lead to their equal use.
Refer to Fig. 6.2. As expected from the above discussion, by limiting the
capacity of the crowded road to 50 % just for a single day, some users of the
crowded route are shifted to the empty route, the inequality of both routes is
corrected, and the network began to be utilized efficiently.
Of course, the above calculation result is merely a virtual calculation in a virtual
environment. However, by repeating such simulations, the idea was born that the
imposition of a “temporary structural change may be effective.”
2
In real life, some drivers may begin to choose a new behavior by hearing or reading about the
change in its service level. However, it is also true that in reality, a considerable number of drivers
will have formed the habit of using a specific route. Additionally, for an individual who has
formed such a habit, their behavior will become automated. Therefore, they do not make efforts to
gather new information, as verified in various experiments (refer to Chapter 4). Taking this point
into account, the result of the overly simplified simulation calculation shown in the main text
should not be too unrealistic, and it would seem that “even if you improve the service level of the
unpopular route, it may not necessarily lead to a great increase of users.”
Fig. 6.2 Change in traffic

volume for both routes in a
case when Route 1’s traffic Route 1 ( crowded route )
Traffic volume
capacity is decreased by half
for 1 day (From Fujii et al.
2001)
Route 2 (empty route)

Number of days
Simulation can greatly help researchers in their process of considering a logical

hypothesis. In many cases we have to rely on simulation in order to figure out a
logical, but fundamental causal hypothesis which will simplify any complicated
phenomena. It is because simulation is an apparatus based on a simple and fun-
damental hypothesis to recreate complicated phenomena in a virtual environment.
The simulation approach enables researchers to observe in a controlled manner and
from various angles the mutual relation between the micro causal relationship and
the macro phenomena. Just by aimlessly looking at complicated phenomena, and
being caught by trivial and minute matters, an observer will never capture the
fundamental and universal causal relationships.
However, in the end any logical hypothesis must be exposed to empirical ver-
ification. Simulation research can only yield valid knowledge by combining it with
empirical research. In the following section, the above simulation will be verified
with empirical data.

Change: Positive Analysis on Cognition and Behavior
In considering a strategy to solve a dilemma, the most important condition for a

temporary structural change to be effective is that initially a noncooperator has formed
a deluded belief on cooperation. Chapter 5 discussed that there are several empirical
studies supporting this point. However, in order for any temporary structural change to
be effective, the following set of hypotheses should be proven to be true:
(1) Through a temporary structural change, the cooperation of a noncooperator is
facilitated,
(2) The deluded belief is corrected by experiencing the cooperative behavior, and
(3) Even after the temporary structural change ends and the structure of the
behavior environment returns to its previous state, the cooperative behavior is
continuously conducted.
The set of these hypotheses is verified in the data drawn from a situation where
“drivers regularly commuting on a highway, the Hanshin Expressway Sakai Route,
were unable to use the highway for a period of 8 days due to road closure”
Before the closure

During the closure
Railway commuting rate
Strong-habit driver (n=34) Moderate-habit driver (n=78) Weak-habit driver (n=216)
Fig. 6.3 Change on the railway commuting rate of habitual drivers due to the road closure. The
above data processed the figures reported by Fujii et al. (2001). Note Strong-habit driver: commute
by car everyday Moderate-habit driver: commute by car 80 % or more Weak-habit driver:
commute by car less than 80 %
(Fujii et al. 2001). In the following, data gathered during this period will be used to
verify the above (1)–(3).
Figure 6.3 shows the railway commuting rate (ratio of weekly working days
commuted by train) for each driver, before and after the road closure. Like Fig. 5.3,
this diagram divides the drivers into three groups, according to the strength of their
car commuting habit; it is revealed that the railway commuting rate increased in all
groups as a result of the road closure. This means that “(1) through a temporary
structural change, the cooperation of a noncooperator is facilitated,” as described in
the above hypothesis.
Yet, closer observation shows the degree of change in the railway commuting
rate becomes smaller as the degree of car commuting habit becomes stronger. In the
group with a weak car commuting habit, it increased by 20 %. In the group with a
strong car commuting habit, it increased by only 9 %. From this observation, it is
considered that although cooperation is facilitated through the temporary structural
change, the stronger the defective habit, the more difficult it is to facilitate
cooperation.3
3
As a result of the calculated repeated measurement analysis of variance on the railway commuting
ratio (during and before the road closure) and the strength of car commuting habit (weak vs.
moderate vs. strong), it was found that both the change in railway commuting ratio due to the
Cognitive travel time on railway commuting (minutes)
Strong-habit driver (n=27) Moderate-habit driver (n=18) Weak-habit driver (n=22)
First day of railway commuting

Second day of railway commuting
Fig. 6.4 Change on the rate of commuting by public transportation of habitual drivers due to the
road closure (temporary change). The above data processed the figures reported by Fujii et al.
(2001). Note Cognitive travel time: estimated duration of time when commuting by railway
Strong-habit driver: commute by car everyday Moderate-habit driver: commute by car 80 % or
more Weak-habit driver: commute by car less than 80 %
Next, let us take a look at the second hypothesis that “(2) the deluded belief is
corrected by experiencing the cooperative behavior.” As already shown in Fig. 5.3,
the stronger their car commuting habit, the longer drivers estimated the required
time of railway commuting (i.e., cooperation).
It is shown that the difference is approximately 5 min in the group with the
strongest car commuting habit. Now, Fig. 6.4 extracted the drivers who commuted
by railway for two or more days during the road closure. It measured the average
railway commuting cognitive travel time on the first day and the second day of
railway commuting, shown by the different strength of the car commuting habit.
In other words, this diagram indicates the cognitive travel time of railway
commuting before and after using the railway. To express it another way, it indi-
cates the impact of the one-time railway usage experience on the estimated value of
railway commuting time.
(Footnote 3 continued)
closure, as well as the interaction between this change and the strength of car commuting habit
were significant.
Fig. 6.5 Change on the rate Railway commuting rate

of commuting by public
transportation of habitual
drivers due to the road closure
(sustained change). The above
data processed the figures
reported by Fujii et al. (2001)
Used railway during the Did not use railway during the
closure (n=16) closure (n=95)
Just before the closure

One year after the closure
Although in the moderate and weak-habit groups, no clear difference was seen
between the first and second day (no significant change was observed by verifi-
cation), in the strong-habit group, there was a clear difference between the 2 days
(significant change was observed by verification). The difference is approximately 5
min, which is about the same as the amount of time estimated by the “deluded belief
of strong-habit drivers” shown by Fig. 5.3. Namely, the data supports the
hypothesis that “only strong-habit drivers who do not usually use railways form
overly negative deluded beliefs on railway commuting, but the deluded belief can
be corrected by using the railway just once during the road closure (temporary
structural change).”
Now, regarding the habitual car commuters who have corrected their negative
deluded beliefs, we addressed the question to what degree did they become railway
users after the reopening of the road. In other words, is it possible to empirically
prove the last hypothesis described above, (3) even after the temporary structural
change ends and the structure of the behavior environment returns to its previous
state, the cooperative behavior is continuously conducted?
In order to verify this point, we conducted research by asking the same partic-
ipants their means of commuting 1 year after the 8-day road closure (Fujii and
Gärling 2003).
We divided the participants whose frequency of railway commuting was less
than once a month before the road closure (i.e., those who are regarded as having
formed the negative deluded belief) into two groups. One is a group who used the
railway during the road closure, and the other group who did not. Figure 6.5 shows
the average railway commuting rate for each group, just before the road closure,
and 1 year after the road closure.
As shown in this diagram, regarding the group who did not use the railway
during the road closure, there was only a 2 % difference between right before the
road closure and 1 year later. In contrast, for the group who used the railway during
the road closure, the change was as significant as 10 %. In other words, the habitual
car commuters who temporarily used the railway due to the road closure have
maintained the improved tendency to commute by railway, even after a year.4
The above result coincides with the result of the virtual simulation calculation
shown in the previous section. Namely, we have observed that the temporary
cooperation facilitated through a temporary structural change corrected the negative
deluded belief about cooperation, resulting in an increasing tendency of people’s
cooperation.

Change: Positive Analysis on Attitude, Habit,
and Behavior
The data in the previous section showed that the implementation of temporary
cooperation facilitated through temporary structural change, however temporary it
may be, led to the change in the cognition or beliefs about cooperation, and thereby
sustainable cooperation was facilitated. However, implementation of temporary
cooperation can have an impact in various other ways as shown in Fig. 6.6. In the
following, each impact will be described based on this diagram.
(1) Impact on cognition
The stronger the defective habit, the larger the negative belief (refer to Fig. 5.3).
Additionally, the larger the negative belief on cooperation, the less tendency people
will have to implement cooperation. As shown in Fig. 6.6, the negative beliefs
about cooperation and the strength of the defective habit mutually reinforce each
other. However, as repeatedly mentioned up to now, implementation of temporary
cooperation corrects the negative belief on cooperation, and puts an end to the
reciprocally reinforcing relationship between the negative belief (deluded belief)
about cooperation and the defective habit.
(2) Impact on attitude
Attitude is regulated by belief (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). Therefore, if the
negative belief about cooperation is corrected, the attitude toward cooperation also
becomes positive. However, the mere fact of “having implemented a cooperative
4
As a result of the calculated repeated measurement analysis of variance on the railway commuting
ratio (before and one year after the road closure) and whether they commuted by railway during
the closure (yes vs. no), there was a tendency that the change before and after the closure on the
railway commuting ratio was influenced by whether they commuted by railway during the closure.
Correction
Strong Negative belief
defective habit of negative belief
on cooperation
Sustained increase of
Positive change in
attitude on cooperation
cooperation
Temporary Temporary
structural change cooperation Formation of a
cooperative habit
Dissolving of a
defective habit
Fig. 6.6 Causal path in which temporary structural change leading to the increase in sustained
cooperation
behavior” also positively changes people’s attitudes to cooperation. There are

several possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, it may be due to what is known
as the “mere exposure effect” (Zajonc 1968). According to this effect, the attitude
about a certain matter becomes positive simply because the person experienced
exposure to that matter. The next possible reason may be Festinger’s Cognitive
Dissonance Theory (Festinger 1957) that was also quoted in Sect. 5.2 (2) when
explaining the logical mechanism of how a deluded belief was formed.
First, let us think of a person who has formed the cognition that “I have formed a
negative attitude on cooperation” (Cognition A). If this person conducted a coop-
erative behavior through structural change, they may form the cognition that “I have
conducted a cooperative behavior” (Cognition B). However, Cognition A and B are
not consonant with each other. In such a case, according to Cognitive Dissonance
Theory, this person is motivated to somehow mitigate the dissonance. There are
several possible ways to mitigate this cognitive dissonance, but one way is to
change the attitude on cooperation from negative to positive. If they do so, they will
form a new cognition, “I have formed a positive attitude on cooperation,” and it is
consonant with Cognition B. In this way, it may be possible to change a person’s
attitude on cooperation from negative to positive, through the mere implementation
of the cooperative behavior.
Such a change of attitude to cooperation in a positive direction through imple-
mentation of a cooperative behavior is verified by research, for instance by Sugiura
et al. (1999). They analyzed the change in the attitude to separating garbage
accompanied by the introduction of a garbage separation system in Nagoya City.
For each household, it is bothersome to separate garbage. But if all households do
not separate garbage, it will cost much more to separate garbage after it is collected.
In addition, if garbage is not separated at all, its disposal would cause a large
environmental burden. In other words, there arises a social dilemma in which
separating garbage at home is cooperation, and not separating it is defection. The
6.3 Sustainable Change Through Temporary Structural Change … 75
garbage separating system can thus be regarded as a solution involving structural

change introduced by the government in order to solve this social dilemma.
Sugiura et al. measured the attitude about the garbage separating behavior
among households located in the following three areas:
(1) Pre-introduction area: area right before introducing the garbage separation
system
(2) Post-introduction area: area right after introducing the system
(3) 1-year after area: area 1 year after introducing the system.
The result showed that the attitude to garbage separation became more positive
in the Post-introduction area right after introducing the system, than in the
Pre-introduction area. Likewise, it was found that the attitude became even more
positive in the 1-year after area than in the Post-introduction area.
Similar results were obtained in an experiment to distribute a free bus commuter
pass among habitual drivers (Fujii et al., to be published; Fujii and Kitamura 2003).
In this experiment, we measured the strength of attitude and habit on bus and car
use in the following three timings (refer to appendix):
Timing 1: Pre-distribution: right before distributing the commuter pass
Timing 2: Post-distribution: right after the expiry date of the pass
Timing 3: 1-month after expiry: 1 month after the expiry date of the pass
Consequently, it was revealed that the attitude on bus usage improved through
distribution of the pass. Even 1-month after expiry, it maintained a higher level
compared with Pre-distribution. Incidentally, in the control group to which no pass
was distributed, no such change was observed.
The data support the hypothesis that a cooperative behavior brought about by
structural change is effective to change the attitude about cooperation to a positive
one.
(3) Dissolving a defective habit and solidifying a cooperative habit
As already mentioned when explaining the behavior modification process model
in Chap. 4 (refer to Fig. 4.1), implementation of a cooperative behavior has an
effect to decrease the strength of a defective habit (habit dissolving effect), and to
increase the strength of a cooperative habit (habit solidifying effect) as described in
Sect. 4.6. These effects are verified in a lab test (Gärling et al. 2001) as well as by
data from other research and field experiments.
The first example was obtained by research targeted at students graduating from
university and starting employment. We asked them the frequency of using car and
public transportation for commuting, as well as habits on car and public trans-
portation twice, once in February just before graduation and in June which is after
graduation in Japan (Fujii and Gärling 2003). For many participants, their means of
commuting after starting work changed greatly from when they were students. It is
considered that this change is not so much from any change in their attitude, but
mainly due to the drastic change in their environment occurring as a result of
changing their home address and their commuter destination. Therefore, this data
may be used to analyze how a behavior facilitated by structural change influences
attitudes.
The habit was measured by using a sheet questionnaire, following the method
developed by Verplanken et al. (1994). After instructing the participants to answer
questions as quickly and intuitively as possible, we presented them with several
virtual situations, and asked them to choose which transportation method they
would take for each situation (refer to Appendix). Here, the number of times a
person chooses each transportation method is considered to express the degree of
habit strength in using each method. This method of measurement is based on a
premise that by asking them to answer intuitively, the degree of automation of using
each transportation method would be reflected by the answer. In fact, Verplanken
et al. reported that there is a correlation between the scale measured in this way and
the scale of cognitive automation in decision-making which was measured sepa-
rately (Verplanken et al. 1994, 1997).
According to the data, we divided the participants into three groups based on the
change in the frequency of using public transportation before and after starting to
work. For each group, we calculated the change in the habit of using public
transportation and car, before and after starting to work (refer to Fig. 6.7). As
shown in this diagram, as for the participants who started to use public trans-
portation to commute, the habit of using public transportation became stronger,
while that of using the car became weaker. In contrast, for the participants who
stopped using public transportation (and started using the car instead) for com-
muting, the habit of using public transportation became weaker, while that of using
the car became stronger.5
The effect on habit is also verified in the experiment of distributing a free bus
commuter pass to habitual car users, described above (Fujii et al., to be published;
Fujii and Kitamura 2003). In this experiment, the strength of the car using habit and
bus using habit were also measured in the same way as the method used by
Verplanken et al. According to the data on habit, for participants who temporarily
increased their bus use with the free commuter pass, there was a tendency that the
strength of the car habit decreased, while the strength of the bus habit increased.
5
As a result of the repeated measurement analysis of variance on the strength of habit of using
public transportation calculated by the change in the frequency of commuting by public trans-
portation (increase vs. little change vs. decrease) and before and after starting to work, it was
shown that the change before and after starting to work in the strength of habit of using public
transportation is significantly influenced by the change of frequency in commuting by public
transportation. A similar effective result was found in the strength of the car using habit.
Habit of using public transportation
Increase in the rate of commuting by

public transportation (n=18)
Little change in the rate of

commuting by public transportation
(n=16)
Decrease in the rate of commuting by

Before starting to work After starting to work
(1)Change in the habit of using public transportation before and after starting to work
Habit of using a car
Increase in the rate of commuting by

Little change in the rate of commuting

by public transportation (n=16)
Decrease in the rate of commuting by

Before starting to work After starting to work

(2)Change in the habit of using a car before and after starting to work
Fig. 6.7 Change of habit strength caused by the change in the means of commuting. Increase in
the rate of commuting by public transportation: a group in which the rate of commuting by public
transportation increased after starting to work. Little change in the rate of commuting by public
transportation: a group in which the rate of commuting by public transportation showed little
change after starting to work. Decrease in the rate of commuting by public transportation: a group
in which the rate of commuting by public transportation decreased after starting to work. (The
above data processed the figures reported by Fujii and Gärling 2003)
Moreover, the effect tended to continue even after the end of the temporary
structural change (i.e., after the expiry date of the pass).6
The data indicates that the strength of habit changes according to the frequency of
behavior. Any increase in the frequency of a cooperative behavior, however tem-
porary it may be, brought about by a temporary structural change, has the possibility
of solidifying the cooperative behavior, while dissolving the defective behavior.
(4) Impact on cooperation
A temporary cooperative behavior brought about by a temporary structural
change does not only change the cognition and attitude on cooperation to a positive
one, but also has the impact of reinforcing a cooperative habit, while dissolving a
defective habit. As shown in Fig. 6.6, all these effects are psychological changes
6
Regarding the strength of the bus using habit just before the distribution of the bus commuter pass
and one month after its expiry date, it did not reach a significant value, but there was a difference in
car usage habit trends.
which support people to sustainably conduct the cooperative behavior. As data to

support this hypothesis, the temporary closure of a highway usually used for
commuting changes the cognition on railway commuting, and thereby increases the
frequency of railway commuting, which continues to be sustained even after 1 year,
as already shown in Fig. 6.5.
Similar results are found in experiments by Everett (c.f. Cone and Hayes 1980)
or by Foxx and Hake (1977). In such experimental research from the 1970s, there is
no measurement on attitude or habit as described above. Yet the data reported
indicated that carrying out temporary structural change yields a sustainable
behavior change. In order to facilitate people using a certain bus route, Everett
introduced a temporary structural change just for a day: if people used the bus, 25
cents was returned after paying a 10 cents fare, which is 2.5 times as much as the
fare; in addition, newspaper adverts announcing the refund were placed beforehand.
The number of bus users before this temporary structural change was 205 pas-
sengers per day. On the day of the refund, there were 370 passengers, about 80 %
more than usual; on the day after the refund, the number of passengers decreased,
but was still about 250, or around 20 % more than the initial number of 205.
Additionally, Everett and Delauriers verified the effect of supplying the reward
only to randomly selected people, as one of the methods of increasing the economic
efficiency of the policies of supplying such rewards (Delauriers and Everett 1977).
The result of their experiment showed that even under conditions where only one
out of three persons received the reward, the same effect was achieved as giving the
reward to everyone.
Foxx and Hake conducted an experiment with 12 university students who reg-
ularly drove their cars. The students were offered a reward according to their
decreased level of car use over a 4 week period. Based on the distance of car use
before the experiment, a $5 reward was offered for every 10 % decrease; a 0–10 %
decrease in distance earned $5; 10–20 % earned $10, and so on. In addition, they
prepared several other rewards according to the level of decrease, such as offering a
ticket to use a charged facility in the university, for a decrease of 20 % or more.
As a result, the distance of car use during the experiment dropped by about
24 %. Incidentally, for the control group of 9 participants without any reward, it
increased by 10 %. Even more encouragingly even 2 weeks after the experiment
ended, the distance of car usage was decreased by 5 % compared to before the
experiment. Nine out of twelve participants decreased the distance of car use during
the experiment, and out of these nine, seven continued to decrease the distance even
after the experiment had ended. This result also supports the hypothesis that a
temporary structural change has a sustainable effect.
The permanent effect of a temporary structural change is also found in the
above-mentioned experiment of distributing to drivers a free monthly bus commuter
pass (Fujii et al., to be published; Fujii and Kitamura 2003). As mentioned before, it
was also confirmed that the attitude and habit had also changed, which was not
verified in the experiments by Everett, or Foxx and Hake. Therefore, it is possible to
verify the adequacy of the hypothesis of the permanent effect of temporary struc-
tural change more directly, compared to the experiments of Everett and others.
Experiment
group
Control
group
Frequency of bus use per week
Just before distributing One month after the expiry

the commuter pass date of the commuter pass
Fig. 6.8 Change in the frequency of bus use just before the distribution of bus commuter pass and
one month after its expiry date, for a group of drivers who received the pass (experiment group)
and those did not (control group). Note There was a difference seen in the frequency of bus use
between the experiment group and the control group even before the distribution of the commuter
pass. The difference was found even though we allocated participants randomly to the two groups
Figure 6.8 shows the frequency of bus use before distributing the bus commuter
pass and 1 month after its expiry date. From this diagram, you can see that by
distributing the pass, the frequency of bus use has sustainably increased by about
20 %, or a little less than once a week in frequency. Incidentally, the verification
showed the tendency that distributing the pass influenced the change in the fre-
quency of bus use. Although this change is just once a week for each driver, if all
drivers traveled by bus once a week, the number of bus passengers will greatly
increase. Concurrently, if each car driver reduced their car use by switching to the
bus once a week, the accumulative decrease in car traffic should be significant.
6.4 Applying Temporary Structural Change to Pragmatic

Administrative Policies
This chapter discussed the possibility of the “method of facilitating experience”

which aims to change people’s behavior through facilitating a cooperative experi-
ence. Especially, as methods to facilitate cooperation, we discussed the possibility
of a strategy to temporarily support cooperation or a strategy to temporarily disturb
defection or provide a negative incentive to discourage defection, and thereby
change people’s attitude, cognition, and habit in the direction of supporting the
execution of cooperation, and eventually increase the sustained tendency of peo-
ple’s cooperation. In this book, such policies are described as “temporary structural
change,” and we explored its possibilities through introducing several results on
simulation analysis, research, and field experiments.
Data shown in this chapter support the hypothesis that temporary structural
change brings about a psychological change to support sustainable cooperation, at
least for habitual noncooperators. These results indicate that the following
administrative policies may be effective as methods to cope with social dilemmas:
– For a limited period of time, close a specific car route.

(Dilemma of car vs. public transportation)
– For a limited period of time, regulate the inflow of cars to a specific area (for example to
a city center).
– Distribute a free ticket for public transportation to habitual drivers.
– Offer a discount period for using public transportation (or a period of free travel).
– For a limited period of time, offer a day of free parking.
(Dilemma of whether to park car/bike illegally or not)
– Distribute a free ticket for a parking space to those parking their cars/bikes illegally.
(Dilemma of whether to park illegally or not)
– For a limited period of time, introduce a garbage separation system as a “social
experiment”.
(Dilemma of whether to separate garbage or not)
– Establish a day to refrain from using air conditioning led by local government or at
workplaces.
(Dilemma of using vast amounts of electricity or not)
Of course, such policies may not solve the root cause of a social dilemma, but as
will be discussed particularly in Part III of this book, there are several problems and
structural strategies which permanently use the carrot and stick to induce people’s
cooperation (Fujii 2001; Yamagishi 1989a). The downside of this approach is that
continued use of punishment and reward may result in a decline in people’s internal
motivation to spontaneously conduct the desired cooperative behavior.
Basically, the protracted use of carrot and stick alone, may mean a failure to
induce people’s cooperation unless by introducing bigger carrots and sticks.
Obviously it is not viable from a financial point of view to permanently conduct
“carrot” policies that provide rewards for cooperation (continuous free bus travel
would be very difficult to maintain). In contrast, forced policies such as perma-
nently charging penalties for defection, or enforcing prohibition may not gain
people’s support, and as a result, it may become difficult to continue enforcement.
In fact, although a road pricing policy charging drivers is regarded as the “best
policy” by economists, most cities in the world have failed to introduce it.
6.4 Applying Temporary Structural Change to Pragmatic Administrative Policies 81
As can be seen, there are several problems when applying the “permanent”
structural strategies.
However, “temporary” structural strategies may avoid such problems.
Since it is only temporary, it may be possible to avoid the decline in people’s
internal motivation to spontaneously conduct a cooperative behavior. Additionally,
even if it is financially impossible to permanently provide a reward to cooperative
people, it should be highly feasible if it is only for a limited period of time, as in the
case of offering free bus transportation for a certain period of time. By the same
token, people may strongly oppose any policy to continuously apply the “stick” for
defection, but if it is only temporary, any psychological resistance should be small.
In real life, people would very strongly oppose the permanent closure of a specific
route such as the Hanshin Expressway. But closing a specific route for 8 days, as
previously described, has actually been carried out on either route, every year.
It would seem that as seen in this chapter, even if a temporary structural strategy
is not so strong as to solve the root of a problem, it does encourage people’s
long-term cooperation, and has been shown to be a solution with a high practical
feasibility.
As a final comment, the imposition of a “temporary structural strategy” is often
experienced by many people in daily life.
It is widely known that many shops hold “bargain sales,” and that new shops
offer “opening sales.” According to the definition in this book, such sales can all be
regarded as temporary structural strategies. It is because these sales “temporarily
reduce the price sharply, and thereby facilitate a temporary behavior of visiting the
shop (needless to say, although it is financially difficult to permanently offer very
low prices, it is possible for a short temporary period). It is expected that the
temporary behavior of visiting the shop, will change people’s cognition, attitude,
and habits, and thereby people are expected to continue visiting the shop.”
An important point to be focused on here is that such “sales” are a serious and
successful strategy figured out by the retail industry in order to survive against
severe competition. If such “sales” were ineffective as a temporary structural
strategy, then such commercial practices would have been abandoned long ago. As
a real-life example, the continuing existence of sales may bear testimony to the
effectiveness of the temporary structural strategy far more eloquently and power-
fully than the results of the research and field experiments mentioned in this
chapter.
References
Cone, J. D., & Hayes, S. (1980). Environmental problems/Behavioral solutions. Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole.
Delauriers, B. C., & Everett, P. B. (1977). Effects of intermittent and continuous token
reinforcement on bus ridership. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 369–375.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to
theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Foxx, R. M., & Hake, D. F. (1977). Gasoline conservation: A procedure for measuring and
reducing the driving of college students. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 10, 61–74.
Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, 667/IV-50, 41–58. (in Japanese).
Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2003). Development of script-based travel mode choice after forced
change. Transportation Research F: Traffic Psychology and Behavior, 6(2), 117–124.
Fujii, S., Nakayama, S., & Kitamura, R. (2001a). Unfreezing habitual behavior by transportation
policies: A traffic network simulation analysis. Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers,
667(IV50), 85–102. (in Japanese with English abstract).
Fujii, S., Gärling, T., & Kitamura, R. (2001b). Changes in drivers’ perceptions and use of public
Sugiura, J., Nonami, H., & Hirose, Y. (1999). The effects of informational exposure and
behavioral commitment on residents’ evaluations of the new waste collection system: an
environmental and social psychological approach. Journal of the Japan Society of Waste
Management Experts, 10(2), 87–96. (in Japanese with English abstract).
Verplanken, B., Aarts, H., van Knippenberg, A., & van Knippenberg, C. (1994). Attitude versus
general habit: Antecedents of travel mode choice. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24,
285–300.
Yamagishi, T. (1989). Unintended consequences of some solutions to social dilemmas.
Sociological Theory and Methods, 4(1), 21–37. (in Japanese with English abstract).
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social
Chapter 7
Basic Theory and Technique
of Communication: Changing Attitude
and Behavior Through Verbal
Communication
Imagine enjoying a meal with a few friends and you want to sprinkle a little salt on
your salad. You notice the salt shaker is on the other side of your friend sitting next
to you and just out of reach. What would you do in this situation? You probably
would not say: “If you pass me the salt, I will give you 10 yen. So please pass it to
me,” or “If you don’t pass me the salt, please pay me 10 yen. So please pass it to
me,” as it sounds very rude.
Instead, you would simply ask: “Could you please pass me the salt?”
Before you start laughing and dismiss this as pretty obvious and perhaps a little
foolish, we would like you to focus on the behavior of “passing the salt/not passing
the salt.” In fact, the behavior to “pass the salt” does not yield any benefit to the
person who is passing the salt. Of course, strictly speaking the effort of using one’s
hand to pass the salt is trivial, but it is also not zero. However, if the person next to
you moves their hand and passes you the salt, you are saved the bother of standing
up and getting the salt. As a result, the sum of the effort of you and the person next
to you becomes minimal. In other words, there is a social dilemma embedded even
in this simple situation: the behavior to pass the salt is cooperation, and not to pass
the salt is defection.
What is more, the above two proposals
“If you pass me the salt, I will give you 10 yen. So please pass it to me”, and
“If you don’t pass me the salt, please pay me 10 yen. So please pass it to me”
actually imply structural strategies to solve this social dilemma. The former is a
type of structural strategy rewarding cooperation, the latter punishes with a penalty
for defection.
Thinking this way, we can say that in our everyday life, it is more common to
solicit cooperation from others through “appropriate communication using appro-
priate language,” rather than through applying a “structural strategy.”
This chapter discusses a way to solve social dilemmas through such appropriate
communication. Incidentally, the term “communication” has several meanings, but
this book uses this term to specifically mean “communication as an impacting
process” (Fukada 1999). It is because communication with the aim of solving a

84 7 Basic Theory and Technique of Communication …
social dilemma expects to influence others, and thereby facilitate cooperative

behaviors such as “passing the salt,” “refraining from illegal parking,” or “re-
fraining from using the car.” Incidentally, refer to note1 for further discussion on
communication.
Of course, you may think that a strategy to solve a social dilemma through
communication may be effective among a group of friends, as in the above case, but
not so effective in a large-scale social situation such as issues concerning trans-
portation, urban city life, and the environment. In fact, many readers of this book
may have experienced doubt concerning the effectiveness of signboards in towns,
such as
“Let’s all stop illegal parking”, or “Let’s drive safely”.
For those who usually think “illegal parking is not good,” these signboards may
remind them “oh, that’s right, this place was somewhere you shouldn’t park” and
stop them from parking. Generally speaking, this is known as a prompt effect and
its effectiveness is empirically proven by Geller et al. (1973) or Delprato (1976).
However, there should be very few persons (if any) who rectify their conduct just
by seeing these signboards, and as a result, stop illegal parking or become a safe
driver. At least, I was not like that, and I have not heard anybody who experienced
such a change in their behavior. It is most likely that those who amend their conduct
by seeing such signboards are already not parking illegally, or are driving safely,
1
The broadest definition of communication is probably the following: “a process including a
transfer of information from one system to another by verbal and nonverbal symbols” (Fukada
1999, p. 4). Moreover, according to Fukada (1999), communication has three aspects: (1) an
interacting process, (2) an informing process, and (3) an impacting process, and there are three
categories of communication corresponding to each of them:
1. Communication as an interacting process: a process in which concerned parties mutually repeat
actions and reactions.
2. Communication as an informing process: a process in which one party conveys a message to
the other.
3. Communication as an impacting process: a process in which one party influence the other.
For instance, personal conversation is “communication as an interacting process.” “Providing
objective information” such as information on the stock market or transportation is “communi-
cation as an informing process”. What is discussed in Chap. 5 as “providing objective information
(solution through ‘correcting’ the cognition)” also is “communication as an informing process.”
Additionally, as for the types of communication discussed in this chapter such as a “request” to ask
someone to pass you the salt, or communication in the form of “let’s conduct a cooperative
behavior in order to solve a social dilemma,” they intend to eventually influence the behavior of
another and so it is categorized as “communication as an impacting process.” However, “com-
munication as an informing process” and “communication as an impacting process” cannot be
clearly separated, since it is not possible to influence others without the conveying of information,
and conversely, conveying information always has some kind of impact on others. Furthermore, if
you think that there is no interacting process that does not include both informing and impacting
processes, these categories should be understood as just having different points of focus. However,
since communication described in this chapter mainly aims at facilitating cooperation, commu-
nication in the main text is defined as “communication as an impacting process.”
7 Basic Theory and Technique of Communication … 85
and have been influenced by other ways and not by seeing and responding to the
signboard.
In this context, it is understandable to draw the conclusion that the effect of such
communication is not significant, if not actually zero, in a real social dilemma.
Yet before concluding that such communication is ineffective, we may need to
closely examine why a simple signboard campaign is inefficient.
For this purpose, this chapter investigates different reasons why “careless
communication” fails, and thereby explores the possibility of appropriate com-
munication that facilitates the tendency of people to spontaneously conduct a
cooperative behavior.
Before starting the main discussion aiming toward this goal, there are two points
to be stressed.
The first point is that this chapter describes communication as a “social policy”
under the common recognition that “conducting a cooperative behavior is socially
desirable.” That is to say, what is discussed here is a type of communication with a
basic premise that there exists a social dilemma, and we are not referring to general
communication that does not particularly assume a social dilemma. Therefore, this
chapter does not explain the various techniques revealed through communication
research to date, such as the foot in the door and boomerang techniques, techniques
to effectively use a primary or proximity effect, door in the face and low ball
techniques, or the four walls technique (for details, refer to Sakaki 2002). Of course,
where needed, we refer to the basic theories on the psychological processes
underlying such techniques, but the main purpose of this chapter is to consider how
communication should be used as a tool of a social policy. Moreover, the final goal
of this process is to draw an outline for actual “administrators” who are in charge of
communication policies, to provide guidelines to the basic way of thinking or
attitudes when drawing up policies. For this reason, this chapter tends to discuss the
“mindset” of administrators, rather than to discuss each technique. Therefore, the
discussion sometimes may not overly focus on logical precision and empirical
support, but we would be grateful if the reader would understand our intentions and
make allowances.
The second point to be stressed is that when considering ways to facilitate
people’s spontaneous cooperation through communication, the proposed methods
are based on a premise that people do have an innate psychological functionality to
conduct cooperation.
This basic standpoint is not restricted to this book.
For instance, the economists Frey et al. use some empirical data to argue that
people do possess “public spirit,” and discuss its significance in terms of economic
theory (Frey et al. 1996). The psychologist and cognitive scientist Saeki overviews
a social decision-making processes, discusses that people innately possess “ethi-
cality,” and argues that the fundamental purpose of research on social
decision-making is to explore the “way to awaken” such ethicality (Saeki 1980).
Referring back to the classics, Plato mentions that education just supports the
“redirection” of people toward the direction they should be (Plato).
Discussion on communication in this book is based on this standpoint that has

been supported over time and in many research fields. In other words, it does not
position communication as a means to force specific values on people. Just as Plato
used the word “redirection,” it positions communication as a means to awaken the
public spirit or ethicality people innately and potentially possess.
Now, there is an additional point to be stressed here. That is, the standpoint of
this book is fundamentally different from “a view of human nature as fundamentally
good.” This book only claims that every human possesses not only selfish and
immoral aspects, but also altruistic and moral aspects. Please bear this point in mind
as you continue reading this book.
Having said that, we will now begin examining the reasons why careless
communication fails, and explore how communication could be effectively used as
a social policy to facilitate people’s spontaneous cooperation.
7.1 Relationship Between the Recipient and the Sender

of Communication
[Key points of this section]

