A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC.

March 7, 2006]

RE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMMITED BY JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, RTC, BR. 27,
GINGOOG CITY

En Banc

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court dated MAR. 7, 2006

A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC (Re: Sexual Harassment Committed by Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Gingoog City)

This refers to the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated 14 December 2005, to wit:

Two (2) women filed separate complaints for sexual harassment against Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot. The first is
Sherlita O. Tan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City and the other is Johanna
M. Villafranca, Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office. Both are married.

Ms. Tan's ordeal started in August 2004 when she refused an invitation from Judge Pacuribot to have dinner.
On October 4, 2004, Judge Pacuribot sent her a text message saying that his blood pressure went up because
she refused to go out with him.

On October 20, 2004, Ms. Tan was attending a wedding at Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro when Judge
Pacuribot called her on the mobile phone asking when she will be back in Gingoog City. She said that she will
leave immediately after the wedding and she will just take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal. Judge Pacuribot said
that she would fetch Ms. Tan from the hotel. Ms. Tan declined the offer but Judge Pacuribot angrily insisted on
the ground that he was already waiting outside the hotel. Ms. Tan, who was now scared, went out and got in
the car. However, instead of bringing Ms. Tan to the terminal, Judge Pacuribot brought her to a motel. When
she protested (sic) Judge Pacuribot harshly told her to -"Shut up! As if you are a virgin!" x x x.

Judge Pacuribot and Ms. Tan left the motel but instead of going to the terminal, he brought her to the Discovery
Hotel saying that it would be better for Ms. Tan to sleep there instead of traveling alone. Judge Pacuribot left
Ms. Tan alone in the room because he had to attend a Masonic Conference. She however could not leave
because she did not have enough money to pay the balance of the hotel bill. At around 7 a.m. of the following
morning, Judge Pacuribot arrived. Ms. Tan's ordeal started all over again.

xxxx

Back in the office, the harassment continued. Whenever Ms. Tan would go inside Judge Pacuribot's chamber,
the latter would grab her blouse, mash her breast, kiss her, touch the crutch (sic) of her pants, pull the string of
her panty and kiss her neck while saying that she smelt so sweet. Judge Pacuribot got angry when Ms. Tan
refused to answer his text messages and insinuated that this will have an adverse effect on her performance
rating.

Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca, on the other hand, was initially the recipient of amorous text messages from Judge
Pacuribot with invitations for dinner. Ms. Villafranca was wary of these invitations because both of them are
married. She refused all of these invitations but Judge Pacuribot was persistent forcing her to request for a
transfer, which was however denied. In the last week of February 2005, she got a call from Judge Pacuribot
who was furious. According to him, he was an honorable person and yet Ms. Villafranca refused his invitations.
Consumed by fear, she finally relented and accepted a dinner invitation on February 22, 2005.

While inside his car, Judge Pacuribot displayed his firearm, which was allegedly for security purposes. It
nevertheless intensified Ms. Villafranca's fear. Instead of going to a restaurant, Judge Pacuribot drove to a
drive-in motel x x x.

xxxx

From that day, Judge Pacuribot constantly demanded that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages and letters
expressing sweet nonsense to feed his ego and any failure or refusal would be met by a threat to divulge the
incident in the motel.

xxxx

Then Judge Pacuribot started demanding food from Ms. Villafranca, which the latter was supposed to bring to
his boarding house. If she refused, Judge Pacuribot would threaten to tell damaging stories to her mother-in-
law with whom she had a strained relation and to show the picture he took on the cell phone. Because of these
threats, Ms. Villafranca was forced to bring some food to Judge Pacuribot. x x x.
When Judge Pacuribot sensed that she was not going to file an annulment case, he drafted a document wherein
it was stated that Ms. Villafranca and her husband supposedly agreed that they may freely co-habit with a third
person. Judge Pacuribot, using threats of physical and social harm, forced Ms. Villafranca and her husband to
sign the document.

