March 8, 2010 Trial Napa

NAPA SUPERIOR COURT
Certificate of Mailing
PEOPLE VS. MUNSON CR749144
DOCUMENT: BRIEFING SCHEDULE

CD: 12/22/2009
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, 3/8/2010
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX
Napa County District Attorney

931 Parkway Mall
Napa Ca 94559 Attorney for Respondent
Don Laughridge
833 Franklin St.
Napa CA 94559 Attorney for Appellant
****CERT/FICATIOIV**'*
I hereby certify that I am not a party to this cause and that copies of the foregoing document were mailed first class
postage pre-paid in sealed envelopes at Napa, California on this date and that this certificate is executed at Napa
California this date.
RICHARD D. FELDSTEIN, Court Executive Officer
FAWN \Bk@%
7/22/2010
Date Court Division Supervisor
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALJFORNJA
COUNTY OF NAPA I
Case Name: People vs. Munson, Rik Wayne
Case Number: CR151673 Amended Notice (If checked)
TO: DON LAUGHRIDGE
833 FRANKLIN ST
NAPA, CA 94559
DATE: December 14, 2010 TIME: 4:00 pm ROOM: D e p a r t m e n t C
LOCATION: 825 Brown Street, 2nd Floor, N a p a
You are notified the Record on Appeal has been filed and the case is scheduled for hearing in the Appellate Division at the location
and time shown above.
NOTE: Oral argument is not required. If any party desires oral argument, a written request must be submitted to the court and served
on all sides no later than 10 davs after the replv brief is due (see date noted below). There is no extension for mailing. If no request with
proof of service is received, the court will deem oral argument waived and the case will be submitted on the briefs on the hearing date
noted above.
BRIEFS SUBMITTED MUST BE IN COMPLIANCE WlTH RULE 8.706 AND LOCAL RULE 11.3
Filed timely in accordance with briefing schedule unless modified by Order of the Presiding Judge of the Appellate Division.
Proof of Service must include and reflect service on the Clerk of the Superior Court for delivety to the Trial Judge.
Original and (3) three copies of all briefs must be filed.
Due dates for filing of briefs:

i ,
Appellant's Opening Brief D e./A3 hh by 4:00 PM
.. Respondenf s Brief Due

Appellant's Reply Brief
by
4:00 PM
by 4:00 PM
Request for Oral Argument with proof of service on all parties due
Appellate Division files are located in Court Services, in the Historic Courthouse, 825 Brown Street, Napa, California, 94559
Certificate of M a i l i n q I S e ~ i c e
I hereby certify that i am not a party to this cause and that a copy of the foregoing document was
mailed (first class postage pre-paid) in a sealed envelope

personal service: personally delivered to the party listed above
placed i n attorneylagency folders in the Criminal Courthouse Historic Courthouse
at Napa, California on this date and that this certificate is executed at Napa, California this date.
I am readily familiar with the Court's standard practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing within the United
States Postal Service and, in the ordinary course of business, the correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal
Service on the day on which it is collected at the Courthouse.
Date: 7/22/2010 Richard D. Feidstein, Court Executive Officer
By:
Deputy Court Executive Officer
Chronological Index People vs . Munson
CR1491441CR151673
Notification of Filing of Appeal;

Order Appointing Appellate Counsel;
Notification of Appointment of Counsel. 5/12/2010 ...............................................
1
Correspondence. 511112010 ..................................................................................

4

Notification of Appointment of Counsel. 5/5/2010 .................................................
5
Correspondence. 5/4/20 10....................................................................................

6
Minute Order: ReturnISurrender on Warrant. 5/3/2010 .........................................7
Bench Warrant. Filed. 5/3/2010 ......................

.................................................. 8
Notice of Failure to Remand & Order. 4/27/2010 ................................................

11
Bench Warrant. Issued. 4/27/2010 ............................................................... 12

Notification of Appointment of Counsel. 4/26/2010 ........................... .
......1 3
Order on Request for Court Appointed Lawyer. 4/20/2010 ..................................

14
Certificate of Mailing: Notice of Appeal. 4/6/2010 ........................ .

.................. 15
Notice Regarding Record of Oral
Proceedings (Misdemeanor). 4/2/2010 ...............................................................
18
Request for Court-Appointed Lawyer

In Misdemeanor Appeal. 4/2/2010 ......................................................................
22
Notice of Appeal (Misdemeanor). 4/2/2010 .........................................................

24
Confidential: Financial Declaration. 41212010 ................................................. 26
Confidential: Defendant's Financial Statement

30
And Notice to Defendant. 4/2/2010 .....................................................................
Promise to AppearICSB Referral. 5/8/20?0 ........................................................32

Exhibit List. 3/8/2010 .................... .
.................................................................
33
Minute Order: Readiness Conference. 3/3/2010.................................................

34
Minute Order: Court Trial. 3/8/2010 ....................................................................

35
Order Denying Rik Wayne Munson's Disqualification

For Cause of Commissioner Monique Langhorne.Johnson. 2/26/2010 ..............36
Minute Order: Settlement Conference. Amended. 2/2/2010 ............................ 38
Reply to Verified Answer. 2/9/2010 .....................................................................

39
.
Minute Order: Settlement Conference 2/2/2010.............................................. 46
Verified Answer Denying All Allegations in

Defendant's Verified Statement of Disqualification. 2/3/2010..............................
47
Minute Order: Settlement Conference. 2/2/2010.................................................

52
Minute Order: Settlement Conference. 2/2/2010................................................ 53
Proof of Service .Civil. 1/25/2010......................................................................

54
Demand for Judicial Notice Auto Equity Sales. Inc.

v . Superior Court 57 ~ a l . 2 "450; Evidence Code g451(a);
Points and Authorities. 1/25/2010 .......................................................................
56
Verified Statement of Disqualification. CCP $170.1;

Points and Authorities. 1/25/2010 .....................................................................
132
Minute Order: Motion to Quash;

Settlement Conference. 12/22/2009 .................................................................
138
Bench Warrant. Filed. 12/14/2009 ............................ ........................................

139
Record of Faretta Warnings. 12/7/2009 ............................................................

140
Own Recognizance & Bail Agreement. 12/7/2009 ............................................

141
Arraignment Form. 12/7/2009 ........................................................................

143
Minute Order: Return/Surrender on Warrant. 12/7/2009 ...................................

145
Notice of Special Appearance. 12/7/2009 .........................................................146

Notice of Motion; Motion to Quash. CCP §418.10;
Points and Authorities. 12/7/2009 .....................................................................
147
Bench Warrant. Issued. 12/2/2009....................................................................

154
Minute Order: Arraignment: Citation. 11/30/2009..............................................

155
Notice of Entry of Plea; Demand for Verified

Complaint; Notice of Rejection. 11/23/2009 ......................................................
156
Citation S 069836. 1O/29/2009..........................................................................

158
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
--000--
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
VS . No. CR149144
RIK WAYNE MUNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.
--000--
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT TIME OF COURT TRIAL
VOLUME 1
(Pages 1 - 98)
--000--
Napa, California
Monday, March 8, 20
8:30 a.m.
--000-- JUL 1 9 2010

Clerk of the Napa Superlor ColaIra
By: F. HUSS
Depuly
Reported by:
LINDA SHRYACK, CSR NO. 12104 8ecebed
2
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NAPA
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN T. KROYER, JUDGE
--000--
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff,
vs . No. CR149144
RIK WAYNE MUNSON,
Defendant.
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS

AT TIME OF COURT TRIAL
--000--
Napa, California
Monday, March 8,
8:30 a.m.
Reported by:
LINDA SHRYACK, CSR NO. 12104
--000--
A P P E A R A N C E S
--000--
For the People: GARY LIEBERSTEIN

District Attorney
931 Parkway Mall
Napa, California 94559
BY: KATHRYN SUSEMIHL
Deputy District Attorney
For the Defendant: In Propria Persona

4
--000--
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX
Page
-
APPEARANCES 3
PROCEEDINGS 6
WITNESSES:
SERGEANT MICHAEL PAUL HUNTER
Direct Examination By Ms. Susemihl 29
Cross-Examination By Mr. Munson 34
IDEN.
- EVID.
PEOPLE'S EXHIBITS:
5 DMV Record 16 55
IDEN. EVID .
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS:
1 Copy of Citation
2 Notes on Citation
3 Notice of Correction
4 DMV Printout
6 10th Circuit Case
7 Citation 46
8 Letter 57
--000--
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 98
5
--000--
ALPHABETICAL INDEX
--000--
Page
-
APPEARANCES 3
PROCEEDINGS 6
WITNESSES:
OFFICER MICHAEL PAUL HUNTER
Direct Examination By Ms. Susemi 29
Cross-Examination By Mr. Munson 34
EVID.
PEOPLE'S EXHIBITS:
5 DMV Record 55
IDEN. EVID.
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS:
1 Copy of Citation
2 Notes on Citation
3 Notice of Correction
4 DMV Printout
6 10th Circuit Case
7 Citation 46
8 Letter 58
--000--
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 98
6
MARCH 8 , 2010 8:30 a.m.
--000--
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came on r e g u l a r l y
t h i s day f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Honorable STEPHEN T .
KROYER, Judge.
GARY LIEBERSTEIN, D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y , County
of Napa, 931 Parkway Mall, Napa, C a l i f o r n i a 94559,
r e p r e s e n t e d by KATHRYN SUSEMIHL, Deputy D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ,
a p p e a r e d a s c o u n s e l on b e h a l f of t h e P e o p l e .
R I K WAYNE MUNSON, a p p e a r e d I n P r o p r i a
Persona.
The Honorable STEPHEN T . KROYER, Judge
presiding.
LINDA SHRYACK, CSR NO. 12104 O f f i c i a l
Shorthand R e p o r t e r f o r t h e County o f Napa, was d u l y p r e s e n t
and a c t i n g .
The f o l l o w i n g p r o c e e d i n g s were t h e n and
t h e r e taken, t o w i t :
P R
- --O-
C-E-
E -
D-I N
-G S
--
THE COURT: I g u e s s t h i s i s t h e Rik Munson c a s e ,
CR149144. Are you Rik Munson?
MR. MUNSON: I am.
THE COURT: And a r e you r e p r e s e n t i n g y o u r s e l f h e r e
today?
MR. MUNSON: I am.
THE COURT: And t h e n who's a p p e a r i n g f o r t h e People?
MS. SUSEMIHL: K a t i e Susemihl on b e h a l f of t h e P e o p l e .
THE COURT: Are t h e People r e a d y t o p r o c e e d w i t h a

7
trial today?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes. We are, your Honor.
THE COURT: And are you, Mr. Munson?
MR. MUNSON: Well, yes, I am. But we have some
housekeeping that needs to be addressed this morning.
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just ask a couple questions
to get oriented, too. Ms. Susemihl, are we proceeding on a
citation?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And which of the three charges remains for
trial?
MS. SUSEMIHL: All three of them.
THE COURT: All three.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And then what are your housekeeping
issues?
MR. MUNSON: Well, to begin with, I haven't entered a
plea in this action.
THE COURT: Would you like to plead not guilty today,
or guilty, or no contest?
MR. MUNSON: Is it appropriate to plead at the time of
trial?
THE COURT: If you want to.
MR. MUNSON: Well, I don't necessarily want to. I'm
not refusing to if it's, if it's appropriate to plead at
trial, as opposed to at arraignment. I'm not really sure
that that's what the rules are.
THE COURT: Are the People aware of any event where
Linda Shryack, CSR 12104

(707) 299-1194
-
8
the defendant entered a plea before now?
MS. SUSEMIHL: I am not, your Honor. I am -- this was
Ms. Belmore's matter. The notes don't indicate, but we
also weren't present at the arraignment.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go.
MS. SUSEMIHL: I'm not sure what happened on February
2nd on the separate trial. I want to say that there was a
plea of not guilty entered, previously. But I couldn't
give a date to be certain of that.
THE COURT: Well, the defendant filed a written
statement on November 23rd, 2009 that says Notice of Entry
of Plea.
MR. MUNSON: I'm aware of that, and do you see one of
the pleas found at 1022 through 1032 of the Penal Code?
THE COURT: What's the code section numbers?
MR. MUNSON: In 1022 through 1032, it lists the six
pleas that are available. 1018 requires that the defendant
enter the plea in open court.
THE COURT: Are you sure that applies to a case like
this?
MR. MUNSON: Is it a criminal action?
THE COURT: Yeah. Is that what the statute says?
MR. MUNSON: That's what the Penal Code says. And the
Civil Code says that the Penal Code defines and prescribes
the procedures for criminal actions, and this leads, of
course, to other issues.
THE COURT: 1017, every plea must be made in open
court, and may be oral or in writing. How did this

(707) 299-1194
9
document come into the court file?
MR. MUNSON: I mailed it in.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MUNSON: When I failed to appear on November 30th,
and that leads us to other sections of the code.
THE COURT: Which of the six pleas do you believe you
entered on November 23rd by filing this written document?
MR. MUNSON: Non of those six. I filed a plea under
40513 (a) of the Vehicle Code, which reads identical to
853.9 of the Penal Code. And it's called a plea of
anything other than guilty or no contest. The citation is
only good for the entrance of a plea of guilty or no
contest. After that, a verified complaint is required'. I
haven't waived my right to a verified complaint as required
by 853.9 and 939 of the Penal Code, and 40513(a) of the
Penal Code.
THE COURT: And tell me that Vehicle Code section you
just cited.
MR. MUNSON: It's on the bottom of the TR-130 document
that's in the court's file. That's the citation.
THE COURT: Why don't you tell me the Vehicle Code.
MR. MUNSON: 40513(a), and that reads identical to
853.9 of the Penal Code.
THE COURT: I'm just double checking all those
citations you're giving me right now.
MR. MUNSON: Okay.
THE COURT: 40513 (a).
MR. MUNSON: Yes.