! First reason why signboard communication fails:
A lack of appropriate sender–recipient relationship
It is not clear who is appealing to whom. Thus people do not even regard it
as communication.
! Countermeasure:
Clarify the target recipient, and respectfully communicate with the
recipient.
For example, even if you were to see a man murmuring to himself at a table, “I
want salt, I want salt…” or a woman making an enthusiastic speech as “when we
are sitting together, let’s pass the salt to the person next to you!” many people
probably would not feel particularly compelled to pass the salt. We would feel
motivated to pass the salt only when there is a clear sense of “this person is
specifically talking to me.” The sender of a communication needs at least to sin-
cerely face their communication target, in order for the recipient to feel a sense of
specialness. Communication is achieved only after the target is acknowledged as a
real person, and an authentic attempt is made to communicate with that person.
Hence communication without an appropriate assumption concerning the human
relationship, such as just writing “let’s stop illegal parking” on a signboard, is not
even regarded as communication. As a result, it will not lead people to think “let’s
do it.” For instance, according to the elaboration likelihood model, in order for
communication to have an impact, one of the prerequisites is that the recipient must
at least become motivated to “process the information” (Petty and Cacioppo 1981).
7.1 Relationship Between the Recipient and the Sender of Communication 87
In order to satisfy this prerequisite, the sender of communication must at least

acknowledge the recipient as an actual person.
It is quite likely that the administrator who authorized a signboard saying “let’s
stop illegal parking” is very aware that a basic rule of communication in everyday
life is to acknowledge and face the target person; any mature person working in
society would be fully aware of such an expectation. Despite this, the reason why
such an administrator goes ahead and makes a signboard saying “let’s stop illegal
parking” is probably because they do not regard the sign as being an example of
“communication.” Therefore, if based on this book anybody is considering intro-
ducing a “campaign to encourage cooperative behavior to address a social
dilemma,” it is important to thoroughly understand that a successful campaign will
be based on the tenet “communication is targeted at different persons with different
personalities.”2
Having said that, the next point I would like you to consider is that a sender of
communication should be careful to always frame their message in the guise of a
“request.” To return to our group of friends at the dining table, it is easy to imagine
that no one will feel like passing the salt if forcibly ordered to “pass me the salt,” or
arrogantly told “you should pass the salt in order to increase our overall social
wellbeing.” According to the Psychological Reactance Theory of Brehm, it is
known that communication with a “pushy impression” may actually cause the
opposite effect. This theory claims that people are motivated to secure their sense of
freedom (Brehm 1966). For instance, even if it is logically anticipated that a person
is thinking of voting in the next election, if he is ordered “to vote in the election,” he
may consider to some degree not voting, in order to recover his freedom. Such an
opposite effect is generally known as the boomerang effect, and is widely known in
the field of communication research (c.f. Sakaki 2002).
In contrast, if the communication is presented in the form of a request, the
recipient has the freedom to accept or not, and psychological reactance will not be
generated. When applying communication as one of the social policies to expect
people to spontaneously choose cooperation, it is important to remember that poor
communication, which may be perceived as looking down on the recipient, may
cause the opposite of the desired effect. Moreover, it is important to always
maintain respect for the recipient and ensure they are aware that “whether to
cooperate or not is completely up to them.”
2
Needless to say, when expecting people’s cooperation in a large-scale social dilemma, it may not
be wise to directly ask “could you stop illegal parking?” in the same way as requesting “could you
pass me the salt?” It is because at the dining table, you are in close proximity to or facing the
person being asked, generally communication as a social policy does not always involve facing the
person. As repeatedly mentioned, it is essential to always keep the attitude of facing a person in
any communication. However, the content of communication must flexibly adjust to each situa-
tion. In the communication of a social policy, in most situations there will be no opportunity to
face the person, and the only choice is simple signboard communication of “let’s do such and
such.” However, if by creating a situation similar to one-to-one communication for a social policy
as seen in the Travel Feedback Program described in Sect. 7.4, it may be possible to ask for
cooperation as naturally as asking “could you pass me the salt?.”
However, a balance must be maintained as it is also important not to be “ob-

sequious” or “to flatter” the recipient, out of fear of triggering psychological
reactance; such approaches may destroy the trust of the recipient, and nullify all the
effects of the communication (c.f. Aronson 1992; Fukada 1999; Fujii 2002a). The
content to be delivered to the recipient is the simple fact that “cooperation is a
socially desirable behavior in the situation of a social dilemma,” and it is also
required that the sender of the communication always maintains a consistent, firm,
and measured attitude.
7.2 One-Sided Presentation and Two-Sided Presentation

! Second reason why signboard communication fails:
A resistance to one-sided persuasion
It causes a sense of resistance as “even if you told me to do it, I have
reasons not to do it, so I just feel confused and upset when you say do it.”
! Countermeasure:
Rather than denying defection one-sidedly, instead make two-sided
communication which expresses that “it is understandable why you choose
defection”.
Concerning a social dilemma, behaviors such as illegal parking or not passing

the salt are socially undesirable, and this is readily understood not only by coop-
erative people, but also somewhere in the back of the mind of a repeated defector
they know too, and this may be why, in order to justify themselves, they tend to
think there is a good reason why they are choosing defective behaviors. Let us
consider this point further.
People tend to form a self-cognition that “I am not the type of person who
conducts socially undesirable behavior.” At the same time, as mentioned several
times up to now, we are motivated to decrease any cognitive dissonance (Festinger
1957). Since the first self-cognition and the cognition that “I am taking a socially
undesirable behavior” are not consonant, people are motivated to decrease any
dissonance. As a result, people may form a new cognition such as “I have sufficient
good reasons for taking this behavior,” or “it may be true that defection is socially
undesirable, but it is not a big deal,” or even think both at the same time.3 For
3
Of course, in order to solve the cognitive dissonance between the cognition of conducting a
defective behavior, and the cognition that defection is socially undesirable, there may be some
people who change behavior from defection to cooperation, rather than change their cognition.
Therefore, by providing objective information that “defection is socially undesirable,” it may be
possible to facilitate people’s cooperation. This point will be discussed in detail later in this book,
with relation to the Norm Activation Theory. However, the target of the main text is “people who
7.2 One-Sided Presentation and Two-Sided Presentation 89
instance, William James in the classic “Psychology, Briefer Course” (1892)

describes this as follows:
Where, however, the right conception (for instance, the conception that defection is socially
undesirable and cooperation is desirable) is an anti-impulsive one (for instance, if it is
against the impulse to choose defection beneficial for oneself), the whole intellectual
ingenuity of the man usually goes to work to crowd it out of sight, and to find for the
emergency names by the help of which the dispositions of the moment may sound sanc-
tified, and sloth or passion may reign unchecked. How many excuses does the drunkard
find when each new temptation comes! It is a new brand of liquor which the interests of
intellectual culture in such matters oblige him to test; moreover it is poured out and it is sin
to waste it; also others are drinking and it would be churlishness to refuse. Or it is but to
enable him to sleep, or just to get through this job of work; or it isn’t drinking, it is because
he feels so cold; or it is Christmas-day; or it is a means of stimulating him to make a more
powerful resolution in favor of abstinence than any he has hitherto made; or it is just this
once, and once doesn’t count, etc., etc., ad libitum – it is, in fact, anything you like except
being a drunkard.” (p. 388–389, description inside the brackets added by Fujii, italic font
[sic])
Of course, this example of a heavy drinker is an extreme case, but more or less,
those who are engaged in defection have a cognition that “I am choosing a behavior
other than the right behavior,” and are making some kind of an effort to justify
themselves, as pointed out by James.
Now, let us think what would happen if you cheerfully tell this heavy drinker
“come on, let’s try not to drink.” “Here we go!” he thinks and quickly pulls out the
“list of the reasons why he has to drink,” and recites each of them carefully in his
heart. “It is a new brand of liquor, it is Christmas-day, it helps me sleep—,” and he
would never admit that “he should not drink.”
Precisely, this is the second reason why signboard communication saying “let’s
stop illegal parking” is not effective. For those who park illegally, when they see
this signboard communication, they simply feel resistance and think “there are
reasons for my illegal parking, so even if you tell me to stop it, I can’t stop it so
easily.”
In order to find a way to mitigate such resistance, let us look back at our daily
life once again.
There are situations in everyday life when you wish to convince someone who
holds a different point of view. It may be two contradictory opinions arising when
working in cooperation with others, or an academic dispute. In such situations, if
others already have an idea quite similar to you, and if your argument is somewhat
“convincing,” you may succeed to win understanding from quite a number of
people. However, when confronting someone with a very different opinion, it is
(Footnote 3 continued)
conduct a defective behavior.” In other words, they are the “people who have chosen to change
their cognition (e.g., rationalizations and excuses for defection) and not to change their behavior
(i.e., they continue defection) when they choose whether to change cognition or behavior to
decrease their cognitive dissonance.” Therefore, as stated in the main text, it is logically expected
that those who continue defection have changed their cognition on defection in some way.
possible that the more you express a convincing opinion, the more resistance grows
in the heart of the other. Resistance may take many forms such as “this point of
view might be right, but really it’s still meaningless,” “reason is not everything,” or
“I simply cannot trust him,” or even lead to foolish slander such as “despite being
correct in his argument, he used to be very different when he was young, or he did
many bad things in the past.” All of this is commonplace and the sad phenomena
sometimes seen in the tabloids, and more often than not unfortunately, the logic,
however reasonable, seems to lose all its power.
However, in the face of such opposition, it is not enough to simply withdraw the
rational logic, and play into the hands of the opposition; it is important to stand by
reason and not simply retreat.
The only way to mitigate such resistance and to find a way out of such conflict is
probably to “show understanding of the opinions of others.” Namely, it is to state “I
truly understand what you say.” The important point here is that “I understand what
you say” and “I agree with what you say” are quite different. “I understand
something” simply means that you understand the content, but it is does not mean
that you agree with it. Therefore, even if you state “I understand what you say,” it
does not mean that you have withdrawn your reasoned argument. Despite that,
because you expressed a certain level of understanding, the other person may be a
little more ready to listen to your opinion, which will allow you both to explore
more and may lead to finding a clue to solving this conflict situation.
Even though these are simple examples of daily life, such communication is
known as “two-sided presentation” in the field of communication research, and it is
considered to be effective in finding common ground for soliciting “agreement”
between two parties with conflicting opinions. Generally speaking, two-sided
communication will present two opinions or two arguing points that are in conflict,
and it is to be distinguished from one-sided communication which presents only
one opinion or one arguing point. For example, the following communication is
one-sided presentation:
“The statistics convincingly show that smoking is dangerous to health, and when
considering this point, it seems it’s better to quit smoking, isn’t it?”
But the following communication is two-sided presentation:
“Smoking may indeed be a stress releaser, but the statistics convincingly show
that smoking is dangerous to health. Considering this point, it seems it’s better to
quit smoking, isn’t it?”
One-sided and two-sided communications yield different results according to the
standpoint of the recipient of the communication. In the case of smoking, for
smokers who do not like smoking so much, one-sided communication will be more
effective. It is because the two-sided communication including the positive infor-
mation that “smoking may indeed be a stress releaser,” may be confusing to the
listener.
On the other hand, for habitual smokers who have formed a very positive
attitude about smoking, one-sided communication will cause resistance, as shown
in previous examples. However, some research has proved that they are ready to
listen to two-sided communication (c.f. Aronson 1992; Fukada 1999). This might
be because senders of two-sided communication are regarded as presenting fairer
information, and thereby increase the credibility of the content of their communi-
cation (Aronson 1992). More specifically, even when one-sided communication
makes the recipient think
“This person tells me to stop smoking, but I have my own reasons for smoking;
they do not understand anything,” two-sided communication may make the same
recipient think.
“This sender seems to understand why I smoke. Despite that, they say it is better
to quit. If so, their opinion may have a valid point.”
In this way, the smoker’s evaluation of the sender of the communication
improves, and the credibility of the communication content also increases. Finally,
it leads to some increase in the possibility of changing the attitude or behavior of the
recipient. Needless to say, however, if the information presented in two-sided
communication is not at all relevant to the recipient, it will not make them ree-
valuate the sender, nor increase the credibility of the communication content. It will
just end up causing resistance, without having any positive impact on the recipient.
Now, as repeated many times in this book, the biggest issue in a social dilemma
is how to deal with habitual noncooperators. This is why Chaps. 5 and 6 focused on
the point that habitual noncooperators form strong negative beliefs on cooperation,
and explored the possibility of changing their behaviors through providing objec-
tive information (Chap. 5) or by applying a strategy of temporary structural change
(Chap. 6). Likewise, in order to figure out a way of communication that solves a
social dilemma more effectively, we need to consider communication that is
effective on habitual noncooperators. This is the reason why we should avoid
one-sided communication such as:
“Illegal parking blocks pedestrians, and spoils the visual environment of the
town. So let’s stop illegal parking,” since it may cause resistance among habitual
noncooperators. Instead, it is better to engage in two-sided communication such as
“There may not be parking space around your destination, or even if there is a
space, it may be inconvenient. You may sometimes want to park only for a short
time. Those are typical reasons why we all tend to leave our bikes unattended.
However, it is also true that illegal parking blocks pedestrians, and spoils the visual
environment of the town. Please consider these points, and try to avoid illegal
parking as much as you can.”
Such communication may, to some extent at least, increase the possibility of
habitual noncooperators listening to these points, and enable them to receive the
communication without resistance.
Here, there are two points to note that are practically and empirically important
when conducting such two-sided communication in real life.
The first key point to be stressed when conducting two-sided communication is
the effort to understand (imagine) the feelings of recipients. If you fail to understand
their feelings, they will take you as “a person who doesn’t understand anything,”
and communication will end in failure. It is a foolish mistake to think that
communication would succeed if you create two-sided presentation by just

mechanically listing the conflicting opinions. For this reason, any administrative
organization or a local government with a department to investigate communication
as a means for implementing social policy, may be wise to choose staff members
who are not only able to imagine the feelings of others in everyday life, but also
listen and understand the opinions of others as well and then still express their own
opinions. Without such interpersonal skills, a strategy to solve social dilemmas
through communication may unfortunately end in failure.
The second point to stress is that even if a signboard with a two-sided com-
munication is displayed on the street, it is hard to imagine that passers-by would
take the time to read it carefully. Therefore, when attempting such two-sided
communication, it is crucial to set some kind of a “mechanism” whereby people
would automatically read the contents, rather than simply placing it on the street (as
estimated by the elaboration likelihood model mentioned earlier, activating the
motivation for information processing is a prerequisite for communication to have
an impact; Petty and Cacioppo 1981). The following are examples of such a
mechanism ranked according to the degree of the selectivity of the recipient:
(1) Publish the contents in a book or a magazine.
(2) Include them as a newspaper or TV news item.
(3) Conduct questionnaire research including the information with two-sided
communication.
(4) Establish a communication program (which introduces the advice method or
the behavioral plan method described later), which includes two-sided com-
munication. Then, invite people to participate in the program.
(5) Introduce the contents in lectures at training schools, or have them included as
part of the school curriculum.
Items at the top of the list have high recipient selectivity and lower rankings have
low recipient selectivity. In other words, in number (1), it is the recipient who
mainly selects or chooses whether to read the book or report, but in number (5), as
long as the recipient attends the lecture, the person will automatically be exposed to
the communication.
In any case, when a government is to introduce such “mechanisms,” they will
probably need a bigger budget than for basic “signboard communication.”4 Due to
such practical budgetary constraints, it may be difficult to implement appropriate
two-sided communication, and any measures limited to only introducing signboard
communication. Even so, the “prompt effect” mentioned in the beginning may still
be expected. That is, a person who is cooperative from the first may upon seeing a
signboard “remember” their previous cooperative behavior and actually implement
cooperation; unfortunately, however, there is little hope for any further effect.
4
Incidentally, in the case of school education, a separate monetary budget may not always be
necessary, but there is a requirement to develop an appropriate curriculum or to have adequate
consideration for the system.
Therefore, it is crucial to allocate a sufficient budget to ensure appropriate and

effective communication of a social policy. In this regard, the biggest hurdle for
communication as a social policy may be the issue of budget allocation by gov-
ernment. As will be described in detail in the latter part of this chapter, commu-
nication techniques have been developed and progressively accumulated based on
several of the theories described above. Therefore, dependent on there being suf-
ficient budget, it is now at a stage ready to be applied to more social policies.
7.3 Presence of Specific Information Needed for Behavior

Change

! Third reason why signboard communication fails:
A lack of specific information
Even if people are requested to “let’s do a cooperative behavior,” they do
not know how to.
! Countermeasure:
Present information necessary for implementing a cooperative behavior
(advice method), or request them to make a behavioral plan (behavioral plan
method).
The above two arguments were both about factors that disturb the motivation to
implement a cooperative behavior, and also have a negative effect on the formation
of implementation intention for cooperation. However, in order to change a
behavior toward cooperation, it is not sufficient that people are just motivated. In
what follows, we will focus on the process of how the implementation intention of
cooperation transfers to the actual implementation.
Suppose that through communication requesting “let’s stop defection and begin
cooperation,” a person thinks “oh yes, from now on, let’s choose a cooperative
behavior.” However, even when the motivation of cooperation is activated like this,
it does not necessarily mean that they will actually begin carrying out a cooperative
behavior. Chapter 4 of this book discussed in detail that in order to change a
behavior from defection to cooperation, it is not enough to activate the simple
behavioral intention of “let’s do it.” As shown in Fig. 4.1, it is essential to activate
their implementation intention of “when, where, and how they should carry out
such a cooperative behavior.” This is the reason why many who want to do it and
think “let’s carry out this cooperative behavior” actually cannot do it, since they
“don’t know how to do it.” In addition, because they “don’t know how to do it,”
there is always the possibility of psychological resistance or reactance against the
communication. For instance, even if a person responds positively to the message
“let’s go and vote in the election,” if they are not told how to go through the voting
process, etc. They can have even stronger resistance as in: “I thought I’d vote, but
they never told me how; I’m never going to bother with voting again.” In fact, many
experimental results confirm that depending on whether there was specific infor-
mation or not a positively intended communication has caused the totally opposite
effect (c.f. Aronson 1992; Fukada 1988). Theoretically, it can be explained through
the defensive avoidance hypothesis of Janis and Feshback (1953), for instance.
According to this hypothesis, “even if fear is increased through a communication
advising the recipient to avoid such dangers as marijuana usage or sexually
transmitted diseases, if there is no information on how to avoid the danger, the
recipients of the communication are not able to decrease their fear by taking a
specific behavior. In such a situation, in order to escape from their fear, people are
motivated to ignore the fear, or minimize it.” If we apply this hypothesis to people’s
behavior in a social dilemma, we will find:
Even if motivation to implement cooperation increased through communication aiming at
facilitating cooperation, if there is no specific information on how to implement coopera-
tion, people are not able to satisfy their motivation to cooperate. Therefore, they are
motivated to decrease their intention of implementing cooperation. As a result, they may
ignore the content of the communication, or deny its validity, and even decrease their
original cooperative tendency.
In this way, in any communication that may have an impact on the behavior of
others, the specific information on how to behave plays an extremely important role
in deciding the success or failure of the communication. Therefore, there is always a
risk of failure for signboard communication just presenting “let’s do this” without
giving specific information on “when, where, and how the recipient should conduct
the cooperative behavior.” This is in fact the third reason why signboard commu-
nication is ineffective. Since there is no specific information included in the com-
munication, no implementation intention is formed, and the cooperation may end
up not being implemented. What is worse, it may even lead to increased psycho-
logical resistance.
Now, based on such considerations, what should be done to increase people’s
implementation intention, and thereby lead the communication to a successful
conclusion? Let us examine this point in what follows.
Implementation intention concerns “when, where, and how to implement the
desired behavior.” “When, where, and how” is a plan of action, generally known as
a behavioral plan (Gärling and Fujii 2002). Therefore, implementation intention can
be rephrased as the intention to implement the behavioral plan. Therefore, in order
to form the implementation intention, the presence of an effective behavioral plan is
essential.
In order to create a behavioral plan, specific information is necessary. For
example, let us take the case of a person illegally parking their bike in front of a
station when commuting in the morning, and how this behavior may be changed to
them using a parking space. In this case, in order to prepare a set of behavioral plans
for using a parking space, at least the following information is needed: (1) direc-
tions to the parking space, (2) directions from the parking space to the station,
(3) time required from their house to the parking space, (4) time required from the
7.3 Presence of Specific Information Needed for Behavior Change 95
parking space to the station, (5) information about the payment system for the
parking space, and (6) the availability of spots in the parking space. Only after
obtaining such information, can they create a behavioral plan such as: “if I leave my
house at 7:00, and ride my bike on the pedestrian walkway along the national road,
I will get to the parking space around 7:10. At that time, there should be enough
parking spots left. I pay 100 yen at the reception at the second basement of the
parking spaces, and then I park my bike. If I walk along the road at the back of the
cigarette shop to the station, I should be able to catch a train at 7:20.”
When we analyze in this way, it very quickly becomes apparent that the simple
behavior of “using a parking space in front of the station” is not as simple as it
seems. Of course, for those who have developed the habit of using the parking
space, it is easy to do with no difficulty at all. But for those who do not have the
habit, especially those habitual noncooperators who park illegally out of habit, they
have very little information about such factors as the route to the parking space, the
payment system, or the degree of crowding. Therefore, it is difficult for them to
make a specific behavioral plan.
Incidentally, the fact that people often do not possess enough information tends
to be forgotten by academic researchers and administrators. That is to say,
knowledge commonly known by specialists in the course of their occupation, is
often not known at all among the general public; it is important for the specialist to
first understand that compared to their inside knowledge the general public only
have limited knowledge and information (Kikkawa 1999).
The prerequisite to form an implementation intention is “to obtain the necessary
information upon which to make a behavioral plan.” Taking this point into account,
the simplest communication method to support the formation of implementation
intention for cooperation would be “to provide the information necessary for
making a behavioral plan.” For example, rather than just listing the risks of
earthquakes or a disease and proposing people avoid them, it is better and more
effective to include information on what countermeasures people can take in order
to avoid them. Such information is generally known as “advice” in the field of
persuasive communication research, and advice plays an extremely important role
in determining the success or failure of persuasion, as mentioned earlier (c.f.
Aronson 1992; Fukada 1988). In this book, this method is referred to as the advice
method.
To date, persuasive communication research has mainly dealt with advice that is
common among several recipients. In this book, this will be described as the
collective advice method. However, the collective advice method as such may be
insufficient to change people’s behavior, as often each person requires different
information to change their behavior. Taking this individual characteristic into
account, the following two methods may be effective to form implementation
intention, and thus facilitate behavior change (Fujii 2002b). Incidentally, both are
derived from the collective advice method, so there is a common feature that both
provide the information necessary for behavior change.
Individual advice method

An individualistic advice method with three steps:
Step 1 A sender of communication makes contact with each recipient, and
gathers information on their behavioral patterns.
Step 2 Based on a recipient’s behavioral pattern, the sender examines the
information needed for each person to make a behavioral plan for
cooperation.
Step 3 Provide the individually tailored information to each recipient.
Through the above process, it can be expected that the recipient of the
communication spontaneously makes a behavioral plan, and thus changes
their behavior toward cooperation.
Incidentally, the method to provide common advice to people is known as the
collective advice method, in order to distinguish it from the individual advice
method.
Behavioral plan method
Just like the advice method, this method also provides
(non-individualistic) information needed to make a behavioral plan for
cooperation. Based on this information, the recipient is requested to actually
make a plan on “when, where, and how cooperation should be implemented,”
and to write it down on a sheet of paper.
The individual advice method is a type of communication technique focused on

providing the information needed for making a behavioral plan, with the expecta-
tion of the recipient spontaneously making their plan; this is in contrast to the
behavioral plan method which focuses on supporting the recipient to make a
behavioral plan.
Table 7.1 shows the attributes of each method. It is expected that the behavioral
plan method is more effective in bringing about behavior change, as long as people
respond and follow the communication. It is because this method directly requests
people to create their plan, while the individual advice method only provides
individual information for supporting the spontaneous creation of their plan. Hence,
the behavioral plan method has a higher possibility of leading people to create their
plan and change their actual behavior.
A key characteristic of the behavioral plan is that it requires people not only to
make the plan, but also to “write it down”; the very behavior of “writing it down”
greatly increases the possibility of implementing the behavior. This is known as the
commitment effect, and is commonly found in such situations as after making a
statement in front of people, when it is more difficult to deny what was said, or
signing a document makes it even more difficult to back out (Kiesler 1971). Much
research verifies that the formation of commitment has a strong effect on behavior
Table 7.1 Individual advice method and behavioral plan method

Individual advice method Behavioral plan method
Overview Individually examine After providing information
information necessary for necessary for creating a
creating a behavioral plan based behavioral plan for cooperation,
on each person’s behavioral request the targets to create their
data, and provide it to each of own written plan
them
Goal Provide information necessary Directly support the creation of a
for creating a behavioral plan, behavioral plan, through which
and support the targets to behavior change toward
spontaneously create the plan, cooperation is expected
through which behavior change
toward cooperation is expected
Possibility of Since this method only provides Since this method directly
behavior change information useful for creating a requests the targets to create a
behavioral plan, and expects behavioral plan, there is a higher
targets to spontaneously create possibility that the
the plan, they may not always implementation intention is
create the plan. Therefore, it formed, compared to the
does not always lead to behavior individual advice method. In
change (weak point) addition, commitment is formed
through requesting them to write
down the behavioral plan.
Therefore, there is a high
possibility that it leads to
behavior change (strong point)
Quality of provided Since the recipient can receive Since each person’s behavioral
information individual advice needed for pattern is not measured, it is
behavior change, as long as the difficult to provide individual
sender has sufficient knowledge information matching their
and expertise, it is possible to respective behavior (weak point)
provide individual information
with a high quality (strong point)
Range of targets Even for those with a low For those with a low possibility
possibility of behavior change, of behavior change, and who are
and who are more likely to more likely to ignore the
ignore the communication, if it is communication, it is possible
just read as advice, it is possible that they will ignore the request
that they will participate in to create a behavioral plan (weak
communication (strong point) point)
Communication cost There is a high cost since the The cost can be decreased
borne by sender sender needs to examine and substantially since there is no
process individual information need to process individual
for each recipient, and contact information for each recipient,
them at least twice (weak point) and communication can also be
completed with at least a
one-time contact (strong point)
(continued)
Table 7.1 (continued)

Individual advice method Behavioral plan method
Cases of application The so-called “counseling” is a As a fundamental experiment to
to date representative case of the show the effectiveness of the
individual advice method, yet behavioral plan method, there
cases of the individual advice are Gollwitzer and Brandstätter
method as a social policy are: (1997), Gillholm et al. (1999,
Travel Blending by Rose and 2000), and Orbell et al. (1997).
Ampt (2001), a program As cases of application, there are
constructed by Taniguchi et al. communication on drivers’ route
based on Travel Blending change by Daito et al. (2003),
(2001a, b), Individualized communication on decreasing
Marketing by Brög (1998), and nuisance bike parking by Fujii
Travel Smart as an application of et al. (2001, 2002), and an
Individualized Marketing experiment to decrease car use
(DTWA 2000). Incidentally, by Jakobsson, Fujii and Gärling.
these cases are all categorized as Also, Fujii and Taniguchi (2003)
Travel Feedback Programs applies the behavioral plan
(TFP) aimed at decreasing car method to TFP
use
change. For instance, Dwyer et al. argues this point in detail in a review article on
behavior change research in environmentally friendly behavior (Dwyer et al. 1993).
In sum, the behavioral plan method is expected to be effective in leading people
to change their behavior through the following two effects: the first is to facilitate
the formation of the implementation intention by creating the behavioral plan
themselves; and the second to yield the commitment effect through the behavior of
writing it down.
William James indicates that the following are the three ironclad rules to cure a
habit you wish to cure (Psychology, Briefer Course 1892):
Rule 1: Precisely capture the “trigger” to begin considering quitting the habit.
Rule 2: Once you decide to quit, let everyone know of your determination.
Rule 3: Once you decide to quit, do not make any exceptions.
Based on his recipe for change, the behavioral plan method can be perceived as a
technique to facilitate habitual change from defection to cooperation, in the way
that Rule 1 is artificially carried out through its implementation, Rule 2 is supported
by requesting the “writing down” of the behavioral plan, and Rule 3 is supported by
requesting the “creation” of the plan.
Another characteristic of the behavioral plan method is that the workload of the
“sender” of the communication is minimized. While the individual advice method
requires the sender to prepare individually tailored information for each target, the
behavioral plan method does not require such work. The number of times to make
contact with the recipients also differs; at least twice for the individual advice
method, and at least once for the behavioral plan method.
In addition, in the individual advice method, the recipients just passively receive
the advice, whereas in the behavioral plan method, they are requested to actively
create a plan based on the information provided. Therefore, there is a concern that
the cognitive and physical workload of the recipient becomes larger for the
behavioral plan method. For this reason, it may be easier to communicate with a
wider range of targets using the individual advice method.
However, the individual advice method requires each person to report their
behavioral pattern to the sender of the communication. Thus, in order to ensure
easier participation in the individual advice method, it is important to think how to
make the behavioral survey easier to answer. While in order to ensure trouble-free
participation in the behavioral plan method, it is important to think how to support
people to create their plan.
To sum up, the individual advice method has issues such as a high cost for the
sender, and the risk of the recipient not creating their behavioral plan, but its
positive aspect is that being a method to receive advice passively, many types of
people can participate relatively easily. The behavioral plan method has a low cost
for the sender and there is a much greater possibility of the recipient actually
creating their plan, but of course, the possibility remains that those who do not want
to create a behavioral plan may not participate in the communication at all.
Obviously as both methods have their pros and cons, a wise course of action is to
accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative by combining the two methods as
follows:
(1) Gather behavioral data of a recipient
(2) Based on the data, create advice
(3) Feedback the advice to the recipient
(4) At the same time, request creation of the behavioral plan.
In this way, the disadvantage of the individual advice method that “people may
not necessarily create a behavioral plan” is diminished, and at the same time, the
difficulty of creating a behavioral plan may be decreased since it can be created
based on the detailed advice.
Alternatively, different methods can be designed for different targets. That is,
first conduct a survey to investigate people’s intention for the behavior change
towards cooperation. For those who already have sufficient intention for the
behavior change, apply the behavioral plan method. For those who do not have a
strong behavioral intention, apply the individual advice method.
In any case, the most important point in changing the behavior of a noncoop-
erator towards cooperation is whether they create a behavioral plan describing
“when, where, and how specifically they will conduct that cooperative behavior.”
Therefore, the communication techniques discussed here play an extremely
important role when aiming to solve a social dilemma through communication.
7.4 Conclusion: Conditions Determining Success

and Failure of the Communication
Table 7.2 at the end of this section shows the conditions of successful communi-
cation and failed communication. As shown here, to increase the possibility of
communication leading to noncooperators changing their behavior and engaging in
cooperative behavior, the following three points are important:
Table 7.2 Conditions deciding the failure and success of communication for behavior change
Failed communication Successful communication
Relationship The relationship between sender The relationship between sender
between sender and recipient is unclear for both and recipient is clear for both sides
and recipient sides More specifically, there are the
More specifically, there are the following three conditions:
following three conditions: ・ The sender has a clear image on
・ The sender does not have an how the recipient will receive the
image on how The recipient will communication
receive The communication ・ The sender has respect for the
・ The sender has no respect for the recipient, and the recipient is aware
recipient, and the recipient is aware of this
of this ・ The recipient has an impression
・ The recipient does not have an that “they are attempting to
impression that “they are communicate specifically with me”
attempting to communicate
specifically with me”
How The sender does not understand the The sender imagines the feelings of
persuasion feelings of noncooperators, and noncooperators, and understands
occurs presents only one-sided persuasion, the feeling of conducting a defective
i.e., the claim that cooperation is behavior. This allows the
socially desirable presentation of two-sided
persuasion, i.e., the claim that
“despite that,” cooperation is
socially desirable
Content of It only includes “one-sided After activating the motivation for
communication persuasion” as described above cooperation through the
above-mentioned “two-sided
persuasion,” provide specific
information necessary for
conducting a cooperative behavior
(individual advice method), or
directly request the recipients to
consider “how to conduct a
cooperative behavior” (behavioral
plan method)
7.4 Conclusion: Conditions Determining Success and Failure of the Communication 101
(1) Have an image of the specific recipients, and open respectful communication
with them.
(2) Avoid one-sided persuasion, and use a two-sided approach to first understand
the feelings of the defector, and then stress that even so “cooperation is still
socially desirable.”
(3) Using communication techniques such as the individual advice method or
behavioral plan method, enable them to have a specific structured image of
how they can conduct a cooperative behavior.
Among these points, for point (3), it is possible to create documents or even a
manual to some extent. But for points (1) and (2), unfortunately, it is difficult to
draw up a manual containing more than the “description of mindset” shown in the
main text or Table 7.2. It is because “respect” or “understanding of the feelings of
others” can easily change from appropriate communication to inappropriate com-
munication through subtle differences caused by the choice of words or
illustrations.
However, all is not lost, it should be quickly added that it does not mean solving
a social dilemma through communication is difficult, as everyone communicates
successfully many times in everyday life. We all use subtle differences in nuance,
communicate in appropriate ways to different people, flexibly show “respect” to
others, and understand the “feeling of others” (c.f. Humphrey 1986). If we draw
upon such daily experiences, the above-mentioned mindset should not be so dif-
ficult for a mature person in society with a modicum of common sense.
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Chapter 8
Case Studies on Communicative Strategies
to Change Attitudes and Behavior
The previous chapter discussed basic ideas on communication that can lead to a
behavior change toward cooperation. This chapter introduces several examples of
communication based on such basic theories and techniques, but first we shall
review the basic techniques comprising communication as follows (refer to
Fig. 8.1).
(1) Request method: a method to elicit cooperation by claiming that defection
decreases public benefit while cooperation increases public benefit. It is the
most fundamental method comprising communication that aims at behavior
change.
(2) Advice method: a method to provide advice and information on how to
conduct a cooperative behavior. There are two categories: an individual advice
method giving individual advice based on each person’s behavioral pattern
and attributes, and a collective advice method which gives nonindividual,
generic advice.
(3) Behavioral plan method: a method requesting a person to create and write
down a behavioral plan listing “what actions they would take to conduct a
cooperative behavior.”
(4) Feedback method: a method taken in communication involving several times
of contact, in which the information obtained in past communication is
returned to a recipient as feedback. There are two categories: an individual
feedback method giving separate feedback on each person’s behavioral
information, and a collective feedback method giving feedback on the
aggregated data of people’s behavioral and psychological tendencies.
A greater impact is expected for the individual feedback method by combining
it with the “goal setting method” which sets a behavioral goal.
In the following, we introduce several cases aimed at encouraging cooperation
by combining some of these communication techniques.