When Ms. Villafranca still did not file the annulment case, Judge Pacuribot slapped her and hit her head with a
clenched fist. Again he placed a kiss mark on her neck and when her husband saw it, he beat her up. When
Judge Pacuribot knew of the beating, he forced Ms. Villafranca to file a rape case but she refused.

xxxx

The complainants filed their complaints personally before the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Christopher
O. Lock. Although Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca knew each other professionally, their meeting at the said office
was purely coincidental and they had no idea that the other was likewise the victim of Judge Pacuribot. Ms. Tan
and Ms. Villafranca tearfully related to Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock their harrowing experience
at the hands of Judge Pacuribot.

The investigation of Ms. Tan's complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation of the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City while that of Ms. Villafranca falls within the jurisdiction
of this Office since she is not an employee of the judiciary. In either case, the seriousness of the offense calls
for a full blown investigation and for this purpose it is necessary to suspend Judge Pacuribot. His suspension
from office will serve not only to protect the principal witnesses against harassment but will also prevent him
from committing further acts of sexual harassment. The fact that two (2) women filed these complaints
independent of each other and that the allegations therein show a consistent pattern of sexual deviancy,
present a prima facie case against Judge Pacuribot whose immediate suspension is demanded by the
circumstances.

In the same Memorandum, the OCA recommended that:

1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the Committee on Decorum and Investigation of the regional
Trial court (sic) of Gingoog City for investigation;

2. The complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca be docketed as a regular administrative matter;

3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of Ms. Villafranca; and

4. Judge Pacuribot be suspended immediately until further orders from this Court.

After painstaking consideration of the facts and existing laws, this Court finds the foregoing recommendations
not to be wholly in consonance with, as in fact it contravenes, Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,[1]cralaw providing for the manner by which complaints against Judges of
regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals[2]cralaw are investigated, in relation to the Supreme Court's constitutionally guaranteed power of
administrative supervision [3]cralawover all courts and the personnel thereof.

Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, categorically provides that:

Sec. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the expiration
of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the
matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case
for investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a
Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent
is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial
Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.

By virtue of the aforequoted provision, Section 8 of Administrative Circular No. 03-03-1 3-SC[4]cralaw, the Rule
on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the
Judiciary, which provides for the referral of work related sexual harassment complaints committed by officials
and employees of the Judiciary, necessarily including Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, but excluding the members of this Court
and the Judicial and Bar Council, to committees on decorum and investigation[5]cralaw(CODIs), appears to
furtively dilute the exclusivity of this Court's constitutionally guaranteed power of administrative supervision
which necessarily includes the authority to discipline Judges and Justices.

Section 8 of the Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work
Decorum in the Judiciary states that:

Sec, 8. Jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the CODIs. - The CODIs shall have jurisdiction over all
complaints for sexual harassment committed by officials and employees of the Judiciary. They shall:
(a) Receive the complaint, investigate its allegations, and submit a report and recommendation to the proper
court or authority, as provided for in Section 18 of this Rule;

x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]

The composition[6]cralaw of a particular CODI, to all intents and purposes, partly grants rank and file employees
of courts the competence to recommend administrative sanctions over Judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals thereby potentially
diminishing the authority of this Court over the position, the person and the courts over which they preside.
Appropriately, this Court deems it prudent to exclude said Judges and Justices from the ambit of the jurisdiction
of CODIs as provided under Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC.

Moreover, upon their assumption to office, Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals cease to be ordinary citizens. They become the
visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. The public look up to them as the epitome of
integrity and justice. For this reason, as this Court has stated in the case of Aquino v. Acosta[7]cralaw,
"[a]dministrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care, for
proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the
entire judiciary as well." Thus, ever mindful of such propensity, investigations of sexual harassment complaints
involving Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals must be kept in strictest confidentiality - quite relatively unrealistic in proceedings vis-a-
vis referral of a sexual harassment complaint to a group or panel as laid down by the subject rule.