(707) 299-1194
10
(Pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: So both 40513 of the Vehicle Code and
853.9 of the Penal Code, do say as you say, that the
general rule is that if you can demand that a complaint be
filed, and they both contain another provision in
subdivision (b), which says not withstanding the provisions
of subdivision (a) -- I'm reading from 853.9 of the Penal
Code right now.
Not withstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of
this section, whenever the written notice to appear has
been prepared on a form, approved by the judicial counsel,
an exact and legible duplicate copy of the notice, when
filed with the magistrate, shall constitute a complaint to
which the defendant may enter a plea. It goes on to say if
the notice to appear is not verified, the defendant may at
the time of arraignment request that a verified complaint
be filed.
So in looking at the complaint -- I mean, looking at
the citation in this case, it appears to be on a judicial
counsel form, and it appears to be verified. So I think
this is a proper charging document. Next issue.
MR. MUNSON: Well, we have, we have the discovery
dysfunctions, and I only got the packet last Wednesday.
THE COURT: Let's go back to the plea issue. You
believe you've never entered a plea?
MR. MUNSON: I'm quite certain I've never entered a
plea.
THE COURT: What do you consider this document filed

11
November 23rd, Notice of Entry of Plea?
MR. MUNSON: Well, I explained it. It is an entry of
plea of anything other than guilty or no contest. I don't
know what a guy has to do to get a verified complaint filed
into a so-called traffic action.
THE COURT: You don't have a right to that in this
case.
MR. MUNSON: It says very clearly in the section you
just read, right where you stopped, it says it will serve
the function of entry of a plea for guilty and no contest.
And if the defendant fails to appear and enter any other
plea, they're required to file a verified complaint.
And so if your ruling is that it's not required, then
I'm going to -- I've absconced my objection on the record.
And I won't enter a plea to anything but a verified
complaint, and that document doesn't make it.
THE COURT: Okay. Now did you cite another code
section that I've just forgotten for the moment about this
plea of legal and factual innocence?
MR. MUNSON: 1018 of the Penal Code requires a plea,
oral plea by the defendant in open court.
THE COURT: Okay. But it doesn't list that, does it?
MR. MUNSON: I beg your pardon?
THE COURT: It doesn't list that.
MR. MUNSON: No, 1022 through 1032 of the Penal Code
lists the six pleas available in a criminal action.
THE COURT: And you said this is not one of them.
MR. MUNSON: That is not one of them.

(707) 299-1194
12
THE COURT: What is this thing?
MR. MUNSON: That is trying everything I can to get a
verified complaint filed into a traffic action. I failed
to appear -- a plea of anything other than guilty or no
contest. I don't know what you have to do to get a
verified complaint, and I'm not going to sit here and argue
that that is or is not. I'm quite certain it does not
constitute a verified complaint.
THE COURT: Yeah, it's not a verified complaint, but
my reading of the two statutes that you cite is just a
little different than yours. That's all. And I think
that -- I think the legislature has allowed for the
prosecutor to save a little tree work here and not create
another piece of paper under certain circumstances, and
those circumstances are a citation on a judicial counsel
form, which has been verified.
And in looking at the document in this file, which I
think is the charging document, it just appears to me -- I
know you disagree, but it appears to me that this is a
proper charging document upon which they can proceed today.
MR. MUNSON: You've made your ruling. I'm not going
to debate it further.
THE COURT: And then so if I understand you correctly,
given that circumstance, you are not willing to enter one
of the six pleas to that charging document.
MR. MUNSON: That's correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MUNSON: And that leads us to 1024 of the Penal

(707) 299-1194
14
equipment, in the automobile that the officer was using. I
don't know if there was any audio/video equipment that
would protect the rights of a citizen. There's a lot of
stuff I don't know. And they have an ongoing duty to
provide anything that may be exculpatory. I don't have a
witness list. They didn't mention -- I don't have a
statement of any of the people present. There were two
police officers present. There were two officials from the
City of American Canyon who appeared on scene and
confronted me while I was physically in police custody.
Apparently, the prosecution hasn't inquired as to the
facts, per se.
THE COURT: So what are you asking me to do right now?
MR. MUNSON: I'm making an objection to the failure of
the prosecution to obey the rules. And at this point,
there's not much we can do, except determine along the way
how disadvantaged I am as a result of this. So I'm lodging
my objection for the record.
THE COURT: Okay. Did you want to respond to that,
Ms. Susemihl?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor, for some reason the
discovery packet that we sent over with the citation or
complaint, that usually contains the police report, and
that information, for some reason that was left in the
court's file, and it was not given to the defendant until
Wednesday.
THE COURT: What Wednesday?
MS. SUSEMIHL: At the readiness conference last week.

(707) 299-1194
15
Judge Boessenecker did ask, and mentioned that if, you
know, because of this discovery, since it was still in the
court file, if there was an issue, he could deal with that.
But the defendant stated that he was prepared for trial.
THE COURT: Why don't you show me what you got last
Wednesday. I'd like to see what we're talking about. I've
got a manila envelope which has the case number and the
defendant's name on the outside. It's the type of
discovery packet that I'm used to seeing in a file when a
citation or a complaint is filed by the DA. And inside are
four pieces of paper. Let's make a record of these things
for your benefit, sir, so we know what we're talking about.
MR. MUNSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: These exhibits will be Defense 1, 2 and 3,
and I'll take four exhibit stickers now, and I'll stick
them on and identify what they are. By the way, all
exhibits will be returned to the party owning them at the
end of this hearing. You're each required to keep them
until this case becomes final.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 1

through 3 were marked for identification.)
THE COURT: Number one looks like a copy of a
citation. These are being marked for identification only
right now.
Number two looked like the notes on the back of the
citation. And I'll check the citation that I have in the
file, which looks like the original. And those two things
seem to match what I have.

(707) 299-1194
16
Number three is a notice of correction to the
citation. That's a photocopy. And that original is also
with the court and was filed with the court.
And then number four looks like a DMV computer
printout of the defendant's driving record. And so are
there any other police reports or statements, or any other
discovery-type material generated in this case,
Ms. Susemihl?
(Whereupon, a Document was then marked

as Defendant's Exhibit No. 4 for
identification.)
MS. SUSEMIHL: The only other discovery was the

certified DMV document which was mailed to Mr. Munson
February 16th, and I believe he indicated that he received
that.
THE COURT: Mr. Bailiff. I'll return the defendant's
four exhihits in the envelope to him for safekeeping, and
then, Ms. Susemihl, show me your certified DMV record that
you want to use as evidence in this trial. We'll mark that
People's Number 5 for identification.
(Whereupon, a Document was then marked as
People's Exhibit No. 5 for
identification.)
THE COURT: And you say you mailed it to, you mailed a
copy of this to the defendant when you received it?
MS. SUSEMIHL: The copy of the memo that went with it
indicated February 16th.
MR. MUNSON: I did receive that in a timely fashion,
your Honor.

(707) 299-1194
17
THE COURT: Okay. And so take a look at Exhibit
Number 5, and tell me if that's a copy of what you got,
sir. I want to make sure you got the same thing.
MR. MUNSON: This appears to be the same document.
THE COURT: Great. Are there any other written
documents generated as discovery material that you're in
possession of, or aware of, Ms. Susemihl?
MS. SUSEMIHL: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: And who are your witnesses in this case?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Sergeant Mike Hunter, who was the
officer who issued the citation.
THE COURT: Do you intend to call any other witnesses?
THE COURT: Okay. Are you aware of any Brady material
or exculpatory evidence-type material that might help the
defendant's case at all?
MS. SUSEMIHL: I am not aware of anything. And we'd
never received an informal request. The defendant listed a
laundry list of things, such as cameras. We never received
an informal request for anything. And I'm not aware of
the --
THE COURT: You mean before now?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Correct. Before today.
THE COURT: Have there been any discovery motions
heard in court that you're aware of?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Not to my knowledge, no.
THE COURT: Sir, once again, I looked at every single
piece of paper in the file. It's about an inch thick right

(707) 299-1194
18
now. Did you file a formal discovery motion in court or
not?
MR. MUNSON: No, I accepted the one document I
received in a timely fashion, and simply asked. I raised
the issue of discovery because I didn't get a witness list.
I didn't really get anything but that one document. So we
did have a discussion about discovery at that time. I'm
just making an objection, as opposed to any formal motion.
It's a little bit late for materials to appear at this
time, let alone, you know, to be confronted with a choice
between getting this thing over and extending it who knows
how long.
THE COURT: Okay. Are there any other housekeeping
issues before trial?
MR. MUNSON: We do have the question of judicial
notices. I provided the prosecution with a -- copies of
the statutes with -- that begins with a list. I sent those
to the Court as well. I can submit them in their entirety
if the Court would want to label those.
THE COURT: You probably don't need to give those to
me right now. You say you filed a request for judicial
notice document in the file.
MR. MUNSON: I filed a motion, demand for a judicial
notice citing all equity sales which basically informs the
Court that it's bound by the decisions of higher courts and
higher authorities, etcetera. Then I cited -- I have a
list of cases and addendum, and a list of the statutes
themselves, and the actual photographs of the statutes

(707) 299-1194
19
themselves from the assembly law library.
THE COURT: Okay. I've got that packet. That's, oh,
about three quarters-of-an-inch thick. And it appears to
be a document that begins with a title of demand for
judicial notice, auto equity sales. And it was filed
January 25th, 2010. And it has photocopies of lots of
different legal authorities attached to it. So I do have
that in the file. And I'll make reference to that as the
case progresses.
MR. MUNSON: The photo copies are only of the
statutes. I didn't bother to load the file with the case
from California.
I do have one other case now that I do have to submit.
Because it's a federal case, I have to give everybody a
copy of it. It came out on December the 9th.
THE COURT: Hold on just a second.
MR. MUNSON: I also have Brady cases here. All of
them, the Court to take judicial notice of them, as opposed
to submitting them.
THE COURT: Okay. We'll mark this 10th Circuit case,
number 082169, as Defense Exhibit Number 6.
(Whereupon, a Document was then marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 6 for
identification.)
THE COURT: And anything else before we get started,
about the trial itself?
MR. MUNSON: Well, I'm going to -- for the record of
the trial, I'm going to object to the denial of assistance
of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, and

(707) 299-1194
20
that's basically based upon the fact that I have refused to
waive one to exercise another. And I will cite from the US
Supreme Court in the case of Simons v. United States at 390
U.S. 389, where the court says and we find it intolerable
that one constitutionally protected right should have to be
waived to exercise another.
I have a First Amendment right to manage the affairs
of my own life, and that's a protected political right, and
I also have a Sixth Amendment right to advice of the
assistance of counsel, as well as Article One, Section 115
of the California Constitution, right to advice and
assistance of counsel.
And although I've chosen to manage the affairs of my
own life, it does not include my right to the advice and
assistance of counsel. I didn't even need to have someone
sitting here, but I certainly could have used a sounding
board, and so I'm going to object to the denial of counsel
at the critical stage.
THE COURT: And are you referring to a prior ruling of
another judge?
MR. MUNSON: Yes, I am.
THE COURT: Okay. As you may know, one judge like me
does not have the right to change the ruling of another
judge of equal stature. So your objection is noted for the
record, but there's nothing I can do about that today.
MR. MUNSON: I'm aware of that. At this point, I'd
say it's a little too late for me to move this Court to
appoint assistant counsel.