104 8 Case Studies on Communicative Strategies …
Communication technique Request method
Behavioral plan method
Advice method Individual advice method
Collective advice method
Feedback method Individual feedback method

(can be combined with the goal setting method)
Collective feedback method
Fig. 8.1 Category of communication technique for behavior change
8.1 Case Studies of the Collective Advice Method
First, this section introduces a case in which illegal bike parking behavior actually
decreased through applying the collective advice method (Fujii et al. 2001, 2002).
In this experiment, 99 Kyoto University students were randomly divided into
four groups, and asked to come to a campus room at a different time for each
group. Each group participant was asked the following questions regarding bike
parking: Please state the purpose of your trip and the destination, and by each
purpose and destination, how many times have you parked your bike in the past
week? How many times did you park it in a place other than a parking space? Each
group was then subjected to the following treatment and methods of communica-
tion; the four groups were as follows:
Control group: no communication was conducted (25 persons).
Request group: a group subjected to communication based only on the request
method. For 5 min, participants silently read a B5-size, four page color booklet,
titled “Let’s stop leaving bikes in the street” presenting several arguments
explaining why illegal parking is socially undesirable, and calling for cooperation.
For details, refer to Fig. 8.2 (25 persons).
Advice group: a group subjected to communication based on the request method
and the collective advice method. In addition to silently reading the same booklet
for 5 min, participants were also requested to silently read another booklet titled
“How to decrease leaving bikes in the street” for 5 min. For details, refer to Fig. 8.3
(25 persons).
Behavioral plan group: a group subjected to communication based on the
request, the collective advice, and the behavioral plan methods. In addition to
reading the two booklets for 5 min each, participants were requested to write down
on a separate sheet of paper how they could avoid leaving bikes in the street, for
each bike-leaving incident they answered in the initial questionnaire. Fifteen
minutes was allowed for this process, and they were asked to write down as many
ideas as possible (24 persons).
8.1 Case Studies of the Collective Advice Method 105
Fig. 8.2 The full text and the structure of the booklet “Let’s stop leaving bikes in the street”
Several psychological factors assumed in Schwartz’s Norm Activation Theory

were then measured at two timings: right after providing information, and 2 weeks
later (a questionnaire was sent by post and participants returned it by post) (refer to
Sect. 4.3 and Fig. 4.2). The following were measured:
• behavioral intention (how strong they agree with the statement: I should stop
leaving my bike on the street) on cooperation (behavior to decrease illegal
parking)
• awareness of consequences (cognition on how much the bike-leaving behavior
has a negative impact on society, and how important it is to stop this behavior)
• moral obligation (how strong they agree with the statement: I have a duty to stop
leaving bikes on the street)
The follow-up questionnaire sent 2 weeks later also measured:
• decision-making commitment (the degree of commitment to refrain from leav-
ing bikes on the street)
Fig. 8.3 The full text and the structure of the booklet “How to decrease leaving bikes in the
street”
Incidentally, the decision-making commitment is an index to indirectly measure

the strength of implementation intention (Rise et al. 2000).1
Table 8.1 shows the number of times each group left bikes on the street. In the
control group, little change was seen. But for the request group it decreased by
about 13, 31 % for the advice group, and 26 % for the behavioral plan group. This
decrease was not statistically significant for the request group who were not given
advice on how to decrease illegal parking, but it was statistically significant for both
1
It is not easy to directly measure implementation intention, so instead of attempting direct
measuring, we measured the decision-making commitment to indirectly measure the intention. The
reason is that implementation intention is an intention to implement a behavioral plan, but the
behavioral plan itself varies from person to person. Therefore, it is difficult to measure the
implementation intention on a single unified scale, common to all people. In contrast,
decision-making commitment is a scale that indicates how much effort a person spent on creating
and implementing their behavioral plan, and it indirectly implies the strength of the implemen-
tation intention. Moreover, it is a scale we can commonly measure for everyone, so it is used as a
scale to indirectly measure implementation intention by Rise et al. (2000).
Table 8.1 Change in the number of times bikes were left in the street per week, before and after
the communication (average value for each group)
One week before the One to 2 weeks after the Rate of
communication communication decrease
Control group 14.12 14.00 0.8 %
Request group 14.72 12.72 13.6 %
Advice group 14.52 10.04 30.9 %***
Behavioral 13.00 9.67 25.6 %*
plan group
*Shows the result of intertemporal t-test of difference between before and after the communication
(*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01)
Fig. 8.4 Behavior change process based on activation of moral obligation
the advice group and the behavioral plan group, who did receive advice on how to
decrease illegal parking. In other words, this result indicates that for participants
who received specific advice on behavior change, they stopped illegal parking
behavior just through reading this written communication, although the advice was
not individually tailored. It proves the importance of “advice” in solving a dilemma
through communication, as repeatedly stressed in the previous section.
Now, what caused such a behavior change? If the process model of behavior
modification discussed in Sect. 4.1 of this book (refer to Fig. 4.1), is combined with
Schwartz’s Norm Activation Theory discussed in Sect. 4.2 (refer to Fig. 4.2), we
can think of a behavior change process as described in Fig. 8.4.2
First, an awareness of consequences is activated, which is the cognition that
illegal parking has a socially undesirable impact. Then, in order to delete such a
socially undesirable impact, the recipient becomes aware of a responsibility to quit
illegal parking (ascribed responsibility). Then the moral obligation is activated,
which is to believe “illegal parking should be inhibited.” All these stages are found
in Norm Activation Theory discussed in Sect. 4.2. Moreover, based on such moral
obligation, the behavioral intention is formed: “I’ll stop illegal parking.” Then, in
2
Except for ascribed responsibility which is not measured in this experiment, all causal relation-
ships are statistically supported by path analysis.
Table 8.2 Moral obligation, behavioral intention, and decision-making commitment (average
value for each group)
Moral obligation Behavioral Decision-making
intention commitment
Right after the Two weeks after Right after the Two weeks after
communication the communication the
communication communication
Control 29.92 30.12 7.36 14.68
group
Request 25.88 25.64 6.36 11.36
group
Advice 29.20 29.32 7.68 16.64
group
Behavioral 30.17 31.04 7.83 18.29
plan group
order to realize this behavioral intention, an implementation intention is formed,

concerning how to specifically quit illegal parking. At last, there will finally be a
visible change and the illegal parking behavior is stopped. Incidentally, it is
expected that the implementation intention will be activated through the collective
or individual advice method, or through the behavioral plan method, as discussed in
Sect. 7.3 in the previous chapter.
Based on the above theoretical hypothesis, it would be reasonable for a group
which has implemented a behavior change, to have a stronger activation of the
implementation intention than other groups. In this experiment, decision-making
commitment is measured as a proxy variable of implementation intention. As
shown in Table 8.2, the decision-making commitment of the advice group and the
behavioral plan group is higher than that of the control group.3 Namely, the par-
ticipants in these two groups made a certain amount of effort to decrease their illegal
parking, such as creating a behavioral plan, or implementing it. This is the reason
why their illegal parking actually decreased.
Next, let us focus on behavioral intention which indicates a degree of agreement
with the statement “let’s inhibit illegal parking” (Table 8.2). There is no evidence to
indicate a higher tendency of behavioral intention in the advice group or the
behavioral group compared to the control group. Likewise, regarding the awareness
of consequences and moral obligation to consider “illegal parking should be
inhibited,” no results show these are higher for the two groups compared to the
control group.
These results indicate that the reason why the level of implementation intention
of the advice group and the behavioral group was higher is not because behavioral
3
Decision-making commitment was higher for the plan-requested group than the control group or
the request group, and it was higher for the advice group than the request group, and these
differences were significant. Also, there was no significant difference between the advice group
and the behavioral plan group.
intention and its preceding factors, moral obligation and awareness of conse-
quences, were higher. As repeated several times, the advice method aims to directly
work on the implementation intention and for the participant to consider “let’s
conduct a cooperative behavior in this specific way” (refer to Fig. 8.4). Therefore,
this result indicates that this goal of the advice method was fulfilled, and it increased
the implementation intention, which actually led to cooperation.
8.2 Countermeasures of Psychological Reactance
In this way, the experiment proved the effectiveness of advice, yet there was
another interesting finding, which supports Brehm’s “Psychological Reactance
Theory” explained in the previous section. In Table 8.2, let us focus on the “request
group.” The request group shows the lowest values for all three categories:
decision-making commitment, behavioral intention, and moral obligation. A point
of key importance here is that all indices are lower than the control group, which
received no communication.4 Participants of the request group received commu-
nication asking for the inhibition of illegal parking, without receiving the specific
advice on the actual steps to change their behavior. Therefore, this result implies
that asking for cooperation without providing advice has a danger of increasing
resistance, lowering moral obligation, and pushing people somewhat far away from
cooperation.
Whether psychological reactance appears or not depends on the provision of
advice, along with the degree of discord between the communication content and
each person’s behavioral pattern or attitude. For instance, those who are relatively
open to cooperation may favorably receive communication calling for cooperation,
while for those with a strong defective tendency, there is a risk of resistance to such
communication. It is because the stronger their defective tendency, the greater the
discord between the communication and their own behavior (as well as the cog-
nitive dissonance), and the more difficult for them to conduct a cooperative
behavior. Therefore, in order to dissolve the dissonance, there is no way other than
forming a psychological reactance to the communication.
This theoretical estimation is also verified in several experiments such as follows
(Fujii 2003). Targeted at visitors to Kyoto City center, about 50 % of the partici-
pants were given a newspaper article calling for people to refrain from visiting the
city center by car. The other 50 % were given no materials. All participants were
asked their means of transportation to the city center this time, and their behavioral
intention was also measured by asking them what means of transportation they
would use in their next visit to central Kyoto. After analysis, it was found that the
effect of the communication depended on the means of transportation they took
4
There was a significant difference between the request group and the control group on moral
obligation and decision-making commitment.
Fig. 8.5 Change in

behavioral intention by
different means of visiting the
city center, through a
“communication calling to
refrain from visiting central
Kyoto City by car.” Note This
figure processed the
coefficients of the multiple
regression analysis on
behavioral intention reported
by Fujii (2003)
when they came to the city center. Refer to Fig. 8.5. The vertical axis of this figure
indicates the effect of communication. Namely, it is the difference between cases
with or without communication on the behavioral intention of “let’s refrain from
coming to the city center by car,” or “let’s come to the city center by public
transportation.” As shown in this figure, for those who visit the city center by public
transportation twice a week, this communication has a positive effect. Likewise, for
those who visit the city center by public transportation and by car once a week,
respectively, the communication has a positive effect, though it is small. However,
for those traveling to the city center by car twice a week, it is shown that the
communication has a negative effect. Namely, when users of public transportation
receive communication calling to refrain from visiting the city center by car, their
mindsets change toward that direction. But when those who come to the city center
only by car receive this communication, they feel resistance and continue using the
car even more stubbornly.
This psychological reactance is a very important issue requiring serious con-
sideration, when applying communication to a social policy. Insufficiently thought
out communication may not only have a zero effect, but may even cause the
opposite effect. The first way to cope with this is to provide appropriate advice.
Even when there is a request for cooperation through communication, as long as
there is appropriate advice, people can smoothly follow the advice. However,
if people are not given appropriate advice, they do not know how to actually do it,
resulting in resistance. Therefore, when considering an actual policy, it is crucial to
apply at least the collective advice method mentioned earlier, the individual advice
method, or the behavioral plan method which will be explained in the following
sections (refer to Sect. 7.3).
The second way to cope with psychological reactance is to understand each
person’s cooperative tendency in advance, and choose a communication method
accordingly. For instance, the simplest form of this approach is called
Individualized Marketing, which is a communication program aiming at changing
transportation behavior, described in detail in the coming Sect. 8.3 (Brög 1998).
8.2 Countermeasures of Psychological Reactance 111
In this communication program, when the first contact is made with a participant,
a survey is conducted on whether each person is interested in changing their
behavior from car to other means of transportation, or how often they use public
transportation already. Those who do not use public transportation nor have the
motivation to change their behavior are removed as the target of communication.
Of course, this approach is able to avoid the danger of causing the opposite effect
through well-crafted communication, but as it makes no approach at all to the
habitual noncooperators who are the most important component of a social
dilemma, the drawback is that this approach cannot solve the root of the problem.
Taking this point into account, we can think of an individualistic approach such as:
• For those with a positive attitude toward cooperation:
– One-sided communication with a strong clear tone such as “cooperation is
needed.”
• For those with an ambiguous attitude toward cooperation:
– At the same time, provide general advice on how to implement cooperative
behavior and request them to create a behavioral plan.
• For those with a negative attitude toward cooperation:
– Two-sided communication with a soft tone such as “it is understandable that
people unconsciously conduct a defective behavior from time to time. But
cooperation is needed. So it may be a good idea to choose a cooperative
behavior within your comfort zone.”
– At the same time, provide individual advice on how to implement cooper-
ative behavior and request them to make a behavioral plan. In addition, by
offering a temporary incentive for cooperation (temporary structural change
such as distributing free tickets, refer to Chap. 6), arrange for them to
experience cooperation even temporarily.
Therefore, the stronger their negative attitude on cooperation, the more careful
attention should be paid to the communication. Needless to say, it indicates that it is
more difficult to change the behavior of habitual noncooperators through commu-
nication. However, putting it the other way around, this means that even for
habitual noncooperators, as long as refined communication applying various
techniques and theories is used, it may be possible to solicit their behavior change
through verbal communication.
The following two sections introduce successful cases of such appropriate
communication based on the individual advice method and the behavioral plan
method.
8.3 Travel Feedback Programs (TFP)
A representative case of a behavior change communication program based on the

individual advice method is the Travel Feedback Program (hereafter abbreviated as
TFP; Brög 1998; DTWA 2000; Fujii and Taniguchi 2003; Fujii et al. 2002; Rose
and Ampt 2001; SOCIALDATA 1998; Taniguchi et al. 2001a, b, 2003). TFP
focuses on the social dilemma of car use, and it has been developed and applied in
several cities as a communication program designed to decrease car use.
TFP is defined as follows (Taniguchi et al. 2003):
It is a communication program that:

• aims at encouraging people to spontaneously conduct cooperative transportation
behaviors such as reducing car use,
• combines several communication techniques such as the request, advice,
behavioral plan, and feedback methods
• assumes several times of contact and a two-way information exchange
Since it assumes two-way information exchange, one of the characteristics of

TFP is the provision of individual advice to each recipient. Another important
characteristic is that the feedback method can be incorporated in the program;
namely, tailored feedback to each person concerning various indices on their
behavior, such as CO2 exhaust, travel distance by car, and the ratio of car use. This
kind of feedback information is something not normally obtained in daily life, but is
made available through the structure of TFP. As indicated by Goal Setting Theory
(Locke 1968, 2000) and Control Theory (Ashby 1956; Carver and Scheier 1982)
this information is essential for people to achieve and maintain their goals.
Therefore, through giving feedback on each person’s behavioral information, TFP
can facilitate behavior change toward a cooperative transportation behavior, and
also maintain the behavior change. Before starting to discuss TFP in detail, we will
first refer to the effectiveness of the feedback method, and then, describe a type of
TFP incorporating the feedback method.
(1) Effectiveness of the feedback method
The simplest example to show the importance of feedback information is the
thermostat function of air conditioning, which compares the current temperature
and the preset temperature, monitors any difference, and controls the air condi-
tioning until they match. Through this system, the thermostat fulfills two functions:
(1) changes the room temperature to the preset temperature, and (2) keeps the room
temperature constant. Needless to say, this system will not function if it cannot
constantly monitor the current temperature, and thus provide feedback information
for itself.
8.3 Travel Feedback Programs (TFP) 113
Of course a thermostat is a machine and rather impersonal, a more human

example is a food diet and a weighing scale. Let us assume a person wants to lose
weight, in order to achieve this goal, the first step is to know the current weight.
With this feedback information, the gap between the current status and the goal is
known, and for the first time a rough idea of the amount of effort needed to reach
the goal is known. After a certain amount of time and effort a second weigh-in will
give more feedback information on the new weight. If the weight hardly decreased,
the effort up to now was in vain, and there is a need to make an adjustment to the
diet. If the weight decreased as desired, the same effort can be continued. This
psychological process of achieving a goal is described in Goal Setting Theory
(Locke 1968, 2000). Please note of course, that simply achieving the desired weight
just once is a positive outcome, but in order to maintain the desired weight,
feedback information is required from further periodic weigh-ins. Control Theory
(Ashby 1956; Carver and Scheier 1982) describes a process of convergence which
includes this process of maintaining the weight. In this way, feedback information
obtained by standing on a scale is crucial for diet success, and with this information,
(1) weight is lost until the target is reached, and (2) the target weight is maintained.
By the same token, mock exam results are feedback for a student preparing for an
actual exam, and golf scores and fish catches are all feedback information which
will encourage and reward effort for golfers and fishermen.
As it is clear from these examples, when people have a goal to “conduct a
cooperative behavior,” the feedback information showing their level of achieve-
ment plays an extremely important role for them (1) to conduct a cooperative
behavior, and (2) to carry on and sustain it.
In fact, various research to date has verified the effectiveness of feedback
information. For example, Everett measured the car travel distance of participants in
an experiment, and after calculating the cost of car use based on the distance,
provided this feedback information to them (see Cone and Hayes 1980). In this
experiment, the following feedback groups were set: a travel distance group; a
personal cost, i.e., gasoline consumption group; and a gasoline and social costs
group, i.e., including factors such as gas costs, air pollution and health damage
incurred by others in monetary terms, according to each travel distance. As a result
of the experiment, no significant decrease in terms of travel distance was found.
However, it was statistically shown that through the feedback, people formed a
negative attitude to car transportation. Moreover, there was a greater impact on
attitude change when the number of items described in monetary terms in the
feedback information was larger. In other words, there was a greater impact on
those who received the feedback on social costs as well. Touching on other research
involving energy consumption and the provision of feedback information to
households, Midden et al. reported energy consuming behavior decreased by 12 %
(Midden et al. 1983). Hayes and Cone reported a decrease of 10 % (Hayes and
Cone 1981). Additionally, McClelland and Cooke also reported a decrease of 12 %
(McClelland and Cooke 1979/1980), all of which shows that the individual feed-
back method that provides feedback information to each person is an effective
technique to encourage cooperation.
(2) Combining the feedback method and the goal setting method
Using the feedback method as it is, and combining with the goal setting method,
a greater effect can be expected. According to Locke’s Goal Setting Theory,
motivation to achieve a goal will be activated when two conditions are met: (1) the
goal is clear, and (2) the person has accepted the goal. In order to fulfill the first
condition that “the goal is clear,” a specific numerical target is useful. For the
purpose of setting such a numerical target and making an effort to achieve it,
feedback information is essential (Locke 1968, 2000). Next, in order to meet the
second condition that “the person has accepted the goal,” it is best for the goal to be
set by the person, rather than given by someone else. In other words, it is expected
that the possibility of behavior change will further improve when the feedback
method is applied in conjunction with requesting targets to set their own goal
(Dwyer et al. 1993).
In fact, the above-mentioned Midden worked together with McCally on an
experiment to provide feedback information on energy consumption, and then
request each household to set a goal on how much they aimed to decrease their
energy consumption. As a result, they reported a 20 % decrease (McCally and
Midden 2002). This was about double the 10 % decrease of the control group who
received feedback information, but was not requested to set a goal.
Additionally, included in this experiment was another comparison between the
experimenter “requesting” participants to set a goal, versus the experimenter
“presenting” a goal. The result showed an interesting phenomenon, with the overall
average for the presented goal having a smaller energy decreasing effect, compared
to participants setting their own goals. However, they further measured the social
value orientation of each participant, and based on that information, they catego-
rized the participants into two groups: a “prosocial” group who tend to consider the
benefit of others, and a “proself” group who tend to consider self-centered benefit
(Messick and McClintock 1968; refer to the appendix for details of the catego-
rization). When the results were reanalyzed based on this categorization, the proself
group showed an approximate 25 % decrease when they set the goal themselves,
while only a 10 % decrease with a given goal. Interestingly, the prosocial group
showed an approximate 20 % decrease when they set the goal themselves, and a
25 % decrease when the goal was given. In other words, for those with strong
self-centered motivation (proself people), the decrease was higher when they set the
goal themselves, and in contrast, for those with a strong tendency of considering the
benefit of the society as a whole (prosocial people), the decrease was higher when
the goal was given, rather than when they set the goal themselves. Possibly for
proself people, when a goal is given by others, the “level of acceptance” declines.
As Goal Setting Theory predicts, this leads to the decline in motivation for behavior
change, resulting in a lower energy decrease. As prosocial people have a high
tendency to accept goals given by others, a given goal has no negative effect, unlike
in the case of proself people. What is more, for a group who set the goal them-
selves, the standard of the goal was 15 %, but the goal set by the experimenter was
20 %. Therefore, for prosocial people, they showed a greater decrease when the
goal was given, since it was set as a higher goal from the beginning.
As seen, the feedback method itself may lead to behavior change, but when
effectively combined with the goal setting method, a greater behavior change can be
expected. If in advance the proself/prosocial tendency of participants is captured,
whether to request a goal or give a preset goal can be fine-tuned to even greater
effect.
TFP applies the concepts of the feedback method to a transportation behavior
change program involving a communication program consisting of the feedback
method and various other communication techniques such as the request, advice,
and behavioral plan methods. The following part of this section introduces case
studies on different types of TFP conducted to date.
Incidentally, presently TFP is a communication program focused on “trans-
portation behavior,” but it is expected that the TFP concepts can also be applied to
other social dilemmas, especially, those involving behaviors in daily life, such as
environmentally friendly behaviors or the recycling of garbage, TFP is expected to
be a very useful tool.
(3) Individualized Marketing
As an example of TFP based on the effective feedback method, there is a method
known as Individualized Marketing.
Individualized Marketing maintains the following three steps which lead people
to shift from using cars to using public transportation (Brög 1998):
Step 1 Obtain the motivation for the shift.
Step 2 Obtain the specific information.
Step 3 Obtain the actual experience of usage.
If we compare it with the behavior change process model toward cooperation
described earlier in this book (refer to Fig. 4.1): Step 1 corresponds to a stage to
obtain the behavioral intention toward behavior change; Step 2 corresponds to a
stage to obtain the information needed for forming the implementation intention;
and Step 3 corresponds to a stage when a defective habit begins dissolving as a
cooperative habit begins forming.
Individualized Marketing by first examining upon which step the campaign
targets are positioned and responding accordingly avoids people’s psychological
reactance (as explained in the previous section). Additionally, being so specific
saves wasted communication costs to those with a low possibility of behavior
change, thus achieving a greater impact with a limited budget.
Upon first contact with an individual or a household, a survey ascertains whether
they are interested in shifting from car to public transportation, and how much they
already use public transportation. They are then categorized into the following three
groups:
Group 1 Individuals who do not use public transportation, and with no motiva-
tion to change. (Pre Step 1): removed as a target of Individualized
Marketing.
Group 2 Individuals with the motivation to shift to public transportation, but do
not use it (Step 1): Facilitate them to proceed to Step 2 by a direct phone
call giving specific information provided by investigators with expertise
in public transportation. Upon request, the investigators will also visit
their home. At the same time, distribute a free ticket for public trans-
portation valid for a certain period of time.
Group 3 Individuals who already use public transportation (Step 3): Similar to
the above Group 2, provide specific information through a phone call or
a visit. However, in order to avoid inhibiting their spontaneous use of
public transportation, any free tickets are not distributed.
Brög et al. first conducted several pilot studies to verify its effect, followed by
contacting 15,000 households living in several German cities, and conducting
Individualized Marketing (Brög 1998; SOCIALDATA 1998). It is reported that for
each city, Group 2 increased their frequency of using public transportation between
10–20 %, and Group 3 increased it 30–40 %.
Individualized Marketing was also conducted in Perth, Australia, targeting
15,300 households (DTWA 2000). Incidentally, this Individualized Marketing in
Perth was implemented as a part of a transportation policy package called Travel
Smart aiming at shifting from car usage to other means of transportation. As a
result, the frequency of using public transportation increased by 0 %, bike use
increased by 0 %, and walking increased by 15 %, while car use decreased by
10 %; such changes were maintained even 2 years after the experiment (Goulias
et al. 2001).
Brög et al. also made a cost-benefit analysis in each of these application cases,
and showed that even when the administrators had to contact each household to
provide information, because of its long-term effect, the benefits outweighed the
costs (Brög 1998).
(4) Travel Blending
In Individualized Marketing, individuals and households without the motivation
to decrease car use were removed as the target of the policy. In contrast, Rose and
Ampt proposed a different type of TFP: Travel Blending Program (hereafter
abbreviated as Travel Blending; Rose and Ampt 2001). By taking an environmental
approach and appealing to people’s public spirit, it aimed at activating the moti-
vation to decrease car use, thereby leading to behavior change. Travel Blending
consists of the following four steps:
Step 1 Send a letter requesting participation, distribute to households (1) “Why”
booklet (explains why decreasing car use is needed), (2) “How” booklet
(explains how specifically they can decrease car use), and (3) One week
travel diary to be kept by participants and returned.
Step 2 Based on the returned travel diary, analysts examine for each household
how they can decrease car use, and create advice such as:
“Craig, would it be possible for you to travel by public transport one day a
week or one day a fortnight? You could catch the train from Blaxland
Station and change to the 301 bus at Central Station. We have enclosed
copies of the train times which seem to suit your travel pattern.” (Rose and
Ampt 2001, p. 100)
“Everyone: Remember when you share a ride with someone instead of
driving yourself, this is a real benefit to the environment in Adelaide.”
(Rose and Ampt 2001, p. 100)
For each household, send the following three documents: (1) An A4-size
sheet of customized advice, (2) A “Thinking about your travel” booklet (a
booklet asking them to seriously consider their transportation behavior
based on the advice sheet), and (3) A “goal card” (a card to write their own
behavioral goal for decreasing car use).
Step 3 Four weeks after sending the Step 2 documents, send a second 1 week
travel diary, requesting them to complete and return.
Step 4 Compare the two diaries, examine how each household decreased car use
according to the individual advice given in Step 2. Create a customized
feedback sheet informing each household of their changes. Create and
enclose tailored advice similar to Step 2, asking them to continue to refrain
from car use as much as they can.
The theoretical implication of each step is as follows.
First, Step 1 provides motivation for behavior change toward cooperation, and
aims at the formation of behavioral intention on cooperation. Next, Step 2 provides
individual advice, which supports the creation of a behavioral plan, thereby aiming
at facilitating the formation of the implementation intention (for Steps 1 and 2, refer
to Chap. 4 and Sect. 7.3). The following Step 3 corresponds to the measurement for
obtaining the feedback information (such as the information obtained from a “scale”
or “thermostat”) in Control Theory mentioned earlier in this section. Finally, Step 4
is a stage to create feedback on the information obtained in Step 3, in order to
support people to maintain the behavior change in their transportation behavior.
Travel Blending was also applied in Leeds, England, despite being only a
small-scale pilot study targeted at 42 households, the frequency of car trips
decreased.5 Additionally, pilot analysis was conducted in Sydney and Adelaide in
Australia, with samples of 100–200 people. As a result, in Adelaide, the travel dis-
tance by car in each household decreased on average about 10 % (Rose and Ampt
2001). In addition, through a post-survey interview of each household, it was reported
that people’s attitude had changed, and their environmental awareness increased. For
example, one participant in the pilot experiment in Sydney commented as follows:
5
http://www.camparie.com/.
I used to consider convenience and cost when making travel decisions, now I consider three
things: convenience, cost and environment (Rose and Ampt 2001, p. 105).
As this comment shows, we can change people’s attitude through a communi-

cation program.
(5) Case of application in Sapporo City
The Individualized Marketing or Travel Blending TFP introduced up to now
were all overseas, but there are also Japanese cases in Sapporo City where TFP was
developed and applied based on Travel Blending (Taniguchi et al. 2001a, b, 2003).6
Moreover, effects of the programs in all the above overseas cases were evaluated
only through a behavioral index, but the cases in Sapporo also analyzed the impact
on psychological processes (Taniguchi et al. 2003). In the following, a series of
TFP application cases in Sapporo will be briefly reviewed based on literature
reports (Taniguchi et al. 2001a, b, 2003).
In Sapporo, a pilot experiment was held in 1999 targeted at about 40 households,
resulting in about a 10 % decrease of the modal split of cars. In 2000, after refining
the pilot questionnaire sheets and pamphlets, a program was launched in two areas
(a residents’ association with 142 households, 352 persons, and a neighborhood
association with 41 households, 120 persons) and an elementary school (39
households, 127 persons). In each case, more than 90 % of households responded.
This TFP targeted each household unit, and requested every member of each
household to participate. The content was based on the four step Travel Blending
described earlier. The following introduces the content of each step, together with
its psychological significance.
Step 1 Pamphlet distribution and a 7-day diary survey
First, the pamphlet requests people to rethink and decrease unnecessary car use
as much as possible, and to use cars “wisely.” This does not advocate completely
stopping all car use, but rather proposes a gradual revision of lifestyle, starting from
those small things participants can start immediately. This approach is based on the
“two-sided communication” explained in Sect. 7.2, aimed at minimizing psycho-
logical reactance.
Next, the diary survey asks people to write down their transportation behavior
throughout a day in a diary format. It collects information which will be the base for
customized feedback given to each person in the steps that follow. In addition to the
diary survey, a questionnaire survey ascertains information such as car possession,
car use, household attributes, and individual attributes.
6
Taniguchi et al. (2001a, b) developed a communication program based on Travel Blending by
Rose or Ampt, and named the program the Travel Feedback Program. However, for the definition
of Travel Feedback Program, this book adopts the broad definition of Taniguchi et al. (2003).
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, the program developed by Taniguchi et al. (2001a, b) is
positioned as one of the examples of the general term of Travel Feedback Program.
Fig. 8.6 A part of the Diagnosis Report used in the communication program in Sapporo City
(Material provided by Hokkaido Development Engineering Center)
Step 2 Feedback in the form of a “Diagnosis Report”

About 3 weeks after Step 1, feedback is given to each participant as an A3 size
“Diagnosis Report” describing the result of each person’s 7-day diary survey, and
offers advice on their transportation behavior entitled “your diagnostic result”. As
shown in Fig. 8.6, since the diagnosis visualizes the 7-days transportation pattern, it
can be easily understood at a glance. It also reports objective numerical data on the
frequency and the total duration of using each means of transportation within the
7 days. In addition, there is also feedback on CO2 exhaust emissions according to
each transportation mode. Such feedback provides a trigger for people to review
their own behavior, and it may lead to behavior change.
Moreover, after providing such feedback, a goal of a 15 % CO2 reduction is
presented. The intention is to facilitate more effective behavior change by com-
bining the goal setting method with the feedback method.
Moreover, the advice on transportation behavior is presented in the form of
“proposals.” For instance, in order to mitigate the issues of congestion and air
pollution, a proposal is made for people to use public transportation as much as they
can, by making use of the enclosed discount information on public transportation. Or
a proposal for people to try to complete several errands at once, in order to decrease
the number of car journeys. Such proposals do not force people to stop car use, nor
compel them to shift to public transportation. For example, proposals gently suggest
people to begin from what is easy for them to do, such as to start using public
transportation “once a week, on a sunny day when you do not have a lot of bags.”
This “requesting,” and not “demanding” style of proposals also include praise for
each person on any positive aspects of their transportation behavior, such as:
Your transportation behavior over the 7 days was ideal for helping mitigate congestion and
air pollution in the city. You always commuted by public transportation; please continue to
use public transportation in future.
These are all methods to prevent psychological reactance, especially, compared

to Step 1 when communication is through a pamphlet common to everyone, such
individual advice is very specific and has a risk of causing stronger psychological
reactance, so it is critical to be sensitive when designing this part of the
communication.
Step 3 7-day diary survey
About 1 month after distributing the Diagnosis Report, a second diary survey is
carried out as in Step 1.
Step 4 Feedback of the “Final Diagnosis Report”
One month after Step 3, each person is given feedback as a Final Diagnosis
Report. This includes information based on the diary survey of Step 1 and Step 3 on
how their car use decreased through the communication program. As shown in
Fig. 8.7, this report gives information on the change to CO2 exhaust emissions for
each means of transportation and as a whole. It also proposes that the participants
continue considering the environment when they use their car. As Control Theory
and Goal Setting Theory state, at least for participants who succeeded in reducing
their CO2 emissions, this feedback proves the “achievement” of their efforts, so it is
expected to continue motivating their efforts to conduct transportation behavior in
consideration of the environment.
The aggregated first and second diary surveys in this Travel Feedback Program
(Taniguchi et al. 2001a, 2003), showed the number of car trips decreased by about
5 % (5.6 % reduction from 6,852 trips to 6,472 trips) and the total duration of car
trips decreased by about 15 % (14.1 % reduction from 180,424 to 155,017 min).
The number of bus trips increased by about 10 % (10.7 % rise from 560 trips to 620
trips) and the total duration of time traveled by bus increased also by about 10 %
(9.2 % rise from 13,898 to 15,183 min). Moreover, CO2 exhaust from all modes of
transportation decreased by just under 20 % (17.7 % reduction from 189,675 to
156,131 kg).
Additionally, in order to verify whether the change toward environmentally
friendly transportation behavior prompted by this program was maintained in the
long term, a follow-up survey was held 1 year later (Taniguchi et al. 2003). The
survey measured the psychological factors estimated in Norm Activation Theory
(refer to Sects. 4.3 and 7.4): awareness of consequences, moral obligation,
behavioral intention, and self-reported value on the behavior to inhibit car use. In
addition to the participants of the TFP held in 2000 (experiment group), households
Fig. 8.7 Final Diagnosis Report used in the communication program in Sapporo City (Material
provided by Hokkaido Development Engineering Center)
who did not participate in the previous TFP were asked to become new participants
for this survey (control group). Based on the obtained data, the psychological
factors of the two groups were compared; the results showed no significant dif-
ference in the awareness of consequences, moral obligation, or behavioral intention.
However, the self-reported value on the behavior showed a significantly higher
standard for the experiment group, compared to the control group; in other words, it
was verified that TFP has a sustainable effect on behavior change.
Further analysis of the survey data supported the causal relationship predicted by
Norm Activation Theory shown in Fig. 8.4. That is, the result coincides with the
series of causal relationship as in “awareness of consequences ! moral obliga-
tion ! behavioral intention ! behavior” (Taniguchi et al. 2003). When we care-
fully observe this result and the fact that there was no difference between the
experiment group and the control group in awareness of consequences, moral
obligation, or behavioral intention, we find that the difference was in actual
behavior, TFP should have exercised an impact on the psychological factors that lie
between the behavioral intention and the actual behavior (which was not measured
in this survey). When we focus once again on the theoretical hypothesis shown in
Fig. 8.4, the implementation intention is a psychological factor between the
behavioral intention and the behavior. Therefore, we may conclude that TFP
activates the implementation intention and thereby facilitates people’s cooperative
transportation behavior in the long term.
This result is in line with the results of the communication experiment based on
the advice method explained in Sect. 8.1 calling for decreasing illegal bike parking.
Moreover, this result supports the theoretical hypothesis that advice activates
implementation intention, as shown in Fig. 8.4. Therefore, it may be concluded that
the reason why the Australian TFP in Adelaide (refer to Sect. 8.3(1) of this section)
or Perth (refer to Sect. 8.3(2) of this section) led to behavior change in people’s
transportation behavior is the specific advice on behavior change facilitated the
formation of the implementation intention in the form of “when, where, and how I
should refrain from using the car.”
(6) Challenges of TFP research
Up to now, we have seen several cases of TFP application. While TFP combines
several communication techniques into a program for transportation behavior
change, the effectiveness of each communication is not clearly revealed. For
instance, Individualized Marketing incorporates the following three separate tech-
niques: the method of facilitating experience through temporary structural change,
the individual advice method, and the collective advice method. Likewise, Travel
Blending and the case of Sapporo incorporate the following four separate tech-
niques: the request method, the individual advice method, the collective advice
method, and the individual feedback method. The research to date does not clearly
reveal whether all these techniques were equally important, or if the same effect
could have been achieved even if some techniques were left out. Therefore, while
continuing the approaches taken in general environmental psychology (e.g., Cone
and Hayes 1980; Dwyer et al. 1993), it is now becoming more important to conduct
empirical research and accumulate data to verify the individual effect of each
communication technique.
However, considering the point that conventional TFP has effectively led to
behavior change, the pragmatic approach of simply streamlining the process may be
even more effective. For instance, as Goal Setting Theory predicts, combining the
feedback method and the goal setting method may have a greater effect. Namely,
after giving feedback information on CO2 exhaust emissions, participants may be
requested to set a goal on how much they would decrease their emissions (refer to
Sect. 8.3(1)). An even greater effect may be expected by measuring a participant’s
social value orientation in advance, and then either provide a prepared goal, or
request each person to set their own goal (McCally and Midden 2002; refer to
Sect. 8.3(1)). Alternatively, as predicted by Gollwitzer’s theory on implementation
intention (refer to Sect. 4.4), we may introduce the behavioral plan method instead
of the individual advice method into TFP, so that the effect of behavior change may
be greater, while minimizing the administrative cost of the program.
In attempting to achieve improvement both in effectiveness and efficiency, such
empirical studies to reveal the effect of each communication technique would be
very useful. There is no doubt that the fundamental theory and empirical knowledge
on psychological processes can directly or indirectly contribute to the success of
actual administrative policies.
8.4 Case Studies of the Behavior Plan Method
Next, let us discuss the practical feasibility of a communication program based on