In fine, the referral of Ms. Sherlita Tan's sexual harassment complaint against Judge Rexel Pacuribot to the
CODI of the RTC of Gingoog City for investigation, report and recommendation, contravenes Section 3 of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court and limits, nay, weakens this Court's constitutionally mandated disciplining authority
over Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals, besides exposing the courts to ridicule and derision.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby Resolved, that in accordance with Section 6, Article VIII of
the Constitution vesting this Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts and personnel
thereof, inclusive of which is the authority to discipline Judges and Justices, complaints of sexual harassment
against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the CODIs. Accordingly, Section 8 of A.M. No.
03-03-13-SC, the Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work
Decorum in the Judiciary is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 8. Jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the CODIs. - The CODIs shall have jurisdiction over all
complaints for sexual harassment committed by officials and employees of the Judiciary, except those against
Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals, which shall fundamentally adhere to the proceeding laid down in Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, as amended.

CODIs shall:

(a) Receive the complaint, investigate its allegations, and submit a report and recommendation to the proper
court or authority, as provided for in Section 18 of this Rule;

x x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]

With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in accord with existing laws, the
same are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until further
notice from this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca
within ten days. The complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular administrative
matter to be consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca's for proper disposition in line with the
foregoing discussion.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Clerk of Court
SHERLITA O. TAN AND JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA VS. JUDGE PACURIBOT
Facts:
Judge Pacuribot was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness by Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.
Ms. Tan was deceived twice by Judge Pacuribot when he offered to take her to the bus terminal but instead
brought her to a motel where he ravished her. Not contented, he rented a room in the house of Ms. Tan
wherein he would order Miss Tan to go to his room when her husband was not around. Further, Judge
Pacuribot during office hours would also request Miss Tan’s presence in his chamber where respondent would
sexually harass her even in the presence of another person.
Ms. Villafranca was also deceived by the said Judge when he made her believe that they were going to go out
for dinner but instead brought her in a motel in Butuan City where he ravished her and took a nude picture of
her. The respondent used such picture to blackmail Ms. Villafranca and would threaten her that in the event
she would refuse to submit to his lustful desires, he would send the picture to her family. After the incident, the
respondent would order her to bring food at his rented room and would subsequently rape her. Furthermore,
the respondent ordered the complainant to send sweet text messages and write love letters and greeting cards
to him and even ordered her to file an annulment case against her husband.
Both charges were denied by Judge Pacuribot. Moreover, He claimed that delay in the filing of the charges
against him casted doubt to the truthfulness of their claim and that if they were truly raped by him why did they
not refuse at all but instead continued to submit themselves to him. He alleged that the charges imputed
against him were complainants’ tool of revenge.

Issues:
1. Whether denial can prevail over positive testimony of the witness.
2. Whether the delay in the filing of the charges against him casted doubts to the truthfulness of their claim.
3. Whether the repeated sexual harassments and violence inside Judge Pacuribot’s chamber was improbable.
4. Whether inconsistencies of the witness’ testimony affects the credibility of the witness.
5. Whether absence of physical resistance from the victims negates the commission of the crime of rape.

Ruling:
1. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like
alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that
rings the truth on one hand, and bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.

2. As held in People vs. Espino delay in the commission of rape is not an indication of
fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they
prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender’s
making good on his threats. This is understandable, considering the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their
aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
Delay in the filing of charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses. The Supreme Court
has deemed delay justified when there is fear of reprisal, social, humiliation, familial considerations and
economic reasons.

3. Judge Pacuribot’s defense of improbability cannot be accepted. As held in People v. Lavador,

wherein the rapist argued that rape was impossible due to the presence of the victim’s son on her side, the
Supreme Court said that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even in places
where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where
there are several occupants and even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping.

4. Minor and trivial discrepancies which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of
memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility of the witness, for they shake off the
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As held in Simbajon v. Esteban the Supreme Court said that No married
woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain
her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.