(707) 299-1194
21
THE COURT: Yes, it is.
MR. MUNSON: I'm not raising that, other than just to
note for the record, for the review, I'm of the, of the
opinion that my right to assistance of counsel was denied,
and it was denied twice by two other Courts.
THE COURT: I understand your position. Anything else
before we get started with the trial?
MR. MUNSON: Yeah, there are a couple of issues. And
they may seem unusual. One of the things I want to touch
on here is the verified statement of disqualification. I'm
going to object to the ruling of the judge pro tern. It's
void on its face. Page two of the verified answer from --
THE COURT: Let me interrupt and save a little time
here. There's no point in talking about that now, because
that is something that was done by other people --
MR. MUNSON: Yes.
THE COURT: -- earlier. As a matter of fact, a
visiting judge or an outside judge from another county was
appointed by the judicial counsel to rule on your statement
of disqualification of the commissioner. And, as you know,
that judge found the commissioner not to be disqualified.
But also, as you know, your case isn't being heard in front
of that commissioner at your request. We've honored that.
MR. MUNSON: I'm aware of that.
THE COURT: So there's no point in talking about that
now.
MR. MUNSON: If it please the Court, the ruling of the
judge pro tern stands for the proposition that the courts do

(707) 299-1194
22
not on have to follow the rules. Rule 3.513 and 3.514 of
the California Rules of Court makes it very clear that the
only parties than can appear at a motion are those that
have filed an answer, an objection, a counter motion,
etcetera. Okay.
So my point is very simple. I expected everyone to
obey the rules. I'm here because I allegedly didn't obey
the rules, and I demand that my servants who are charged
with the preservation of public justice, obey the rules.
So that's just a notice to everyone. I've been complaining
about the rules disregards so far this morning. So I want
it on the record for review. There seems to be, also, some
confusion over the nature and cause of this action. You,
again, reenforce the commissioner's ruling that this is a
criminal action, but I have some questions about that in
joinder of civil and criminal, as well as things like
14607.4 of the Vehicle Code, where the legislature talks
about the constitutionality of an act based upon the case
of Calero-Toledo, which is a seizure of a yacht.
THE COURT: Spell that.
MR. MUNSON: Calero-Toledo.
THE COURT: She's writing all your words down
carefully, so...
MR. MUNSON: It's cited on 14607.4(g) of the Penal
Code.
THE COURT: Do you know how to spell that? And can
you spell the name of that case for her benefit.
MR. MUNSON: C-A-L-E-R-O --

(707) 299-1194
23
THE COURT: You can j u s t s p e l l i t o u t . We d o n ' t need
t o see it.
MR. MUNSON: C-A-L-E-R-0, d a s h , T-0-L-E-D-0. Toledo
v . P e a r s o n Yacht Leasing C o r p o r a t i o n , and t h e j o i n d e r of
c i v i l and c r i m i n a l , and s o - c a l l e d t r a f f i c . I ' m of t h e , of

t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t r a f f i c m a t t e r s a r e , a r e commercial
matters. They a r e c o n f i n e d t o t h e r e a l m o f commerce, and

s o I ' m g o i n g t o move t o o b j e c t -- t o d i s m i s s t h i s morning
under Rule 9 ( h ) o f t h e F e d e r a l Rules of C i v i l Procedure,
b e c a u s e I b e l i e v e t h e p r o p e r d e s i g n a t i o n of t h i s a c t i o n .
On t h e c r i m i n a l s i d e , we o n l y have two j u r i s d i c t i o n s . One,
t h e common law, and t h e o t h e r one, admiralty. So I ' m going
t o o b j e c t under Rule 9 ( h ) , t h a t t h e r e ' s no p l e a d i n g o f
admiralty i n t h i s case. You might t h i n k I ' m a l i t t l e

whacked r a i s i n g t h e s e kind o f i s s u e s , b u t I have a r e a s o n
f o r it.
THE COURT: So t h e motion t o d i s m i s s i s d e n i e d b e c a u s e
I t h i n k I ' m o b l i g e d t o f o l l o w C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e law and n o t
Federal law. Of c o u r s e , I ' m bound by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n and
t h a t s o r t of t h i n g . But we a r e n o t bound by s t a t u t e s and
c a s e s t h a t do n o t a p p l y d i r e c t l y t o C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e law
and t h e C a l i f o r n i a V e h i c l e Code. A s I understand it, we're
p r o c e e d i n g under t h r e e s e c t i o n s of t h e C a l i f o r n i a V e h i c l e
Code. Count One which c h a r g e s you w i t h V e h i c l e Code
s e c t i o n 4 0 0 0 ( a ) , driving without t h e proper r e g i s t r a t i o n .

Count Two c h a r g e s you w i t h V e h i c l e Code s e c t i o n 12500 ( a ) ,
d r i v i n g without a proper d r i v e r l i c e n s e . And Count Three
c h a r g e s you w i t h V e h i c l e Code s e c t i o n 1 6 0 2 8 ( a ) , d r i v i n g

( 7 0 7 ) 299-1194
-
24
without the proper insurance. Number one and number three
are defined under California law as infractions. And
number two is defined for purposes of this case. Now under
California law as a misdemeanor, all three of them are
criminal violations, so to speak, under California's
definition of that word. And so you're motion to dismiss,
based on the authorities you just cited is denied.
MR. MUNSON: Okay. I expected that. I just wanted it
on the record. And there is one more issue. You may think
this is a little bit odd, but from my study of the Central
Contractor's Registry for the United States, suggests that
the Superior Court of California is operating in an
instrumentality of the United States, and may not
necessarily be a de jure California republic office. So on
that basis, I'm going to dismiss under the foreign
sovereignty Communities Act -- ask you to dismiss that as
well.
THE COURT: That motion is denied, as well. I think
I'm a state court. I think I was a judge who was properly
appointed by the governor of the State of California. To
my knowledge, the federal government had nothing to do with
my being here today.
MR. MUNSON: I understand.
THE COURT: Are there any other pre-trial motions?
MR. MUNSON: No, ready to go.
THE COURT: Great. Let's begin the trial, which
normally begins with an opening statement from a
prosecutor. You can give one or not give one at a court

(707) 299-1194
25
trial.
MS. SUSEMIHL: I will not give an opening statement,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Then it's your chance to give an opening
statement.
MR. MUNSON: I'll reserve.
THE COURT: I'll help you out just a little bit by
pointing out your options all along. Sounds like you know
this one, but I want to make sure we're on the same page.
You can give an opening statement now, or you can give an
opening statement at the beginning of the case, or not at
all, whatever you choose.
MR. MUNSON: I'll reserve.
THE COURT: Okay. So who is your one-and-only
witness, Ms. Susemihl?
MS. SUSEMIHL: The People call Sergeant Mike Hunter.
MR. MUNSON: I'll object on the basis of no witness
list.
THE COURT: Did you provide the defense with a witness
list?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor, I do not believe that one
was provided. He is the only individual listed in the
discovery that was provided. It is my recollection,
Wednesday -- I did not appear on this matter Wednesday, but
this issue was discussed, and the defendant was advised
that Sergeant Hunter would be the one-and-only witness
testifying.
THE COURT: Did you want to elaborate on your

(707) 299-1194
26
objection, sir?
MR. MUNSON: Well, the Court on Wednesday asked me if
I wanted more time. But I'm not the one that needed more
time. The prosecution had a, had a duty to provide me with
exculpatory evidence, witness lists -- may be a record of
dispatch showing how long this incident lasted, things like
that, anything exculpatory. And a witness list is part of
notifying me of how much preparation I have to do. And the
reason we have these rules under 1054 of the Penal Code is
to prevent ambush at trial, and so the People don't have to
prepare for the world-of-all possibilities. I should be
able to narrow my focus to just those things being brought,
and I should be able to base me preparation on what I
received at discovery. And I don't have to ask in a
criminal --
(Interruption by the court reporter.)
MR. MUNSON: I'm sorry. The prosecution shall provide
the defense with, and there's a list A through F.
THE COURT: And are you talking about Penal Code
section 1054.1?
MR. MUNSON: I am.
THE COURT: In a sense, it sounds like the People have
made a mistake as you complain about. 1054.1 says that the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defendant all of the
following materials, and it includes the names and
addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as
witnesses at trial. Ordinarily, at a trial, there are more
witnesses than just the arresting officer, that you were

(707) 299-1194
27
aware of on the day you were given your citation. And so
ordinarily a prosecutor would be obligated at least 30 days
before trial, to disclose the names of any witnesses they
intend to call at the trial so that you could know who they
were, and interview them if you wanted to, and that sort of
this thing.
In this particular case, I'm not going to impose a
discovery sanction. I will allow the citing officer to
testify, and that's because, in fact, you were aware that
that person was a witness who was probably going to testify
at trial when you were given the citation back on day
number one of this case, if you will. And then when you
were given the discovery packet, it didn't disclose the
names of any other witnesses. And so I don't think it's a
surprise to you that the citing officer is testifying here.
And so, although it's a technical violation of the
discovery statute, to spell that out to you 30 days or more
ago, I find there to be no harm to you because of that.
Especially since, apparently, Judge Boessenecker said last
week when this issue came up, Mr. Munson, do you want more
time to prepare for the trial, and you said, no, that's not
necessary. And you just lodged your objections on the
record, right?
MR. MUNSON: That's not necessarily so.
THE COURT: What happened?
MR. MUNSON: Well, I'm not the one who needs to be
counting their shoe laces and muttering excuses for why I
need an extension to give the defendant more time. I'm not

(707) 299-1194
28
the one who -- I'm just the one complaining about the
dysfunction and the right to notice in a timely fashion.
That's all. And so I didn't make any decisions for the
Court.
THE COURT: Once you learned that this officer was the
one-and-only witness in this trial, at least last week, did
you do anything with that knowledge to prepare for this
trial, that you had not already done?
MR. MUNSON: Well, yeah, in fact, and I might be a
little naive, but it occurred to me when I did get the
discovery packet, and I saw the note on the back of officer
Hunter's ticket, a version of his copy, it occurred to me
that my perception of the facts may not really avail me,
when it's Officer Hunter's perception of the facts that
we'll be dealing with. I didn't give any kind of abstract
of his intended testimony. I'm sort of in the blind as far
as that goes. I know what happened in terms of my
recollection and my quality of the perception, but I have
no idea what Officer Hunter perceived, and I have no
suggestion of what the facts might be from his perspective.
THE COURT: Other than what he wrote on the front and
back of the citation?
MR. MUNSON: Pretty much.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that, that is your typical
police report, so to speak, in a case like this. And I'll
find, based on everything I've heard so far from both
sides, that, that is the written document which informs
this witness' testimony, in addition to his memory. Of,

(707) 299-1194
29
course, if you testify or produce witnesses, I'll be
considering all that, just as much as I consider the
testimony of the witnesses.
MR. MUNSON: My witness list is blank.
THE COURT: Couldn't quite hear that.
MR. MUNSON: My witness list is blank.
THE COURT: Okay. Come on up and be sworn, sir.
MICHAEL PAUL HUNTER,
a witness called by the People, who, being first duly
administered an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, was examined and testified as
follows :
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Can you begin by telling us your name and
spelling it, please.
THE WITNESS: Michael Paul Hunter, H-U-N-T-E-R.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
Q Thank you, your Honor. Good morning. What is
your current occupation?
A Deputy sheriff for the County of Napa.
Q And how long have you been deputy sheriff for
the County of Napa?
A Going on 15 years.
Q Were you working on October 29th of last year,
2009?
A Yes.

(707) 299-1194
30
Q Where were you working?
A I was assigned as a patrol sergeant for the
contract City of American Canyon in the County of Napa.
Q At approximately 11:16 in the morning on that
day, the 29th, did you conduct a traffic stop?
A Yes, I did.
(1 Why did you do that?
A For a vehicle that had expired registration.
Q How did you know the registration was expired?
A I ran the license plate through dispatch and
confirmed that the registration was expired.
Q Do you know when it was expired?
A It was, it expired on the 14th of November --
excuse me, October.
Q Of?
A 2009.
Q 2009, so what did you do once you observed the
vehicle registration was expired?
A I initiated a traffic stop.
Q Okay. What happened?
A I contacted the sole occupant of the vehicle,
which was Mr. Munson.
Q Do you see the individual you contacted in
court?
A Yes.
Q And could you, please, identify for the record
who you're referring to.
A Mr. Munson is sitting, was sitting next to me,

(707) 299-1194
31
and i s w e a r i n g a p r i n t e d w h i t e s h i r t , w e a r i n g g l a s s e s and
dark jeans.
THE COURT: The w i t n e s s i s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e d e f e n d a n t
i n t h i s case.
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
Q Where e x a c t l y d i d t h i s t r a f f i c s t o p t a k e p l a c e ?
A On Donaldson Way.
Q And i s t h a t i n t h e County o f Napa?

A Yes.
Q What h a p p e n e d a f t e r you i n i t i a t e d t h e t r a f f i c
stop?
A I c o n t a c t e d t h e d r i v e r a t h i s window.
MR. MUNSON: Objection. Assumes f a c t s n o t i n
evidence.
THE COURT: Overruled. Go a h e a d .
THE WITNESS: I contacted t h e d r i v e r a t t h e d r i v e r ' s
window.
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
(1 L e t m e b a c k up. When you o b s e r v e d t h i s v e h i c l e ,

was it moving?
A Yes.
Q And f o r how l o n g d i d you o b s e r v e t h e v e h i c l e ?