the behavioral plan method. As mentioned in Sect. 7.3, this method requests people
to create a specific behavioral plan as in “if you are to conduct a cooperative
behavior, when, where, and how will you do so?” Like the advice method, it
facilitates the formation of implementation intention. In addition, by requesting
people to write it down, it leads to increased commitment, and thereby expects to
achieve their spontaneous behavior change (refer to Table 7.1). This behavioral
plan method has the following strong points, compared with the advice method
discussed up to now (refer to Table 7.1);
(1) Since each person spontaneously creates their behavioral plan, the adminis-
tration cost of the policy can be drastically reduced.
(2) When each person creates the plan, they can incorporate their own specific
conditions; conditions that administrators would not know in the creation of
advice for the person. This detailed behavioral plan increases the likelihood of
implementation intention to be formed.
(3) Writing it down (expressing it) increases commitment, in much the same way
as if they have made a promise. Therefore, the intention to implement the plan
they made (i.e., implementation intention) will be strengthened.
However, in order to maximize the effect of these advantages of the behavioral

plan method, it is crucial to first provide the information required by people to
create an adequate behavioral plan. If not, even if participants are requested to
create a behavioral plan, they may fail to do so.
Now, various field experiments confirm that whether or not a behavioral plan is
created has a big effect on the “possibility to successfully execute what they intend
to do,” namely, the feasibility of behavioral intention. The details of such funda-
mental experiments were already introduced in Sect. 4.4, so they will not be
repeated again. But in what follows, we will introduce several cases aimed at
behavior change toward a cooperative transportation behavior.
The first case to be introduced is a field experiment conducted by Jakobsson
et al. (2002). This experiment verified that even if a person had a motivation for
behavior change, if the behavioral plan method was not applied, it would not lead to
the actual behavior change. Namely, it empirically showed that implementing a
road pricing policy (which is one of the structural strategies) would not lead to
people’s behavior change by itself, but only when people created a behavioral plan,
was the actual behavior change carried out.
The selected targets for the experiment were 82 households in Gothenburg,
Sweden; each household was requested to calculate their car travel distance for a
given period of time (2 or 4 weeks) using a distance recorder. In addition, they were
given a sum of money from which to pay the researchers a fee based on the travel
distance calculation (which was almost the same as the cost of gasoline; no
household actually used their own money to pay the fee). Households were divided
into three groups: a pricing group who carried out pricing; a pricing + behavioral
plan request group who in addition to pricing, created a plan for car use during the
pricing period; and a control group who took no part in any activity. The results in
Fig. 8.8 show no decrease in travel distance, not only for the control group, but also
for the pricing group. However, only for those households requested to create a
behavioral plan, there was a 13 % decrease in travel distance. This data empirically
indicates that behavior change will not occur simply by activating motivation, but it
is important that implementation intention is activated through the application of the
behavioral plan method.
As a practical administrative case, a communication experiment aimed at
facilitating the use of the Hanshin Expressway Wangan Route (Daito et al. 2003)
shows the effectiveness of the behavioral plan method. Two expressways run in
Fig. 8.8 Result of

experiment on
pricing + behavioral plan
method (travel distance by car
per week) (The above data
processed data by Jakobsson
et al. 2002)
8.4 Case Studies of the Behavior Plan Method 125
Fig. 8.9 Communication tool calling for the use of the Wangan Route
parallel; the Kobe Route runs inland, and the Wangan Route runs along the coast;
users of the Hanshin Expressway Kobe Route, an alternative route to the Wangan
Route in the Hanshin Area received a communication asking them to switch to the
Wangan Route. Comparing the two, the Wangan Route has less traffic and the faster
average speed, so it is known that using this line is more environmentally friendly.
However, drivers have to take a little detour with the Wangan Route, this detour
creates the social dilemma in which using the Kobe Route is defection, and using
the Wangan Route is cooperation.
The communication tool prepared was a leaflet briefly explaining the
above-mentioned situation, and requesting drivers to use the Wangan Route in
consideration of the environment (refer to Fig. 8.9). The back of the leaflet was
titled “A guide to using the Wangan Route”, with an overall map of the area around
the Wangan Route as well as detailed maps of all its entrances and exits. It also
recommended drivers keep the leaflet in their car, and refer to it when using the
Wangan Route. This kind of information describing how to use the Wangan Route
is regarded as a communication tool applying what is defined in this book as the
(nonindividual) advice method. Incidentally, the name of the office in the university
was given as the sender of the communication (Fig. 8.10).
In this experiment, 10,000 drivers at Kobe Route tollgates were randomly
selected; one-third of the drivers were designated as a control group, and did not
receive the above leaflet, but were only given a detailed questionnaire about their
Average change in the share of Wangan

Route usage by each individual
15%
10%
5%
0%
Control group Advice group Behavioral plan
request group
Fig. 8.10 Result of experiment on request method + behavioral plan method (change in the share
of Wangan Route usage by normal cars used for commuting, before and after the request). Note
The share of Wangan Route usage: Calculated as the rate of the number of times using the Hanshin
Expressway Wangan Route over the total number of times using the three main roads connecting
Osaka and Kobe (Hanshin Expressway Wangan Route, Hanshin Expressway Kobe Route, and
Route 43) in a week (The above data processed the data by Daito et al. 2003)
transportation behavior on the day they received the sheet, how they normally use
the Kobe Route, etc. Another one-third of the drivers, the advice group, received the
questionnaire as well as the above leaflet. The final one-third of the drivers, the
behavioral plan group, received the questionnaire sheet and the leaflet in the same
way. However, this group’s questionnaire was slightly different and included the
following question: “regarding your travel on the day you received the question-
naire, if you plan to use the Wangan Route, which route would you choose?”
Drivers were also requested to draw their route on a blank map.
From the 10,000 target drivers, 1,936 responded. Incidentally, just before this
experiment, to facilitate use of the Wangan Route, an environmental road pricing
policy giving a reduced toll and targeted at only large-sized cars was introduced if
the Wangan Route was used. The survey also measured the policy’s effect on
drivers of these large-sized cars.
Analysis showed no effect by the introduction of the environmental road pricing;
nor any effect by providing specific information and requesting drivers to use the
Wangan Route. However, for those drivers requested to create the behavioral plan,
their share of using the Wangan Route greatly increased by 12.5 %; about a
threefold increase from 5.9 % just before the experiment to 18.4 % after the
request.
The request for the behavioral plan only involved drivers drawing their route to
use the Wangan Route on a small simplified blank map; it involved work of no
consequence and would not have taken more than a minute to complete. It deserves
a special mention that despite such a trivial effort, the result showed such a clear
effect. Incidentally, if we simply expand this experimental result and request to
create a behavioral plan to all users of the Kobe Route, it is expected that 10 % of
the total traffic of the Kobe Route would switch to the Wangan Route.
The last case to be introduced is an example of TFP introduced by the behavioral
plan method (Fujii and Taniguchi 2003).
This is a type of TFP involving elementary school education, in which requests

for cooperation were made to four classes in the fifth grade, and was conducted over
three lessons in total (Taniguchi et al. 2003). This TFP was implemented as a
program dealing with environmental issues, which was part of a comprehensive
learning curriculum. It was described as a “how to use the car wisely” program in
the lessons. The basic concept was for each household to consider “how to use the
car wisely,” under a basic cognition that as part of an environmentally friendly
lifestyle and within their comfort zone, each household would refrain from using
their car(s).
Two classes out of four, received a similar version of the TFP described in
Sect. 8.3(4). After completing the survey on transportation behavior, the first lesson
focused on global environmental issues and each household’s CO2 exhaust emis-
sions in order to motivate students to consider “how to use the car wisely.” The
lesson ended with a diary survey of the transportation behavior of each student’s
household. In the second lesson, students were provided with “individual advice”
based on the diary survey (refer to “Diagnosis Report” in Fig. 8.6), followed by a
lecture on how to use the car wisely. Subsequently, a second survey on trans-
portation behavior was conducted. The third lesson provided feedback on how the
CO2 emissions from each household decreased before and after receiving individual
advice (refer to “Final Diagnosis Report” in Fig. 8.7).
For the remaining two classes, instead of providing the Diagnosis Report with
the individual advice method, TFP was presented incorporating the behavioral plan
method requesting students to spontaneously think about how to use cars wisely.
Basically, in this version of the program, the first and the third lessons are the same
as the above TFP, but the processes before and after the second lesson are different.
After the transportation survey and the first lesson for promoting motivation, and
just before the second lesson, students were requested to fill in a car trip survey on
how each household used the car. In the second lesson, after a lecture on “how to
use the car wisely,” students were requested to examine how they can reduce car
use, based on their car trip survey, and to write their ideas down on a separate sheet.
At the end of the lesson, a survey sheet was distributed, and students were taught
the following procedure for each household;
(1) Together with any family members who use a car in each household, write
down a representative plan of car use in the near future (a maximum of three
plans).
(2) For each car use plan, examine the possibility of using a substitute mode of
transportation so as to decrease CO2.
(3) If a substitute mode of transportation is possible, write down in the behavioral
plan how that car journey will be substituted by other means of transportation
(refer to Fig. 8.11). At that time, refer to “how to use the car wisely” examined
by each student during the lesson. The rest of the program is the same as the
first two classes; conduct the transportation behavior survey, and provide each
student with the feedback information on how CO2 emissions from each
household decreased before and after the second lesson.
128
8 Case Studies on Communicative Strategies …
Fig. 8.11 Behavioral plan form on “how to use the car wisely”
In the two classes that received individual advice, there was no statistical change
in the amount of each household’s CO2 exhaust emissions from transportation
behavior. However, as explained in detail in Sect. 8.3, many cases confirm that TFP
based on the individual advice method can actually lead to change in transportation
behavior. Hence this result is in apparent contradiction to these conventional
examples. One of the possible reasons is that the 3-day measurement period for
transportation behavior was too short, so the impact of any singular value which
was partially found exercised a great impact. Despite that, however, in the other two
classes that participated in the behavioral plan method, each household’s CO2
exhaust caused by transportation behavior decreased by more than 30 % on
average.
This result indicates a possibility that compared with the advice method, the
behavioral plan method strongly facilitates the formation of the specific imple-
mentation intention, and the commitment for actual implementation becomes
stronger, thereby more effectively leading to a change in transportation behavior.
Incidentally, staff working hours required for the behavioral plan were almost zero,
whereas about 100 h were required to examine individual advice and to create the
individual Diagnosis Reports. This shows that the behavioral plan method may also
be more economically efficient in terms of work hours and costs.
However, the effort required from the participants is known to be larger for the
behavioral plan method since it requires them to create the plan spontaneously.
Therefore, the ratio of households participating in the program as a whole was
about 68 % for the advice method program, while it only remained at about 53 %
for the behavioral plan method program. Since this case was conducted as part of
elementary school lessons, we can say that the participation trend of each household
would be much higher than a normal survey. Despite that condition, there was still a
very big participation gap between the two methods; this raises the concern that if
this program were implemented on normal targets, and not elementary school
students, the gap would be even larger. This is an important issue to be tackled
when implementing TFP with the behavioral plan method.
8.5 Activation of Moral Obligation
As discussed above, these cases statistically verify that communication programs

based on the advice method or the behavioral plan method increase people’s
implementation intention, which may lead to behavior change. However, a certain
number of cases have reported no impact on the psychological factors preceding the
implementation intention, such as behavioral intention, moral obligation, and
awareness of consequences. For example, in the communication experiment by
Fujii et al. (2001, 2002) calling to decrease illegal bike parking (refer to Sect. 8.1),
and in TFP by Taniguchi et al. (2003), they found changes in implementation
intention and the actual behavior, but they did not find any change through the
communication on the following: the attitude toward cooperation and defection, the
moral obligation to conduct a cooperative behavior, or the awareness of conse-
quences to recognize that defection may have a negative impact on society.
One interpretation suggests the possibility that for social dilemmas such as car
use and illegal bike parking, most people already have an idea that such defective
behavior is socially undesirable (awareness of consequences), they already think
that they should conduct a cooperative behavior (moral obligation), and intend to do
so (implementation intention), but just because they specifically do not know how
to conduct the cooperative behavior, they are taking the defective behavior instead.
This may be the reason why the advice method and the behavioral plan method
played an important role for behavior change toward cooperation.
At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that everyone’s moral obligation is at
such a high level that it cannot be further activated. In fact, there are several cases
which report that people’s moral obligation is activated through communication
programs.
For example, by holding a seminar targeted at graduate students of Kyoto
University, we found that the moral obligation on transportation behavior was
activated (Fujii 2000). The weekly seminar was held seven times in total, with a
theme of transportation problems in central Kyoto City. Students were divided into
three groups consisting of five to seven people. In every seminar, each group chose
a theme and made a presentation on that theme, namely: regulation of car inflow
into the city center, congestion caused by taxis waiting for customers in the city
center, and illegal bike parking in the city center.
At the beginning of the seminars, a lecture on social dilemmas concerning
transportation in the city center, followed by guidance was given. From the second
week onwards, the seminars consisted of choosing an issue, creating guidelines for
countermeasures, a survey plan for examining countermeasures, and a survey report
conducted based on the plan, along with implementation of a reviewed plan and a
report on its result. And as a final report, they presented their proposal on the
countermeasure against the issue they chose as a theme.
At the last seminar, a questionnaire regarding the regulation of car inflow into
Kyoto city center was distributed to measure moral obligation (cognition that I
should not visit the city center by car), awareness of consequences (cognition that it
is a problem to visit the city center by car), ascribed responsibility (consciousness
that no one else but I should refrain from visiting the city center by car), and
behavioral intention (intention not to visit the city center by car), and asked the
students to answer (n = 12) (for the survey items, refer to appendix). In addition,
each student was requested to choose one fellow student from their lab (not a
seminar participant) to answer the same questionnaire (n = 12).
Table 8.3 shows the results of several multiple regression analyses held to
investigate the causal relationship predicted in Norm Activation Theory, and to
measure how seminar participation has an impact on each factor. As the theory
predicts, this table shows that awareness of consequences impacts ascribed
responsibility, and moral obligation impacts behavioral intention. However, the
8.5 Activation of Moral Obligation 131
Table 8.3 The results of several multiple regression analyses held to investigate the causal
relationship among awareness of consequences, ascribed responsibility, moral obligation and
behavioral intention not to use a car when visiting the central part of Kyoto City
Behavioral intention moral obligation ascribed responsibility awareness of consequences
β t p β t p β t p β t p
seminar -0.26 -1.27 .22 0.42 2.40 .03 0.24 1.32 .20 0.04 0.21 .84
participation
awareness of 0.01 0.04 .96 0.58 3.04 .01 0.47 2.54 .02
consequences
ascribed 0.37 1.80 .09 -0.14-0.71 .49

responsibility
moral obligation 0.54 2.36 .03
R2 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.02
Note : bold number if p is less than 10%
theoretical prediction of ascribed responsibility impacting moral obligation was

rejected. The reason for this was not revealed. However, there is a tendency that
ascribed responsibility impacts the behavioral intention, and as Norm Activation
Theory estimates, ascribed responsibility and awareness of consequences have at
least an indirect impact on the behavior to inhibit visiting the city center by car.
Now, the condition of seminar participation did not show a direct impact on
awareness of consequences, ascribed responsibility, or behavioral intention.
However, it showed a significant impact on moral obligation. This result indicates
that this seminar activated the moral obligation “to not use a car when visiting the
central part of Kyoto City.” Moral obligation refers to the consciousness to match
one’s behavior to “norms,” and in this case, the norm is that “we should not use a
car when visiting the central part of Kyoto City.” The reason why moral obligation
was activated may be because the students became aware of the norm itself through
the seminars.
Activating factors preceding the implementation intention were also found in the
case introduced in 8.4, in which TFP based on the behavioral plan method was
introduced to the households with fifth grade elementary school children in Sapporo
(Fujii and Taniguchi 2003; Fuji et al. 2003). In this case, various psychological
factors assumed in Norm Activation Theory as shown in Fig. 4.2, or the behavior
change process model as shown in Fig. 4.1, were measured, before and after the
implementation of TFP (for survey items, refer to appendix). When the causal
relationship between these psychological factors based on Norm Activation Theory
and the behavior change process model were estimated, and then verified with a
structure equation model, the following causal relationship was found:
• Behavior (inhibiting car use)

– implementation intention (intention on how to inhibit car use)
– behavioral intention (intention to inhibit car use)
– moral obligation (consciousness that car use is not a good behavior)
Additionally, it was shown that participation in TFP directly activated all psy-
chological factors except for the actual behavior, namely, implementation intention,
behavioral intention, and moral obligation. That is to say, we can regard that TFP
does not only activate the implementation intention through the advice method or
the behavioral plan method, but also activates the behavioral intention as well as the
moral obligation through classes that provide information on environmental issues,
or the relationship between car use and the environmental issues.
In sum, we described cases in which moral obligation (i.e., “I should conduct a
cooperative behavior in a social dilemma”) was activated by communication
through university seminars and elementary school classes. Yet it has not been
verified whether moral obligation can be sufficiently activated with communication
outside the classroom framework.
However, as repeatedly mentioned in this book (refer to Sect. 3.2(4)), and as
Dawes stressed (1980), moral obligation plays the most important role as a psy-
chological factor in solving a social dilemma. It is because that due to the very basic
structure of a social dilemma, no other factor will activate their motivation and shift
the daily defector to begin to behave cooperatively other than moral obligation
which is to behave with “consideration to the social and public benefit.”7
As long as a social dilemma structure clearly exists, if people do not potentially
possess the feeling to be considerate so as to increase the social and public benefit,
we cannot avoid defectors continuing to behave defectively. However, as intro-
duced in this chapter, just by providing advice or requesting the creation of a
behavioral plan, people’s behavior did change toward cooperation. This implies that
people potentially possess the moral obligation to be cooperative and is the reason
why a psychological strategy based on communication has the potential to solve a
social dilemma. Furthermore, in order to maximize the effect of communication to
solve a social dilemma, it is extremely important to make an effort to theoretically
and empirically reveal how best to carry out communication to further activate the
moral obligation that all people innately possess. In order to solve social dilemmas
in real society, there is a strong need for more research focusing on people’s moral
obligation.
7
It may be possible to think in terms of a conformity effect (that people try to conform to the
cooperative behavior of others) in a society where the majority are cooperators. However,
unfortunately, many social dilemmas have a structure that when there are more cooperators, the
“benefit” of defection becomes larger (Dawes 1980; Olson 1965). Therefore, we must say that it is
difficult to expect people’s cooperation just through the conformity effect in the situation of a
social dilemma.
References 133
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Part III
Structural Strategy
• As long as there are individual differences in the cooperative tendency found

among people, and cooperators and defectors coexist in society, it is difficult to
solve social dilemmas by just implementing psychological strategies. One reason
for this difficulty is because of the possibility that a defective behavior engaged in
by one section of society may spread throughout society (existence of the Bad
Apple Effect). In addition, since defectors accumulate more wealth than coop-
erators, cooperators will gradually be driven out of society (existence of Darwin’s
dilemma) (Sect. 9.1–9.3).
• A structural strategy has desirable and undesirable side effects (Sect. 9.4).
- Desirable side effects are as follows: (1) an effect of facilitating cooperation
through which people form a positive attitude and habit toward cooperation,
and (2) an effect of strengthening the social norm to consider cooperation
should be conducted (Sect. 9.4.1).
- Undesirable side effects are as follows: (1) an effect that by introducing a
structural strategy, people perceive the social dilemma not as an ethical matter
but as a business matter, and (2) an effect to decrease the motivation for
spontaneous cooperation (Sect. 9.4.2).
• Introduction of a structural strategy may create various dilemmas at a higher
order (Chap. 10).
- Second-order public goods dilemma: whether to pay the cost of maintaining a
structural strategy.
- Public acceptance dilemma: whether to support or object to a structural
strategy.
- Expert-volunteer’s dilemma: whether to become a specialist with the expertise
ability and knowledge, and thereby solve a social dilemma
- NIMBY-type volunteer dilemma: although it is not necessary to obtain
expertise and knowledge, whether some ordinary individuals bear the cost of
implementing a structural strategy for the whole of society
• Among high order dilemmas, the most important in the practical administration of
a real-life social dilemma is the public acceptance dilemma (Chap. 11).
136 Part III: Structural Strategy
• Cooperation in the public acceptance dilemma (namely, to express support to

spontaneously accept a structural strategy) is facilitated through a decrease in the
infringement on freedom, an improvement in both procedural and distributive
fairness, and participation and trust in the administration (Chap. 11; refer to
Fig. 11.1 and Table 11.1).
Chapter 9
Merits and Demerits of the Structural
Strategy: Its “Indispensable Negative
Impact”
Whether it is an environment, urban, or transportation problem, it is no exagger-

ation to say that at least in Japan, the authorities to solve social dilemmas have
always discussed the application of structural strategies to facilitate cooperation or
inhibit defection, such as introducing new facilities/administration systems or
amending a tax system. Against this background, this book has claimed that it is
necessary to thoroughly examine pragmatic ways to introduce psychological
strategies which expect to change people’s attitude through communication or
providing objective information, and thereby lead them to choose cooperation
spontaneously (refer to Chap. 3). In Part II, we introduced specific methods using
several psychological strategies, and showed with empirical data that such methods
do actually encourage people’s cooperation.
However, as it is clear from the above summary, there is no denial of the value of
structural strategies, nor a claim that only psychological strategies should be applied
to actual problems. Instead, the book only claims that it would be valuable to
examine psychological strategies which have not been sufficiently examined in the
past, and we should examine and implement these strategies in a specific and
pragmatic manner, based on the appropriate theoretical understanding of psycho-
logical processes. If a structural strategy is an effective way to solve a social
dilemma, we should definitely introduce it. Especially, if there is a certain limit to
any psychological strategies, a structural strategy may even be indispensable. In
fact, it is difficult to imagine a society in which all people spontaneously conduct
cooperative behavior. In addition, if we take into account an evolutionary aspect,
there is the possibility that spontaneous cooperators may eventually be driven out
from society. By taking these points into account, it is considered that a structural
strategy to punish noncooperators is crucial as long as a social dilemma exists.
However, since a structural strategy coerces people to conduct a cooperative
behavior through the carrot and stick, research to date has revealed that there are
also unexpected negative impacts. Therefore, it is dangerous, to simply assume that
the introduction of a structural strategy will solve a social dilemma, as it may even
increase the problem. In other words, a structural strategy “cuts both ways”.
138 9 Merits and Demerits of the Structural Strategy …
This chapter will discuss such points, and additionally, at the end, we will
discuss the basic conditions for introducing a structural strategy.
Incidentally, please especially note the basic viewpoints of discussion differ
between Part II and Part III; Part II has been a micro-discussion focusing on the
psychological process to solve social dilemmas, while Part III will discuss not only
each person’s psychological process, but also the structure of social dilemmas, and
thus by including both micro and macro standpoints deal with the mutual corre-
lation between individuals and society. Namely, the feedback loop whereby each
person’s psychological process decides their own behavior, and the accumulation of
behaviors decides the collective social status, and the arising social situation in turn
also influences each person’s psychological process (c.f. Messick and Liebrand
1995; Nowak et al. 1990; Kameda and Murata 2000). We have already introduced a
case of a simulation research in Part II (5.1(1)) Deluded belief of a noncooperator,
which was also an example of discussion on xxxmicro-macro correlation.
9.1 Bad Apple Effect: Doubt Toward a Psychological

Strategy
Any psychological tendency is associated with individual dispersion, which is an

undeniable fact verified in probably all experiments and research to date. Of course,
this fact also applies to people’s cooperative tendency in a social dilemma. For
example, in the social dilemma of illegal bike parking, there will probably be three
groups: those who never park illegally, those who always park illegally, and those
who sometimes park legally or illegally. Also in the social dilemma of car use, there
will be a similar spectrum ranging from those who never use the car with con-
sideration for the environment, those who scarcely or sometimes use the car, and
onto the extreme of those who never give the environment a thought and use the car
every day. Such spectrums of behavior are to be expected, but because of this
personal dispersion in cooperative tendencies, it is very easy to arrive at a con-
clusion that a social dilemma cannot be solved by only expecting people’s spon-
taneous cooperation, and there is the need to introduce a structural strategy.
This result is derived from at least two logics. One is a discussion based on the
“Bad Apple Effect (c.f. Bonacich et al. 1976; Ohnuma 2001). The other is a
discussion based on Darwin’s dilemma (Ichikawa 2000; Fujii 2001b). In this sec-
tion, we will first discuss the Bad Apple Effect.
Everyone knows that in a box of apples, the one bad apple will make the apple
next to it rotten, and so on, until all the apples are rotten; so from one single bad
apple the whole box is affected. The same process may be applied to the behavior in
a social dilemma; even if all group members except for one, engage in cooperative
behavior, if some of them observe this one defector’s behavior and its benefits,
there is the possibility they will also begin doing the defective behavior; by simple
repetition all group members could end up as defectors.
9.1 Bad Apple Effect: Doubt Toward a Psychological Strategy 139
When no car is parkedtes does ‘illegal parking’ occur?”
Minutes
When no car is parked When one car is parked
Fig. 9.1 For a 2 h period on a certain section of a road in Tokyo, observe the vehicles parked on
the road. From that data, calculate the total minutes of two conditions “when no car is parked” and
“when one car is parked”. At the same time, count the “number of vehicles which illegally parked
when no car was parked” and the “number of vehicles which illegally parked when one car was
parked”. The above is a result of dividing the former by the latter and calculated “how frequently
in minutes illegal parking occurred, when no car is parked”, and “when one car is parked”
For instance, Hashimoto (1993) conducted research focused on littering

involving placing an empty can in a highway parking area. It was found that even
when everyone put their empty cans in the garbage bin, it only took just one empty
can in the wrong spot for people to suddenly begin leaving empty cans nearby.
Similar results have been found with illegal car parking (refer to Fig. 9.1; Fujii
2003b). According to research, the frequency of illegal parking in a place where
cars are already illegally parked is more than twice as high as in a location with no
illegally parked car.
The Bad Apple Effect when applied to such social dilemmas as littering empty
cans, illegal bike or car parking, demonstrates that just one defective person, creates
a cascade of defections. Therefore, the prerequisite of solving a social dilemma is
that everyone, without any exceptions, engages in cooperative behavior.
Under this condition, let us consider whether it is possible to solve a social
dilemma only using psychological strategies.
First, refer to Fig. 9.2. The horizontal axis of this diagram shows people’s
cooperative tendency, and the vertical axis its frequency. This diagram is based on
Dispersion of people’s Effect of the psychological strategy Dispersion of people’s

cooperative tendency cooperative tendency after
before deploying a deploying a psychological
psychological strategy
strategy (Dispersion B)
(Dispersion A)
The number of
noncooperators before
the psychological
strategy
The number of
noncooperators after
the psychological
strategy
More defective Cooperative tendency (for example, moral obligation) More cooperative
Defective behavior Cooperative behavior
Threshold
Fig. 9.2 Defection remaining after implementing a psychological strategy

the assumption that those with a smaller cooperative tendency beneath a certain
“threshold” will conduct a defective behavior, and those with a greater cooperative
tendency higher than the threshold will conduct a cooperative behavior. Then
suppose that people’s cooperative tendency is in a status of Dispersion A, people
within the area drawn with diagonal lines in the diagram will carry out a defective
behavior.
Now, under this situation, if some kind of psychological strategy is applied,
people’s spontaneous cooperative tendency will improve, and the dispersion may
shift to the position of Dispersion B, for example. What is important here is that if
the dispersion of people’s cooperative tendency is wide as shown in this diagram,
even when the expected value of the dispersion shifts in a cooperative direction,
there always remain some people, although only a few, who still engage in
defective behavior. For instance, in any civilized and highly moral society, since
there are good as well as bad people in society, there will always be at least one or
two who engage in a defective behavior.
Thinking this way, a psychological strategy that expects people’s spontaneous
cooperation may be extremely effective in being able to drastically decrease the
number of noncooperators in a social dilemma, but it may not be able to transform
all of them without exception into cooperators.
Therefore, as long as defectors exist, even if there are only a few of them, one
defection leads to another defection, just like a rotten apple spoils the apple next to
it. In the end, although a psychological strategy may once have raised up people’s
cooperative tendency (or moral obligation) from Dispersion A toward Dispersion B,
it may end up falling back to Dispersion A. In this way, the Bad Apple Effect may
offset the usefulness of a psychological strategy.
Let us now consider a case of a structural strategy and assume a simple structural
strategy to impose a charge upon noncooperators, and that this cost outweighs the
benefit yielded by choosing a defective behavior; for example, fines for littering
empty cans, or the removal of illegally parked bikes. In such cases, as long as
monitoring is sufficient and effective in preventing a defective behavior, people will
not do it, simply because the cost charged for defection outweighs the benefits,
meaning there is no longer any merit in conducting a defective behavior.
The other approach is to eliminate people’s defection through providing suffi-
cient incentives to cooperators by rewarding people who do not litter or park their
bikes illegally; as long as there is a sufficient reward, no one will take a defective
behavior.
In this way, as long as there is a structural strategy punishing noncooperators, or
rewarding cooperators, a classic functioning carrot and stick system, it is reasonable
to expect all people’s cooperation without a single exception, and thus completely
solve a social dilemma even in a problem with a Bad Apple Effect.
All well and good, but the key word is functioning, unfortunately to function
well it usually requires a vast amount of money. For example, it is easy to imagine
the expense, resources and personnel needed to monitor every street to ensure zero
littering. Therefore, practically it is extremely difficult to solve social dilemmas
through structural strategies alone. This point will be discussed again later.
9.1 Bad Apple Effect: Doubt Toward a Psychological Strategy 141
On the positive side, it is at least theoretically possible for a structural strategy to

solve a social dilemma. It is important to note that it is “theoretically” possible,
whereas in a case with a Bad Apple Effect, it is “theoretically” predicted that a
psychological strategy as such, no matter how successful it may be, cannot solve
such a social dilemma, as shown in Fig. 9.2. On the other hand, it is “theoretically”
predicted that a structural strategy can solve a social dilemma. In other words, as
long as the Bad Apple Effect exists, it is a logical consequence that a structural
strategy is needed.
9.2 Solving a Social Dilemma Through an Equilibrium

Solution Shift: Overcoming the Bad Apple Effect
(1) Cooperation rate function

However, there are social situations in which the Bad Apple Effect does not
exist.
With no Bad Apple Effect, a psychological strategy increases cooperators and
decreases noncooperators, and thereby solves a social dilemma, as shown in
Fig. 9.2.
For a case where the effect of a few noncooperators will not spread to the whole
group, Fig. 9.3 demonstrates such a specific situation with the presence of an
S-shaped relationship between “the ratio of those who conduct a cooperative
behavior” (hereafter expressed as cooperation rate of others), and the “cooperative
tendency of each person”1. Hereafter, a function to express this relationship
between the cooperation rate of others and each person’s cooperation probability
will be expressed as the “cooperation rate function”.
The first characteristic of this S-shaped cooperation rate function shown in
Fig. 9.3 is that it rises to the right, mathematically speaking, each person’s coop-
erative tendency (that is, the rate of each person conducting a cooperative behavior)
tends to increase as the cooperation rate of others increases. This mathematical
tendency reflects the so-called conformity effect, which is a psychological tendency
of tuning your own behavior to that of others (Asch 1951; refer to Sect. 3.2).
1
This diagram is based on a presumption that the following hypothesis is met: when the coop-
eration rate of others is provided as a condition, the (conditional) cooperation probability of each
person is considered to be equal among individuals. However, we can develop exactly the same
argument by defining this vertical axis as the “rate of people conducting a cooperative behavior
(with a given condition of the cooperation rate of others)”, instead of the “probability of con-
ducting a cooperative behavior”. When defined this way, we will allow the presence of individual
differences in the (conditional) cooperation probability when the cooperation rate of others is
provided as a given condition. Moreover, this graph will then indicate the collective rate of people
conducting a cooperative behavior, with the given condition of the cooperation rate of others. In
the main text, a graphical expression is based on the presumption of equality among individuals,
but there is no reason other than just for explanatory convenience.
Probability of conducting a cooperative behavior (each Probability of conducting a cooperative

person’s cooperative tendency) Note
behavior = cooperation rate of others
100
B2% Equilibrium point 2 (stable)
B1%
Function expressing each person’s
cooperative tendency with a given condition
of the cooperation rate of others
(cooperation rate function)
Equilibrium point 3 (unstable)
A1
A2
Equilibrium point 1
Equilibrium point 1 (stable) B0% B1% E 2 % (stable)

0 E1% A2% A1% A0% 100%
X%(Critical mass)
Fig. 9.3 An equilibrium mechanism on the number of cooperators and the number of
noncooperators in a frequency-dependent behavior
A behavior with a strong conformity effect is also described as a frequency-

dependent behavior (Yamagishi 2002), and it is known from research to date that
cooperation in various social dilemmas has this frequency-dependent aspect (Dawes
et al. 1977; Fujii et al. 2001; Jakobsson et al. 2000; Marwell and Ames 1979;
Tyszka and Grzelak 1976). Next, the second characteristic of this cooperation rate
function is that it has an S-shaped curve showing that in the area where the
cooperation rate of others is around 0 and 100 %, each person’s cooperative ten-
dency does not change so much even when the cooperation rate of others greatly
changes (in other words, the slope of the function is small). In contrast, when the
cooperation rate of others is in the middle, each person’s cooperative tendency
responds sensitively to any change in the cooperation rate of others (namely, the
slope of the function is large). Incidentally, the fact that the cooperation rate
function takes an S-shaped curve is not only empirically verified through research
(Shinada and Kameda 2003), but it also has a theoretical foundation. There is a
hypothesis that “people’s cooperative tendency is in a positive relationship with
‘the ratio of those conducting a cooperative behavior’ and a negative relationship
with ‘the ratio of those conducting a defective behavior’, and this hypothesis
mathematically leads to the S-shaped cooperation rate function. For the detail of the
mathematical logic, refer to Additional Text 9.1, and for the details of data by
Shinada and Kameda (2003), refer to Additional Text 9.2.
9.2 Solving a Social Dilemma Through an … 143
(2) Critical mass and equilibrium solution