5. In the case of People v. Fernandez the Supreme Court held that physical resistance need not
be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her
attackers because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer
strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by
itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to
bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the burden of proving
resistance.
Atty. Susan M. Aquino vs. Hon. Ernesto D. Acosta
A.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

Facts: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the U.S., bringing gifts for the three judges of
the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her
hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.

On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone, saying he will get
something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas."
Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could see him in his chambers
in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to
evade his sexual attempt.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, while complainant and
her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders
and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his office. She then asked
Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her. Fortunately, when they reached his chambers,
respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and asked her to see him
in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but
suggested that they should act as if they met by accident in respondents office. Ruby then approached the secretarys
table which was separated from respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in front of
respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed to be at a loss for
words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent
approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she
found what she was looking for and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo
kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but
respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair
trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left
crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note
stating, sorry, it wont happen again.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment.

Held: No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated of the charges against him and is advised to
be more circumspect in his deportment.

Rationale: “A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within the purview of
sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:

'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment
of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or
the refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in anyway would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employees;

2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws; or

3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as follows:

1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor,
or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another;

2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;

3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any
other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor.”

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded, requested or required any
sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges
specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WILFREDO F. TUVILLO v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON

PER CURIAM:
This is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City (MeTC). The first case arose from the complaint of Wilfredo Tuvillo
(Wilfredo) for immoral conduct, and the second case from the complaint of Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa) for
unexplained wealth and immorality.

Wilfredo and Melissa Tuvillo are husband and wife. Wilfredo works as a seaman and is out of the country most
of the time. Melissa is a businesswoman with several B.P. Blg. 22 cases filed against her in the MeTC of Makati
City. In her desire to have her cases resolved, she approached the respondent Judge Henry Laron (Judge
Laron). The respondent is married but his wife was in the United States at the time the events of this case
transpired. Due to their frequent interaction with each other, Melissa and Judge Laron became intimate with
each other and their relationship gave rise to these administrative cases.

The Complaint of
Wilfredo Tuvillo

On May 2, 2008, Wilfredo wrote a letter-complaint against Judge Laron to the Court Administrator for
immorality and unacceptable wrongdoing. He submitted a Complaint-Affidavit[1] where he alleged, among
others, that his wife Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron for t resolution of the cases filed against her; that,
in turn, Judge Laron asked money from Melissa and forced her to produce it whenever he needed it; that they
lost all their savings and their two houses and lots because of Judge Laron's constant requests for money from
Melissa; that Judge Laron would physically hurt Melissa when she could not produce the money he needed;
and that Judge Laron "transgressed, intruded and besmirched the tranquility and sacredness of our marital
union and family unity" To support his complaint, Wilfredo attached Melissa's complaint-letter and her
affidavit where she admitted having illicit relations with Judge Laron.[2]

Wilfredo also submitted the Joint Affidavit of his two sons[3] wherein they alleged:

6. That sometime in the year 2007, we were living in our house in Antipolo city; We were surprised that certain
Tito Henry Laron used to go to our house in Antipolo; He slept in our house twice or thrice a week specially
during weekends; Nagtaka kami mga magkakapatid bakit natutulog si Tito Henry Laron sa bahay namin at
sinusundo na kami at ang mama namin tuwing umaga minsan gamit ang kanyang sasakyan minsan aming
sasakyan ang ginagamit niya at sunduin kami sa school tuwing hapon.

This allegation was confirmed by their caretaker in her Affidavit[4] stating that Judge Laron slept in the
Antipolo house during weekends, picked up Melissa and her children in the morning, and fetched them from
school in the afternoon using either his own or Melissa's car.

In his July 2, 2008 Comment,[5] Judge Laron averred that he had already confessed his affair with Melissa to
his wife. In his December 18, 2008 Comment,[6] he claimed that Melissa told him that she was a widow and
explained that his relationship with her was an intimate emotional and personal attachment that did not
involve any sexual liaison.