A Couple of minutes.
Q Okay. So g o i n g b a c k , you c o n t a c t e d t h e d r i v e r ?
A Correct.
Q What i f a n y t h i n g d i d you s a y ?
A I a s k e d him f o r h i s d r i v e r l i c e n s e ,
r e g i s t r a t i o n , proof of i n s u r a n c e .
L i n d a S h r y a c k , CSR 12104
(707) 299-1194
32
Q Was he able to provide any of those documents to
you?
A No.
MR. MUNSON: Objection. "Able" is suggestive.
THE COURT: That objection is sustained. The answer
is stricken. That calls for speculation.
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
Q Did he provide any of those documents to you?
A No.
Q Did you ask him any further questions about
those documents?
A I asked him if he had a driver license, and he
provided a passport for identification, and I asked him for
proof of insurance, and he couldn't provide a proof of
Insurance.
MR. MUNSON: Objection. Speculation, "couldn't."
THE COURT: I'm going to strike that answer as
nonresponsive, the "couldn't provide" insurance part. The
rest of it can stay in.
THE WITNESS: Didn't provide insurance when asked.
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
Q Okay. And did you ask him -- did he -- you
asked him for a vehicle registration, correct?
A Correct.
Q Did he respond by saying anything?
A I --
MR. MUNSON: Objection.
THE WITNESS: He responded --

(707) 299-1194
33
THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on.
MR. MUNSON: Calls for hearsay.
THE COURT: Wait for the argument. Pardon me?
MR. MUNSON: Calls for hearsay.
THE COURT: That objection is overruled. I think it's
admissible under Evidence Code section 1220, the admissions
exception to the hearsay rule. So go ahead. Did he say
anything?
THE WITNESS: When I asked for the documents, he
advised me that I did not have a legal right to stop him,
and did not provide anything other than the passport.
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
Q Did you ask him if he had a driver's license?
A Yes.
Q Did he respond to you?
A Yes.
Q What did he say?
A He said he no longer had a valid driver license.
Q Did he say anything else?
A He said quite a bit. He said it expired, and he
didn't feel the need to renew it or something, and spoke a
lot about government rules and stuff. I didn't quite
understand everything.
MR. MUNSON: I'll object to that last statement as
vague, a lot of comments about government rules or
something like that.
THE COURT: Well, it's a little bit vague. And you
can cross-examine him if you want.

(707) 299-1194
34
MR. MUNSON: I'm objecting to it as vague.
THE COURT: The question wasn't vague, the answer was
responsive, so that objection is overruled.
MR. MUNSON: Okay.
BY MS. SUSEMIHL:
Q When you asked him specifically for his vehicle
insurance, did he give you a response?
A Yes, he said he -- I don't recall exactly if he
said he didn't have one, or didn't have one with him. I
don't recall.
Q Okay. But he didn't provide you with a paper
document or any information?
A No, he did not.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor, I have no further questions
at this time.
THE COURT: Would you like to cross-examine this
witness?
MR. MUNSON: Yes, I will.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Officer Hunter, you stated that you're a deputy
sheriff for the County of Napa?
A Correct.
Q And that you were under contract to the City of
American Canyon. So on that morning, were you operating
both as a deputy sheriff for the County of Napa, and as a
police officer for the City of American Canyon?
A I was acting as a peace officer for the City of

American Canyon.
Q Okay. So you're a sworn California peace
officer then?
A Yes.
Q And, okay. And as a sworn California peace
officer, are you authorized to enforce provisions of the
Vehicle Code?
A Yes.
Q And are there procedures required by the
legislature that are applicable to peace officers when
enforcing provisions of the Vehicle Code?
A Could you be more specific?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection.
THE COURT: What's the objection?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Relevance.
THE COURT: Relevance?
MS. SUSEMIHL: And vague.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Is it a fact that --
THE COURT: Are you rephrasing the question?
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Yes, I am. Is it a fact that at 40300 of the
Vehicle Code, the legislature has provided procedures
applicable to all peace officers when enforcing provisions
of the Vehicle Code?
A I would have to have that in front of me.
Q Can we get it in front of him, or shall I just
read it into the record, your Honor?

(707) 299-1194
36
THE COURT: Well --
MR. MUNSON: I want to know.
THE COURT: Well, the question calls for improper
legal-opinion testimony. So, please rephrase that. You
can certainly refer to the law when you're arguing the
case. But generally speaking, you don't argue about the
law with a witness.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Are there procedures prescribed by the
THE COURT: Now that question calls for improper legal
opinion. So the Court will interpose its own objections.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Are you required to follow procedures, Officer
Hunter?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. Vague as to "procedures."
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. MUNSON: I would like to read 40300 of the Vehicle
Code into the record at this point, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Provisions of this chapter shall govern all
peace officers in making arrests for violations of this
Code without a warrant for offenses committed in their
presence. But the procedures prescribed, herein, shall not
otherwise be exclusive at any other method prescribed by
law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an

(707) 299-1194
37
offense of like great.
Now Officer Hunter, as a California -- as a
sworn California peace officer, does this provision bind
you to the procedures that the legislature has prescribed?
THE COURT: Sir, those are going to be valid points to
raise during your argument about whether you're guilty or
not, or what the evidence means. But I can't let you ask
this witness, or any other witness, about the law. It's my
job to interpret the law after listening to you. And the
prosecutor tell me what you think it is. But it's never a
witness' job to render opinions about the law that applies
to the case.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Okay. Officer Hunter, do you have personal
knowledge of the procedures that were prescribed by the
A All of them? You mean, required? And still you
have to be a little more specific.
THE COURT: You guys need to take turns talking.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q I'm sorry.
A Could you be more specific.
Q Well, when the legislature prescribes a
procedure that is applicable to a peace officer who
enforces a provision of the code, are you required to
follow those procedures?
A I believe so.

(707) 299-1194
38
Q Okay. And do you have personal knowledge of the
procedures that you followed on the date in question on --
in this case, did you follow the procedures that are
prescribed by the legislature?
A I believe so.
Q Okay. Do you, do you have any exception from
those procedures?
A I'm not an attorney. I'm not sure what
exemptions I do and don't have.
Q Okay. Do you know where a peace officer's
authority comes from in the law?
THE COURT: I'm going to interpose an objection, since
the prosecutor is not saying anything here. That calls for
improper legal opinion.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Okay. We'll move on. Officer Hunter, on
October 29th of 2009, did you initiate contact with the
defendant?
A Yes.
Q And what time was that?
A At approximately 11:16 in the morning.
Q You said 11:16 a.m. okay. And what were you
doing just prior to your first observations of the subject
vehicle?
A I was patrolling.
Q You were patrolling?
A Driving, yes.
Q You were assigned to a traffic patrol?

(707) 299-1194
A No, I'm actually a sergeant, and I was on
patrol.
Q Okay. Was the patrol car you were using that
day equipped with any kind of audio or video recording
systems?
A NO.
Q And in order to initiate contact with me, did
you activate your patrol vehicle's overhead emergency
lights?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And at that time you initiated contact
with me, were you acting in your official capacity?
A Yes.
Q And was I traveling on a public right-of-way?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And when you activated your lights
initiating contact with me, was I free to go?
A NO.
Q And was it your intention that I stop?
A Yes.
Q Did I comply with that command?
A Yes.
Q And at that time, that you initiated c
with me, was it your intended purpose for that contact to
enforce a provision of the Vehicle Code?
A Yes.
Q Was it a suspected violation of section
4000(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code the only reason you

(707) 299-1194
40
initiated that contact?
A You use the word "suspected," I already
confirmed it through dispatch.
Q I would object to the answer as non-responsive.
This is a yes or no question.
Was 4000(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code the only
reason why you initiated that contact?
THE COURT: That's a different question. And is that
the reason you initiated the contact?
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Both this answer and the prior answer can
stay in. The prior answer was, in fact, responsive to the
slightly different question.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q I did rephrase it to make it easier for him.
Let me ask you this, Officer Hunter: Did you
issue a notice to appear alleging violation of section
4000 (a)(1) of the Vehicle Code?
A Yes.
I! Did you inform the defendant at any time that he
das under arrest?
A No.
Q When you ran the -- did you run the defendant's
?assport through dispatch, his name and all that?
A I ran the subject's name and date of birth
through dispatch.
C! What time was that?
A Within a few minutes after the stop.

(707) 299-1194
41
Q A few minutes, so without the record from
dispatch, we don't know what time that was, do we?
A I'm not sure what we know, because you're having
me answer what the -- you know.
Q -- dispatch, and you can't seem to affix the
time. Is that the best you can do "within a few minutes"?
A Yes.
Q Thank you. That goes to discovery, your Honor.
Was there any other officer who arrived on
scene?
A Yes, later in the stop there was.
Q Later in the stop, who arrived on scene?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. Relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Who else arrived on scene?
A I don't recall.
Q You don't recall who the other officer was who
arrived on scene?
A That is correct.
Q Did another officer arrive on scene?
A I already answered that. Yes.
Q Well, I'm going to object to the failur
discovery to divulge that very important information.
Officer Hunter, I just -- I've already lodged
the objection. I'm just going do --
THE COURT: Yeah, you don't need to repeat what we've
already put on the record, as far as I'm concerned. So

(707) 299-1194
42
next question.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Okay. So another officer arrived on scene. You
don't know who it was. No, okay.
While I was in your custody; while you were
doing your police work, did anyone else appear on scene to
your knowledge?
A Yes.
Q Do you remember who? Do you know who they were?
A Some people from the City of American Canyon.
Q But you don't know their names.
A I think -- I believe one of their names is
Lastiv Cannon (phonetic) which is a code enforcement
person.
Q And the other?
A I don't know.
Q Did they attempt to confront the defendant while
he was in your custody?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Overruled. And the answer is --
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q There are how many of them?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. Asked and answered.
MR. MUNSON: Well, I believe he said two. I just want
to be sure for the record that there were two other,
besides the police officer. So there were three others.

(707) 299-1194
43
THE COURT: Now y o u ' r e e n t i t l e d t o c l a r i f y t h a t . Now
a r e you t a l k i n g about t h e t o t a l number of o t h e r p e o p l e who
stopped a t t h e scene?
MR. MUNSON: O t h e r t h a n O f f i c e r Hunter, y e s .
THE COURT: Do you r e c a l l t h a t number?

THE WITNESS: I r e c a l l two, two o t h e r p e o p l e , o t h e r
than t h e covering p o l i c e o f f i c e r .
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Okay. So, t h a n k you. Do you know what t i m e it

was t h a t t h e C i t y o f f i c i a l s showed up on s c e n e ?
A No, it was b e f o r e I was done i s s u i n g t h e t i c k e t .
I d o n ' t have t h e e x a c t t i m e .
Q "Before -- done i s s u i n g t h e t i c k e t . " Okay. Did

you a t any t i m e o r d e r me t o e x i t my a u t o m o b i l e ?
A Yes.
Q You d i d . And d i d you f r i s k me f o r weapons?

A I don't recall.
Q Did you open my c a r door and o r d e r me t o e x i t

t h e automobile?
A I r e c a l l r e q u e s t i n g you t o s t e p o u t . I don't
r e c a l l w h e t h e r I opened t h e d o o r , o r you opened t h e d o o r .
Q A t t h a t p o i n t i n t i m e , do you r e c a l l i f I a s k e d
you i f I was under a r r e s t ?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And your answer was?

A NO.
Q Okay. And d i d I t h e n a s k i f I was f r e e t o go?

A That i s c o r r e c t .

( 7 0 7 ) 299-1194
44
Q And do you recall what you said?
A Yes.
Q What did you say?
A I said you're not free to go until you sign this
citation, or request me to take you in front of a
magistrate.
Q That's not what I remembered, but that's okay.
THE COURT: You're chance to testify is going to come.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q I understand. That's close enough.
You said you patted me down for weapons. Did
you instruct me to remove myself to the front of your
patrol car?
A Can I clarify? I didn't say I patted you down
for weapons. I said I didn't recall whether I patted you
down for weapons.
Q Did you ask me to remove myself to the front of
your patrol car?
A I don't recall.
Q Did you search my automobile?
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I believe I did search the gl ove box for
your registration and insurance.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Okay. Did you ask me for permission to search
my automobile?
A I don't believe so.