When the cooperation rate function is the S-shaped function as Fig. 9.3, as
sufficient time goes by, the cooperation rate will eventually converge on the
equilibrium point 1 or 2 for the following reasons.
First, suppose that the cooperation rate in the mass (i.e., cooperation rate of
others) is A0%. In this case, due to the graph in the diagram, people conduct a
cooperative behavior with a probability of A1%. Therefore, the ratio of those who
choose a cooperative behavior among the whole mass, namely, the cooperation rate
of others, will be A1%. Next, suppose that the cooperation rate of others is A1%, the
probability of each person conducting a cooperative behavior will now be A2%,
according to the graph. Therefore, the ratio of those who conduct a cooperative
behavior, that is, the cooperation rate of others, will be A2%. If this process is
continued, it will eventually converge on the “equilibrium point 1”, and the rate of
people conducting a cooperative behavior will settle to E1%. From this reason, if
the cooperation rate is below X%, no matter what value the default is, it eventually
becomes E1%.
Next, suppose that the cooperation rate of others in the mass is B0%. In this case,
people carry out a cooperative behavior with a probability of B1%, according to the
diagram. As a result, B1% of the total mass will cooperate. Having this as a given
condition, people’s cooperation probability will become B2% according to the
graph, and as a result, the cooperation rate in the mass will become B2%. If this
process is continued, it will eventually converge to the “equilibrium point 2”, and
the rate of people conducting a cooperative behavior will settle to E2% this time.
Similarly, if the cooperation rate is X% or more, no matter what value the default is,
it eventually converges to E2%.
In this way, regardless of what default you begin with, it will eventually converge
to the equilibrium point 1 in which most people are defective, or to the equilibrium
point 2 in which most are cooperative. However, only when the cooperation rate is
exactly X%, the cooperation rate will not converge to the equilibrium point 1 or 2,
but stay there. In this sense, the cooperation rate X% may be regarded as another
equilibrium point next to the equilibrium points 1 and 2. However, if the cooperation
rate increases just a little more than X%, cooperation calls for more cooperation, and
it eventually converges to the equilibrium point 2 where most people are coopera-
tive. In contrast, if it becomes just a little less than X%, defection calls for more
defection, and it eventually converge to the equilibrium point 1 where most people
are defective. Therefore, the equilibrium point 3 is an equilibrium solution that is
very unstable. X% is sometimes described specifically as the “critical mass”, since it
is an important boundary to decide whether it will become a society dominated by
cooperative or by defective people.
(3) Bad Apple Effect and the cooperation rate curve

In a social situation where two stable equilibrium solutions exist, as shown in
Fig. 9.3, there is no need to worry so much about the “Bad Apple Effect” in solving
a social dilemma. The reason for this is that even if there are a few bad apples
(noncooperators), and they spoil the neighboring apples (defection spreads), if the
number of bad apples is below the critical mass of X%, their existence will not
endanger the others.
Next, let us describe a case when the Bad Apple Effect does become a problem,
using the cooperation rate function. Refer to Fig. 9.4(1). The cooperation rate
function shown here is an S-shaped curve like the one in Fig. 9.3. So the shape
itself is basically the same, but the difference between Fig. 9.3 is that there is only
one intersection point with the straight line of “y = x” in Fig. 9.4(1). This implies
that the cooperation rate function in Fig. 9.3 has three equilibrium solutions in total,
including the two stable ones, whereas in the case of Fig. 9.4(1), there is only one
equilibrium solution, and that equilibrium solution is in a status where most people
are defective. Therefore, in Fig. 9.4(1), regardless of the default situation, most
people will over time end up as defectors. This is the social situation in which the
Bad Apple Effect becomes a problem.
However, Fig. 9.4(2) depicts a contrasting situation in which even if most are
defective, as sufficient time goes by, the number of noncooperators will gradually
decrease, and in the end, everyone becomes cooperative. Here, comparing the
cooperation rate function of Fig. 9.4(1) and (2) reveals that the function (2) is
located “above” the function (1). This indicates that even when the cooperation rate
of others is identical, each person’s cooperation rate is higher for (2) compared with
(1). In other words, it means that “people’s innate cooperative tendency is higher”
for the case of (2) than (1). Therefore, if people are innately cooperative, cooper-
ation encourages more cooperation, and the number of cooperators snowballs,
leading to a society in which everyone is cooperative (the equilibrium solution of
Fig. 9.4(2)).
Each person’s cooperation probability: y Each person’s cooperation probability: y

Cooperation rate of others x
Equilibrium
y=x
y=x
Equilibrium
Cooperation rate of others Cooperation rate of others
(1) Cooperation rate function bringing about defective equilibrium (2) Cooperation rate function bringing about cooperative equilibrium
(A situation in which the Bad Apple Effect becomes a problem)
Fig. 9.4 Cooperation rate function with a unique equilibrium solution

However, when people’s innate cooperative tendency is low, defection creates

more defection, and the number of noncooperators increases leading to a society of
all defectors (the equilibrium solution of Fig. 9.4(1)).
(4) Solving a social dilemma through an equilibrium solution shift
The above discussion is based on the presumption that social dilemma refers to a
frequency-dependent behavior, but this discussion has an important theoretical
indication for any administrative and pragmatic attempt to solve a social dilemma.
That is to say,
(At least in a social situation with a strong conformity effect), solving a social dilemma
means a shift from a defective equilibrium solution to a cooperative equilibrium solution.
Therefore, whether it is a structural strategy or a psychological strategy, when aiming at
solving a social dilemma, the strategy must be one to realize an equilibrium solution shift
from the defective equilibrium solution to that of a cooperative one.
For instance, when there is a cooperation rate function as shown in Fig. 9.3,
whether to introduce a certain policy to make the cooperation rate to (X – 1)%, or
to make it (X + 1)%, the eventual social situation achieved as an equilibrium point
will be very different. Metaphorically speaking, it resembles a situation at the top of
a mountain where a ball placed just a tiny bit to the right or to the left will when
pushed end up in a totally different destination.
From this view atop the mountain, the following section describes how a
structural strategy or a psychological strategy may impact the equilibrium solution.
First, let’s consider a case with three equilibrium solutions (two of which are
stable equilibrium solutions) as shown in Fig. 9.3. If we call the equilibrium
solution 1 the “defective equilibrium”, and the equilibrium solution 2 the “coop-
erative equilibrium”, any strategy to solve a social dilemma must find a way to shift
from a defective equilibrium to a cooperative one.
One of the ways to achieve this equilibrium solution shift is to temporarily raise
the cooperation rate above the critical mass of X%. Any of the psychological
strategies depicted in Part II may induce such a temporary improvement of the
cooperation rate. It is because psychological strategies aim at increasing people’s
cooperative tendencies at least temporarily, as shown in Fig. 9.2. In addition, as
introduced as one of the psychological strategies in Part II of this book (refer to
Chap. 6), it is also possible to temporarily improve the cooperation rate by tem-
porarily deploying a structural strategy.
Now, another way to achieve the equilibrium solution shift to solve a social
dilemma would be to shift the cooperation rate function itself upwards, as shown in
Fig. 9.5.
Imagine a default situation as shown in Fig. 9.5(1) when the cooperation rate
function exists in a way that there are several equilibrium solutions, and among
these, the defective equilibrium is actually realized. In this situation, as explained
above, we can indeed achieve the equilibrium solution shift toward cooperative
Cooperative Cooperative
Each person’s cooperation probability: y equilibrium Each person’s cooperation probability: y equilibrium
Equilibrium Equilibrium
solution shift solution shift
y=x y=x
Shift of cooperation
rate function
Shift of cooperation rate function
Defective equilibrium Cooperation rate of others x Defective equilibrium Cooperation rate of others x
(1)Equilibrium solution shift from defective
(2)Equilibrium solution shift from unique defective
equilibrium to cooperative equilibrium when equilibrium to cooperative equilibrium
there exist several equilibrium points
Fig. 9.5 Equilibrium solution shift through the upward shift of the cooperation rate function
equilibrium by temporarily raising the cooperation rate above the critical mass.
However, we can also achieve the equilibrium solution shift from a defective to
cooperative equilibrium by shifting the cooperation rate function upwards, since it
will lead to only one equilibrium solution.
Such a method to solve a social dilemma through shifting the cooperation rate
function may be effective not only in the above case with several equilibrium
solutions, but also in a case when there is only a defective equilibrium solution, as
shown in Fig. 9.5(2). In other words, the method to expect the equilibrium solution
shift through temporarily increasing the cooperation rate is only effective in a case
with several equilibrium solutions, but the method to expect the equilibrium
solution shift through shifting the cooperation rate function is effective in any case.
Now, let us recall the earlier discussion of Sect. 9.2(3) that a psychological
strategy cannot solve a social dilemma “when the Bad Apple Effect exists” as
described in Sect. 9.1.2
This actually implies that a psychological strategy cannot solve a social dilemma
“when there only exists a defective equilibrium solution” (refer to Fig. 9.4(1)).
However, the above discussion indicates that if you shift the cooperation rate
function upwards, the social situation with only a defective equilibrium solution
may transform to a social situation with a cooperative equilibrium, as shown in
Fig. 9.5(2). In other words, shifting the cooperation rate function erases the prob-
lem of the Bad Apple Effect. Therefore, if a psychological strategy succeeds to shift
the cooperation rate function upwards, a social dilemma will be solved in any
situation.
Now, the question is, can a psychological strategy lead to the shift of the
cooperation rate function?
2
The discussion here considers the “Bad Apple Effect” not just as a theoretical concept to imply a
phenomenon that defection spreads, but as a theoretical concept that implies that defection spreads
to all people.
(5) Shift of the cooperation rate function

In order to find an answer to this question, let us think once again what the
cooperation rate function is all about and return to the premise shown in Fig. 3.1 of
this book. This diagram indicates that a cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is
influenced by both “environmental factors” and “psychological factors.” Here, the
psychological factors mean internal factors such as attitude, personal norm, and
moral obligation, as discussed in detail in Part II, and the environmental factors
refer to factors concerning the environment when an individual is assessing and
deciding such questions as the size of the benefit yielded by defection, or the cost
paid for cooperation. And the “cooperation rate of others” can also be regarded as
one of the environmental factors. Based on the above premise, the following
equation is a simplified form of expressing the probability of each person con-
ducting a cooperative behavior:
Pcoop ¼ f ðx; Psy; EnvÞ
Here, Pcoop refers to the cooperation probability, x the cooperation rate of

others, Psy the psychological factors, Env the environmental factors (excluding the
cooperation rate of others), and f() the function.
The cooperation rate function is regarded as “expressing the probability of each
person conducting a cooperative behavior as the function of the cooperation rate of
others”. Therefore, if you regard Pcoop as the function of the cooperation rate of
others x, you can regard it as the cooperation rate function S(x). In other words, it is
Sð xÞ ¼ f ðx; Psy; EnvÞ:
For the sake of simplifying the discussion that follows, suppose that each of the
following effects can be expressed in linear combination3: the effect of the coop-
eration rate of others to the cooperation probability, the effect of Psy, and the effect
of Env. Then we can formulate it as
SðxÞ ¼ S1 ðxÞ þ S2 ðPsyÞ þ S3 ðEnvÞ
Incidentally, S1(), S2(), and S3() refers to functions.

This formula indicates that the upward and downward shift of the cooperation
rate function can be expressed by the increase and decrease of S2(Psy) and S3(Env).
As described in Fig. 3.1, since a structural strategy expects cooperation by
impacting the environmental factors Env, and a psychological strategy expects
cooperation by impacting the psychological factors Psy, you may conclude that the
3
Here, we ignore the existence of interactions between Psy, Env, and x in order to simplify the
explanation, but it is considered that such interactions exist in reality. However, even when we
presuppose interactions, as long as the main effect exists in each of them, it is possible to make the
same argument as discussed here.
cooperation rate function may be shifted upwards either through a psychological or

a structural strategy. As described already in the previous section, if we also con-
sider the discussion that a social dilemma may be solved in any situation if the
cooperation rate function is shifted upwards, we can derive the conclusion that a
psychological strategy can solve any social dilemma.
9.3 Darwin’s Dilemma: Limitations of a Psychological

Strategy
This chapter has focused on whether it is possible to solve a social dilemma just
through a psychological strategy, or whether it in fact requires a structural strategy,
and introduced two main discussions. The first discussion in Sect. 9.1 claimed that
as long as the Bad Apple Effect exists, a psychological strategy as such is not
sufficient to solve a social dilemma, and so a structural strategy is necessary. The
following Sect. 9.2 focused on the conformity effect of cooperation and defection.
Based on a premise that there exist equilibrium solutions in the cooperation rate in
society, we introduced several observations. As a result, we pointed out that as long
as the “upward shift of the cooperation rate function” is realized, the equilibrium
solution shift from the defective equilibrium to cooperative equilibrium may be
achieved in any case.
Based on the above discussion, we will be able to derive a conclusion that since
a psychological strategy can solve a social dilemma, a structural strategy is not
always required.
However, this conclusion is not necessarily appropriate. It is because the above
discussion misses the “evolutionary standpoint”.
Certainly, the discussions in Sects. 9.1 and 9.2 took into account the interaction
between individuals such as the conformity effect. Therefore, it was definitely an
argument to structurally better understand social dilemma, compared to the one
focused only on the internal psychological processes of individuals. However, the
above discussion does not entirely take into account the change of people’s
cooperation and defection over the course of time, especially, adaption to the
environment. As time goes by, a certain behavioral pattern may proliferate by
adapting to a certain environment, or it may else decline by failing to adapt to the
environment, and the aggregation of behavioral patterns adopted by many people
will have an impact on each person’s behavior as an environmental factor. Only
after analyzing people’s cooperation and defection from such a standpoint, will we
be able to logically derive a conclusion on which strategy may function effectively
in solving a social dilemma.
Now, based on the evolutionary standpoint, the proposition claimed in 9.1, and
rejected in Sect. 9.2, is to be supported once again. This proposition is that a
“psychological strategy expecting to improve people’s cooperative tendency and
facilitate their spontaneous cooperation may succeed to improve the cooperation
9.3 Darwin’s Dilemma: Limitations of a Psychological Strategy 149
rate temporarily, but in the end there will be a return to a society where most people
are defective.” In this section, we aim to describe the logical process why this
proposition is supported again, based on the assumption of a social dilemma
structure with the evolutionary viewpoint known as “Darwin’s dilemma” (Fujii
2001b; Ichikawa 2000).
As a basis of considering Darwin’s dilemma, let us look back at Hardin’s
“Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968). Though it is a repetition of Sect. 2.3 of
this book, the following is the overview of the Tragedy of the Commons;
Suppose that a pasture is shared by several shepherds. Each shepherd lives by raising sheep,
and can decide the number of sheep in their flock. Now, imagine that there is a rational
shepherd who wishes to maximize his profit. He will try to increase the number of sheep as
much as possible, since he can obtain a greater amount of milk and wool. Likewise, if all
shepherds are rational, they will all try to increase the number of sheep as much as they can.
However, the amount of grass provided by the pasture is limited. Therefore, all the sheep
will die before the next spring comes. And all shepherds will totally lose their livelihoods.
Now, let us examine step by step whether this tragedy of the commons can be
avoided only through a psychological strategy that raises people’s internal con-
sciousness on cooperation.
(1) Heterogeneity of the inhibition intention:
Suppose that some kind of psychological strategy was introduced among the
shepherds in this commons. For example, we may well inform them that if everyone
continues this defective behavior, it will in the end cause a tragedy of the commons.
Alternatively, as a temporary structural change, we may introduce a temporary
scheme that requires people to pay tax in order to increase the number of sheep. We
may also develop a series of educational programs by using various communication
techniques, and deploy it as part of the school education system, and thereby
strengthen the moral obligation and cooperative habit of shepherds.
Moreover, suppose that all these psychological strategies achieved great success,
and people’s tendency to spontaneously conduct a cooperative behavior improved
significantly. In other words, suppose that the dispersion of people’s cooperative
tendency remarkably shifted toward cooperation. However, since the cooperative
tendency entails the heterogeneity between individuals, it is difficult to consider that
all shepherds will restrain themselves to the exact same standard. Therefore, even if
the psychological strategies ended with great success, there will be some shepherds
who have greatly restricted the number of their sheep, while some others will hardly
have exercised any restraint.
(2) Superiority of the selfish shepherd
Now, let us focus on the amount of wealth accumulated by each shepherd.
A defective shepherd who did not overly restrict the number of sheep raises more
sheep, so has more wealth; a cooperative shepherd who greatly restricted the
number of sheep raises less sheep, so has less wealth.
(3) Loss of sustainability

In this way, the situation favors defective shepherds, and is unfavorable for
cooperative shepherds. Over a number of years, while defective shepherds become
increasingly wealthier, cooperative shepherds earn less and less income. Hence the
income gap between the defective and cooperative shepherds becomes increasingly
larger. Over decades, defective and rich shepherds can buy more expensive, better
quality sheep, and invest in their farm facilities. With such massive monetary
reserves, they can cure or ride out the effects of disease and the like. Meanwhile the
cooperative and now poor shepherds are unable to invest in their farms or the health
of their sheep. Rich shepherds by purchasing sheep at higher prices are likely to
contribute to skyrocketing prices further decreasing the poorer shepherd’s ability to
improve their stock. In this way, the cooperative poor shepherds will be forced to
quit being shepherds. In the end, it is only the rational, self-centered, and defective
shepherds who will be left on the commons, with little intention or incentive to
inhibit their flock size. Therefore, the tragedy of the commons will roll out, and all
sheep and shepherds will eventually perish.
That is to say, even when a psychological strategy is particularly successful and
people’s cooperative tendency has remarkably improved, since there is an indi-
vidual difference in the cooperative tendency, more defective people will gradually
become richer, while cooperative people will gradually become poorer. In the end,
the defectors gradually drive out the cooperators. This is a phenomenon similar to
the Bad Apple Effect, in which just a few noncooperators over time will turn every
one into a noncooperator.
However, there are two basically different mechanisms in play; the Bad Apple
Effect occurs through the spread of defection caused by people’s tendency to
conform to the behavior of others. In other words, the fundamental reason driving
the Bad Apple Effect is not an environmental factor, but is the result of each
individual’s psychological tendency.
Therefore, a social dilemma can be solved without relying on a structural
strategy, but by applying a psychological strategy with the expectation of an
increasing cooperative tendency that outweighs the conformity effect). In contrast,
the fundamental reason why Darwin’s dilemma occurs is not due to any psycho-
logical tendency, but because of an environmental structure within which defectors
become predominant because being defective yields more benefit; it is not because
defective people intend to drive out cooperative people. Purely because of structural
reasons, defectors happen to become predominant, unconsciously, just as a con-
sequential result. So even through deployment of a psychological strategy whereby
people increase their cooperative psychological tendency, as long as individual
differences exist, without realizing it a society in which defectors predominate will
arise.
Now, it may seem that Darwin’s dilemma and the various problems in actual
society such as urban, transportation, and environment problems are separate issues.
It may seem that the issue of evolution with a time scale of several million or even
billion years, and contemporary social dilemma issues with a lifespan of a few years
9.3 Darwin’s Dilemma: Limitations of a Psychological Strategy 151
to several decades, or at the longest, several hundred years, may seem very far
apart. However, as long as the contemporary social dilemma issues basically have
the same structure as the above-mentioned tragedy of the commons, there is a
possibility that evolutionary dilemmas exist. As an example, let us consider a social
dilemma in urban transportation, which sets car use as defection and public
transportation use as cooperation (Fujii 2001b).
First, the fundamental reason why the social dilemma of car use occurs is
because the road capacity is not unlimited but limited, and it is a “commons” that
anyone can use freely. Since the car is more convenient than public transportation,
if people only pursue their own rationality, they will use the roads, which are the
urban commons, more frequently. Hence, urban roads will be full of cars, resulting
in congestion; it is a small step to link the problem of road congestion to the tragedy
of the commons, with urban residents taking the role of shepherds.
Now, in order to avoid the problem of the commons, namely, to avoid trans-
portation congestion in a city, suppose that urban residents intend to spontaneously
decrease car use. For example, such a scenario corresponds to a case when some
kind of psychological strategy is introduced; but obviously it is difficult to imagine
that all individuals will be equal in their commitment to decreasing car use. Thus,
there will be cooperative urban residents with a strong desire who will not use their
car, and there will also be defective urban residents who barely decrease car use.
The roads will then be occupied by defective urban residents, and since there is a
tendency that defective urban residents use the car only from the perspective of their
own convenience, even if road congestion is solved thanks to cooperative urban
residents inhibiting car use, defective people will feel able to use their car more
often, to fill up that excess capacity. Also, among the cooperative urban residents
who refrained from using their car, when they see that congestion is mitigated,
some may start using their car again, resulting in the roads returning to their original
congested status. In other words, the tragedy of the commons this time in the form
of congestion will occur once again.
An important factor to note here is that compared with the primary congestion
before attempting to intentionally decreasing car use, in this secondary congestion,
there is an increasing ratio of defective urban residents. There is no longer any
cooperative urban resident on the road, and inhibiting car use through spontaneous
intention has now become more difficult.
When this scenario is played out over a longer time span, the situation will
become even worse, even within ten years, as the new generation of drivers will
have mainly selfish and defective senior drivers as role models, and sadly they too
will recognize behaving selfishly when using a car is “common sense”. In this way,
even for those drivers with the possibility of becoming cooperative, they will more
likely end up using roads selfishly, based on this norm of “common sense”. Each
generation will be subject to this vicious cycle and the situation will spiral ever
downwards.
Considered in this way, the social dilemma of urban transportation can also be
regarded as having the same structure as Darwin’s dilemma, meaning road con-
gestion cannot be solved only through people’s spontaneous awareness of
decreasing car use.
To sum up, from an evolutionary perspective over a period of time, as long as
the structure of a social dilemma is due to environmental reasons, a psychological
strategy alone is insufficient as a solution, and it is indispensable to introduce a
structural solution, such as punishing noncooperators or rewarding cooperators to
solve a social dilemma.
9.4 “Side Effects” of a Structural Strategy
In the above, we discussed whether a structural strategy is needed or not, and as a

result, we pointed out that a structural strategy is essential for solving a social
dilemma. However, a structural strategy not only has its “merits”, but also has its
“demerits” with unexpected side effects. We will now explore the side effects of a
structural strategy, discuss their desirability and undesirability, and thereby reveal
the “merits and demerits” of a structural strategy.
9.4.1 Desirable Side Effects
The first desirable change was introduced in Chap. 6 in Part II: the experience of a
cooperative behavior solicited by a structural change may lead to psychological
changes desirable for sustainable cooperation, such as dissolving a defective habit,
and the attitude toward cooperation becoming positive. For instance, as introduced
in Chap. 6, when a garbage separating system was introduced, those with a negative
attitude toward garbage separation may change to a positive attitude (Sugiura et al.
1999). Likewise, even for those who usually use a car, when they experience public
transportation due to a structural change, they may form a positive attitude towards
it (Fujii and Gärling 2003; Fujii et al. 2001; Fujii and Kitamura 2003; Fujii et al. to
be published).
Also, in a case of a structural strategy to punish noncooperators, it is expected
that it may strengthen the social norm that perceives “defection is a bad behavior,
and cooperation is a socially desirable behavior”. For example, joint research with
Fujii and Eek et al., aimed at grasping the impact of introducing a system to charge
a penalty when people conduct a defective behavior. For that purpose, we exper-
imentally created a social dilemma situation, and measured a participant’s behavior
under each of the following conditions (Eek et al. 2002):
9.4 “Side Effects” of a Structural Strategy 153
Control condition: the penalty system is not introduced at all

Condition of penalizing others: the penalty system is introduced to a part of the
mass, but not the participant
Condition of penalizing the participant: the penalty system is introduced to a part
of the mass including the participant
If introduction of this penalty system has no psychological impact, then no
difference between the control condition and the condition of penalizing others will
be found; it is only under the condition of penalizing the participant that the
cooperative tendency may increase. In contrast, if introduction of this penalty
system has some kind of psychological impact, then some difference concerning the
cooperative tendency between the control condition and the condition of penalizing
others should be found.
The experiment results showed the cooperation rate for the control group was
only 3.8 %; in contrast the condition of penalizing the participant was 66.3 %.
Needless to say, this remarkable increase in the cooperation rate indicates the
effectiveness of the structural strategy. Now, what is critical here is the cooperation
rate of the condition of penalizing others was 15.4 %, which is about four times
higher than that of the control group.
As said before, if people only consider their own benefit, there should not be a
big difference between the control condition and the condition of penalizing others
in the cooperation rate. Therefore, this fourfold increase in the cooperation rate
implies a possibility that introduction of a penalty system itself may have some kind
of impact on people’s cooperative tendency, such as moral obligation or norm
consciousness that they should conduct a cooperative behavior.
In addition, in order to verify this effect, Fujii and Eek et al., measured each
person’s social value orientation, and divided them into two categories: a prosocial
group with a high tendency of considering the benefit of others, and a proself group
with a high tendency of considering their own self-centered benefit (Messick and
McClintock 1968), and conducted the same experiment (for details on catego-
rization, refer to the appendix). If introduction of a penalty system itself has some
kind of impact on norm consciousness or moral obligation, the non-selfish prosocial
group may show a great difference between the control group and the condition of
penalizing others, while no such difference will be seen in the self-centered proself
group (Eek et al. 2002).
If you refer to Fig. 9.6, you can see that in the control condition without the
penalty system, there is no difference between the two groups in the cooperation
rate. Likewise, in a case when the penalty system is introduced to the participant,
there is no difference found. However, in a condition that the penalty system is
introduced to others, there is a significant change found. First, in the proself group
with a strong self-centered tendency, there is no change seen between the control
condition and the condition of penalizing others, in their cooperation rate. It even
shows a small drop in the cooperation rate when the penalty system is imposed on
others. This may be because proself people imagined that if the penalty system is
imposed on others, these others have no way but to cooperate. In other words, there
The ratio of participants who conducted a cooperative behavior

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Condition of Condition of penalizing
Control condition
penalizing others the participant
Prosocial group
Proself group
Fig. 9.6 Result of experiment to measure the effect of “introducing the penalty system”
(The diagram was created based on the values reported by Eek et al. 2002)
is a possibility that the following process occurred; if others have to cooperate, you
can “free ride” on cooperators by behaving defectively, and their greed (c.f. Wilke
1991) is activated to choose defective behavior, thereby decreasing the cooperation
rate as a result (Olson 1965; Dawes 1980).
On the other hand, if you focus on the prosocial group, there is a significant
difference between the control condition and the condition of penalizing others. The
cooperative tendency increases twice as much from just over 40 % to about 80 %.
Additionally, it is true that a higher cooperation rate is seen in the condition of
penalizing the participant compared to the condition of penalizing others, but this
difference is less than 10 %. In other words, for cooperative people with a high
tendency of considering the social benefit, the fact of introducing the penalty
system itself has an impact to increase the cooperation rate. In addition, this effect is
almost as strong as that of the structural change which is encouraging the selfish
motivation of “let’s cooperate in order to avoid a penalty”.
The above results indicate that a penalty system punishing defection not only has
the effect of compelling cooperation, the original aim of the structural strategy, but
also the unexpected effect of facilitating people’s spontaneous cooperation through
some kind of psychological influence. There are various theoretical possibilities
about the attributes of such psychological influence, but at least, we can consider
the theoretical possibility that introduction of a structural strategy activates the
awareness of the existence of the social dilemma issue, and delineates just what is
cooperation and what is defection, as well as strengthens the social norm of con-
ducting a certain behavior.
9.4.2 Undesirable Side Effects: The Problem

of a Decision Frame
Despite the desirable side effects, a structural strategy, which rewards cooperation
and penalizes defection, may unintentionally cause at least two undesirable side
effects. One concern is how to interpret a situation when making a decision,
namely, the construction of a “decision frame” (c.f. Kahneman and Tversky 1984;
Takemura 1994) and how the structural strategy may convert this decision frame
from an ethical frame to a business frame. The other problem is how influencing the
causal attribution of your own cooperation and that of others may decrease the
motivation to spontaneously conduct a cooperative behavior.
Let us first discuss the problem of the decision frame. When facing a social
dilemma, not all people will understand the situation in the same way; it is natural
to assume that the decision frame to understand the situation will differ among
people. For instance, Tenbrunsel and Messick pointed out two divergent frames:
some people will grasp a social dilemma as a business matter, while others consider
it as an ethical matter (Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).4 From the business point of
view the situation is understood from the perspective of maximizing the individ-
ual’s benefit. From the ethical standpoint the situation is interpreted by answering
the question, what is the ethically correct thing to do? As a matter of course, those
in the ethical camp have a strong tendency to spontaneously conduct a cooperative
behavior, while those in the business camp have a strong tendency to behave
defectively.
Now, suppose a shopkeeper faces a choice of incorrectly putting a higher quality
label on a product and selling it more expensively, or putting on the correct quality
label and selling it at the proper but lower price. For any merchant with a sense of
values that money making is everything, and who regards any commercial trans-
action completely as a business matter (and considers there is no danger of anyone
finding out the label is wrong), there is no way that this merchant will label the
product honestly and correctly.
Let us consider an old-fashioned shopkeeper who practices honest business,
while recognizing that the commercial transaction itself is a business matter, they
will consider which label to use as an ethical issue, and without any doubt will use
the correct label. In reality, a completely venal or moral shopkeeper are extreme
cases that rarely exist; most would be positioned somewhere in between. In other
words, a person may grasp one situation as a business matter, and the same person
may grasp another situation as an ethical matter. In this way, the decision frame
changes depending on the situation, and this fact is also backed up by the results of
4
The economist Thøgersen also theoretically explains the same situation in different wording. He
pointed out that recycling behavior can be interpreted either as a matter attributed to the domain of
morality or a matter attributed to the domain of economy. Having said that, he shows theoretically
and empirically that introduction of a reward and sanctioning system will increase the tendency of
people to interpret it as a matter attributed to the domain of economy (Thøgersen 1996).
various experimental research focused on decision frames (e.g., Fujii and Takemura
2001; Fujii et al. 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Takemura 1994).
Such a decision frame is of course applicable to the issue of whether to use the
car or railway, a constant theme in this book. If someone comprehends the issue of
car use as an ethical matter, they would recognize that it leads to pollution and
global warming, and considers it is ethically incorrect behavior to use a car, and
thus has the higher tendency to inhibit car use. If someone comprehends car use as a
business matter, they would make a decision based on “rational” thinking by
considering “at what price you purchase the service of comfortable and convenient
transportation”, and thus there is a higher tendency to choose the car, which is
convenient, comfortable, and charge free.
Now, Tenbrunsel and Messick point out that concerning such a decision frame in
a social dilemma, the introduction of a system to punish defection may decrease the
number of people who understand it as an ethical matter, and increase those who
understand it as a business matter.
Actually, this effect is the exact opposite of the effect explained earlier.
For instance, they created a virtual situation of conducting a joint business with
others, and introduced a reward and sanctioning system to inhibit defection. As a
result, they verified that introducing the reward and sanctioning system increased
the number of people who understood it as a business matter, while decreasing the
number of people who saw it as an opportunity to cooperate with others. In
addition, they showed that in a case when the level of the reward and sanctions are
not high enough, the introduction of this system even increases the number of
defectors (Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).
In order to consider this issue as a real-life social dilemma, let’s consider a
system to charge car users. This system is already being used in places such as
Singapore and Oslo in the form of a road pricing system.5 It was recently imple-
mented in London, and Tokyo is also investigating the possibility of its introduc-
tion. Even if the decision frame of drivers does not change by the introduction of
the road pricing system, car use would still be inhibited in any case. That is, those
who consider it as a business matter would reduce car use through the fact that it
became more expensive, and those who consider it as an ethical matter would
inhibit car use by reconfirming that it is socially undesirable (refer to Sect. 9.4(1)).
However, people usually look at social situations with one eye as a business matter,
and as an ethical matter with the other. Moreover, depending on the situation, the
rate of understanding the situation as an ethical matter or a business matter changes
even within a single person, (Fujii and Takemura 2001; Fujii et al. 2002; Takemura
5
The idea of road pricing was proposed by researchers who belong to the academic field of the
so-called neoclassical economics in which it is considered that lying behind such concepts is a
one-sided belief that “a human is a being who can only deal with problems as a business matter,”
Therefore, if one discusses various social policies including road pricing only based on the
framework of neoclassical economics, it is inevitable that due to the various “unexpected side
effects” discussed here, the possibility of causing an “unexpected massive failure” is always
lurking.
1994). This is the reason why the introduction of the reward and sanctioning system
may change people’s decision frame.
For instance, when we introduce a road pricing system asking people to pay 300
yen, people will be forced to become conscious of the necessity of paying 300 yen.
As a result, even for a person who in a small way had some ethical awareness of
their car use when they did not have to think about money, since they now have to
think about money, the possibility of understanding car use as an ethical matter may
decrease or even vanish.6 Therefore, introduction of a punishment system through
road pricing may enhance the tendency to judge car use by a simple business
criteria of “whether it is beneficial for me”, and not by an ethical standard of
“correct or incorrect”. In the end, introduction of road pricing may decrease peo-
ple’s spontaneous cooperative tendency, which may lead to the ironic result of road
congestion getting worse.
9.4.3 Undesirable Side Effect: Issue of Intrinsic Motivation
Now, while the undesirable side effect of a structural strategy may be pointed out
from the standpoint of a decision frame, it may also be considered from the
standpoint of the “motivation of conducting a cooperative behavior”. The following
section discusses this point.
The effect through causal attribution of your own behavior:
We all have a tendency that we objectively analyze a behavior after conducting
it, and recapture the cause and significance of it (James 1892; Midden et al. 1983).
For instance, when someone conducts a cooperative behavior in a certain social
dilemma, they may capture their own behavior as “I did it because I thought I
should behave morally”, but they may also think that “I did it because cooperation
may lead to my future benefit”.
Such causal attribution to one’s own behavior after conducting the behavior may
influence future behavior. If someone considers that they conduct a cooperative
behavior because they thought they should behave morally, that person may form a
self-concept that they are a moral person able to behave morally, and they may
indeed become a person who acts in accordance with their self-image, and may
spontaneously conduct cooperative behavior. On the other hand, if they take the
opposite view of conducting cooperative behavior from selfishness, they may form
a self-concept of being a selfish, rather than a moral person, and go onto act
selfishly in accordance with their self-image. In other words, the self-concept
6
From the result of a questionnaire survey on attitudes to transportation policies conducted in six
cities in Japan, it was indicated that among various structural strategies, the road pricing policy
activates a self-centered motivation stronger than any other transportation policy, while decreasing
social motivation (Fujii 2003a). This result implies a possibility that a structural strategy using
“money” may shift people’s decision frame from an ethical to a business frame.
concerning “what type of person you are” is not restricted to the past analysis of a
behavior, but may influence future behavior (Markus 1977).
Now, from the study and experiments on the relationship between the self-concept
and various reward and sanctioning systems, Deci pointed out that the introduction of
such systems changes people’s self-concepts, and thereby changes their behavior
(Deci 1975, 1980). According to him, motivation of a behavior can be categorized into
two types; intrinsic motivation referring to a type of motivation that exists even
without any clear reward or penalty, and extrinsic motivation, which is activated by an
external cause such as reward and punishment. He claims that introduction of a reward
and sanctioning system leads to a decline in intrinsic motivation.
In order to explain Deci’s hypothesis, let’s suppose that in a social dilemma, one
cooperator acts cooperatively with no clear reward or penalty. Such an individual
upon analysis of their behavior and not recognizing the existence of a reward or
penalty, would consider their behavior was driven by intrinsic rather than extrinsic
motivation. Therefore, a self-concept as a cooperative individual will be formed,
and it is expected that their tendency to choose a cooperative behavior in a future
social dilemma will increase.
Next, let us consider the effect of introducing a structural strategy such as a
reward and sanctioning system on this individual’s self-concept of being a person
who spontaneously cooperates, regardless of the introduction of the structural
strategy. Even so under a reward and sanctioning system, they may interpret their
actions as being motivated only because there is a reward and sanctioning system.
The existence of the reward and sanctioning system prevents this person from
forming a belief that they are a cooperative person, and may decrease their tendency
to choose a cooperative behavior in an intrinsic and spontaneous manner.
Deci conducted a series of experiments to verify that introduction of a reward
and sanctioning system decreases intrinsic motivation. For example, he designed a
situation to observe whether a person “spontaneously” solves simple puzzles. He
created a group of participants with the experience of receiving a reward (1 dollar)
for completing a puzzle, and another group who received no reward. He then
compared the two groups to ascertain any difference in the tendency of solving
puzzles spontaneously. As a result, rewarded participants showed little interest in
solving puzzles without a reward, but the non-reward participants were happy to
tackle a puzzle even for no reward. In other words, introduction of a reward and
sanctioning penalty system of giving even just one dollar drove away people’s
intrinsic motivation.
The effect through causal attribution of behavior of others
Moreover, the presence of the reward and sanctioning system does not only
influence the individual self-concept, it also influences the concepts of others, and
thereby decreases people’s cooperative tendency (Yamagishi 1989). Without a
reward and sanctioning system, an individual seeing a person conducting a coop-
erative behavior may form the cognition that “people are cooperative and moral”,
but with a reward and sanctioning system, they may think that “the person is forced
to choose a cooperative behavior”, even if the cooperator is the type of person who
chooses a cooperative behavior without any reward and sanctioning system.