Wilfredo subsequently filed an adultery case against Melissa and Judge Laron before the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati but it was later dismissed for lack of probable cause.[7] Wilfredo's petition for review was also
dismissed by the Department of Justice[8] for failure to comply with DOJ Circular No. 70 and for lack of
reversible error.[9]

The Complaint of Melissa Tuvillo

This case was initiated by Melissa on May 14, 2008 when she wrote a letter to the Court Administrator accusing
Judge Leron of unexplained wealth and immorality. In her letter, she asked that Judge Laron be investigated
because based on his salary as a judge, he could not have acquired their P9 million house. She also claimed that
Judge Laron could not have afforded to buy several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma televisions, expensive
furniture, a Nissan Patrol, and to send his three children to private schools. Her letter also bore her admission
that she was his mistress for three years.

In his July 21, 2008 Comment,[10] Judge Laron explained how he was able to afford and own the properties that
Melissa claimed were beyond his means. He said that he and his wife sold their townhouse for P1.7M and
obtained a P3.2M loan from Land Bank to cover the P4.4M construction cost of his house. [11] The Nissan Patrol,
a 2001 model, was allegedly bought for P1.15M with money borrowed from his father's retirement
proceeds.[12] The Lamarroza paintings, accumulated through the years from 2004 to 2007[13] for a total value of
P410,000.00, were purchased at a low price because the artist was his wife's friend. The two (2) plasma
televisions, on the other hand, were gifts to them while the other two were purchased in 2000 and 2002. His
children's tuition fees were covered by educational plans[14]and their furniture was part of his wife's
commission as a dealer in his relative's furniture shop.
In her July 31, 2008 Complaint-Affidavit,[15] Melissa admitted that she had approached Judge Laron when she
needed help regarding the pending cases against her. Her liaisons with Judge Laron started in November 2005
in his office (doon una niya akong naangkin). She said that he slept in their house in Antipolo and was in her
Pasong Tamo condominium almost daily from August 2007 to January 2008. At that time, Melissa was
receiving a monthly allowance of US$2,000.00 from her husband while Judge Laron would ask money from
her every month and whenever he needed it. She cited several occasions when she gave him money. Judge
Laron would hurt her physically and threaten to tell her husband about their relationship every time she would
refuse to give him money. To meet Judge Laron's demand for money, she said that she sold her house and lot
in Taguig City and her two vehicles - a Pajero and a Honda CRV. Yet, only two of her four pending cases were
settled. She also mentioned an incident in Judge Laron's office in April 2008 when a lawyer attempted to effect
a reconciliation between her and Judge Laron.

Defense of Judge Laron

In his October 27, 2008 Comment,[16] Judge Laron related that Melissa was introduced to him in November
2005 and that in December 2005, she informed him about her B.P. Blg. 22 cases. He refuted the alleged sexual
liaisons that happened in his chambers by attaching affidavits of his staff who swore that the door to his
chambers was necessarily open because the air conditioner that supplied the cold air to the staff room, the
telephones, the fax machine, the coffee maker, and the refrigerator were all in his chambers. He likewise denied
that he had asked Melissa for money or that she gave him money. He pointed out that Melissa could have
settled the cases against her by paying the complainants because she had the money. The cases against her
were violations of B.P. Blg. 22: two counts for P20,000.00, two counts for P19,377.00, and two counts for
P24,620.00. He also mentioned that the threats and harassment against him started when he began avoiding
her.

A member of the staff of Judge Laron, Ma. Anicia Razon, related in her affidavit that on April 16, 2008, a
woman went inside the chamber of Judge Laron and started shouting and berating the judge. [17] A man, who
was then with her, pulled the woman away and brought her out of the room. She, however, continued her
outburst even when they were already along the corridor. Seven other staff members executed a joint
affidavit[18] about the incident narrating that they ran to his chambers after they heard a woman shouting and
then saw the woman berating Judge Laron (minumura at inaalipusta) while the judge just remained quiet
(nanatiling tahimik). The woman's shouts were heard even in the courtroom. They recounted that the woman
told the judge: "IDEDEMANDA KITA!" to which the judge retorted: "Idedemanda ka rin ng misis ko."