(707) 299-1194
45
MR. MUNSON: Okay. Your Honor, I'd like to show
officer Hunter the TR-130, the citation. And I believe the
Best Evidence Rule would require that the complaint in this
action be showed to the officer, the original complaint?
THE COURT: You want him to look at the original one
in the file?
MR. MUNSON: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: That's fine. I'll show it to the witness.
THE WITNESS: May I approach, your Honor.
THE COURT: Go ahead and take it down.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Officer Hunter, do you recognize that
instrument?
A Yes.
Q Is that your handwriting?
A Yes.
Q And is that your signature?
A Yes.
Q Is everything you wrote on that instrument true
and correct?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
Your Honor, I'd like the TR-130 introduced into
evidence and have it marked as a defense exhibit.
THE COURT: Any objection?
THE COURT: Okay. It will have to stay in the file --

(707) 299-1194
46
MR. MUNSON: That's fine.
THE COURT: -- but go ahead and put a defense exhibit
sticker on it. Exhibit Number 7 is the citation in the
file. I believe it's the original. And it is received
into evidence.
(Whereupon, a Citation was then marked as

identification.)
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit No. 7,

previously marked for identification, was
received in evidence.)
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Thank you. Officer Hunter, prior to, or at the
time that you activated your lights initiating contact with
me, was it your belief that you were the witness to a
public crime or offense?
A I believe, I believe you violated a infraction
of the California Vehicle Code. If that's what you're
saying, yes.
Q Okay. Is it your belief that an infraction of
the Vehicle Code is a criminal offense?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm sorry. She objected.
THE COURT: What did you say?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. Calls for legal conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained. The answer is stricken.
MR. MUNSON: Well, I would say it goes more to the
question of mistake of fact, or mistake of law. And I
think that's relevant.

(707) 299-1194
47
THE COURT: I don't think his opinion about the answer
to that question is relevant. As far as the testimony
goes, it's certainly a relevant issue in this trial, but
not right now.
MR. MUNSON: Okay. I pressed it. You passed on it.
We can move on. I'm trying to slow down, because I
generally move very quickly.
THE COURT: That's okay.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Officer Hunter, at the time you initiated
contact with me and throughout the duration of that
encounter, did you observe anything that would lead you to
believe that the automobile was being used for the
transportation of passengers or freight?
A Yes.
Q Was there a passenger on board?
A Yes, you.
Q Okay. I was a passenger. I thought you said
earlier that I was the driver.
A The driver is still a passenger of the vehicle.
Q And where do you derive that a passenger and the
driver are the same thing?
A I believe you're a human being, so you are.
Q In other words --
A An occupant is still a passenger.
Q In other words, your opinion is not based upon
any legal authority?
A I believe you were a passenger, which gives me a

48
right to stop to the vehicle.
Q You "believe." In other words, it's your
opinion?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. Argumentative.
THE COURT: Sustained. Why don't you ask another
question.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Okay. I'm fine. I think we've established that
Officer Hunter doesn't have a foundation for his opinion in
the law, so we can move on.
At the time you initiated contact with me,
Officer Hunter, were you in possession of responding to a
warrant for the search and seizure of my person?
A No.
Q And at that time you activated your lights
initiating contact with me, were you in possession of, or
responding to a warrant for the search and seizure of my
car?
A NO.
Q Okay. And you previously testified that at the
time you activated your overhead lights initiating contact
with me, that I was not free to go. At what point was I
free to go?
A When you were done signing the citation.
Q Okay. What time was that?
A I don't have the exact time.
Q Okay. So when I signed the promise-to-appear
portion of the notice to appear that you issued, that's

(707) 299-1194
-
49
when I was free to go?
A Correct.
Q And after I signed that promise to appear to
secure my release from your custody, was I free to get back
in my car and continue on my way?
A No.
Q What would have been your reaction?
A Excuse me?
Q What would you have done if I wasn't free to get
back in my car and leave? What would you have done if I
got back in my car and went on my merry way?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. Calls for speculation.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Is there -- did you tell me I couldn't get back
in my car, Officer Hunter?
A No, I told you you could not drive your car.
Q I see. Did you tell. me what you would do if I
left the scene in my automobile?
A Yes.
Q What did you tell me you would do?
A I would attempt to stop you again.
Q Did you tell me that you would arrest
impound my car?
A Probably.
Q As a sworn California peace officer, Officer
Hunter, are you required to enforce provisions of the
Vehicle Code?

(707) 299-1194
50
A No.
Q Okay. So then we can agree that discretionary
and mandatory do not mean the same thing?
A Correct.
Q Okay. Do you have personal knowledge that the
Vehicle Code defines my passenger automobile as a vehicle
of a type required to be registered under this code?
A I believe so.
Q You believe so. Do you have personal knowledge
or not?
A I don't have the legal knowledge.
Q Okay. Would you happen to know where in the
Vehicle Code the legislature has defined the type of
vehicle that is a vehicle of the type required to be
registered under the code?
A No.
MR. MUNSON: I'm asking if he has personal knowledge.
THE COURT: That does not call for legal conclusion.
The answer will remain. The objection is overruled.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Officer Hunter, would you please identify for
the record the particular section of the Vehicle Code that
contains the procedures you followed when you issued a
notice to appear for suspected violation of 4000(a)(l) of
the Vehicle Code?
A I don't know it off the top of my head.
MR. MUNSON: At this point, your Honor, I'd like to

(707) 299-1194
51
read the relevant portions of 40500, and 405 --

MR. MUNSON: I would like to read the relevant
portions of 40500 and 40504 of the Vehicle Code into the
record.
THE COURT: Is that because you want to ask him some
questions about them?
MR. MUNSON: Yes. Basically, yeah, I do.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MUNSON: Because I've already --
THE COURT: Read them out slowly, please.

MR. MUNSON: Okay. Get my glasses.
THE COURT: I'm letting you read this, because you
want to ask him a question about the law. That's okay.
But if you're just reading the law into the record, you
don't need to do that now. You can do that at the end of
the trial instead.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q I'll wait on this one. Let's just wait on this
one. I'll return to that.
At the time you initiated contact with me, is it
a fact that you were authorized to make a warrantless
arrest for suspected violation of Vehicle Code section
4000 (a)(l)?
MR. MUNSON: Well, I'm asking if he has personal
knowledge of his authority and the limit on that authority.

(707) 299-1194
THE COURT: I understand.
MR. MUNSON: And --
THE COURT: But that's asking him to give an opinion
about the law. Even police officers don't do that. He's
just a witness here. Not an authority on the law.
MR. MUNSON: Okay. But the question is whether or not
he is aware of what the law is that authorizes him to act
and that limits his actions. Does he know?
THE COURT: It may sound funny -- it may sound funny
for me to say this, but that doesn't matter.
MR. MUNSON: I see.
THE COURT: It matters that he followed the law.
MR. MUNSON: Well, and that's kind of what I'm asking
him.
THE COURT: It matters that I understand the law, but
it doesn't matter what he thinks the law is.
MR. MUNSON: Well, he testified that he, that he
thinks he followed the procedures. Apparently, he's not
really sure what the procedures are.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. MUNSON: And so he's out there. He's got a gun, a
badge and other weaponry, and he's what he thinks is
enforcing the law. Police officers are not omnipotent.
They're delegated with authority. And my question to
Officer Hunter, does he know the delegation of authority?
Does he know the rules? Did he follow the rules?
THE COURT: And my prior ruling on that question
stands.

(707) 299-1194
-
53
MR. MUNSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Next question, please.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Can you identify for the record the particular
section of the Vehicle Code that contains the procedures
you followed when you executed a warrantless arrest for a
violation of section 4000(a)(l) of the Vehicle Code?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Objection. One, I believe it's been
asked and already dealt with. But also, calls for legal
conclusion.
THE COURT: It calls for improper legal opinion
testimony once again. Sustained.
BY MR. MUNSON:
Q Well, he either followed the procedures that are
prescribed by the legislature or he didn't. He thinks he
did, but how can you follow procedure if you don't know
what the -- he either knows what it is and followed it, or
he doesn't know what it is, and therefore, he couldn't have
followed it, other than --
THE COURT: I'll hear your arguments on the effect of
his not following the law of the State of California at the
proper time in this trial. Right now, you're just creating
evidence, so to speak. And his opinion about the law
doesn't matter.
MR. MUNSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Whether he followed it, does. But his
opinion about it doesn't matter. So you should ask him
what happened out there, not to render opinions about the

(707) 299-1194
- -
54
law.
MR. MUNSON: Well, I think we've established what
happens to some degree. But let me go ahead and finish up
here. I do appreciate your explanation, your Honor. I do.
And since we're going to skip over that section, we'll talk
about it in the future. I think that, I think we have
enough.
THE COURT: Is there any re-direct?
THE COURT: Thank you very much.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: And did you say you have some more
evidence?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes, your Honor. I believe People's
Exhibit 5 that's been previously marked, is a certified --
MR. MUNSON: I'm going to object.
THE COURT: Let her finish talking first.
MS. SUSEMIHL: A certified document from the
California Department of Motor Vehicle.
THE COURT: And you're offering it into evidence?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: And your objection is what?
MR. MUNSON: My objection is under 1271. I think it's
C or D of the Evidence Code. That document requires the
custodian of record to be present to answer four different
types of information about it. And the Sixth Amendment
right to confront the witness also comes into play. That's
all listed under -- well, I found it in Atkins, Volume 10

(707) 299-1194
- -
55
on California practice -- enter objections in the case
cited by Atkins is Huber Hunt (phonetic) and Nickels
Incorporated v. Moore.
THE COURT: Can I see the document. Exhibit 5, is it?
I can't really read that number.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes, it is five.
THE COURT: Is it five? I'm going to cross off this
five and put a different five on there. It's a two-page
document. I'm not going to receive page one of Exhibit 5,
the cover sheet, but I will receive into evidence over the
defendant's objection, the front and the back of page two,
which is a properly certified DMV document that I think
comes within the official record exception to the hearsay
rule.
(Whereupon, People's Exhibit No. 5, previously
marked for identification, was received in
evidence.)
THE COURT: So I'll repeat. I'm not receiving into
evidence the cover sheet, which appears to be the piece of
paper with an exhibit 5 sticker attached to it. Do you
have any other evidence?
THE COURT: Would the People rest?
MS. SUSEMIHL: The People rest.
THE COURT: And Mr. Munson, would you like to give an
opening statement now, or waive an opening statement?
MR. MUNSON: I'm going to waive an opening statement.
THE COURT: Would you like to present any additional
evidence today?

(707) 299-1194
56
MR. MUNSON: Well, I have exculpatory evidence of that
document you just accepted into evidence. The problem is
we don't have anyone to exam in regards to that document.
But I have an original letter here. I would like to have
it admitted into evidence. It was a document received from
the Department of Motor Vehicles in response to a
communication which I initiated.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor --
THE COURT: What's the next exhibit number?
THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANT: Number eight.
THE COURT: Okay. That letter from DMV will be
Defense Exhibit Number 8.
(Whereupon, a Letter was then marked as

identification.)
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor, I'm going to object, based

on discovery.
MR. MUNSON: I believe impeachment evidence is --
doesn't come under that ambit.
THE COURT: I'll just let her look at it as long as
she wants, and then we'll -- is it a two-page document?
MS. SUSEMIHL: It is.
THE COURT: We'll staple it together and mark it as an
exhibit for identification right now, and then I'll hear
argument on admissibility. You're offering it for evidence
right now, sir?
MR. MUNSON: Yes, to impeach the document which the
Court just accepted from the prosecution. And if I may,

(707) 299-1194
57
that document was mailed immediately after I received the
discovery packet on Wednesday
THE COURT: You sent a copy of it to the DA. Okay.
MR. MUNSON: On Friday it was mailed, but that's --
you know, I didn't have much time.
THE COURT: I'll have to see what we're talking about
before I hear argument on its admissibility. This two-page
letter is Exhibit Number 8 by the defendant. And you don't
want me to admit Exhibit 8, because?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Well.
THE COURT: What's the legal basis for your objection
to it?
MS. SUSEMIHL: I'm not sure what the relevance is.
THE COURT: Well, if you're not worried about the
relevance, why not just be nice to the defendant and let
consider --
MS. SUSEMIHL: I'll submit the matter to the Court.
THE COURT: There are various reasons why it's
inadmissible, but if you agree to let me consider it as
evidence in the case, I'd be happy to do that.
MS. SUSEMIHL: That's fine, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Exhibit 8 is in evidence now.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit No. 8,
previously marked for identification, was
received in evidence.)
MR. MUNSON: And the first thing I want to say about
Exhibit 8 is patently unreliable.
THE COURT: We're not arguing.
MR. MUNSON: I understand its relevance. Its

(707) 299-1194
58
relevance has to do with the other patently unreliable
document.
THE COURT: Hold on a second. I just admitted it into
evidence at your request. That's what you wanted me to do.
MR. MUNSON: Yes, I'm aware of that.
THE COURT: So right now then, rather than talking
about its significance, which is premature --
MR. MUNSON: I understand.