Namely, a reward and sanctioning system decreases the tendency to form a belief
that others are cooperative and moral; in contrast holding the belief that others are
cooperative and moral increases the possibility of spontaneous cooperation (e.g.
Fujii et al. 2002; Yanagida and Fujii 2003). In sum, the introduction of a reward and
sanctioning system reinforces the belief that others are more defective and selfish,
and thereby decreases the tendency to spontaneously choose a cooperative
behavior.
In this way, the reward and sanctioning system has the possibility of reinforcing
a belief that your own behavior and the behavior of others are both selfishly
motivated, rather than motivated by intrinsic moral obligation and norm con-
sciousness. Therefore, the formation of such a belief may lead to a decline in the
intrinsic motivation to spontaneously choose cooperation.
Empirical knowledge of the bad influence of the reward and sanctioning system
This “bad influence” of the reward and sanctioning system is found not only in
controlled experiments, but also in the actual behavior of people.
For example, Thøgersen reviewed various research conducted up to the begin-
ning of the 1990s on recycling behavior and consideration for the environment. As
a result, he indicated that in most cases, the key factor with the most impact on the
attitude to recycling behavior were beliefs concerning how much the recycling
behavior increased the public benefit, rather than self-centered benefit or costs
(Thøgersen 1996). However, he also reported exceptional cases, as seen in data
from an area in Denmark, where a policy to provide monetary reward to households
carrying out recycling was introduced. When they analyzed preceding factors
concerning recycling behavior, it was found that the effect of self-centered benefit
and cost were larger than the effect of public benefit; the complete opposite to
conventional research. In other words, introduction of the reward and sanctioning
system drove away the moral tendency that people innately possessed. On the other
hand, it was found that the level of the attitude to recycling does not change by
introducing a reward and sanctioning system. Namely, the decline in moral con-
sciousness caused by reward, which is the “negative” effect, offset the “positive”
effect of providing the reward.
Moreover, there are other cases where the negative effect of a reward and
sanctioning system exceeds its positive effect, and as a total, this system brings
about the opposite effect.
Fukui et al. (2002) conducted an experiment to find out the relationship between
a reward system and the cooperation rate when distributing a questionnaire by post,
namely, the return rate of a questionnaire. The experiment set several types of
rewards and several standards of politeness in requesting people to answer the
questionnaire (low politeness: print the recipient’s name; medium politeness: hand
write the name; high politeness: hand write the name, use high-quality paper for the
letter of request, and put the seal of the person in charge).
Figure 9.7 shows the difference in the recollection rate at each level of politeness
and by no reward or a reward of one hundred 1,000 yen lottery prizes. The
Fig. 9.7 Change of Recollection rate (%)

cooperation rate by reward
No reward 1,000 yen reward given by lottery
Low politeness
Medium politeness
High politeness
condition with the highest recollection rate was a polite request with no reward.
While the recollection rate for printed names was about 25 %, a polite request
yielded a recollection rate 1.5 times higher, a little less than 40 %. What is
important here is the effect of the reward. It is shown that for low politeness, the
recollection rate is a little higher when offering 1,000 yen by lottery. However, for a
polite request with a lottery reward, the recollection rate actually drops by 10 %.
This implies that a reward provided when people’s intrinsic motivation is suffi-
ciently activated, leads to driving down the intrinsic motivation, and since the intrinsic
motivation driven down was far greater than the extrinsic motivation triggered by the
expectation of 1,000 yen, it led to the recollection rate dropping by as much as 10 %.
In addition, Frey et al. conducted an experiment targeted on residents of areas
actually examining whether to accept a nuclear power plant. One set condition was
to propose “if you accept a nuclear power plant, the government will pay you a
reward equal to your current household income each year.” The other condition was
without such an offer of a reward. When the answers were analyzed it was found that
the rate of acceptance with an extrinsic reward was about half of that without such a
reward (Frey 1993; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Frey et al. concluded that the
reward proposal drove down people’s public spirit as in “if the nation requires the
nuclear power plant for the public good, I don’t mind accepting it”, and instead,
enhanced people’s self-centered tendency to oppose the nuclear power plant,
viewing it as an unwelcome facility. Based on this argument, this experiment result
also indicated that the public spirit driven down by the reward and sanctioning
system was so big that it could not even be balanced by offering the extremely strong
incentive of “double the current household income.” Furthermore, Frey et al. argues
that the bad influence of the reward and sanctioning system is not only limited to the
original problem for which the system was introduced, but has a spillover effect onto
various other problems (Frey 1993; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). It is because if
what they call the public spirit is driven down, there will be an increasing tendency
of people choosing a defective behavior in those social dilemmas which require

public spirit to solve them.
Having said that, the economist Frey stresses that although the concept of the
reward and sanctioning system being effective in soliciting cooperation is one of the
most important theoretical attributions of general (or neoclassical) economic the-
ories when presuming a fundamentally rational human being, its theoretical attri-
bution may not actually have realistic validity (Frey 1993). Similarly, Thøgersen,
who is also an economist, by empirically showing the negative influence of a
reward system on the recycling behavior mentioned above, employed the following
expression.
Economic theory creates the monsters it describes. (Thøgersen 1996, p. 436)
Namely, social policies based on controlling human behavior through the carrot
and stick actually create selfish and rational human beings who can only be con-
trolled through the carrot and stick.7
In this way, a structural solution introduced for the purpose of soliciting coop-
eration has the unexpected side effect of decreasing people’s intrinsic motivation,
and as a result, people’s defection may even be enhanced. The existence of this
possibility is not only theoretically feasible, but it is also an undeniable fact verified
by data targeted at the actual behavior and opinions of people.
Even when a structural strategy is an important component in solving a social
dilemma, if such a fundamental bad influence exists, what kind of effort should we
make in order to solve the social dilemma?
[Additional Text 9.1] Theoretical background of the S-shaped curve of a
frequency-dependent behavior
Here, we define the vertical axis of the S-shaped curve shown in Fig. 9.3 as the
“rate of people conducting a cooperative behavior (when the cooperation rate of
others is provided as a given condition)”, as described in footnote 1. Additionally,
the cooperation rate function will be described as S(x).
To begin with, let’s consider a situation where the number of cooperators
fluctuates in a group with a total of n people. Also, suppose that the ratio of
cooperators in the group is x. In this case, the ratio of noncooperators is 1-x. Here,
7
It is argued that just as the implementation of a policy based on economic theories actually creates
the rational and selfish individuals presupposed by these theories, the mere behavior of learning
the economic theories may create rational and selfish individuals. For instance, Frank et al.
published an article titled as
Does studying economics inhibit cooperation?

In an academic journal of economics, Journal of Economic Perspective (Frank et al. 1993).
Likewise, Marwell and Ames published an article titled
Economists free ride, does anyone else?
In an academic journal of economics, Journal of Public Economics (Marwell and Ames 1981).
the fluctuation of the cooperation rate is generated through the following two
conversions: (1) conversion from cooperator to noncooperator, and (2) conversion
from noncooperator to cooperator.
First, we will examine the conversion from cooperator to noncooperator. The
number of people who can make such a conversion is nx. Here, suppose that when
the cooperation rate in the group is x, the tendency of cooperators converting to
noncooperators TR(−)(x) is influenced by the conformity effect that “if there are
many noncooperators, there will be an increased tendency of people choosing a
defective behavior”. There are several possible ways satisfying the above suppo-
sition to formularize the possibility of converting to defection, Ptr(−)(x), but the
simplest way to describe it is:
Ptr ðÞ ðxÞ ¼ k1 ð1 xÞ ð9:1Þ
Here, k1 is a parameter.
Now, the number of people converting from defection to cooperation when the
cooperation rate is x is:
Ntr ðÞ ðxÞ ¼ nx Ptr ðÞ ðxÞ ð9:2Þ
Therefore, it will be
Ntr ðÞ ðxÞ ¼ k1 nxð1 xÞ ð9:3Þ
Next, let’s consider the conversion from noncooperator to cooperator. The

number of people who can make such a conversion is n(1 – x). Here, suppose that
when the cooperation rate in the group is x, the tendency of noncooperators con-
verting to cooperators TR(+)(x) is influenced by the conformity effect that “if there
are many cooperators, there will be an increased tendency of people choosing a
cooperative behavior,” and describe it as
Ptr ð þ Þ ðxÞ ¼ k2 x ð9:4Þ
Here, k2 is a parameter.
Now, since the number of people converting from defection to cooperation when
the cooperation rate is x, Ntr(+)(x), is
Ntr ð þ Þ ðxÞ ¼ nð1 xÞ Ptr ð þ Þ ðxÞ ð9:5Þ
It will be
Ntr ð þ Þ ðxÞ ¼ k2 nxð1 xÞ ð9:6Þ

Now, the fluctuation of the number of cooperators when the cooperation rate in
the group is x can be calculated if we subtract the number of people converting from
cooperators to noncooperators, Ntr(−)(x), from the number of people converting
from noncooperators to cooperators, Ntr(+)(x:
Ntr ð þ Þ ðxÞ Ntr ðÞ ðxÞ ð9:7Þ
If we insert the above equation to this, it will be
k2 nxð1 xÞ k1 nxð1 xÞ
ð9:8Þ
¼ ðk2 k1 Þnxð1 xÞ
Since this is the fluctuation of the number of cooperators, we divide this by n to

obtain the fluctuation of cooperation rate Xtr(x) when the cooperation rate is
x. Therefore, it will be
XtrðxÞ ¼ kxð1 xÞ ð9:9Þ
Here, k is a parameter of k2 – k1.

Now, when the cooperation rate is x, the fluctuation of the cooperation rate, Xtr
(x), is a differential function of the cooperation rate function by its definition.
Therefore, the cooperation rate function S(x) can be described as follows:
dSðxÞ=dx ¼ XtrðxÞ ¼ kxð1 xÞ ð9:10Þ
When you solve this differential equation, it will be

Z
SðxÞ ¼ kxð1 xÞdx
ð9:11Þ
¼ ðk=2Þx2 ðk=3Þx3 þ C
And if we presuppose f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 as a boundary condition for con-

venience, it will be:
SðxÞ ¼ 3x2 2x3 ð9:12Þ
Here, this function becomes the S-shaped curve as shown in Fig. 9.3.
Now, the above description shows only one of the various ways to explain that
the “S-shaped curve can be derived just by presupposing a simple equation based
on the conformity effect.” In formularizing the Eqs. (9.1) and (9.4), though they are
based on the presumption that the conformity effect exists (that is to say, having
satisfied a condition that it is a monotonically increasing function on x), the
S-shaped curve can be derived by using a more general formularization, and it is
also possible to suppose a different hypothesis for the boundary condition.
However, for the sake of simplification, we only state the above example here.
[Additional Text 9.2] Empirical verification of the S-shaped curve in a

frequency-dependent behavior
The S-shaped curve on the relationship between the number of cooperators and
your own cooperative behavior has been empirically examined through several
experiments (e.g., Hirose 1995), but the mathematical quality of the function has
not been examined sufficiently. For example, Shinada and Kameda (2003) con-
ducted an experiment involving feedback on the information concerning the
cooperative behavior of others, and reported the result on the relationship between
the cooperation probability of participants and the number of cooperators other than
yourself (refer to Fig. 9.8). But they do not clearly discuss about the function form
itself. However, at least visually, the function form seems to have the S-shaped
curve which is theoretically presumed. Here, we’d like to offer some additional
thoughts on the function form from the mathematical and statistical point of view.
Based on a presupposition of a linear model and the S-shaped curve model as a
cooperation rate function in the Eq. (9.11) described in [Additional Text 9.1]
(hereafter described as the S-shaped model), we made an estimation using a
least-squares method, based on the values reported by Shinada and Kameda (2003).
As a result, we obtained the following estimation result:
Cooperation probability
Cooperation rate of others

Measured value
S-shaped model
Linear model
Fig. 9.8 Measured values by Shinada and Kameda (2003) based on the cooperation rate function,
along with the linear model and S-shaped model. Note The “measured values” in the diagram are
values reported by Shinada and Kameda (2003). The “S-shaped model” and the “linear model”
indicate values estimated by Fujii based on the measured values
Linear model
a = 0.32 (t = 15.18), b = 0.38 (t = 10.60)
R2 = 0.957, RMR = 0.0265
in “S(x) = a + b x”.
S-shaped model
a = 0.32 (t = 15.18), b = 0.38 (t = 10.60)
R2 = 0.981, RMR = 0.0175
in “S(x) = (k/2)x2 – (k/3)x3 + C”
Figure 9.8 shows the cooperation rate function calculated on these estimated
values. From this diagram, we can see that compared to the linear model, the
S-shaped model is closer to the measured value. In fact, the goodness of fit shown
above is that the number of parameters for both models is the same, which is two,
the S-shaped model had a better standard than the linear model both for R2 and
RMR (Root Mean square Residual). This result not only indicates that the exper-
imental data of Shinada and Kameda (2003) is in line with what is discussed by
Fujii et al., that the cooperation rate is dependent on the cooperation rate of others,
but also implies the possibility that it can be described in the cooperation rate
function model in a S-shaped curve led by the simple differential equation discussed
in [Additional Text 9.1] in this book.
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Chapter 10
Higher Order Social Dilemma in Response
to a Structural Strategy: Public
Acceptance, Public Opinion, Volunteers,
and Justice
Whether to accept a structural strategy by behaving cooperatively and supporting its

introduction, or to behave defectively and be against it, is a problem that embraces
the very heart of any social dilemma. If you cooperate in the implementation of a
structural strategy, the social dilemma will be solved through your cooperation, and
public benefit will increase accordingly. If you do not cooperate in its implemen-
tation, the structural strategy will not function as planned and the social dilemma
will not be solved, with an ultimate decrease in public benefit. This social dilemma
concerning the proposed structural strategy belongs to a different higher dimension
than the level where the social dilemma originally exists. If we refer to the original
dilemma as a first-order dilemma, the dilemma over the acceptance of a structural
strategy may be termed a second-order dilemma.
Upon closer examination, the second-order dilemma takes on a little more
complicated appearance in comparison to the first-order dilemma. It is because the
first-order social dilemma concerns each person’s individual behavior concerning
cooperation and defection, whereas the second-order dilemma not only deals with
each person’s individual behavior, but is a problem with a multilayered structure
encompassing the decision-making of a society as a whole.
In order to unravel the multilayered hierarchical structure of the second-order
dilemma, once again we will turn to Hardin’s commons of shepherds, (refer to
Sects. 2.3 and 9.3). This time we find our shepherds now thinking about intro-
ducing a structural strategy to avoid the impending tragedy, and with their help we
will explore the structure of a second-order dilemma.
Needless to say, this example of shepherds in the commons is of course a virtual
case adopted just to simplify the problem. However, as Hardin intended, it provides
an easy-to-understand model depicting the fundamentals of a variety of real-life
social problems, such as transportation, urban life, and the environment.
As we explore the life and death problems facing our shepherds, we will be able
to draw some parallels with real situations and gain insights into a variety of
dilemmas and their implications for modern society.

170 10 Higher Order Social Dilemma in Response …
10.1 Second-Order Public Goods Dilemma
Hardin’s shepherds all share the same pasture, and they are all free to raise more
sheep to increase their profits. However, if all the shepherds raise more sheep in
order to increase their own profit, all the grass will be eaten as the pasture area is
limited. Therefore, all the sheep will die before the next spring, resulting in the
shepherds totally losing their livelihoods.
Now, suppose that the shepherds become aware of this problem, and realize they
must find a solution. Suppose that they begin to examine making a joint investment
to hire an “observer” who monitors the number of sheep each shepherd may raise,
and how much grass they eat (for instance, refer to an argument by Yamagishi
(1986)). This observer has the authority to judge and punish shepherds who raise
too many sheep. Therefore, if this monitoring system is introduced, shepherds will
not increase the number of sheep excessively, and the grass in the commons will be
maintained. As a result, the shepherds can continue to maintain their livelihoods.
Indeed, the introduction of this monitoring system is what we refer to as a structural
strategy. Incidentally, since this system would be a social foundation for shepherd
society, the project to introduce this system may be rephrased as a “public works”
that supports the livelihood of those who belong to the organization.
However, to hire this observer requires operational costs such as labor, a
monitoring system, and monitoring bases. If someone other than yourself pays the
system operation costs, you do not have to pay it out of your own pocket. Instead,
you can receive the benefit of the monitoring system “free of charge.” That is to say,
the social dilemma is solved, and people become richer, including yourself. In other
words, there exists a social dilemma in which cooperation is defined as bearing the
cost of the monitoring system, and defection as having others bear the cost burden
in an attempt to receive its benefit for free, namely, to free ride (Olson 1965).1 This
dilemma is in a different dimension compared to the above-mentioned first-order
dilemma of “whether to keep the number of sheep under a certain limit.” Therefore,
the dilemma whether to bear the cost needed for the monitoring system can be
regarded as a second-order dilemma (Yamagishi 1986). Now, this second-order
dilemma is a type of dilemma involving trying to receive the benefit of the mon-
itoring system as a form of “public goods” provided by the cost being borne by
others. Therefore, for convenience in this book it will be described as a “second
order public goods dilemma.”
Incidentally, like most public goods dilemmas (refer to Sect. 2.4),
this second-order public goods dilemma has a structure of a step level (refer to
1
This is the public goods dilemma mentioned in Chaps. 2–4 of this book.
10.1 Second-Order Public Goods Dilemma 171
Sect. 2.7).2 That is to say, if you can obtain cooperation above a certain threshold,
a system involving a structural strategy will be introduced as public goods, but if
you do not exceed or meet the required level, the system will not be introduced.
10.2 Public Acceptance Dilemma
(1) Dilemma over the pros and cons of public works

Moreover, in a society in which the introduction of a structural strategy (namely,
implementation of public works in the organization) is decided by people’s political
opinions, there will be another type of dilemma that is different from the previously
described second-order public goods dilemma. Among those who can take
advantage and “make a good thing” out of the first-order dilemma, some may
oppose a monitoring system, since once it is introduced they will not be able to
“make a good thing out of it” anymore. In other words, this dilemma is caused by
people who think that
I want to earn as much money as I can. So I want to increase the number of my sheep. But if
the monitoring system is introduced, I will never be able to increase the number of my
sheep. I definitely oppose such a system.
This dilemma defines cooperation and defection as follows.

Cooperation: to express one’s political opinion and accept the introduction of the
monitoring system
Defection: to express one’s political opinion and oppose the introduction of the
monitoring system
The reason why these behaviors can be cooperation and defection respectively is
because this organization is a “democratic” organization in which an organizational
2
However, it is possible to consider a type of a structural strategy that does not provide a single
system applied throughout society, but instead, each person spontaneously carries out some kind
of a sanctioning system. For instance, in this example of the shepherd society, it refers to a
mutually monitoring system in which shepherds mutually monitor each other to limit the size of
their flocks, and when anyone is found with too many sheep, sanctions are imposed on that person
(Yamagishi 1986; Axelrod 1986).
In effect, it is similar to a mutually monitoring system involving “ostracism” of an individual.
In this case, the second-order dilemma will have a profit structure different from the step-level
dilemma described in the main text. However, this book basically does not deal with this type of
the second-order dilemma, for the following reason. Needless to say, it is crucial to theoretically
presume a mutually monitoring sanctioning system in order to understand our psychological
mechanism, or to understand the process of its formation. However, this book targets large-scale
social dilemmas with serious problems in actual society such as that of transportation, urban life,
and the environment, and there is very little possibility of any ostracist type monitoring sanctioning
system providing a useful solution to these dilemmas. The basic understanding of this book is that
when considering a structural strategy in real society, it is necessary to recapture the problem of the
second-order dilemma in a wider context.
decision whether to introduce a structural strategy (also restated as a collective

choice, public decision, or social decision) depends on the political opinions of
members of that society. In other words, if a sufficient number of people in the
organization conduct a defective behavior as defined above, which is to oppose the
introduction of the monitoring system, it will not be introduced in the end. If that
happens, those who want to increase the number of sheep will continue to do so,
and the commons will be grazed bare, all the sheep will die, and all shepherds will
totally lose their livelihood. In contrast, if many people in the organization conduct
a cooperative behavior as defined above, which is to accept the introduction of the
monitoring system, it will actually be introduced to the commons. If that happens,
even those who wanted to increase the number of sheep without limit and maximize
their own benefit will not be able to do so. Therefore, the grass will be maintained,
and the shepherds will be able to continue their livelihood.
This book will describe the above dilemma as the “public acceptance dilemma.”
This public acceptance dilemma is a kind of second-order dilemma, in the sense
that it concerns whether to cooperate to realize a structural strategy or not, likewise
the second-order public goods dilemma described in the previous section. However,
there is a significant difference between the two. That is, in the second-order public
goods dilemma, there exists social agreement on the recognition that a structural
strategy itself is necessary for increasing one’s own benefit. While in the public
acceptance dilemma, there is no such social agreement. It means that any indi-
viduals who behave defectively in the second-order public goods dilemma, while
only considering their personal benefit and not considering the benefit of others, at
least consider their personal future benefit, as shown in Fig. 10.1. They at least have
an ability to imagine that although the structural strategy may not be necessary for
themselves at the moment, it may be needed for their future benefit. So by being
mean and hoping someone else bears the costs of introducing the structural strategy,
they will be able to gain even larger personal benefit. Unfortunately, defective
individuals in a public acceptance dilemma do not show enough consideration even
to their own future benefit (refer to Fig. 10.1). Without a structural strategy, the
commons will fall into ruin, and all shepherds including themselves will totally lose
their livelihood. Despite this grim fact, they stay blind to reason and oppose the
introduction of the structural strategy in order to greedily enjoy the short-term
benefits of “here and now.”3
(2) Public acceptance and acceptance
Now, let us reconsider the meaning of the term “public acceptance.” Generally
speaking, upon hearing this term, not a small number of readers may conjure up the
following slightly exaggerated image:
3
The discussion here is derived from the point that such a first-order dilemma exists, and in this
virtual situation, it is not required to discuss whether a structural strategy is needed or not.
10.2 Public Acceptance Dilemma 173
Time Scope of benefit considered by a

Future noncooperator (an individual
who attempts to free ride within
the context of introducing a
structural solution to solve a
problem) in a second order
public goods dilemma
Present
Social
Complete other Yourself Complete other distance
Scope of benefit considered by a

noncooperator in a public acceptance
dilemma
Fig. 10.1 Scope of benefit considered by a noncooperator in a second-order dilemma or a public

acceptance dilemma
Members of the general public reluctantly accepting a policy or plan the government has
made up according to its own whims, and which the Government is trying to then force
upon the general public
This view may be appropriate for those who only have the motivation to
“greedily enjoy the short-term benefits of here and now.” If we may repeat, since
these people do not show any interest in any long-term benefit or social benefit
whatsoever, a structural strategy introduced for the sake of increasing a long-term
social benefit will be perceived by them as nothing more than a restrictive measure
forced on them against their will. For example, computer hackers and the like who
commit internet crimes, will regard any proposal to regulate such behavior, as
something imposed on them by the government which they will have to reluctantly
accept.
However, this book has a vision of public acceptance far removed from such an
image; rather it is a situation in which:
On their own initiative, people spontaneously manifest their desire for a structural strategy
to be implemented in order to solve a social dilemma.
For instance, returning to the earlier example of going on a diet; the classic diet
scenario involves the dieter spontaneously refraining from eating sweets (defection)
and instead eats healthy food (cooperation), and at the same time, in order to stave
off the temptation to indulge in sweets, they spontaneously introduce a penalty
system (a structural strategy). This is the totally opposite approach of taking sweets
away from a child and forcing them to eat their vegetables.4
In the following part of this book, the tendency for an individual to desire a
structural strategy will be referred to as the “acceptance” of a structural strategy, and
the term “public acceptance” will refer to the collective tendency of people in society
as a whole to spontaneously desire a structural strategy on their own initiative.
(3) Social fence in a public acceptance dilemma
Now, a characteristic of the above public acceptance dilemma is that it has a
step-level structure, like the second-order public goods dilemma mentioned earlier.
If a large enough group of people are cooperative (namely, if many people agree to
introduce a structural strategy), then the structural strategy will be implemented,
and everyone in shepherd society can live well. On the other hand, if that does not
happen (namely, if many people do not want to introduce the structural strategy),
then it will not be implemented, and the dilemma will not be solved. As a result, all
the sheep will die and people in the organization cannot maintain their livelihood.
The public acceptance dilemma also has the characteristic of a social fence (refer
to Sect. 2.5). Namely, by embracing a problem that aims to overly increase a
short-term benefit, we find a long-term benefit will be lost. The reason for this
dilemma structure of a social fence is that the full effect of introducing a structural
strategy is always delayed.
If the commons shared by our shepherds is rich and verdant, then the shepherds
may be able to survive for quite some time even though the monitoring system is not
introduced. For instance, if the previous generations of shepherds were sufficiently
self-disciplined and practiced good husbandry of animals and pasture, then their
efforts will be passed onto the current generation of shepherds, who in effect will live
off the good deeds of their ancestors. Today’s generation may indeed survive for
quite a long period of time even though they greedily pursue their self-interest.
Furthermore, if the pasture does not fall into ruin even when the shepherds increase
their flocks, they may become even more optimistic and selfish, by thinking as
4
However, depending on the case, it may be indispensable to introduce some kind of a structural
strategy in a forcible manner, such as physically taking away sweets from a misbehaving child, or
removing a rotten apple from a box of apples. For instance, Plato gives a metaphor that a nation
consists of a human (guardian/ruler), a lion (supporter), and a monster (greed), and in the same
way, each person also has corresponding parts inside themselves, namely, rationality, thumos, and
desire (Plato). He claims that an ideal nation and an ideal personality are in a situation in which a
human ably controls the monster and the lion. Without question, the monster in Plato’s metaphor
refers to the thoughts of those people who only have the motivation for defection. Since I share the
ideals of Plato, I consider it is necessary for a human to control the lion or monster. In the context
of “control,” it includes any structural strategy such as “taking away sweets from a misbehaving
child or removing rotten apples. However, as Plato presupposed, all people possess these three
kinds of feeling of thumos, desire, and rationality within themselves. And for that reason, this book
claims that all people, at least latently, possess an ability to willingly and spontaneously accept a
structural strategy to solve a social dilemma, in the same way as “they discipline themselves to
diet.”
10.2 Public Acceptance Dilemma 175
follows: “even as we continue to raise even more sheep, the commons continues to
provide grass, and everything is going well. So it should be alright to continue
increasing the number of sheep for ever. We don’t have to discuss such an intrusive
thing as a monitoring system.” A social fence problem in this public acceptance
dilemma has the following characteristic: the problem becomes increasingly serious
when there is a larger time gap between the point of choosing the defective behavior
by not accepting the structural strategy, and the point when due to defection the
problem is experienced at first hand (when the first-order dilemma occurs because
there is no structural strategy to prevent it). This is because the farther the effect is
away from the present, the degree of worry about any future effect declines; this may
perhaps be a universal attribute with a biological foundation that exists in many
animals including humans (e.g., Rachlin and Green 1972).
Perversely, the time until the negative consequences of defection appear,
namely, the time until the present generation have consumed all the accumulated
benefits of their predecessors, may be quite sometime in the future, especially if
they have inherited considerable reserves. Therefore, paradoxically, the more the
earlier generations have been self-disciplined, practiced good husbandry and
expanded the commons, and passed down a rich commons to the present genera-
tion, the present generation then has the possibility to become only more interested
in their personal self-interest. They are secure enough to neglect the welfare of the
commons as a whole, and as a result, there will be an increasing tendency to oppose
any public works designed to implement a structural strategy. This is a common
scenario, as seen in a son born to a rich family becoming a spoiled,
pleasure-seeking wastrel. To put it another way, throughout the course of history,
with the gradual accumulation of wealth and ideas society becomes more affluent,
and there will be a stronger tendency for people to not appreciate their good fortune,
and by taking it for granted just consume it all as their legitimate birthright; this is
an often repeated and unfortunate causality in society.
10.3 Spiral of Silence in the Public Acceptance Dilemma
In addition, there is another significant difference in the public acceptance dilemma

compared to the previously described types of dilemma we have dealt with. That is
to say, the conformity effect (the tendency to conform one’s own behavior or
opinion to that of others, refer to Sect. 9.2(1)) plays an extremely important role in
people’s behavior in public acceptance dilemmas. It is because the previous
dilemmas concerned behaviors in daily life, such as actual transportation behavior
or energy-consuming behavior. In contrast, the cooperation or defection presumed
in a public acceptance dilemma does not entail an actual behavior, but is just a
“manifestation of an opinion.”
Regarding actual behaviors, it requires a vast amount of cost to change them. As
discussed in detail in Part II of this book, even if a person is motivated to change their
behavior, such as having a strong motivation to quit smoking or to refrain from
eating sweets, it is quite difficult to actually realize it. This is probably a convincing
fact if we consider our own behavior in daily life. In contrast, “manifestation of an
opinion” does not require any such large cost. It is very easy to express Opinion A
today, instead of Opinion B which was your opinion yesterday—so much easier than
actually quitting smoking, changing your car use life style, or restricting your energy
consumption.5 So in the case of an actual behavior, even when the conformity effect
exists, as long as it is small, people’s actual behavior will not be the same, but in the
case of expressing an opinion, even with the existence of a small conformity effect, it
is highly possible that opinions expressed by people will converge on the same point.
This is exactly what Noelle-Neumann suggests as the “spiral of silence”
(Noelle-Neumann 1982).
The Spiral of Silence Theory presumes the following series of dynamic pro-
cesses to describe how a “public opinion” is formed.
(1) If a person has the impression that their opinion is held by the majority, then
there will be an increased tendency to make their opinion public. In contrast, if
a person believes their opinion is only held by a minority, they will have less
inclination to make their opinion public, as they feel afraid of being isolated
(that is, they become silent).
(2) Hence the opinions made public in society are mainly made by “those who
realize they are in the majority” (hereafter referred to as public opinion), and
the opinion of those who realize that they are in the minority (hereafter
nonpublic opinion) will rarely be heard.
(3) Through this phenomenon, those in accord with public opinion reinforce their
confidence in their opinion, and make it public even more assertively. In
contrast, those with a nonpublic opinion become even less confident in
expressing their opinion, and become ever more silent.
(4) As the above spiral is repeated it becomes self-reinforcing with increasingly
vocal proclamations of the public opinion encouraging those with a nonpublic
opinion to keep their silence, and with no overt opposition, supporters of
public opinion become even more assured and assertive, while those with the
nonpublic opinion become even more silent, in the end, many of those with a
nonpublic opinion are likely to “conform” to the public opinion, change their
minds and join the majority.
According to this theory, public opinion from the start is not formed by the
accumulation of each person’s independent, rational judgment concerning “which of
A and B is correct?” Instead, it assumes that either of A or B may be supported by
public opinion, and is dependent upon a slight disturbance or a tiny “trigger” at an
early stage of the formulation of the public opinion. For instance, there may be cases
where although roughly the same number of people support A and B, if there was only
5
Of course, for this very reason, many ethical systems require people to be responsible in what
they say, and impose a large cost on anyone changing their opinion. For instance, the saying that
“samurai do not change their minds” refers to an attitude of not giving into the conformity effect,
but always expressing what they believe to be true and just.
10.3 Spiral of Silence in the Public Acceptance Dilemma 177
one person who has a little louder and more insistent voice than others, public opinion
as a whole may be led to A as a result of repeating the spiral of silence. Furthermore,
even when those supporting A are actually in the minority, and the majority silently
supports B, there is a possibility that if the following two conditions are met public
opinion swings to A through the spiral of silence. The first condition is that if the voice
and behavior of those who support A is loud and assertive, for instance, by intensive
leafletting of each household to support A or heavily pushing the A campaign on local
radio. The other condition is for the supporters of B to keep silent, which often
happens when it is considered to be a virtue not to vocalize an obvious truth.
That is to say, in the words of Noelle-Neumann as she reviewed her own Spiral
of Silence Theory in later years: it is the “denial of the ideal image of the ‘intelligent
and responsible citizen’ that is supposed to be the basis of democratic theory”
(Noelle-Neumann 1982).
Now, what will happen if we apply this Spiral of Silence Theory to the public
acceptance dilemma discussed in this section?
The two confronting opinions in the public acceptance dilemma discussed here
are whether to agree to introduce the monitoring system as a structural strategy
(cooperation) or to oppose it (defection). Of course, the Spiral of Silence Theory
cannot predict whether public opinion supports cooperation or defection, since it
depends on trivial events at the beginning of the formation of public opinion.
However, it is safe to predict at least the following:
If there is not one single person with a long-term public viewpoint, there will be no one to
propose the introduction of a structural strategy.
In other words, if all shepherds are only interested in the area around the point of
origin (namely, here and now) shown in Fig. 10.1, in this particular society of
shepherds, the very argument of whether to introduce the monitoring system will
not appear in the public awareness; all shepherds will be trapped by the dilemma,
and totally lose their livelihood. Self-evidently, if there is only one shepherd with a
long-term public viewpoint, there is a chance that this tiny minority viewpoint may
become public opinion.
This is an extremely important point in considering how to solve a social
dilemma.
As a matter of course, no matter what type they may be, social dilemmas which
are the theme of this book become a serious social problem because
• Despite the reality that everyone will become unhappy if the majority is made
up of those who consider only the benefit of “here and now,”
• Everyone is inclined to have a self-centered attribute to consider only the benefit
of “here and now.”
These two factors are the reason why in shepherd society we can easily imagine
that in the public acceptance dilemma, the majority would be those who only con-
sider the benefit of “here and now” and who “strongly oppose” a structural strategy.
Therefore, we can consider the possibility that also in our real society, a social
dilemma would not be solved, and people would become extremely poor, in the same
way as the shepherds totally losing their livelihood. This is truly a sad and regrettable
situation, but we cannot hope to solve a social dilemma if we do not start from calmly
accepting that such a worstcase scenario is definitely one of our possible futures.
Having accepted this bleak possibility, there is still a faint hope, as the Spiral of
Silence Theory implies if there is only a small number or even just one shepherd
with a long-term, public viewpoint, there is a possibility that society may escape the
trap of the social dilemma. Of course, it is also essential to recognize that there is
quite a low possibility that the opinion of a single person or only a small minority
will sway public opinion. In addition, it is also crucial for the minority to be
prepared to make a significant effort (or incur various social costs including
expenditure and time) in order to win over public opinion. Despite all these neg-
ative factors, the possibility is not zero, but rather, because of the very existence of
the spiral of silence, there is a possibility that the opinion of one individual or
insignificant minority may gather momentum and become public opinion.
In fact, Noelle-Neumann looks back at the social process generated by the
Reformation led by Martin Luther, and argues as follows:
If the definition of public opinion and a conformity effect is the same for normal people,
then public opinion for them should be a lever (Noelle-Neumann 1982).
Furthermore, the very fact that “the effort of just one person may change public
opinion, and lead to the introduction of a structural strategy, and thus prevent the
shepherds losing their livelihood” has the structure of a social dilemma in itself.
This is a dilemma at the level of whether to become a “volunteer” to help solve the
public acceptance dilemma, which is a second-order dilemma. Therefore, it may be
said that the volunteer question is a “third order dilemma” which is in a higher
dimension than the second-order dilemma. Moreover, this dilemma literally has the
structure of the “volunteer’s dilemma” (refer to Sect. 2.7).
10.4 Volunteer’s Dilemma
(1) Expert volunteer’s dilemma