Imelda Laron, the wife of Judge Tuvillo, also executed an affidavit where she recounted that sometime in
January 2008, she lifted their home phone and heard a conversation between her husband and another
person.[19] She confronted her husband about what she overheard and they had a serious talk about Melissa.
She also stated that after that incident, "nasty text messages with threats from different cellphone numbers
were sent to me;" that their sons also received the same messages in their cell phones; and that her relatives in
the province, whose cellphone numbers were listed in her list of contacts, called her "about the damaging text
messages they received about my husband and the woman named Michelle."

The Office of the Court Administrator in its Report[20] recommended the consolidation of the two complaints as
all the allegations in both were rooted on the alleged affair between Judge Laron and Melissa.[21] After its
evaluation, the OCA recommended that Judge Laron be found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and be
fined P10,000.00, and that the case for unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.

The Court's Ruling

Unexplained Wealth

The charge of unexplained wealth was disputed by Judge Laron who was able to explain the source of the
money he used to pay for the construction of his house and the purchase of his vehicle, televisions and
furniture. He also attached copies of the educational plans of his children. On the other hand, Melissa failed to
substantiate her claim that Judge Laron, by his salary, could not afford to buy those properties and send his
children to private schools. For said reason, the Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation that the
complaint for unexplained wealth against Judge Laron be dismissed.

Immorality

The charge of immorality, however, is a serious one covered by Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The
penalty therefor includes dismissal from the service. Section 8 of Rule 140 provides:

Serious charges include:

 1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. [Emphasis Supplied]

Moreover, members of the judiciary are essentially guided by Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics in their acts. Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on an
affair with a married woman is highly improper. Pertinently, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.

A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not
only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety both in
his professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court. [22] As the
judicial front-liners, judges must behave with propriety at all times as they are the intermediaries between
conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. These most exacting standards of
decorum are demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the Judiciary.[24] No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and
uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench.[25] As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's
personal behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a necessity in the judiciary.[26]

In these cases at bench, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting standard. By carrying an affair
with a married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and utterly failed to live up to noble
ideals and strict standards of morality required of the members of the judiciary.[27] As the Court wrote in Re:
Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz,[28] "a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must
comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
the performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His
character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense
of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system."

In these cases, both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted the affair. In the case filed by Wilfredo, the July 2, 2008
Comment[29] of Judge Laron reads:

1. Sometime in November 2005, Melissa Tuvillo was introduced to me. In December 2005, Melissa
approached me regarding problems about a vehicular accident she was involved in. She later informed
me about the bouncing checks filed against her. At that time, I had been married for more than 17 years,
and my wife was in the United States attending to her ailing father. Melissa was likewise then without a
husband and Mr. Tuvillo was out at sea. She was aware of my marital status and that I have three
sons. We were both mature lonely people whose marriages had lessened sheen. She
brought me a sense of soul connection, understanding and great company. [Emphasis
supplied]

2. On the week of the May 2007 elections, Melissa called and told me that her husband Wilfredo died of
illness in China. She even told me that the remains were cremated, that a padasal was held at Brgy.
Pitogo, Makati City, the place of her husband. After that, she frequently asked for my presence and
company, she even asked me to help her guide her four children, and we developed an intimate
personal attachment to each other. She showered me with the affection I felt I needed,
and I reciprocated. We however tried our best to be discreet and sensitive to the
sensibilities of those around us.
 3. September of 2007 was a turning point. Imelda, my previously distant wife became ever present. My
wife was all over me, ever caring and loving. On November 2007, I started to distance myself from
Melissa.