THE COURT: Are there any other items of evidence you
want to present?
MR. MUNSON: No, I think that's going to do it.
THE COURT: Okay. Is there any rebuttal evidence by
the People?
THE COURT: All right. Then the way we finish a trial
as you probably know, as you seem to be doing very well,
sir, it will begin with the closing argument of the
prosecutor. She can give one, or not give one. Then it's
your one-and-only chance to argue the case, and that's when
I expect you to persuade me why you're not guilty, and
argue all the law you want to argue at this point, that you
think is relevant for me to know about. And then, of
course, the prosecutor under California law has a chance to
respond to what you have to say, and get the final closing
argument, and then it's my turn to talk.
So does the DA want to give an opening/closing
argument?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor, just very briefly. To

59
summarize, Sergeant Hunter testified that he was on patrol,
observed the defendant driving a vehicle with expired
registration. He verified that he initiated a traffic
stop, asked for license, registration, proof of insurance,
was not given any of those documents, and the defendant
indicated that he no longer had his license. It was
expired, and he didn't feel that he had a need for it, I
believe, was the testimony. And I believe that that meets
all of the requirements that are set forth in the three
counts of the citation.
THE COURT: Mr. Munson, your chance for your closing
argument.
MR. MUNSON: Okay. Your Honor. The officer testified
that he made a warrantless seizure for a suspected
violation of 4000(a) (1) of the Vehicle Code. I would
object to this as hearsay, that he ran it through dispatch
and that they confirmed. The question I'm going to raise,
first of all, is the Fourth Amendment.
THE COURT: Let me just rule on that objection right
now. It's a little untimely.
MR. MUNSON: It is. And I agree with that. It just
occurred to me as I looked at my notes here, that you did
make that statement. And it is not, not -- wasn't a proper
answer. I believe I should have objected to it while we
were arguing on this.
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard on that
evidentiary-objection part of your case right now,
Ms. Susemihl?

(707) 299-1194
60
MS. SUSEMIHL: What the --
THE COURT: That he ran the plate and found out
through dispatch that it was expired.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Yes.
THE COURT: What do you want to say about that?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Regarding the hearsay objection?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Goes to the officer's state of mind.
It would explain. It's not hearsay.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, even though it's late and
because you don't have a lawyer sitting next to you, I'm
going to cut you a little bit of slack, Mr. Munson, and I'm
not going to accept that answer to prove that the
registration was expired, because that is hearsay. I was
kind of surprised you didn't object at that time.
MR. MUNSON: Well --
THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Let me talk. So I'm
not going to admit that portion of Sergeant Hunter's
testimony to prove that the registration was expired. But
I'm going to leave the answer in only to show what he was
aware of. In other words, his state of mind which in his
mind justified the right to stop your car, okay.
MR. MUNSON: Yes, as long as it's not being used to
prove the thing asserted.
THE COURT: It's not. Now before we go on any
further, do you want to reopen your case to present any
additional evidence on that subject or not? Because you
thought there was evidence that the registration was

(707) 299-1194
61
expired when you presented your case. There doesn't appear
to be right now.
MS. SUSEMIHL: Correct, your Honor. That, I will
leave it the way it is.
THE COURT: Great. All right.
MR. MUNSON: Yeah, I would move the Court to take
judicial notice of 40300 of the Vehicle Code.
THE COURT: I will do that.
MR. MUNSON: 4300 et sec of the Vehicle Code
prescribes the procedures that are applicable to all peace
officers when enforcing provisions of the Vehicle Code.
There is no authority under 4300 for a peace officer to
make a warrantless arrest for conduct not rising to a level
of the crime.
Vehicle Code, a violation of 4000 (a)(1), suspected
violation of 4000(a) (l), is a Vehicle Code infraction,
according to the court of appeals, the Fourth District
Court of Appeals at People v. Sava at 190 Cal.App.3rd 438.
THE COURT: Can you spell Sava?
MR. MUNSON: S-A-V-A, it clearly states that
infractions are not crimes. They rely on two patently
defensible opinions out of LA Superior Court Division, and,
and, nonetheless, come to the conclusion that the
legislature never intended to classify infractions as
crimes.
The initial police contact in this instance was a
warrantless seizure for a civil infraction. Now the Fourth
Amendment is pretty clear on that, but before we get there,

(707) 299-1194
62
I'm going to move the Court to take judicial notice of
40500 and 40504.
THE COURT: The Vehicle Code?
MR. MUNSON: Yes, of the Vehicle Code.
THE COURT: I will do so.
MR. MUNSON: And those are the sections that prescribe
the procedures for release from custody on a promise to
appear. These two sections of law, together, prescribe the
procedures, identify the procedures that the peace officer
must follow. They authorize the officer to act, and they
limit that action at 40300.5. And I would move the Court
take judicial notice of that statute.
THE COURT: I will.
MR. MUNSON: The authorization provided to a peace
officer under the Vehicle Code is that found at 836(a) (1)
of the Penal Code, which authorizes a peace officer to make
a warrantless arrest, an arrest without a warrant, when
they observe conduct that rises to the level of a crime.
The rules are different for misdemeanors than they are for
for felonies. None the less, there is no authorization
provided by the legislature for a peace officer to make a
warrantless arrest for a non-criminal violation of the
Vehicle Code. It's a simple question of delegation of
authority. The notice to appear that the Court has
accepted in evidence, describes that relationship as an
arresting officer, arrested person. The arresting officer
will fill out a notice to appear in triplicate and offer it
to the arrested person, so that the arrested person can

(707) 299-1194
sign the promise to appear in order to secure his release
from custody. Now that custodial relationship is very
clearly defined by the statute itself. There is no
authority provided by the legislature for a warrantless
seizure, for conduct not rising to the level of a crime.
All of the Fourth Amendment cases are very consistent,
that in order for a peace officer to make a warrantless
seizure, he must observe something that would lead him to
have a reasonable suspicion that a crime is in the --
and that brings me tO the case that I asked the Court to
take judicial notice of, the Jose Luis Pena Montez out of
the 10th Circuit. Just happened to be published on
December 7th, the date that I appeared for arraignment. On
page seven of that decision, they make a very, very simple
and concise statement of the Fourth Amendment, consistent
throughout the Ninth Circuit and all of the rest of them.
They state, paragraph two, a routine traffic stop is
indisputably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. And they go on to give a dissertation regarding
the relationship of crime as the reasonable basis for that
seizure.
When the legislature decriminalized traffic
infractions, it was to avoid the cost of doing business for
such minor themes as non-criminal conduct. I mean, when we
look at the Vehicle Code and -- we realize that the
application of the Vehicle Code as being improperly
applied, based upon the assumptions that don't take into
consideration the meaning of the words we're using.

(707) 299-1194
64
"Traffic," for example, under Black's Law Dictionary, is a
strictly commercial term, and yet Officer Hunter testified
that he made a traffic stop. And the more we look at the
language we're dealing with, the harder it is to get away
from those conclusions.
We also have -- so I mean, that's the, that's the
Fourth Amendment issue, is the police power of the State
does not apply to the conduct not rising to a level of the
crime. I don't find anywhere in California's statutes
where police can apply the State's police power to civil
conduct without warrant, capias, or process of a court or
competent jurisdiction.
Now the officer applied the state police power to
non-criminal conduct, and, and that's my objection, that he
admitted he didn't have a warrant. And so he's basing his
authority to seize on his own perception that someone
violated a rule. But I don't find where the legislature
has delegated him with that authority. And I'd like to go
on down through the cases. First of all, I'd move on the
Court to take judicial notice of Vehicle Code section 260.
Vehicle of type required to be registered under this code
is a phrase that appears numerous times throughout the
Vehicle Code, but the only section that describes the type
vehicle, that is a vehicle of a type to be required to be
registered under the code, is section 260. Section 260
then excludes passenger automobiles, etcetera, from the
ambit of commercial motor vehicle.
THE COURT: And I'll take judicial notice of section

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260.
MR. MUNSON: Okay. And now I'd like to move the Court
to take judicial notice to section 1201.5(e).
THE COURT: I'll do that also.
MR. MUNSON: At 1201.5 (el, the legislature has
strictly forbidden a peace officer to make a warrantless
arrest under the mere suspicion that --
MR. MUNSON: The legislature has specifically
forbidden a peace officer from making a warrantless seizure
for a suspected violation of 12500(a) of the Vehicle Code.
And which I don't think we'll ever get to, because -- and I
believe that the exclusionary rule after Proposition Eight
is, is strictly construed to the federal standard. The
federal standard is very clear that police conduct cannot
be applied to any kind of -- the police power of the state
can't just be applied to any kind of conduct. It has to be
authorized, and the only authorization in the Vehicle Code
is under the sections that I've quoted, 4300, 4500, et sec.
And that leads us to People v. Wohlleben, a California
case, 261 Cal. App. 2d at 461. Wohlleben, basically, is a
case from 1968 where they state a number of things. First
of all, they talk about the authority of a peace officer to
make an arrest, and they very clearly state that the
procedures that a peace officer is required to follow are
those prescribed by the Vehicle Code, not those contained
within the Penal Code.
And so the case of Wohlleben pretty much confines the

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officer to the procedures contained in the Vehicle Code.
That brings us to People v. Horvath. People v. Horvath is
found, and I happen to have a couple copies of those if
you'd like. People v. Horvath is a very wanting case,
because it addresses the issues I'm raising, but it does so
using the Vehicle Code. It does a comparative analysis,
and I have a copy for the Court, convenient. Horvath
involves a warrantless arrest under the public utility code
for a DUI aircraft taxying down the runaway. Officer
showed up, and even though she didn't observe the conduct,
she listened to a witness statement, and observed that the,
that the individual was intoxicated and made a warrantless
arrest under the public utilities code. That would have
been a lawful arrest had the legislature -- or according to
a legislature, had the authority been vested with that
authority. But because the -- was it the commissioner,
whoever it was, that had the authority to designate the
El Monte peace officer, and failed to do so. Therefore,
without the authorization, the seizure is not justified.
So we have Horvath, and then we go to Halwin,
(phonetic). People v. Halwin, stands for the simple
proposition that once it has been established that a
seizure is without a warrant, the burden of showing that
the seizure was reasonable shifts to government. I don't
think there's been any effort to show that the seizure was
reasonable. In fact, Ms. Halwin failed to ask the simple
question, did you have a warrant? And so the Halwin case
is pretty interesting, based upon the simple fact that the

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officers are presumed to act lawfully, and so if you do not
absconce upon the record the evidence of a warrant, it will
be presumed that they act lawfully.
That brings us to a lot of California caselaw that is
generated based upon presumption. The case, Supreme Court
case of McKay, and I have it somewhere. McKay was seized
riding a bicycle on the wrong side of the street; however,
McKay's counsel never challenged the initial seizure.
They, they -- the officer stopped McKay and asked him if he
had identification. McKay then in response to that search
inquiry, responded with an admission that he did not. The
officer took McKay before a magistrate under 40502, as
opposed to releasing him under 40504. It was that decision
that was challenged by the Court in McKay. McKay never
challenged the initial contact. In fact, the Court says
that at the time McKay admitted they he didn't have
identification when the officer made the arrest, but that's
a presumption based upon the fact that, that counsel for
the defense never, never challenged the initial contact.
And there are numerous cases like this, where it implies a
warrantless seizure for an infraction of the Vehicle Code
is legitimate, but those questions were never before any of
those courts. And I don't think you can find a case on the
books where a warrantless seizure for a non-criminal
conduct has been directly addressed and ruled upon and held
to be valid. All of the Fourth Amendment cases in the
federal courts are very clear. They're limited to, they're
limited to the application of the police power of the state

(707) 299-1194
68
to crime. The civil case says we need a capias or other
process of the jurisdiction.
And so I think that's going to conclude my discussion
on the Fourth Amendment. I think it's a question that
needs to be ruled on. Either non criminal civil infraction
of the Vehicle Code is conduct which rises to the level of
crime, justifying a warrantless seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and entitling one to Sixth Amendment appointed
counsel, at the public expense, if one is indigent, and a
Seventh Amendment jury trial. 689 of the Penal Code also
requires a jury trial for any form of crime or public
offense. Infractions are not crimes. It's not only the
judicial counsel report to the governor in 1967 that
continually refers to them as non criminal, but the statute
of 1968 specifically excludes infractions from the ambit of
crimes of public offenses. And I didn't submit that one,
because it's -- my research is ongoing, but the statute of
1968, I think it's A, B 1662, chapter 220, the statute of
2003, and that completes my Fourth Amendment argument. And
now I'd like to move to the first, which -- and I do have
the Brady cases here.
THE COURT: We probably need to give staff a little
bit of a break.
MR. MUNSON: Let's do that.
THE COURT: Let's take our break right now, and resume
at five minutes after 11:OO.
(Recess taken.)
MR. MUNSON: Thank you, your Honor.