Suppose that there is a profit structure in which if one person behaves cooper-
atively, society can solve a dilemma even when all other people are defective. Then,
this situation can be defined as a social dilemma with a profit structure of the
volunteer dilemma dealt in Sect. 2.7 of this book.
As described earlier, if one (or a small number) of the shepherds confront the
current situation, and invest a vast amount of effort, the public opinion in society
may change (however low this possibility may be), and the structural strategy may
be introduced (i.e., the public acceptance dilemma as a second-order dilemma is
solved). As a result, the shepherds will start refraining from raising too many sheep
(i.e., cooperate in the first-order dilemma), and the society of shepherds will be able
10.4 Volunteer’s Dilemma 179
to survive. In such a situation if a society can escape the dilemma through one
person’s “volunteer” cooperation, it may seem that solving the dilemma is easy.
However, as mentioned earlier, there is an extremely low possibility that public
opinion will be overturned by the efforts of just one person. In order to take on this
difficult task, our hero must have significantly high skills and expertise, which will
have required considerable time and effort to attain. They must be willing to put in
significant amounts of time, money, and effort to work on the task. As only one
person in the whole of society is making this effort, it is in one sense extremely unfair.
What is more, in the public acceptance dilemma, it is more than likely that many will
hold a political opinion to “oppose the implementation of the structural strategy.” In
such a climate, proclaiming an opinion different from the majority may lead the
volunteer to face quite strong social pressure to conform, and in some cases, there is
the possibility of some kind of specific social sanction (Noelle-Neumann 1982).
A similar volunteer’s dilemma may also arise as a second-order dilemma, in
which cooperation is defined as follows: one of the shepherds bears the cost of
making the effort to become a “specialist in the structural strategy,” and after
becoming such a specialist, bears the further costs of implementing the structural
strategy alone, and thereby solves the social dilemma. For example, if someone
becomes a professional capable of monitoring and sanctioning, and accomplishes
that task, the social dilemma will be solved even if the cost to implement the
structural strategy is not necessarily borne by all shepherds equally. However, in
this case, our volunteer has to bear a great personal cost incomparable to any costs
borne by others, so in this sense it too is also extremely unfair. What is more, since
our volunteer shepherd both monitors and sanctions their fellow shepherds, they
may become extremely unpopular among those who oppose this system. Despite
that, however, if there is a “volunteer” who bears all such costs on their own, the
commons of the shepherds will not be ruined, and they will all be able to survive.6
In any case, cooperation in this third-order volunteer dilemma or the second-order
volunteer dilemma involves an extremely large personal loss compared to any of the
investment of time and energy required in the first-order dilemma or the
second-order public goods dilemma. Therefore, it is possible that no one wants to
take on such a role, and in the end, there may not be one person who behaves
cooperatively in the third-order dilemma.
Now, whether it is a problem of a volunteer solving the public acceptance
dilemma, or a problem of a volunteer directly implementing the structural strategy,
those who can cooperate are usually not so-called normal people. Rather, they are
6
Incidentally, there may also be occasions when everyone feels thankful to this “volunteer,” and
gives tangible and intangible donations to this person, and thus the cost is shared by all. If this
happens, the structure of a problem shifts from a volunteer dilemma to the issue of the
second-order public goods dilemma. Needless to say, in this second-order public goods dilemma,
it is not necessarily the case that all people behave cooperatively. Therefore, some may appreciate
this “volunteer” while others may not. Incidentally, if we consider the viewpoint of a social
transaction, the feeling of appreciation itself may be considered as an intangible reward to the
volunteer.
those involved in the individual social dilemma as an expert (such as a specialist

involved in public works, or a public transportation plan), or a person with a
specific occupation such as those involved in politics or the mass media. In this
sense, the above-mentioned volunteer dilemma can usually be expressed more
accurately as the expert volunteer’s dilemma.
In contrast to the expert, there is also a type of volunteer dilemma in which any
one can become a volunteer, even without the expertise ability or a specific
occupation, and still solve the dilemma. This is a problem generally known as the
NIMBY problem (c.f. Fujii et al. 2002), which will be discussed in the following.
(2) Volunteer dilemma as a NIMBY problem
NIMBY is an acronym of Not In My Back Yard; a NIMBY problem is quite
simply expressed as: It may be good for society, but I do not want it in my town or
street. Society might need a so-called unwelcome facility (prison, power plant, etc.)
but there is the problem of choosing a suitable site.
For example, let us consider a first-order dilemma in which cooperation is defined
as each household responsibly disposing of its own garbage, and defection is
throwing it away inappropriately. Since it is an extremely inefficient and difficult task
for each household to responsibly dispose of its garbage, many households may
probably end up throwing it away inappropriately. Therefore, the town environs will
be full of garbage, and the public benefit of all people will decrease significantly. As
a way to structurally solve this dilemma, suppose that the town decides to build a
garbage disposal facility. Such a facility means each household can dispose of its
garbage at an extremely low cost. However, no one wants to live next to the garbage
disposal facility, because it smells and it is seen as unhygienic. In other words,
everyone in town wants the facility, but just Not In My Back Yard. Obviously in
such a case, the garbage disposal facility cannot be built anywhere, and the problem
of the first-order dilemma occurs anyway, and everywhere will be covered in gar-
bage. In other words, in this NIMBY situation also, if just one or a few “volunteers”
devoted to the good of society are willing to accept this extreme unfairness and the
large personal burden of living next to the garbage dump, then the structural strategy
will be implemented, through which the social dilemma will be solved.
(3) Volunteer dilemma and justice
As described above, the volunteer dilemma may occur both as a second-order
dilemma or as a third-order dilemma (and of course, as a dilemma of a higher
order), and in either case, it requires volunteer(s) willing to bear a significant
personal burden and to incur extreme unfairness. In fact, there are no small number
of reports of actual cases involving community and town planning that show evi-
dence of this phenomenon. That is to say, whether it is an administrator, a civil
engineer, or a member of the general public, the presence of one or a few volunteers
willing to bear a significant cost leads to the smooth progression of community
10.4 Volunteer’s Dilemma 181
planning and the maintaining of public order in a local area (e.g., Nakayachi 2002;
Sakano and Dohmen 2002).7
If this volunteer is truly not complacent, and their actions are essential for the
prosperity and wellbeing of society, perhaps they are what we may call a “knight in
shining armor.” It is not too great a simplification to claim any hero in a children’s
movie or a cowboy program is a “volunteer,” who does not mind bearing a sig-
nificant personal burden and extreme unfairness.8
As one of the theoretical possibilities, we may indicate that there is an extremely
deep relationship between this volunteer dilemma as a third- or second-order
dilemma and the concept of justice in society. For instance, in Plato’s The Republic,
the “justice” spoken about by Socrates definitely has a profound relationship with the
idea of cooperation described in the volunteer dilemma. The Socratic dialogue, The
Republic, has a theme of how to maintain a happy status in a situation when all people
in a nation (or a society) are inclined to become unhappy. Rephrasing this theme
using the theoretical terminology of a social dilemma, it is “how to make all people
behave cooperatively in a dilemma in which everyone is inclined to behave defec-
tively.” In The Republic, Plato presents a dialogue that those who have been trained
well and appropriately to acquire an ability to judge “what is beautiful, correct, and
right (Plato)” may “consider that taking the responsibility of governance is an
inevitable compulsion, and decide to take that role.” In other words, he predicts that
(1) For solving a social dilemma, it is required to have a few competent persons
with the appropriate skills and ability.
(2) But such a person with this true ability will never “covet” the position of
governance which would be coveted by those without ability.
(3) Despite that, because of their ascribed responsibility, they consider it as an
inevitable compulsion that they would become “volunteers” who sponta-
neously put themselves in the position of governance.
It is argued that through this process, the nation’s justice and people’s happiness
are maintained for the first time.
7
Sakano and Nakayachi respectively indicated this in their presentations made in academic con-
ferences, which were based on their papers; Sakano made a presentation called “Social Implication
of Trust” in the 43rd Conference for the Japanese Society of Social Psychology held in 2002, based
on the paper by Sakano and Dohmen (2002). He indicated that some residents of Den-en-chofu
area in Tokyo continued efforts to maintain the commonage of the area, such as by continuously
persuading new comers to abide by the local regulations, through which public order was main-
tained. In addition, Nakayachi made a presentation called “Psychology of Agreement Formation”
in the 25th Conference of the Committee of Infrastructure Planning and Management held in 2002,
based on the paper by Nakayachi (2002). He indicated that the promotion of local public works
based on mutual trust is largely dependent on the effort of some of the responsible administrators.
8
As mentioned earlier, please note that if there is something called a complacent hero, they will
only provide externality or be a great nuisance. What we refer to as the “knight in shining armor”
requires credibility (such as an ability to truly solve a social problem). I believe that one of the
approaches to coming close to the heart of justice is to theoretically reveal the condition of the
“knight in shining armor.”
Considering this point, it may be possible to define the concepts of “justice” that
have been discussed for several thousands of years by many philosophers and social
scientists since Socrates, in the mathematical framework based on the volunteer
dilemma discussed above. Of course, in order to reveal it, various theoretical
examinations are essential. For instance, we need to theoretically reveal issues such
as (1) how people may behave toward this volunteer who is a knight in shining
armor, or (2) what is the social structure to foster the motivation to drive a person to
cooperation in a volunteer dilemma which involves a significant personal burden,
namely, the motivation for someone to “consider it as an inevitable compulsion and
put oneself in the position of governance.” Also for the purpose of revealing the
essence of “justice,” it is desirable to conduct further theoretical and empirical
research by taking these points into account.
References
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American Political Science Review, 80,
1095–1111.
Fujii, S., Takemura, K., & Kikkawa, T. (2002). Decision making process and consensus building:
a strategy to restraining an egoistic motivation in social dilemmas. Journal of Japan Society of
Civil Engineers, 709/IV-56, 13–26. (in Japanese with English abstract).
Nakayachi, K. (2002). Psychology of citizen participation. JSCE Magazine “Civil Engineering”,
87(6), 33–36. (in Japanese).
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1982). Die Schweigespirale: öffentliche Meinung-unsere soziale Haut.
Franskfult: Varlag Ullstein GmbH.
Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice and self-control. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 17, 15–22.
Sakano, T., & Dohmen, T. (2002). A study on legitimacy and efficiency of community charter by
the theory of self-organized collective choice. Papers on City Planning, 37, 331–336. (in
Japanese).
In E. Lawler & B. Morkovsky (Eds.), Advances in group processes (Vol. 3, pp. 52–87). JAL:
Greenwich, CT.
Chapter 11
Public Acceptance of Structural Strategy
The previous chapter demonstrated that whether it is a problem of urban life,

transportation, or the environment, when we examine the introduction of a struc-
tural strategy to solve social dilemmas in real society, inevitably we would find the
creation of another social dilemma but at a higher level. The following are a list of
the higher order dilemmas we have discussed:
• Second order public goods dilemma: dilemma whether to bear the cost of
implementing a structural strategy
• Public acceptance dilemma: dilemma whether to agree to a structural strategy
• Expert-volunteer’s dilemma: in a case where acquiring specific expertise,
knowledge or skills is required in order to implement cooperation in a second
order public goods dilemma or public acceptance dilemma; this dilemma refers
to who is to bear the cost of implementing cooperation, including the cost of
acquiring such knowledge and skills.
• NIMBY-type volunteer dilemma: in a case when there is no need to acquire
expertise or the like for bearing the cost of a structural strategy, rather it usually
refers to one or a few ordinary individuals who will have to bear the cost of
implementing the strategy for the whole of society.
The following is a list of these dilemmas applied to transportation issues:
• Second order public goods dilemma: whether each person bears the cost of
preparing a new public transportation rail line
• Public acceptance dilemma: whether each person agrees to the introduction of a
road-pricing scheme
• Expert-volunteer’s dilemma: whether a person makes the effort to persuade
people who are against the introduction of road pricing to understand its
necessity and spontaneously accept its introduction
• NIMBY-type volunteer’s dilemma: whether to accept an airport (with a high
level of noise) in your neighborhood

184 11 Public Acceptance of Structural Strategy
As discussed in the previous chapter, these dilemmas are different in their basic
benefit structures, but share the same fundamental question of whether to behave
cooperatively or defectively toward a structural strategy.
Regarding the second order public goods dilemma, normally the budget of a
large-scale structural strategy is rarely secured through “people’s spontaneous
donation.” Instead, it is most likely that the public will bear the cost through the
“introduction of a new specific-purpose tax” or an “increased rate of consumption
tax.” Therefore, this situation will naturally take the form of a public acceptance
dilemma.1 The expert-volunteer’s dilemma, as its name implies, will not necessarily
apply to the general public, since it relates to those involved in a specific social
dilemma as an expert with knowledge of public works or a specialist of trans-
portation planning for example, or those with specific occupations involved in such
fields as politics or mass communication.
For that reason, when tackling any actual large-scale social dilemma such as an
issue of transportation, urban life, or the environment, we can say that the two
important high order dilemmas would be the public acceptance dilemma and the
NIMBY-type volunteer dilemma. What is more, in a real-life social dilemma,
cooperation in the NIMBY-type volunteer dilemma is an issue involving mainly
those people in a specific area near a facility such as an airport, a garbage dump or
nuclear power plant. In the actual administration process, it is often the case that the
problem simply reduces to whether “people in that area accept the public facility or
not” (however, it is important to always keep in mind that the difference between a
NIMBY problem and a normal public acceptance dilemma is that the former
imposes extreme unfairness on a small local group.).
In any case, when a public entity in reality tackles higher order social dilemmas
involving a structural strategy, all types of problems will converge into the issue of
“public acceptance.”
Now, it is important to note that public acceptance does not mean “whether the
general public accepts a policy forcibly imposed by the authority.” As pointed out
in Sect. 10.2(2), this book defines “public acceptance” as follows:
On their own initiative, people spontaneously manifest their desire for a structural strategy
to be implemented in order to solve a social dilemma
Based on this perception, this book overviews what has been revealed in the-
oretical and empirical research to date regarding the psychological factors that
influence public acceptance of a structural strategy.
On that basis, this book examines the best ways for a social policy to encourage
people’s public acceptance. To repeat, note that the purpose of this chapter is to
consider a “policy to facilitate people’s spontaneous acceptance”, and it does not
aim to discuss techniques to force people to accept a social policy just for a specific
group and unrelated to social benefit.
1
In this case, we can classify whether to agree to a “tax” system introduced to solve a second order
dilemma as a third order dilemma of how to secure the budget to introduce a structural strategy to
solve a first order dilemma.
11 Public Acceptance of Structural Strategy 185
Infringement
Self-centered factors
on freedom
Acceptance
Distributive
fairness
Fairness
Participation in
administration
Procedural
fairness
Trust in Ethical factors

Administration
Fig. 11.1 A causal structure of factors regulating the acceptance of a structural strategy
Incidentally, this book proposes a causal structure shown in Fig. 11.1 as a

complex of factors regulating the acceptance of a structural strategy. Additionally,
based on this causal structure, Table 11.1 is a list of methods that foster acceptance
of a structural strategy. The following discussion is centered on these tables and
figures.
11.1 Infringement on Freedom and Fairness
From a series of studies by Baron et al., it is known that there are two psychological
factors that play an important role in people’s acceptance of an enforced policy like
a structural strategy (Baron 1995; Baron and Juney 1993). Namely, they are
infringement on freedom and fairness (refer to Fig. 11.1). Anyone who considers
the implementation of a structural strategy infringes upon their freedom will nat-
urally have a strong tendency to oppose it. In contrast, anyone considering the
policy to be fair will support it. For instance, if road pricing is considered as a
structural strategy for a transportation problem, non cooperators (car users) may
think they are being deprived of two kinds of freedom: continued use of their car by
paying the charge (i.e., continuing defection), can be seen as infringing upon the
drivers right to use their car with no charge. Or if the driver stops using their car to
avoid paying the charge (i.e., changes their behavior toward cooperation), they may
consider their right to travel freely has been infringed. Alternatively, when the
authorities introduce a policy to directly regulate traffic inflow to a city center, a
driver may think they have been directly deprived of their freedom to travel by car.
Table 11.1 Method of enhancing the acceptance of a structural strategy
Note In the process of “formation of expectation toward increasing public benefit,” people
naturally come to focus on public benefit. As a result, it is expected that their “public spirit” will be
activated. Namely, “activation of public spirit” and “formation of expectation toward increasing
public benefit” are theoretically different, but empirically speaking, they are achieved through the
same policies
All these perceived infringements on a driver’s freedom will lower their acceptance
of a structural strategy.
In fact, by analyzing data acquired by research conducted in major cities in
Japan, it was revealed that fairness has a positive impact, and infringement on
freedom has a negative impact, in all of the structural strategies studied such as road
pricing, regulation of inflow to a city center, and a number plate system (i.e., a
policy to prohibit the inflow of cars to a city center according to the car number
plate; refer to Fujii 2001, 2003). Other than this domestic research in Japan, we also
conducted international research to compare the acceptance of road pricing in
Sweden, Taiwan, and Japan, and confirmed that infringement on freedom and
fairness influenced the degree of acceptance in all of these countries (Fujii et al.
2003).
11.1 Infringement on Freedom and Fairness 187
The remarkable indication shown by all of these research results is that the
perception of fairness has a greater impact than any infringement on freedom. This
implies that there is a good chance a structural strategy will be socially acceptable if
the general public consider it to be the correct thing to do, no matter how much it
infringes on people’s freedom or incurs loss of any individual private benefit. This
importance of fairness is also repeatedly pointed out in political psychological
analysis on the pros and cons of various administrative policies (c.f. Lind and Tyler
1988; Smith and Tyler 1996). For example, research in Japan shows “fairness” has
a great influence on the acceptance of special taxation for solving environmental
problems (Fujii et al. 2002a, b, 2004).
The above result may indicate that humans by no means lead a self-centered
existence with behavior solely based on the calculation of profit-and-loss, but are
actually ethical and value fairness and justice.
This fact has an extremely important significance when considering the issue of
public acceptance.
For instance, Saeki (1980) reached the following conclusion, after overviewing
the Social Decision Theory of the time.
Social Decision Theory is not a study that looks upon people with distrust, for the purpose
of finding the principles to maintain society no matter how bad or cunning some may be. It
must be a study to invoke and inspire people’s concepts of ethicality, listen and appeal to
their innate ethicality, and thereby construct an ethical society (p. 308).
Certainly, the public acceptance issue regarding structural strategies dealt with in
this section is nothing other than one of these “social decision theories” discussed by
Saeki. His opinion is supported by the above findings that fairness has an extremely
significant impact on public acceptance. Encouragingly, these are actually solid
empirical findings analyzing a variety of problems from all over the world.
Therefore, anyone implementing a structural strategy to solve a social dilemma
needs to start by recognizing people not as self-centered beings, but as ethical beings.
If those administrators in local or national government responsible for the intro-
duction of a structural strategy, do not trust in the innate ethicality of the general
public, they will only offer temporizing policies such as how to decrease the
infringement on freedom, or mitigate any infringement on freedom by providing
other incentives (refer to Table 11.1). As discussed in detail in the previous chapter,
whether people cooperate with a structural strategy is a problem that embraces the
structure of a social dilemma in itself. In other words, a structural strategy in prin-
ciple causes a loss to people’s short-term, personal benefit, and it aims to solve a
social dilemma through infringing people’s freedom in some way. This principle
cannot be concealed, no matter how you smooth it over. If that is the case, there is a
natural limit to how much can be achieved by introducing a structural strategy just by
considering people’s infringement of freedom. If you wish to introduce an effective
structural strategy to solve a social dilemma, it may be necessary to allow people the
freedom to ethically judge the fairness of the solution for themselves, and thereby
obtain their evaluation that “it is fair.” As Saeki (1980) implies, there is no way to
achieve public acceptance without trust in the ethicality of the general public.
11.2 Distributive Fairness and Expectation on Increasing

Public Benefit
The above discussion implies that the most central arguing point when considering
social acceptance of a structural strategy is:
What kind of a structural strategy do people judge as fair?
Luckily, this question has been examined by various researchers to date (c.f.
Lind and Tyler 1988; Tanaka 1997; Tyler et al. 1997), and their findings provide us
important insight into this question. Among these researchers, fairness is often
categorized into “distributive fairness” which refers to fairness concerning the result
of decision making, and “procedural fairness” which refers to the fairness of the
decision making procedure. First, this section touches on distributive fairness, and
the next section on procedural fairness, after which we will examine what consti-
tutes a well-designed social policy to enhance public acceptance. In the discussion
of distributive fairness, we will also discuss how an expectation on the increase of
public benefit may influence fairness.
(1) Distributive fairness
Distributive fairness refers to fairness in distributing a specific resource among
people. There are several representative standards to assess fairness, for instance,
“equality” regards fairness as distributing an equal amount of the resource to
everyone, “equity” regards fairness as distributing an amount according to how
much effort a person has made in order to acquire the resource, and “need” regards
fairness as distributing an amount according to how much a person actually needs
the resource. These different standards of distributive fairness, equality, equity, and
need, are applied to different circumstances. For example, in a performance-based
business, equity will be preferred by distributing according to each person’s con-
tribution. Among a group of friends, equality is common, no matter how much each
person actually contributed. When considering a welfare issue, an individual’s need
is often the primary factor.
Now, it is easy to see how distributive fairness may become an arguing point in
the introduction of a structural strategy involving road pricing, inflow regulation, or
the number plate system to a specific area. If these enforced policies are imple-
mented only in one district, car users in that area will be the targets of regulation,
while car users in other areas will not be affected, resulting in a feeling of
unfairness. Road pricing may hardly be a burden for high-income earners, but may
be a big burden for low-income drivers, who will consider this pricing policy as
unfair.
In addition, as mentioned several times up to now, distributive fairness becomes
most problematic in a NIMBY problem. Even if a garbage disposal facility or a
nuclear power plant is necessary for society as a whole and for increasing future
benefit, there will be a great “inequality” in terms of who is to bear the cost of
accepting it. Furthermore, if a nuclear power plant or a garbage disposal facility is
11.2 Distributive Fairness and Expectation on Increasing Public Benefit 189
constructed in an area with a low population density, and any benefit is mainly
received by an area with a high population density, the location of the facility is
totally at odds with the concept of “equity,” since it is possible to argue that the
distant area which receives a greater benefit should actually bear the greater burden.
In order to prevent such unfairness in implementing a structural strategy, public
entities such as an administration or a government should pursue the following
principles when designing the structural strategy and actively communicating with
the general public (refer to Table 11.1);
(1) A specialist should design a specific form of a structural strategy policy so that
it will be fair in terms of distribution, and
(2) The specialist who designed the structural strategy or the public entity itself
should actively explain to the general public that it is fair in terms of
distribution.
If we employ an economics term, a structural strategy is a policy to prevent the
emission of “externality,” or to internalize it by measures such as charging a fee.
Externality can be rephrased in everyday language as the “trouble” caused to others
or to society (refer to Sects. 1.3 and 10.1; in Sect. 10.1, externality is referred to as
a “social demerit” for convenience). For instance, using a car may be regarded as
trouble, in the sense that it worsens road congestion and prolongs the traveling time
of other cars including buses, for an amount of one car. Also, the exhaust gas
emitted from the car may be regarded as causing trouble to others since it pollutes
the air. Taking into account such externality (or social demerit), we may deem that
many structural strategies such as road pricing and inflow regulation are theoreti-
cally fair policies in terms of distribution. Therefore, even when such policies are
introduced only in a specific area, if the road congestion or the environmental
problem in that area is serious, it may be justified from the viewpoint of fairness. It
is because in an especially crowded area, the externality of each car is especially
large, so reducing it to make it closer to the standard of externality of a car in other
areas may be regarded as a fair policy in terms of equalizing the amount of
externality.
(2) Expectation to increase public benefit
Fairness regarding the result does not only refer to benefit distribution among
individuals within a society, such as equality, fairness, and equity.2 In their inter-
national comparison research on social value, Schwartz and Bardi pointed out that
fairness is also related with the size of public benefit of society as a whole
2
Social dilemma research has often used the concept of “fairness” limited to fairness regarding
distribution (e.g. Wilke 1991). In such a series of research, the size of public benefit discussed in
the main text is termed “efficiency”, and it is distinguished from the concept of “fairness”. Of
course, this book also considers that efficiency, procedural fairness, and distributive fairness are
theoretically different constituent concepts. However, it acknowledges they all influence the
“judgment on the correctness of a policy”, namely, “judgment on fairness”. Therefore, this book
regards them as included in the broad definition of “fairness”.
(Schwartz and Bardi 2001). They listed “fairness” as one of the important values
concerning the universalism defined as “securing the present and future welfare of
society as a whole”. Based on this premise, they found that people in many
countries constantly place importance on fairness. In other words, regardless of a
country or a region, in considering what result is fair, the general public do not only
take into account the benefit distribution among individuals such as equality,
fairness, and equity, but they also pay great attention to the present and future
welfare of society as a whole (namely, public benefit or social welfare). Hence, if a
structural strategy can really solve a social dilemma, and if it leads to increasing the
future welfare of society as a whole, it may be enough to make people recognize it
as a fair policy. For example, there are a number of findings showing that the more a
structural strategy is recognized as significantly contributing to increasing public
benefit, the higher its acceptance (e.g., Fujii 2001; Sugiura et al. 1999; Hirose et al.
2001; Yamagishi 1986). This implies the possibility that the expectation to increase
the public benefit fosters fairness, through which public acceptance is increased.
In order to directly verify this possibility, we conducted an experiment on
transportation policy to compare the cognition of fairness on a structural strategy
under two conditions: a condition to explain the fact that public benefit would
increase if a structural strategy is introduced, and a condition with no such
explanation. As a result, it was revealed that the cognition of fairness is significantly
higher when the explanation was given (refer to Sect. 11.2(3) for detail, Fujii 2003).
Moreover, in several countries including Japan, it is confirmed that the stronger an
individual believes that the environmental problem is serious and it requires some
kind of a countermeasure, in other words, when they have a higher Environmental
Concern (Fransson and Gärling 1999; refer to Appendix) and regard environmental
policies as greatly enhancing social benefit, there is a higher possibility that they
will regard a road pricing policy as fair (Fujii e al. 2001, 2003). All of these findings
support the hypothesis that if there is an expectation that a specific structural
strategy increases public benefit, it enhances the perceived fairness of the structural
strategy.
(3) Explanations about increasing public benefit and fairness
Therefore, if people take into account not only the benefit distribution among
individuals, but also increasing public benefit, there is no small possibility that a
structural strategy may be recognized as a “fair” policy. However, even if a
structural strategy may be regarded as fair from an expert point of view, it does not
mean that people will necessarily recognize it as fair. For this reason, if a structural
strategy is truly a fair policy from the standpoint of benefit dispersion among
individuals, as well as the standpoint of increasing future public benefit, it is
essential that a public entity persuasively explains to people that this policy is
indeed fair.
Incidentally, the very problem of whether a public entity makes such an
explanation openly and honestly or not has the structure of the expert-volunteer’s
11.2 Distributive Fairness and Expectation on Increasing Public Benefit 191
dilemma dealt in Sect. 11.4(1), with an open explanation being cooperation and no
explanation being defection.
Now, let us rethink the problem of a decision frame (c.f. Kahneman and Tversky
1984; Takemura 1994). People’s decision-making and judgment greatly change
with how a problem is portrayed, namely, “how it is framed.” Therefore, we may
consider that by just adding a few words explaining the reason why a structural
strategy is needed, people’s acceptance may change to no small extent (Fujii and
Takemura 2001; Fujii et al. 2002c; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Takemura 1994).
Actually, data that support this idea has also been obtained.
This is an aggregated result of research on the acceptance of three transportation
policies (road pricing, number plate regulation, and inflow regulation), conducted in
six cities in Japan (Fujii 2003). All of these three policies are a type of structural
strategy to forcibly regulate car use. In this research, when we explained each
transportation policy, we set a group to which we added a phrase explaining “for the
sake of mitigating congestion and environmental problems”, and a group with no
explanatory phrase. Participants were randomly allocated to either group, and we
ascertained their cognition of acceptance on a scale of 1–7 ranging from 1 as
absolute opposition, 7 as absolute agreement, and 4 as neutral. As shown in
Acceptance was improved by just adding a few words of explanation. It is deemed
that such change was brought about for the following two reasons. As already
indicated earlier, the first reason is that such explanations improved the cognition of
fairness on each transportation policy, and thereby improved their acceptance. And
the other reason is based on a hypothesis of focusing regarding decision making and
judgment (Fujii and Takemura 2001; Fujii et al. 2002c; Takemura 1994), as
explained as follows. By simply adding an explanatory phrase such as environment
and congestion, the focus of decision making changes. As a result, it decreases the
“amount of focus” on individual benefit such as the infringement on freedom or the
increased inconvenience of not being able to use their car, and increases the
“amount of focus” toward a public benefit such as congestion and environment. As
a result, it enhances the rate of acceptance.
In fact, when focusing on the “change of acceptance according to the strength of
regulation” (for instance, the difference in the average acceptance in a case of a 100
yen versus 1,000 yen charge), as can be seen in Figs. 11.2 and 11.3, such change
becomes smaller when an explanation is given, compared to no given explanation.
This result indicates that an explanatory phrase decreases the tendency to consider
the strength of the regulation. Namely, it supports the hypothesis that an
“explanatory phrase decreases the amount of focus on the individual benefit”.
In this way, people do not necessarily consider only individual benefit, but also
consider public benefit. Moreover, the ratio of considering individual benefit and
public benefit changes according to the situation. Therefore, when considering the
public acceptance dilemma, how a structural strategy is framed and presented has
an extremely important effect. The public entity must seriously consider this point,
and frame its communication to lead people to make a decision more from the point
of view of the public and long-term benefit.
Neutral
4
Without explanation With explanation
3.5
2.5
1.5
1
Road pricing Number plate regulation Inflow regulation
Definitely
disagree
Fig. 11.2 Average value of acceptance of three structural solutions
0.6
Without explanation With explanation
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
Road pricing Number plate regulation Inflow regulation
Fig. 11.3 Change in pros and cons by the strength of regulations
11.3 Procedural Fairness
In this way, fairness regarding the result has a significant impact on people’s
acceptance, and this fact has begun to be gradually recognized by those involved in
actual administration. Also in recent economics, especially in the field of public
economics that deals with public policies, there is now discussion on “fairness” (or
distributive fairness) (e.g., Kobayashi 2000). Unfortunately, however, we must
admit that when considering resource allocation among siblings or a private
organization it may not be so difficult to theoretically achieve fair distribution, but it
is extremely difficult to do so in a structural strategy involving several thousands, or
sometimes even several millions of people.
For example, when introducing road pricing, it is practically impossible to
strictly reflect in the price charged such factors as the differences in people’s
incomes, or differences in congestion according to area or time. Especially, in the
case of a NIMBY problem which imposes an excessive burden on relatively few
people, it is impossible to ensure distributive fairness.
11.3 Procedural Fairness 193
This then raises the question of if it is ever actually possible for people to regard
a structural strategy as fair, and for society to accept it?
Luckily, research on fairness to date shows we need not be so pessimistic, and
there is a possibility that the expectation of increasing public benefit may enhance
fairness, as pointed out earlier. And a series of research on fairness to date (c.f. Lind
and Tyler 1988; Tanaka 1997; Tyler et al. 1997) importantly show that compared to
distributive fairness (how fair the result of the social decision making will be),
procedural fairness (how fair the administrative decision making process is) has a
greater impact on people’s perceptions of pros and cons (refer to Fig. 11.1). For
instance, Tyler and his collaborators showed that the main factor concerning peo-
ple’s satisfaction toward the Reagan administration’s taxation policy was their
cognition on procedural fairness (Tyler et al. 1985). In addition, they also showed
that the factor with the greatest impact on the election behavior in the 1986 pres-
idential election was the perception of procedural fairness (Rasinski and Tyler
1987). A similar research result is also found in Japan. Regarding special taxation to
protect the nature of Yakushima Island as a World Heritage site, we conducted a
causal analysis on what factors influence the pros and cons concerning the proposed
taxation. As a result, it was revealed that procedural fairness had the largest impact,
more than the actual amount of taxation, and more than the attitude toward
Yakushima Island (Fujii et al. 2002, 2004).
We pointed out earlier that as long as a structural strategy in principle infringes
each person’s freedom, there is a limit to any expected improvement to public
acceptance through mitigating infringement on freedom, and what is needed instead
is to improve fairness. As a discussion in line with this concept, as long as it is in
principle impossible to realize a situation that is completely fair for all people, it is
also impossible to focus only on distributive fairness as a type of fairness, and to
aim for public acceptance of a structural strategy through achieving distributive
fairness.
Therefore, in aiming at public acceptance of a structural strategy, it is essential
not only to secure fairness regarding the “result”, but also to aim to secure fairness
in the “procedure” of administrative decision making. In other words, even when a
structural strategy infringes freedom, and is not completely fair in terms of distri-
bution, if people recognize that its introduction is decided through a fair political
and administrative procedure, there is a good chance that they will agree to its
introduction.
Now, in the past research on procedural fairness, it is revealed that people’s own
involvement in a decision making process is one of the representative conditions to
secure a fair procedure (c.f. Lind and Tyler 1988). One reason for this is that if a
person participates in the decision making process, there is a possibility that they
can contribute to the outcome they desire, in other words there is a possibility to
influence the result. This implies that if you introduce PI (Public Involvement) or
PP (Public Participation) to an administrative procedure, people may regard this
administrative procedure as being fair.
However, procedural fairness can also be improved even if a person cannot