4. Around the first week of January 2008, Imelda would later hear of the affair, she confronted me and I
soon had to choose between the mother of my three children, or Melissa, the woman who made me feel
needed and cared for. One look at my three sons made the choice plainly clear. I could not abandon my
family. I confessed to the affair, and vowed that I would immediately mend my ways. I started to
exercise more self-discipline, and became more aware of my responsibilities to my family. I now
persevere in keeping true to the straight and narrow path." [Emphases supplied]

The affidavit of Melissa, on the other hand, stated that:[30]

2. I have been maintaining an illicit relation with the said Judge above-named since November 2005 until
March 2008. Our relation is known among the personnel in the court's premises in Makati City.

3. To support my complaint are the various text messages and videos, ATM cards, bank checks which I am
willing to present in the proper forum. [Emphasis supplied]

The illicit affair must have been known to the staff of the court because in their joint affidavit recounting the
scene created by Melissa when she berated the judge in his office, none of them attempted to stop her harangue
which was highly disrespectful of the judge's status. Judge Laron's inaction on the face of Melissa's verbal
attack was a strong indication that they had a relationship which was more than official or professional.

In finding Judge Laron guilty of immorality, the Court is guided by the ruling in Geroy v. Calderon[31] where it
was written:

The bottom line is that respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which
every member of the judiciary is expected to observe. Respondent is a married man, yet he engaged in a
romantic relationship with complainant. Granting arguendo that respondent's relationship with complainant
never went physical or intimate, still he cannot escape the charge of immorality, for his own admissions show
that his relationship with her was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.

As the Court held in Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr.;[32]

[I]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare. [Italics Supplied]

Immorality under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11,
2001 on the discipline of Justices and Judges, is a serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions:
(1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The Court also finds Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is
another serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. The illicit relationship started because
Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with respect to her pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and, apparently, he
entertained the request for assistance. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 2.04.—A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.

Judge Laron admitted that Melissa had informed him about the f@ B.P. Blg. 22 cases against-her one month
after she was introduced to him. One of those cases was before Judge Laron himself. The case was dismissed
upon agreement of the parties.[33] Another case was pending before the sala of another judge which was
provisionally dismissed.[34] The situation highly smacked of impropriety because Judge Laron, at the very least,
"aided" Melissa in a case pending before him and before another judge.

Another situation of impropriety was when Judge Laron asked money from Melissa who was a litigant in a case
pending before his court. This is also a serious charge under Section 8 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Wilfredo
and Melissa alleged in their complaints that Judge Laron continuously demanded money from Melissa which
led to the sale of their houses and vehicles. Melissa claimed that: Judge Henry Laron was asking an amount of
money on a monthly basis. In addition, he is also asking me to purchased his medicines (Teveten, Forecad. I
even shoulder the expenses of his executive check-up (07-08 June 2007) and also the normal visitation, to his
doctor (Dr. Antonio Sibulo, St. Luke's Hospital) in which he kept all the receipt. He was also asking for cell
phone load, gasoline, and monthly groceries (Puregold). Judge Henry Laron even ask for an allowance when
he was sent to Canada (a total of 2,000 US dollars) for a study grant last year.[35] She further claimed that
Judge Laron would physically hurt whenever she could not give him money and this averment was
corroborated by her sons who stated in their affidavit that "he is hurting physically our mother because we
saw once our mother having maraming paso, the result of the physical punishment made by Tito Henry
Laron."[36] Melissa also submitted a photocopy of a Bank of Philippine Islands deposit slip US$200 deposited
in the account of "Henry E. Laron."[37]

All these conduct and behavior are contrary to the canons of judicial conduct and ethics. Judges are held to
higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and
confidence. Judges should uplift the honor of the judiciary rather than bring it to disrepute. Demanding money
from a party-litigant who has a pending case before him is an act that this Court condemns in the strongest
possible terms. In the words of Velez v. Flores,[38] such act corrodes respect for the law and the courts,
committed as it was by one who was tasked administering the law and rendering justice.