(707) 299-1194
- --
69
THE COURT: So go ahead, Mr. Munson.
MR. MUNSON: Thank you, your Honor. There was one
more case on the procedures, and that's People v. Superlor
Court, Simon, S-I-M-0-N, from 7 Cal.3d 186, where on page
14 they state that sections 40300 through 40604 of the
Vehicle Code provide the exclusive procedure to be followed
after making a warrantless arrest for a traffic violation
not amounting to a felony. So I just want to include that,
since I came across it in closing.
I wanted to address the evidence. I'm not sure which
exhibit it was, but there was a document introduced by the
prosecution, which I objected to. And then I asked to have
a rebutting document introduced.
THE COURT: Exhibit 5, the DMV document?
MR. MUNSON: Yes, that one. And I introduced the
document with the intention of impeaching that record as
unreliable. The problem I have with the letter I received
from the DMV, is it is rubber stamped BB Jones. BB Jones,
I can tell you, doesn't exist, and that's why I say the
document itself is patently unreliable. The reason I asked
to have it introduced into evidence, is that it makes
reference to DL-142 document having been submitted to the
Department of Motor Vehicles. That submission does not
show up anywhere on the document introduced by the
prosecution, which, I mean, basically, it's evidence that
that document is not reliable. But I can't ask anyone
about that document, because we don't have a custodian of
records here. So I'm going to reiterate my objection to

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70
introduce -- the introduction of that document.
And now I'm going to move onto definitions.
Officer Hunter made a formal legal opinion when he
testified that the defendant was a driver. That's a legal
conclusion. I objected to that. It was overruled. And at
the same time, when I asked Officer Hunter questions about
the law, the objections were sustained, because he's
apparently not qualified to form a legal opinion. So
there's a little tit for tat there.
Officer Hunter testified the defendant was both a
driver and a passenger. All of these things can't be true.
The definition of passenger -- I move the Court to take
judicial notice of definition of passenger. In Black's Law
Dictionary, passenger is a very narrowly defined legal
term. Basically a passenger in general is a person that
gives compensation to another to be transported. And all
through the entire definition of passenger, it's
consistent. It has to do with payment to be transported.
A carrier transports a passenger who pays him a
compensation. The proper term for someone who is riding in
an automobile who's not paying to be transported is the
term "guest" or "friend," but not "passenger."
And driver, of course, is any person who operates a
commercial motor vehicle, and 15210(p)(7) of the Vehicle
Code states that in the absence of a federal definition,
existing definitions under the code shall apply. Even
though it qualifies the statement with for purposes of this
chapter, chapter entitled "headings" are not official, and

(707) 299-1194
- - -
71
do not expand or limit the scope of provisions within them.
Also, I would move the Court to take judicial notice
of the legal definition of "traffic." Traffic is trade,
commerce, the transportations of goods, services for hire.
And Officer Hunter testified that he made a traffic stop.
I happen to -- the Romans called law, Lex. And Lex in
Latin means language. And I'm a stickler on the language
for particular reasons. If we don't understand the
language we're using, we can't possibly understand the
concepts surrounding them. So when we talk about traffic
and transportation, we talk about routine traffic stops.
We're talking about commerce. The arteries of interstate
commerce are reserved to commerce under the congress.
MR. MUNSON: Arteries of interstate commerce are
reserved to congress under the commerce clause which is
Article One, clause three, of the federal state
constitution.
The street and the highways also belong to the people
as rights of way. And so that alone should indicate that
it is not the streets and the highways themselves, but the
manner in which they are used to determine whether or not
one exercises a right or a privilege. I'm going to move
now from the Fourth Amendment to the First Amendment
discussion.
We the People ordained and established the
constitutions of government. We were very clear in the
California constitution, that we the People of California,

(707) 299-1194
72
grateful to all mighty God for our freedom to ordain and
establish this constitution for the State of California.
That's the de jure constitution of 1849. I don't think
that the de facto constitution of 1879 mentions anything
about God. But it does say in Article One, section one,
that all men by nature are free and independent. If the
mode of, the present mode of enforcement is -- can be said
to be legitimate, what it, in fact, does, is it reduces the
right to be free and independent, and the right to liberty,
to freely associate, to move about, and even to petition
for re address of grievance is reduced to a licensed
privilege.
Now as we start looking at that fact, we realize that
in practical application, the license to drive, not merely
in correct legal context, a license to engage in the use of
the highways as a place of business for personal gain or
profit to the transportation of persons or passengers.
It's a little bit of a complex discussion. So I think what
we should do now is start by going through the statutes of
California I've submitted, because they're very clear.
According to the DMV's own website, and I disagree with
some of the things on there, but they have a time line
showing the history of the motor vehicle department. They
didn't come in until later on. The first licensing statute
became law in 1914, based upon the statute of 1913.
Prior to that, the first indication that we had of
regulatory control, was the California Road Laws of 1911,
published by the A. Carlisle Company out of San Francisco.

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73
They make numerous r e f e r e n c e s t o d r i v e r , b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t
of e v e r y t h i n g from t h e h o r s e l e s s c a r r i a g e t o a , t o a , an
oxcart. Driver i s a t r a d i t i o n a l term, i n t e g r i t y r e l a t e d t o
commerce. We can go t o Bouvier 1856. I have a
l e a t h e r - b o u n d s e t of B o u v i e r ' s , o r i g i n a l . D r i v e r s , when
employed, e v e n t h e d i c t i o n a r i e s we h a v e t o d a y s a y " d r i v e r s
when employed." Now we use t h e l a y p e r s o n c o n t e x t of
d r i v e r , b u t t h e l a y p e r s o n c o n t e x t of d r i v e r i s n o t t h e same
a s t h e l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n of d r i v e r . One i s a n o r d i n a r y
word, and t h e o t h e r one i s a v e r y n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d l e g a l
term i n r e l a t e d t o commerce. I would move t h e Court t o
t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e C a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t e s o f 1925.
And I c h o s e t h e c e r t a i n -- because o f t h e c l a r i t y , a t pages
833 t o 838. B a s i c a l l y a t page 833, c h a p t e r 412, s e c t i o n
one, p a r a g r a p h B s t a t e t h a t t h e word --
THE COURT: Slow down.

MR. MUNSON: I ' m sorry. S h a l l include a l l persons,
f i r m s , a s s o c i a t i o n s and c o r p o r a t i o n s , b u t s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e
p e r s o n s who t r a n s p o r t h i s o r h e r own p r o p e r t y , o r who
t r a n s p o r t s not persons o r property f o r h i r e . You know,
t h a t ' s an a b b r e v i a t e d e x t r a c t , b u t I d i d submit t h e
photocopy o f t h e a c t u a l s t a t u t e and t h o s e p a g e s .
The s t a t u t e t h e n goes on t o t a l k a b o u t t h e revenues
g e n e r a t e d by t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , making it u l t i m a t e l y c l e a r
t h a t what t h e y ' r e l i c e n s i n g i s o p e r a t o r s who t r a n s p o r t
freight f o r hire. The o t h e r r e f e r e n c e i n t h o s e codes have
t o do w i t h t h e term c h a u f f e u r . C h a u f f e u r s and o p e r a t o r s
were r e q u i r e d t o be l i c e n s e d b e c a u s e of t h e i r

( 7 0 7 ) 299-1194
74
extra-ordinary use of the highways. I move the Court to
take judicial notice of section four to the Vehicle Code,
which, in essence, states that accrued rights are not
effected by the provisions of the code.
THE COURT: Section what?
MR. MUNSON: Section four.
THE COURT: I'll take judicial notice of section four.
MR. MUNSON: It was originally section two, and, you
know, things get moved around. But even the original
Vehicle Code of 1935 contained that section. I have a
collection of older vehicle books, going back to 1917.
Because of the freedom to move about unmolested,
unrestrained, limited only by your obligation to observe
the rights of others, is, I think, one of the most basic of
all of our freedoms, without which no liberty interest can
be fully realized.
And it's unfortunate, because I'm pretty much appalled
at what I'm seeing everyday in this society. And I travel
the world as an entertainer, so I see a number of different
kinds of societies. And I was raised with the particular
type of ideal, thinking that America, land of the free,
home of the brave, greatest country on earth, and I grew up
to realize that that's never really quite manifested.
And so the driver license as it's being, the
requirement is being enforced to date, contrary to what the
statutes say, and they're all consistent. I provided all
of them in the way of judicial notice, and they're all
consistent. What I want to say before moving beyond the

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statutes is that the statute of 1957 -- first 1955 and
Revenue of Taxation Code, they exchanged definition without
a substantive change. They stated identically the same
language that I presented here from the statutes of 1957,
from the Vehicle Code. They state that the, the term
operator's license, and chauffeur's license to be called a
driver license. So it was 1957 that the Vehicle Code first
introduced the term "driver." It has subsequently been
redefined in the codes without any substantive change to
the meaning. The fact is, I would like the Court at this
point to take judicial notice of 22 through 22.2 of the
Civil Code.
THE COURT: I'll do that.
MR. MUNSON: 22 through 22.2 states very clearly that
the law is the solemn expression of the will of the People,
the will of the People as expressed in our constitution and
in our statutes.
And then 22.2 states that the common law of England
insofar as it is not repugnant to our constitution of the
United States of America, is the rule of decision through
the courts of this state. There is no mention of the code,
and there is a reason for that. The codes are a glorified
resource locator. Somehow they have found their way h t o
being treated as if they contain the law, as opposed to
restatements of the law, and that's why I've gone through
the statutes themselves for clarification. And it's too
broad of a subject for me to address all of it here today.
But as I previously stated, I look at the Vehicle Code

(707) 299-1194
76
in prior material. I look at it from its inception to
where we are today, and I have to say I'm appalled that you
can't go anywhere in this society without policeman wailing
passersby for every conceivable human imperfection. I
mean, a civil infraction, for example, the one that leads
me to a warrantless arrest, is an administrative,
non-criminal act. And to apply the State's police power,
you know, when, when anyone falsely arrests another, the
description that we provide for that in the Penal Code is
assault and battery.
Now assault and battery are both very egregious
criminal acts. And yet under the auspice of lawful
authority, which I can't seem to find a delegation for,
this very serious conduct by armed uniformed employees and
municipal corporations generally is being applied to benign
civil conduct not rising to a level of crime for which no
one is even injured. I think the more egregious behavior
is that you can't go down the street without being
concerned that you're going to be stopped. And I watch
legal dissertations all the time. In fact, there's one on
YouTube by a professor James Dwayne (phonetic) out of the
Regent University Law School in Virginia Beach, Virginia,
where he does a dissertation called "I don't talk to Cops."
Immediately after that, he has a police officer from the
same city, from the police department, talk on the same
subject, where he says very clearly that if I can follow
you long enough, you will make a mistake that I can
justifiably stop you for.

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Now I've heard these kind of comments in court where
the judge just said, well, I realize that it's almost
impossible if you live in this society not to get a traffic
ticket. The truth is, is that the laws, the way they're
enforced, if applied only to benign or non-commercial
conduct, people exercising their right to obtain the basic
necessities of life, to secure their, their freedom and
their happiness, if it's applied to just passersby, I'm
afraid that the conduct is quite egregious. And the
license to, quote, drive, then becomes a tool for social
engineering, and that the -- that under the principle of
enforcement of the statutory regulatory scheme, the license
to drive is, in fact, converted to license or permission
for basic survival. And it's permission for living life
itself.
In order to obtain the license, one must waive a
myriad of rights, which it's unconscionable that one right
should have to be waived in order to exercise another. But
the license, and all the law and licensing is very clear.
License can't be held out against the waiver of a
constitutional right, and yet it apparently is, because in
order to get the license for autonomous use on streets and
highways, you have to surrender your right to privacy. We
know that from the case of Reno v. Conlin, where the
attorney general for South Carolina sued to get an
injunction to halt the transfer of his state's citizens'
private information from the DMV to the federal government.
That went all the way to the supreme court, where the

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78
supreme court ruled in the context of a transaction, that
that information was commercial information.
So in order to get the driver license, you have to
waive your right to privacy in that context. Under the
Real ID Act, I think it's 482 USC 666, under the real ID
act, one must -- the states have been required to have it
complied, per se, that I'm aware of, but they were required
to put a radio frequency ID chip in the wallet of every
American citizen with a driver license. This is clearly a
totalitarian surveillance system under the auspice of
tracking down dead-beat parents, but one must accept the
tracking device if one is to apply for and receive a
license.
Then one has to, apparently, as a condition of the
application, one must surrender their right not to be a
victim of a warrantless search and seizure on the street
for non-criminal conduct. I mean, that's a judgment I make
based upon what I'm observing occurring in society. So
people can't even move about unmolested in the land of the
free, and the home of the brave, but they seem to be able
to do it in countries where they have no political freedom.
They seem to have more personal freedom where they don't
have any political freedom. I find that an odd thing to
observe. But, you know, the right to be secure in your
person and possession should not be sacrificed, based upon
ones use of the street and highways as a necessity.
50,000 years of recorded history, people have used the
streets and highways as a matter of right. There are,

79
there are some exceptions, such as under the English common
law. There were many private roads through private
property, and that's where we end up with the concept of a
turnpike. People who opened that land would charge a toll
in order to maintain those roads. The worst road was the
King's road, because the King didn't spend much money on
it. So there was a lot of usage of the private roads. But
in looking through history, you know, a private landowner
has the right to charge a fee or a fair to allow someone
ingress or egress on their property.
The streets and highways in this country belong to the
people. They were designed for the traveling public, and
to hold their use hostage to a license is patently
un-American in my view. You have to surrender your right
not to be a witness against yourself or to produce evidence
on command, and Officer Hunter very clearly testified that
he demanded that the defendant in this case produce
evidence, evidence of this, evidence of that. And that may
be a condition of the driver's acquisition of the driver's
privilege, but beyond that, I don't think it has any
application that's not covered by the Fifth Amendment. And
then, of course, one has to surrender the right not to
associate with, for example, unethical corporations who,
who use the traffic laws as a device for maximizing
corporate profits. And I can give you an example of that
soon. But before I do, I'd like to talk about the use of
one's property, one's private automobile for mere ingress
and egress for the necessities of life.