influence the result directly, but rather through a spokesperson representing ordi-
nary people in the administrative process. For instance, regarding an experiment
concerning decision making on the level of taxation, the result reports that if the
decision is based on a questionnaire targeted at people who are randomly chosen
from the population, even when a person is not included as a target of the ques-
tionnaire, there will be an increased possibility that they will regard this decision
making procedure as fair, and there will be an increased tendency to agree to the
introduction of the taxation system (Fujii et al. 2002, 2004). In fact, in one of the
major research works into procedural fairness by Leventhal, representation in
decision making is indicated as one of the important factors securing procedural
fairness (Leventhal 1980).
Now, representativeness (and bias suppression on judgment) indicated by
Leventhal is as follows:
• Representativeness and bias suppression on judgment: means a decision
making process that is not inclined to favor a specific group of people or specific
ideology when making a judgment. It reflects the interest, values, and the
worldview of all target people, or if not possible, the main organization.
According to this definition, in aiming at securing representativeness to guar-
antee procedural fairness, PI, PP, or citizen participation is not necessarily required.
Of course, if many entities are involved in the decision making process, an unbiased
judgment that reflects the average values and the average world view can be made.
However, as long as citizens feel an unbiased decision making process that reflects
the representative values is in place, they do not necessarily feel the need to
participate.
Additionally, Leventhal points out the following as conditions to guarantee
procedural fairness.
• Consistency: Apply a consistent procedure that is not ad hoc.
• Accuracy: Make a policy judgment based on appropriate analysis, not on
inaccurate information or flawed assumptions.
• Correctability: Ensure mistakes can be rectified.
• Ethicality: The decision-making procedure is not against the general moral
good.
These conditions are not directly related to citizen participation or PI. Rather,
they are related to whether the administration who is the decision maker and acting
as an expert “makes a coherent and ethical decision”. All of the above are com-
monly acknowledged, especially theoretically, as those conditions required by
anyone undertaking the task of decision making within an administration.
11.4 Participation in Administration and Trust 195
11.4 Participation in Administration and Trust
However, looking at the world today, it is also true that the voice demanding citizen
participation is stronger than in previous decades. If this impression is correct, why
in recent years has there been an increased demand for citizen participation? Is it
because the current administration procedure compared to those of the past has a
lower standard of correctability, ethicality, or representativeness? But considering
the fact that recent administrations disclose more information, implement PI, and
have introduced more partial citizen participation than before, should not their
procedures be recognized as fair?
The key to solve this question also lies in the set of conditions on procedural
fairness proposed by Leventhal. He does not argue that as soon as such conditions
as representativeness, consistency, ethicality, and accuracy are satisfied, people will
instantly consider the procedure as fair. He only claims that if people recognize that
the procedure entails representativeness, consistency, accuracy, and ethicality, they
will recognize that a procedure is fair. Taking this point into account, the reason
why people recently began to demand citizen participation is not because the actual
fairness in the administrative procedure has declined, but rather that people may
have come to perceive that the administrative procedure is unfair. In other words,
the people’s voice demanding citizen participation became bigger because they
thought as follows: “it seems to me that the administrative process does not entail
representativeness, consistency, accuracy, or ethicality. Their decision-making is
made only to meet the benefit of their own organization or a specific area, and is
based on inaccurate data and irresponsible methods. I cannot trust such an
administration, so I cannot let them make important decisions. In order to make
decisions by ourselves, citizen participation is necessary.”
Considered in this way, the fundamental reason for the current increase in the
demand for citizen participation may be due to the decline in the standard of trust
toward the administration, so-called political distrust.
However, if there is trust in the administration, the voice demanding citizen
participation will not be raised: “I can trust the administration. So I can let them
make important decisions, thus we won’t have to participate in the process.”
In other words, what regulates the standard of demand for citizen participation is
the level of trust in the administration. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 11.1, procedural
fairness should improve to a certain extent if you introduce citizen participation,
which secures people’s influence over the result. However, as long as there is trust
toward the administration, and even if people do not directly participate in it,
Leventhal’s conditions will be met, and they will come to realize that the admin-
istration’s decision-making process is fair (refer to Table 11.1). Moreover, in
consideration of the current situation of most modern states in which indirect
democracy is adopted, we must admit that perfect citizen participation is impossible
in modern states. For this reason, an approach to secure procedural fairness through
participation in the administration can only be supplemental to the main approach in
which procedural fairness is secured through trust in the administration.
Now, it must be stressed here that in order to secure people’s trust in the
administration, it is a minimum prerequisite that the administration actually secures
credibility. Namely, it must actually guarantee the representativeness, consistency,
ethicality, or accuracy in the administrative procedure. Unfortunately, there are still
cases in which the administration is not trusted by people although their credibility
is actually guaranteed. At least, however, it is extremely difficult to maintain the
opposite, namely, a case in which the administration is trusted by people although
there is no actual credibility (i.e., the situation of deceiving and being deceived), as
pointed out in various research to date (c.f. Cook 2001).
Now, at the beginning of this chapter, we introduced Saeki (1980)’s discussion
on the basic direction of research on social decision making. Based on this dis-
cussion, it was pointed out that in order to win public acceptance of a structural
strategy, the first step is for the public entity aiming at its introduction to trust the
ethicality of the general public. Also vice versa, as it was also pointed out that for
the public acceptance of a structural strategy, what is needed in the end is for the
general public to trust the administration.
To conclude, the discussion over public acceptance of a structural strategy
converges to a discussion of how to build a two-way relationship of mutual trust
between the administration and general public.
If this relationship of mutual trust is about to collapse as seen by recent social
trends, or due to Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1982), or
else Tocqueville’s progress of social equality3 (Tocqueville), it is crucial for any
administration wishing to implement a needed structural strategy to find a way to
halt the collapse and to reconstruct the relationship. In order to reconstruct the
relationship of trust, some kind of a trigger is required to start the process, and
assuming that a structural strategy is the “best policy” to solve a social problem, the
administration, as Saeki (1980) claims, needs to stop distrusting the general public
and instead open up first and sincerely speak to them on the necessity of the
structural strategy. Such an open and honest approach may then repair the damaged
relationship between the administration and people regarding the proposed struc-
tural strategy, leading to the acceptance of the strategy, the solving of the social
dilemma and the greater benefit of society. Of course, such a procedure is easier to
describe than do, but however difficult it may be, it cannot be an excuse to fail to
make an effort to build a relationship of trust between the administration and the
general public.
3
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) commented that the French Revolution is a part of a
two-layered progress of social equality that has been developing little by little for more than one
thousand years. One of the signs of progress is a stream showing the declining social status of the
upper classes, and the other is a stream of the improving social status of the mass of people. He
argues that in this stream of equalization, the mass of people will become the majority, and their
opinion becomes a “queen in the world”, as they gradually “stop trusting and respecting” a specific
class (Tocqueville 1838).
11.5 Conclusion 197
11.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the public acceptance of a structural strategy, and it is

apparent that decreasing any infringement on freedom, mitigating unfairness, and
promoting citizen participation as much as possible should all be effective measures
to enhance people’s acceptance, as shown in Fig. 11.1. However, all of these
methods are not essential in aiming at gaining public acceptance of a structural
strategy. It is because:
• In principle, a structural strategy is a public policy designed to infringe on
people’s freedom and rights,
• There is no such thing as an administrative policy that is completely fair for all
people, and
• In a highly complicated contemporary nation adopting indirect democracy, it is
realistically impossible to presume perfect citizen participation.
Instead, if we truly aim at gaining public acceptance of a structural strategy, it is
argued that the following three points are needed, as shown in Table 11.1;
• Instead of decreasing infringement on freedom, aim at enhancing fairness.
• In order to enhance fairness, instead of sweeping away unfairness, facilitate the
formation of expectation toward increasing public benefit, as well as improving
procedural fairness.
• In order to improve procedural fairness, instead of promoting citizen partici-
pation, restore and encourage people’s trust in the administration.
Measures such as citizen participation, discussion on fairness, and mitigating the
infringement on freedom can be effective only when there is a certain degree of
fairness, especially procedural fairness, and trust in the administration, and it can
never be the other way around.
Now, let us focus on the following points; infringement on freedom involves
avoiding infringing the freedom to have your own private benefit, distributive
fairness refers to fairness concerning the relationship between the benefit of others
and your own private benefit, and citizen participation is related to the desire to
influence the result in the best direction to fulfill your own private benefit.
Therefore, all of these factors have a self-centered aspect related to private benefit,
as shown in Fig. 11.1. On the other hand, fairness against infringement on freedom,
procedural fairness against distributive fairness, and trust in the administration
against citizen participation, are all ethical factors attributed to ethical judgment,
rather than primarily concerning your own private benefit. What is more, as shown
in Fig. 11.1, research on public acceptance, fairness, and trust show that fortu-
nately, ethical factors play a dominant role in comparison to self-centered factors.
If we suppose that a structural strategy is indispensable for solving a social
dilemma, when we try to actually implement it, we cannot avoid the problem of
public acceptance. And the factors supporting public acceptance and people’s
tendency to spontaneously look forward to a structural strategy are the ethical

factors of fairness, especially procedural fairness, and trust.
Taking into account the fact that a structural strategy has the nature of “inhibiting
the maximization of short-term, self-centered benefit in its structure”, we may even
conclude that it is a logical consequence that what supports the tendency of a
society to spontaneously look forward to its introduction is actually people’s eth-
icality. Therefore, when considering public acceptance of a real-life social policy by
referring to Table 11.1, we find what is most required is the effort “to invoke and
inspire people’s ethicality, listen to their wants derived from their innate ethicality,
and thereby construct an ethical society” (Saeki 1980).
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
The purpose of this book is to offer insights into solving a broad range of social
problems such as those found in transportation, urban life, and environment. Based
on the assumption that one of the most effective approaches is to model these
real-life social problems as social dilemmas, and by drawing on a variety of
research, this book theoretically, empirically, and practically discussed how to
implement social policies that can solve social dilemmas in reality.
In concluding this book, we will review why this book employed the social
dilemma theoretical framework as a basis of discussing social problems.
In the first place, the term social dilemma refers to a situation in which if all
people behave according to their “self-centered benefit” and not according to the
“public benefit,” each person’s self-centered benefit will decrease. Therefore, we
can derive an inevitable, theoretical consequence that as long as a specific social
problem has the structure of a social dilemma, if each person behaves only
according to their self-centered benefit, then the social problem can never be solved.
For this reason, if an administrator is facing a social problem with an internalized
structure of a social dilemma, they must abandon any optimistic belief that “this
social problem can be solved easily.”
What we refer to as an optimistic belief is an attitude that the problem should be
easily solved, sometime soon and quite naturally by a wonderful idea, and the only
thing needed is to find that idea. Such optimism may foster such opinions as: “let
the young people brainstorm a wonderful idea, and solve the problem right away as
if by magic,” or “if we exchange different opinions, we may find an unexpected
idea, and solve the problem,” or “it seems that a system introduced in a foreign
country has solved the problem. If we can somehow introduce the same system,
then the problem in our country too may be solved right away as if by magic.”
Yet, we must acknowledge that by adopting such approaches or importing
systems from other countries, a number of problems may actually be solved (Jacobs
1992). In fact, as discussed in Sect. 9.2 of this book, it is also true that there are
cases in which a small trigger may dramatically switch the majority from behaving
defectively to cooperatively. However, we must remember that such cases exist
202 12 Conclusion
only when people’s moral tendencies are sufficiently high. As pointed out already in
Sect. 9.2(3), when the moral tendency is low, there is no equilibrium solution that
can involve a spontaneous cooperative behavior.
In other words, if the target problem is a social dilemma, all the optimistic
solutions will be rejected by people, because a social dilemma implies a social
situation in which when all people only consider their self-centered benefit, they
will eventually suffer a big loss. Therefore, there is no way to solve a social
dilemma other than somehow avoiding a situation in which people only reconsider
their self-centered benefit. It is thus hard to expect any simple idea to change this
situation easily.
The reason why this book argued that it is effective to recapture a social problem
as a social dilemma is because the theoretical concept of a social dilemma as such
includes a theoretical implication and warns against this kind of optimistic prospect.
This book expects that only by dropping our optimistic perceptions, will we be able
to truly confront the real essence of a particular social problem for the first time.
Namely, this book by confronting reality, offers the hopeful prospect that by
recapturing a social problem as a social dilemma, various theoretical and empirical
research focused on social dilemma may begin to be practically applied by an
administration. In other words, by regarding an actual problem as a social dilemma,
we can clearly grasp the core of the social problem, and at the same time, acquire a
“prescription” to cure the heart of the problem.
Based on this recognition, Part II of this book discussed psychological strategies
which encourage people’s cooperation through drawing on their psychological
facts, and Part III discussed structural strategies which encourage people’s coop-
eration through working on environmental factors.
Part II introduced three types of psychological strategies: providing objective
information, methods of facilitating experience, and communication methods.
Based on various empirical researches to date, it was discussed that such methods
have the possibility to lead to behavior change and cooperation. In addition, it was
pointed out that as long as people have a moral obligation and think “we should
conduct a cooperative behavior,” we may encourage their cooperation through
various psychological strategies, even if their moral obligation itself is not directly
activated. At the end of Part II, however, it was indicated that the upper limit of
people’s cooperative tendency in a social dilemma is restricted by the level of moral
obligation, and, for that reason, the most important factor in considering a psy-
chological strategy as a social policy was to consider ways to activate people’s
moral obligation.
Next, Part III pointed out that structural strategies are required to solve a social
dilemma, but since they may have unexpected side effects, when introduced, we
need to be very careful and consider the best decision-making frame to encourage
people to recognize the problem not as a “business matter” but as an “ethical
matter.” On the other hand, it was indicated that it is inevitable that various
high-order social dilemmas occur when implementing a structural strategy. It was
also argued that whether people spontaneously accept the structural strategy,
namely, the problem of “public acceptance” is a key to deciding whether the
12 Conclusion 203
structural strategy can actually be implemented. After that, by overviewing various

psychological factors influencing public acceptance, it was pointed out that among
these psychological factors a sense of ethicality is the most needed attribute.
The above is a brief outline of the discussions of this book, but all of these
discussions may coherently indicate the following conclusion:
What is most needed for solving any social dilemma is to activate people’s
“public spirit.”
We can also rephrase this conclusion that, as stressed a number of times, the
most fundamental method of solving a social dilemma is to facilitate a shift in the
“focus” of people who only consider around the origin in Fig. 1.1, namely, those
who consider only the benefit of “here and now” (Fujii and Takemura 2001; Fujii
et al. 2002; Takemura 1994). We need to encourage a shift in the direction of
considering a longer term, more public benefit.
As stated several times, the arguments in this book match with those ideas
Robyn Dawes emphasized in his paper defining the concepts of a “social dilemma”
(Dawes 1980). He mentioned the key factors needed for solving social dilemmas
are knowledge, trust, and morality, and he strongly argued that of the three,
morality would play the most important role. When social dilemma was theoreti-
cally defined as a conflict between public and private benefit, or whether people
cooperate for the greater public benefit or defect for their own private benefit, it was
probably at this moment that morality or public spirit was destined to take center
stage and always play the most important role in solving any social dilemma.
However, this is definitely not a theoretically boring conclusion.
Since human history began, any problem involving morality and ethics has
always been “theoretically” the most interesting theme that has troubled vast
numbers of the very finest minds.
Since Socrates and Plato discussed, “what is justice,” it has been a central theme
of philosophy, and one of the approaches to unlock its secrets is found within the
framework of social dilemma research, as described in Sect. 11.4. In fact, in the age
of Socrates and Plato when there were no constituent concepts such as Game
Theory or social dilemmas, they continued to argue by bringing out their own
constituent concepts which were nothing other than the same problems we find in
today’s social dilemmas (c.f. Plato).
Furthermore, it is definitely not a conclusion that is practically hopeless either.
As shown through the results of many studies, people’s awareness and behavior
may change from a self-centered direction to one with public spirit. We have seen
examples where people have accepted a structural strategy that infringes on their
freedom by just receiving a simple explanation on its public benefit, or how a
pamphlet encouraged environmentally friendly transportation behavior, or helped
decrease illegal bike parking. In addition, we know that through receiving basic
advice, or by just a request to create a behavioral plan of cooperation, those people
204 12 Conclusion
who continued defective behavior, even though they were motivated to cooperate,
actually conducted cooperative behavior more often. Based on these facts, the
conclusion that it is crucial to appeal to people’s public spirit for solving social
dilemmas is definitely not a practically hopeless conclusion, but we may say it is
rather an uplifting and welcome conclusion.
Of course, we would be foolish to claim we have acquired sufficient knowledge
and the techniques required to “invoke and inspire people’s ethicality, listen to their
wants derived from their innate ethicality” (Saeki 1980). In this regard, the fol-
lowing are several important issues we need to tackle in the future:
• Education and Social value: It has been studied that there is a very close
relationship between “public spirit” or “ethicality” that is known to promote
cooperation, and social values (Schwartz 1992; Stern et al. 1999; Nordlund and
Garvill 2002; Thøgersen and Ölander 2002). In order to discover the most
fundamental knowledge needed for solving a social dilemma, there are many
aspects that need to be revealed in the relationship between social values and
cooperation, as well as the foundation of how social values are formed through
educational process.
• Examination of more effective psychological strategies: This book discussed
various kinds of psychological strategies for soliciting cooperation, but there are
many other possible methods. Especially, there has been insufficient examina-
tion into how to effectively combine various individual techniques. For instance,
in order to facilitate people’s sustainable behavioral change, we may consider a
method to repeatedly communicate with the same individual on a regular basis.
Additionally, a psychological strategy may exercise a greater effect if it is
implemented at the same time as a structural strategy. These issues are not
sufficiently examined yet.
• Cooperation as an organization: This book dealt with social dilemma as a form
of conflict between an individual benefit and social benefit, and as an approach
to resolve it, we focused on the process in which each person changes their
behavior to cooperation. However, in a social dilemma in real society, the
behavior of various “organizations” such as a company, a local government, and
the central government may exercise a great influence (Biel and Thøgersen
2003). In other words, it is possible to restate social dilemma as a form of
conflict between the benefits of three different levels of entities, that is, the
individual, the organization, and society. There is little knowledge on how to
change an “organization” that repeats a defective behavior toward becoming
more cooperative.
• Accumulation of practical application cases: Whether it is a psychological
strategy, about the introductory frame of a structural strategy, or an issue of
public acceptance, most cases to date have been in the experimental stage. Of
course, in order to attempt to solve actual social problems, it is needless to point
out that such experimental research plays an extremely important role. However,
undoubtedly when the experimental results are applied to real-life social prob-
lems, many unexpected issues and points will require discussion. In order to
12 Conclusion 205
tackle these issues, it is important to accumulate knowledge on a variety of cases

applied in actual practice.
In addition to the above, there remain many large and small research subjects. In
order also to cope with these remaining issues, it is essential that various types of
research efforts are made by as many researchers and administrators as possible, for
the purpose of solving social dilemmas in reality. Any such research efforts must be
scientific as well as practical; theoretical as well as empirical; and must handle
micro-phenomena as well as capturing macro-phenomena. By accumulating the
findings of such comprehensive, multilateral research, we will find further clues to
overcoming social dilemmas, and play a part in the arrival of an “ethical society.”
For that day to come, there remain numerous tasks for us to undertake.
References
Biel, A., & Thøgersen, J. (2003). The interaction of values and norms to promote sustainable
consumption and production. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Sustainable
Consumption, 91–98.
Fujii, S., & Takemura, K. (2001). Risk attitude and attention: a psychometric analysis of framing
Fujii, S., Takemura, K., & Kikkawa, T. (2002). Decision making process and consensus building:
a strategy to restraining an egoistic motivation in social dilemmas. Journal of Japan Society of
Jacobs, J. (1992). Systems of survival, a dialogue on the moral foundations of commerce and
politics. New York: Random House, Inc.
Nordlund, A. M., & Garvill, J. (2002). Value structures behind proenvironmental behavior.
Environment and Behavior, 34, 740–756.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and
empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York: Academic Press.
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A., & Kalof, L. (1999). A value-belief-norm theory
of support for social movements: The case of environmentalism. Human Ecology Review, 6,
81–97.
Takemura, K. (1994). Theoretical explanation of the framing effect: situation-dependent focusing
Thøgersen, J., & Ölander, F. (2002). Human values and the emergence of a sustainable
consumption pattern: A panel study. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 605–630.
Appendix
Scale of Each Psychological Factor
The following is an explanation on the scales used to measure psychological factors

such as attitude, habit, and moral obligation, in the research referred to in this book.
Unless otherwise stated below, these scales have been checked for sufficient
credibility (0.7 or more) based on Cronbach’s alpha analysis (Fujii 2002).
Therefore, when conducting research or an experiment measuring these psy-
chological factors, the questions listed here can be considered as one of the most
reliable criteria.
• Attitude on car use (bus use / train use) and personal norm
In Fujii and Kitamura (2003), Fujii and Taniguchi (2003), and Fujii et al. (to be
published), the following questionnaire was used. The total value (or the average
value) of the scales of the first four questions were defined as a scale of attitude, and
the total value (or the average value) of the scales of the latter two questions were
defined as a scale of the personal norm. Incidentally, for a scale of attitude con-
cerning the bus and train, the same questionnaire was used but with the word “car”
changed to “bus” or “train”.
(Attitude)
Very boring Neutral Very enjoyable

Is “travelling by car”
enjoyable?
Does “travelling by car” Not pleasant at all Neutral Very pleasant
give you a pleasant
feeling?
Hate it Neutral Love it
Do you like “travelling by
car”?
Very uncomfortable Neutral Very comfortable
Is “travelling by car”
comfortable?

S. Fujii, Prescription for Social Dilemmas, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55618-3
208 Appendix: Scale of Each Psychological Factor
(Personal norm)
Are people around you in Very unfavorable Neutral Very favorable

favor of you using your
car?
Are p eople around you Very negative Neutral Very positive
positive about you using
your car?
• Habit
This is a method used in Fujii and Gärling (2003), Fujii and Kitamura (2003),
Fujii and Taniguchi (2003), and Fujii et al. (to be published). Similar indices are
used by Gärling et al. (2001). The strength of habit of each transportation method is
defined by the number of times a participant chooses a particular transportation
method from among the choices in the following questionnaire.
These are questions on transportation behavior under a virtual situation.
Please answer them intuitively, not thinking too much, and as quickly as
possible.
What mode of transportation do you use when □Car □Train □Bus

visiting your friend’s house? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going clothes shopping? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going to watch a movie? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going out for lunch? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going out for dinner? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going to the beach? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going skiing? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going to a hospital? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going to a convenience store? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
going to a book shop? □Bike □Walking □Moto □other
Appendix: Scale of Each Psychological Factor 209
• Various psychological factors assumed in the process model for behavioral

change toward inhibiting car use
The following are the indices used by Fujii and Taniguchi (2003).
(Awareness of consequences as a preceding factor for moral obligation to inhibit
car use)
The following three scales were measured. However, according to the credibility
analysis, we could not obtain sufficient credibility between them, so each was used
separately for analysis.
– “Do you think that ‘travelling by car’ is not a good behavior?”
– “Do you think that ‘travelling by car’ is not good for the environment?”
– “Do you think that ‘travelling by car’ is not good for society?”
! Five-grade scales from “I do not think so at all” to “I strongly think so”
These are scales of psychological factors assumed in Norm Activation Theory.
In this case, we only measured the above awareness of consequences. But in
Norm Activation Theory, we can also think of other factors, such as:
– Ascribed responsibility
(“Do you think it is each driver’s responsibility to inhibit travelling by car?” or
“I think it is one of my responsibilities to inhibit travelling by car”)
– Moral obligation
(“Do you think you should inhibit travelling by car?” or
“From a moral point of view, do you think it is necessary to inhibit travelling by
car?”)
The following are scales of psychological factors assumed in Theory of Planned
Behavior, as well as Gollwitzer’s Theory of Implementation Intention.
(Personal norm of inhibiting car use)
We measured the following two scales. However, according to the credibility
analysis, we could not obtain sufficient credibility between them, so each was used
separately for analysis.
– “Do people around you such as your family agree/disagree to your behavior to
‘inhibit car use’?”
! Five-grade scales from “I think they disagree” to “I think they agree”
– “Do people around you such as your family think ‘travelling by car’ is a bad
behavior?”
! Five-grade scales from “They think it is a good behavior” to “They think it is
a bad behavior”
(Perceived behavioral control on inhibiting car use)
We measured the following two scales in five grades from “I do not think so at
all” to “I strongly think so”. We then added the two (and multiply by -1) to
configure the scale of perceived behavioral control.
– “Do you think it requires a great effort to inhibit car use?”
– “Do you think it is difficult to ‘inhibit car use’?”

(Behavioral intention of inhibiting car use)
We measured the following two scales, and added them to configure the scale.
– “Do you have a feeling of ‘let’s inhibit car use as much as possible’?”
! Five-grade scale from “Not at all” to “I have a strong feeling”
– “Do you think ‘let’s inhibit car use as much as possible’?”
! Five-grade scale from “I don’t think so at all” to “I strongly think so”
(Decision making commitment of inhibiting car use)
Implementation intention refers to the “strength of intention to implement a
behavioral plan that you created”, and in order to measure it accurately, it is
necessary to identify each “behavioral plan” created by each person, and to measure
how much that person has an intention to implement it. So it is realistically
impossible to measure them individually. Thus it is proposed to use a proxy
variable of implementation intention to measure the decision making commitment
(Rise et al. 2000; Fujii 2005).
Therefore, Fujii and Taniguchi (2003) measured the following two scales, and
added them to configure the scale of decision making commitment as a proxy
variable of implementation intention.
– “Are you making an effort to ‘inhibit car use as much as possible’?”
– “Do you take some ‘actions to inhibit car use as much as possible’?”
! Five-grade scale from “I do not do it at all” to “I do it a lot”
• Various psychological factors in Norm Activation Theory

In Fujii (2000), each of the awareness of consequences, ascribed responsibility,
moral obligation, and behavioral intention was configured based on the following
questions, by adding up the answers in seven grades from ‘I do not think so at all”
to “I strongly think so”.
(Awareness of consequences on transportation behavior in the city center in
consideration of the environment)
– I very much like visiting historical and cultural heritage sites in Kyoto.
– Kyoto’s tradition and culture is important.
– At the moment, Kyoto’s tradition and culture is vanishing.
– At the moment, what makes Kyoto uniquely Kyoto (Kyoto’s identity) is
vanishing.
– Leaving bikes in the city center of Kyoto deprives Kyoto of its identity.
– Visiting the city center of Kyoto by car deprives Kyoto of its identity.
(Ascribed responsibility on transportation behavior in the city center in con-
sideration of the environment)
– Each person who lives and visits Kyoto has a responsibility to maintain Kyoto’s
tradition and culture.
– It is the city or the government rather than citizens who bear the responsibility of
maintaining Kyoto’s tradition and culture.
(Moral obligation on transportation behavior in the city center in consideration
of the environment)
– Kyoto’s tradition and culture should be maintained in future.
– There should not be a situation in which Kyoto’s identity is lost.
– You should not leave a bike in the city center of Kyoto.
– Leaving bikes in the city center of Kyoto is a behavior that is problematic from a
moral point of view.
– You should not visit the city center of Kyoto by car.
– Visiting the city center of Kyoto by car is a behavior that is problematic from a
moral point of view.
(Behavioral intention on transportation behavior in the city center in consider-
ation of the environment)
– I don’t leave a bike in the city center of Kyoto.
– I don’t visit the city center of Kyoto by bike.
– When I visit the city center of Kyoto, I use bus or metro.
– I agree to the “regulation of inflow of cars to the city center of Kyoto”.
– I agree to the “regulation of inflow of bikes to the city center of Kyoto”.
– I think I should conduct a behavior that is good for maintaining Kyoto’s tra-
ditions and culture, even if it may cause a little inconvenience in my life.
• Environmental awareness
In Fujii et al. (2001, 2003), we measured each of the following questions in nine
grades from “I do not think so at all” to “I strongly think so”, and summed all of
them to configure a scale of environmental awareness.
In addition, Gärling et al. (2003) also measured environmental awareness using
the questionnaire below, but in this analysis, we did not regard environmental
awareness as one psychological factor, as in Fujii et al. (2001, 2003) did, but
analyzed them by structuring according to Norm Activation Theory.
When doing so, we estimated each psychological factor described in brackets,
structured individual scales for each of them, and then analyzed the results.
(Awareness of social consequences)
– I think that environmental pollution has a negative impact on our health, more
than we imagine.
– I think that environmental pollution in one country may threaten the health of
people around the world.
(Awareness of self-centered consequences)
– I think that laws on environmental protection restrict my freedom.

– I think that environmental protection is not desirable from the point of view of
people’s employment.
(Awareness of natural consequences)
– I think that harmony with nature is delicate, and it can easily collapse.
– I think that in the next several decades, more than several thousands of species
will become extinct.
(Awareness of general consequences)
– I think that I cannot ignore the current issues concerning the environment.
– I do not think so much about environmental issues.
(Ascribed responsibility)
– I think that all members of society should have responsibility for the
environment.
– I think that it is important that each person cares about the environment.
– I think that the government or nation should bear responsibility for the envi-
ronment, and not the general public.
(Moral obligation)
– I feel that I should care about environmental issues as a moral duty.
– I feel that I should care about environmental issues in daily life.
In Fujii and Taniguchi (2003) and Fujii (2003), in order to simply measure the
degree of environmental awareness, we extracted the following four questions from
the above list of questions in order to configure the scale of environmental
awareness. For each of the following questions, we measured them in five grades
from “I do not think so at all” to “I strongly think so”, and summed them up.
– Do you think that you should care about environmental issues?
– Do you care about environmental issues in your daily life?
– Do you think it is necessary that each person cares about the environment?
– Do you think that you cannot ignore the current issues concerning the
environment?
• Social value orientation

We requested people to intuitively answer the following nine questions.
Each question consists of the following three: “a choice that your portion is the
maximum”, “a choice that the sum of both parties’ portion is the maximum”, and “a
choice that the difference between the parties is the maximum”.
Then, we counted the number of times participants chose each choice.
Next, we defined an individual as proself if they selected six or more choices that
“your portion is the maximum”, or six or more choices that “the difference between
the parties is the maximum”. We defined an individual as prosocial if they selected

six or more choices that “the sum of both parties’ portion is the maximum”.
When it was not possible to categorize by using this definition, we regarded that
measurement by this test had failed, and did not assign the participant to either
category. In examples introduced in this book, Eek et al. (2002) used this method.
Assume the following nine cases (choices) that decide the portions allocated to
two people.
Please select one choice intuitively, and circle either of A, B, or C.
(Choice 1)
A. Your portion is 480 and the counterpart’s portion is 80.
B. Your portion is 540 and the counterpart’s portion is 280.
C. Your portion is 480 and the counterpart’s portion is 480.
(Choice 2)
(Choice 3)
(Choice 4)
(Choice 5)
(Choice 6)
(Choice 7)
(Choice 8)

(Choice 9)
References
Eek, D., Loukopoulos, P., Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2002). Spill-over effects of intermittent costs for
defection in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 801–813.
Fujii, S. (2000). Analysis on influence of a graduate school lecture on the student awareness of
driving a car into the center of Kyoto City (unpublished data). (in Japanese)
Fujii, S. (2002). Social psychological approach to transportation behavior analysis. In R. Kitamura
& T. Morikawa (Eds.), Analyzing and modeling travel behavior, Gihodo Shuppan (pp. 35–52).
(in Japanese).
Fujii, S. (2003). Analysis on psychological factors of accepting a TDM policy (unpublished data).
(in Japanese).
Fujii, S. (2005). Reducing inappropriate bicycle-parking through persuasive communication.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35(6), 1171–1196.
behavioral plans: An experimental analysis of travel behavior feedback programs. In Prepared
for 9th International Association for Travel Behavior Research Conference, Lucerne,
Switzerland.
Fujii, S., Gärling, T., & Jakobsson, C. (2001). Public acceptance of road pricing and environmental
concern: a psychological strategy for solution of social dilemmas in transportation.
Infrastructure Planning Review, 18(4), 773–778. (in Japanese with English abstract)
Fujii, S., Gärling, T., Jakobsson, C., & Jou, R. C. (2003). A cross-country study of fairness and
infringement on freedom as determinants of public acceptance of road pricing. Transportation.
Gärling, T., Fujii, S., Gärling, A., & Jakobsson, C. (2003). Moderating effects of social value
orientation on determinants of proenvironmental behavior intention. Journal of Environmental
Rise, J., Thompson, M., & Verplanken, B. (2000). The intention-behavior relation:
Implementation intention and commitment. In Presented at XXVII International Congress of
Psychology, Stockholm, Sweden.
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Satoshi Fujii

Prescription for Social

ISBN 978-4-431-55617-6 ISBN 978-4-431-55618-3 (eBook)

© Springer Japan 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

At my home in Murasakino, Kyoto, Japan Satoshi Fujii

“scientiﬁc” understanding of a phenomenon, we present a multi-faceted approach to

At my home in Suginami, Tokyo, Japan Satoshi Fujii

Part I Theories for Social Dilemmas

4.6 Realization of Behavior Change: Formation of Habitual

Part II Psychological Strategy

8.5 Activation of Moral Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Part III Structural Strategy

Appendix: Scale of Each Psychological Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

• Many social problems can be conceived of as social dilemmas (Chap. 1).

1.1 Social Dilemmas in Daily Life

Simply stated, social dilemmas underpin almost all social problems.

© Springer Japan 2017 3

As a more macroscale problem, there is the issue of the global environment. If

grows to have massive negative consequences for society as a whole. Of course,

1.2 Theoretical Deﬁnitions of Social Dilemma

1.3 Pragmatic Deﬁnition of Social Dilemma

This deﬁnition can also be rephrased as follows:

For instance, in an ideal market economy, if producers aim to maximize their

Additionally, a social dilemma caused by a political problem often accompanies

Time Scope of benefit considered

Fig. 1.1 Scope of beneﬁt considered for cooperation and defection

Social dilemma: a social situation in which a choice has to be made between a

Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.

In order to examine the pragmatic methods of solving social dilemmas, it is

2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma

© Springer Japan 2017 11

Keep silent Make a confession

Choices 3 years (R) 1 year (T)

15 years (S) 10 years (P)

confession 1 year (T) 10 years (P)

Condition 1: T < R < P < S

2.2 N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma

The number of cooperators

Fig. 2.2 Beneﬁt structure of n-person prisoner’s dilemma

2.3 Commons Dilemma

2.4 Public Goods Dilemma

2.5 Social Trap and Social Fence

Scope of benefit considered for cooperation

Present Social distance

2.6 Chicken Dilemma

Temptation [ Reward [ Punishment [ Sucker’s payoff

But instead of this relationship, if the following relationship is realized, it is

Temptation [ Reward [ Sucker’s payoff [ Punishment

Incidentally, this inequality sign is based on deﬁning each variable as a proﬁt.

2.7 Step-Level Dilemma and Volunteer’s Dilemma

Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.

3.1 Structural Strategy and Psychological Strategy

© Springer Japan 2017 19

Fig. 3.1 Structural strategy and psychological (behavioral) strategy

Solutions of social dilemmas

Method of providing objective information

Advice method: Advise how to conduct a cooperative behavior.