Judge Laron's immorality and serious misconduct have repercussions not only on the judiciary but also on the
millions of overseas Filipino workers (OFW) like Wilfredo. While Wilfredo was working hard abroad to earn for
his family, Judge Laron was sleeping with his wife in his bed in his house and spending his hard-earned
dollars. What was even worse was the flaunting of the illicit relationship before his young boys (aged 13 and 14)
who related it to him upon his return from abroad. This is the nightmare scenario of every OFW - to be
confronted upon their return with stories from their own children about the "other man or woman" sleeping in
their house while they were away enduring the bitter cold or searing heat, homesickness, culture shock, and
occasional inhumane treatment just to earn the dollars for the food, shelter, clothing, and education of their
family back home.

Under these circumstances, the Court finds itself unable to adopt the recommendation of the OCA that Judge
Laron be simply found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a public official and be fined P10,000.00. The OCA's
recommended dismissal of the charge of immorality is not warranted by the evidence on hand. Judge Laron
himself admitted his immorality and even prayed that he be forgiven and that no disciplinary action be taken
against him.[39] To disregard Judge Laron's admission and grant his plea would mean a betrayal of the public
trust.

WHEREFORE, finding Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati
City, GUILTY of IMMORALITY and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, the Court hereby metes him the maximum
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is
likewise disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The charge of Unexplained Wealth is DISMISSED for insufficient evidence.

SO ORDERED.
 ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. MAILA
CLEMEN F. SERRANO, Respondent. G.R. No. 175433,
March 11, 2015
FACTS:

 This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen F. Serrano (respondent)
against her direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the
Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of
lasciviousness.

 While seated at the table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly took hold of
respondent's face and forcefully kissed her lips…

 Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing
her against her will.

 After releasing her, petitioner said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila...”

 Petitioner alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed to treat them for lunch, as it was
respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a “blowout”.

 He greeted respondent and planted an innocent birthday greeting kiss on her left cheek, near her lips.

 the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau, through Graft Investigation Officer
Marlon T. Molina, issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT

 Penalty of DISMISSAL.

 Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau
DENIED.

 However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the Memorandum issued by
Graft Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon with a decretal portion that:

 from GRAVE MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and from DISMISSAL from the Service
to a mere ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION

 Respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari…

 the CA sustained respondent and rendered the herein assailed decision. Thus:

The CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman….

 Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
DENIED it.

 Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA gravely erred in reversing the Memorandum-Order of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman which
downgraded petitioner's infraction from grave misconduct to simple misconduct (through sexual harassment)

HELD:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action; unlawful behaviour or gross
negligence by a public officer. It is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or
wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully uses his character to procure benefits for himself or for another, contrary to duty and the
rights of others. In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be evident
  SC disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of an established rule attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 1995. Gonzales was charged with knowledge of the
existence of this law and its contents, more so because he was a public servant.

 His act of grabbing Serrano and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable
manifestation of his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work
environment.

 Assuming that Gonzales never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss Serrano was a flagrant
disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that intimate physical contact
between individuals must be consensual.

 The Court agrees with the CA that Gonzales should be held liable for grave misconduct, but holds that a
reduction of the penalty from dismissal from service to a mere suspension of six (6) months without pay,
is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade, there is only one incident of sexual harassment in this case
where Gonzales forcibly kissed Serrano who was his subordinate.

 The Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months suspension without pay is in conformity with Civil
Service Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-0940 entitled the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on
Sexual Harassment Cases. Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as grave, less
grave and light offenses, while Sections 55 and 56, Rule XI provides the corresponding penalties.

CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

 B. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body;
2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or
one’s sexual orientation or used to describe a person;
4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
5. other analogous cases.

 Section 56. The penalties for light, less grave, and grave offenses are as follows:

B. For less grave offenses:

1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and not exceeding six (6)
months 2nd offense – Dismissal

 Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual harassment offense Gonzales
committed falls under less grave offenses which is analogous to “unwanted touching or brushing against
a victim’s body”, and to “derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members
of one sex”, with the corresponding maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

 taking undue advantage of official position

 taking undue advantage of subordinate

 education

Where more aggravating circumstances are present than mitigating ones, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. Hence, the Court imposes the penalty of suspension of six (6) months without pay.