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One has to surrender the right to absolute ownership
of that vehicle, because in paying the fees for the
registration to the DMV, one grants a lien right to that
automobile. And then we have the right to be secure in
one's person and possessions against warrantless seizures
of one's property. And Officer Hunter testified that he
did inform me that if I was to exercise my right to travel
freely and unregulated on the streets and highways, that he
would have arrested me and impounded my automobile. I look
at the section of the law governing the seizure of
property. The Vehicle Code is very clear that the taking
of an automobile without lawful authority, whatever legal
license one requires from the owner, is, is a serious
criminal offense, and yet there are only two sections of
the Vehicle Code that authorize such a seizure, and they
are the Safe Streets and Highways Act of the Community
Caretaking Doctrine. I already mentioned the Safe Street
and Highways Act involving the seizure, and the
constitutionality of that seizure is based upon a federal
case occurring in the territorial waters off the Costa
Rica. I mean, if that doesn't smack of admiralty, I don't
know what is. And under Porta Rican statutes. Porta Rico
is a non, self governing -- not officially self governing.
It's a territorial possession of the United States. The
insular cases make it quite clear that the constitutional
protection does not necessarily extend to all areas under
US control, which lead me to wonder which federal
jurisdiction at the legislature using to justify a

81
warrantless seizure on the streets and highways of
California. And, I mean, are they arteries of interstate
commerce in that context? There's a lot of questions. I
won't go there. I just want to raise them.
But as we start looking at the actual application
of the license and scheme in contrast to what it was
supposed to be, what it should be, and what it reasonably
would be, because otherwise it just conflicts with the
whole notion of liberty. But in order to use your car, and
1 don't know how many traffic courts you've been to. I've
been to a few of them, and I find them to be reprehensible
little places where the only thing of any interest is
filthy lucre, and I hate to put it that way, but I find it
that abhorrent. And there, none of the rules are followed.
They don't even talk to you respectfully. There are few
courts that are an exception to that. I find Napa to be
one of them, but Napa's an exception.
So I think the whole due-process thing, it becomes
topsy-turvey. Either an infraction is a crime justifying
warrantless seizure, or it is not, and it does not, and the
Sixth and Seventh Amendment go along. It can be a crime
for purposes of warrantless seizure, but not a crime for
purposes of due process. It has to be consistent all the
way across the board. California seems to have been taking
from both ends for the last 42 years, and I'm surprised
that none of the lawyers -- I guess I'm not. You get that
much business as the residue of the warrantless search and
seizures, you may have a vested interest in not raising it.

(707) 299-1194
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But I am a person effected directly by the
misapplication of the law. I put myself in this position
with the specific intent of raising these issues, because I
find them intolerable. And I've also read enough caselaw.
If I'm not a person effected by this law enforcement
scheme, then I really have no standing to raise these
issues. And so I'm not here by accident, but with a
specific intent of doing something for the People of the
State of California and this entire country.
And this look to see if there's an alternative to
obtaining the license, to use the streets and highways as
if one were the proper object of the licensing, and I don't
concede that one is. But the alternative to securing the
government-created privilege is to walk, and we all know
how limiting that is in terms of basic society, in a
society that is global, and a world where everything is, is
sort of remote. You have might live in San Francisco and
be able to ride public transportation, but nowhere is it
available outside the metropolitan areas. And for someone
like me, who might perform in Monterey one night and Reno
the next, there's no possible way for me to survive in this
world if my rights to use the streets and the highways for
ingress and egress is held hostage to a license, or a leave
to be granted or withheld at the leisure of government
actors, according to the terms of their own proclamation.
Public transportation as an option to autonomy, means
that I'm confined to someone else's limitation on
schedules, that I'm confined to purchasing transportation

(707) 299-1194
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of the services and customers from a commercial carrier who
has a driver with a chauffeur's license. I can get a ride
from a benevolent friend or benevolent stranger, each of
which would have to hold license or permission. I can even
purchase private transportation services from a private
carrier, a taxicab, a limousine, but non of those options
really provides one with an ability to survive outside the
inner cities, or to exercise the right to survive without
permission.
So riding a bicycle, walking, those things are not
going to take your children to church. They're not going
to get you -- my dentist is in Cloverdale. I don't know
how I would get there without permission, and the whole
notion that I can't live life without permission, is, in my
view, very un-American. And so there might be some
incentive every time the, the municipal corporations
investment portfolios in their retirement take a hit
because the stockmarket drops. I see a bigger sharks
frenzy out there on the street. And I've got to say that
if this is a free society, how it is that we are subjected
to this army of gunmen, who are seizing people right and
left for benign, non-criminal conduct, where no one is
injured. I don't know even what right is being exercised
by the State in that regard. There's only two kinds of
rights. And there's only two kinds --
MR. MUNSON: There are only two types of rights, and
two types of wrongs under the English common law.

(707) 299-1194
84
According to Blackstone's commentaries on the law of
England, book one, page 56, rights are of two kinds. They
are those annexed to the persons of men, rights of men or
de jura personarum. And there are, secondly, the right to
control external objects over which man may intend a
dominion. A comment on the side of that, is the property
is not the thing itself, but the interest one has in
controlling it. Wrongs on the other hand, are of two
kinds, equally of two kinds. And they are either public or
private, which raises me to bring in the question of
admiralty again. On the public side, we have only two
jurisdictions, and public is what we call criminal. And
they are the common law and admiralty. That's the
constitution limits that -- and on the private side, we
have trespass and breach. I don't know what else we have,
except maybe of parents patria, and matters of equity. And
I just don't know what else there is on that side. And to
suggest that Vehicle Code infractions are the non criminal,
is to suggest that they're civil. There isn't anything
else. And to join civil and criminal together is a little
confusing when the Code of Civil Procedure is very clear,
that there's only two kinds of actions, and the elements of
one are not motives in another.
So what we have, in essence, in the present mode of
enforcement of the Vehicle Code, is a legal Frankenstein.
W we have parts that were never intended to be put
together. We don't join civil and criminal actions,
because they are fundamentally converse. One is private.

( 7 0 7 ) 299-1194
85
One is public. So what we have is a mess.
If I have the right to liberty, it doesn't rest upon
leave or license for its execution, yet that would appear
to be the present mode. So that's my brief dissertation on
the First Amendment issues involved. I don't think there's
much left of our Bill of Rights the way the courts are
headed. In fact, my opinion is that the only ones that are
really being given any credit or effected at all, are the
First and Fourth, and they're slowly being eroded. I think
it's important for people like me who have the type of
understanding that I have to do what I'm doing. I think
it's the right thing for me. I think it's the right thing
for the People of California. I think it's the right thing
for this country, because if we don't get our feet back
under us and start looking at the world around us a little
more appropriately, this whole system is having the wheels
come off. We can see that by the massive redistribution of
wealth. I mean, if people like me don't stand up for the
rule of law and demand it from our servants, I don't know
how long it's going to be before we collapse into total
anarchy. Rome, they all did it. And we've just about run
our course. So I think it is very important for the courts
to take a very close look at the statute I've submitted,
and the caselaw I've submitted, and to the wary of those
cases which appear to stand for a proposition. That is, in
fact, the basis of a presumption the courts are compelled
to make on review when the record does not provide the
contrary.

(707) 299-1194
86
So I don't know how much more can be said. The
language of the Fourth Amendment is clear, and I've read
all the cases. I don't care if it's Benford (phonetic). I
don't know if it's the case of Miller, the DMV letter
referred to. None of those cases even remotely address the
questions that I'm raising.
Miller, for example, the case they sent me in
response, Miller was trying to get a driver license, and he
didn't want to submit a Social Security number, and he used
religious grounds. I don't think I'm even remotely similar
to that case. I think on every element it's
distinguishable. And I don't care if we use Utah v -- I
don't remember all the names at this point, but I remember
the cases. Many of these seizures in other states involve
misdemeanors, Atwater v. City of Loma Vista (phonetic),
just came out with the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
California, using it for a completely wrong proposition
based upon a similar Fourth Amendment argument. The
problem is in California, just like in Texas, a child un
restrained in an automobile is a misdemeanor, not an
infraction. So I don't care what case they want to argue.
They can bring up any case they want to, and the facts are
real simple. None of those cases stand for the proposition
that they appear to, based upon simple presumption. I'm
challenging the initial contact as a warrantless seizure.
The 10th Circuit on December 7th came out with a very clear
statement that it was a warrantless seizure, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And the People haven't

(707) 299-1194
87
offered anything to suggest that such a seizure was
reasonable, no public safety concerns, simply an
administrative issue.
And so here we have two problems. We have a First
amendment right to travel being reduced to a statutory
regulatory scheme. And then we have the associated
warrantless seizure concerns. And lucky you, as far as I
know, your Honor gets to be the first to rule on that
question.
THE COURT: Okay. Does that conclude your closing
arguments.
MR. MUNSON: Let me just make sure I didn't miss
anything. I think that's all the statutory references. I
did mention the Code of Civil Procedure. It's basically
section 22 -- well, let's see what is it.
THE COURT: There's no need to repeat yourself because
I have been listening.
MR. MUNSON: I'm a little obsessive/compulsive, so I
appreciate it when you stop me, because I do this a lot
myself.
THE COURT: I have that tendency myself.
MR. MUNSON: Most good juris do. Blackstone and Cooke
C-0-0-K-E, and that's what interested me to begin with when
I recognized myself in the description of someone with that
prowess. I said, wow, maybe this is good for something.
But I have nothing but more cases. It would just be
cumulative at this point, your Honor. And so, yeah, I'm
going to rest now.

(707) 299-1194
88
THE COURT: Okay. Do the People wish to give a
rebuttal argument?
MS. SUSEMIHL: Your Honor, I'll try to be very brief.
It appears that the defendant is making a 1538 motion based
on unlawful detention. There was not one filed, or before
this Court, but it's well settled caselaw that any Vehicle
Code law violation in California is to stop a vehicle. And
in this case, Sergeant Hunter testified that he had reason
to believe that the registration was expired, so he
initiated a traffic stop. While conducting that traffic
stop he learned that the driver was unlicensed, which is a
misdemeanor in California. So I think any 1538, Fourth
Amendment issue -- there isn't one.
And then secondly, it's clear that the defendant
doesn't agree with the law, that you have to have a driver
license in California. But that's not -- the issue before
us today is whether or not he violated the law in
California. I'll submit.
THE COURT: Okay. It's my turn to talk. It does feel
like the defendant is moving to suppress the evidence
seized as a result of an alleged unlawful detention. And
it seems that he is doing that under Penal Code section
1538.5, subdivisions (g) and (h). So I'll first address
that issue that's being raised by the defendant.
Subdivision (g) says if the property or evidence relates to
a misdemeanor complaint, the motion shall be made before
trial, and heard prior to trial at a special hearing
relating to the validity of the search or seizure if the

(707) 299-1194
89
property or evidence relates to a misdemeanor, filed
together with a felony. And it goes on to say some things
that don't really apply. And then subdivision (h) says, if
prior to the trial of a felony or misdemeanor opportunity
for this motion did not exist, or the defendant was not
aware of the grounds for the motion, the defendant shall
have the right to make this motion during the course of
trial.
In this case, the things that the defendant complains
of were well known to him long before trial, and so a
motion to suppress under this statute, anyway, should have
been made before trial. And one reason I'm going to deny
his motion to suppress is that, in fact, it is untimely.
But as an accomodation to the defendant, I'll also note
that if I were ruling on this motion at the trial, on its
merits, in a sense I'm doing that right now for the record,
I would still deny the motion to suppress.
As both of you know, a judge at my level, which is a
trial court judge, is in fact bound by the law as it
exists, and as it is defined by higher courts. I am the
lowest court there is in California, the trial court. They
call it a superior court, but they might as well call it
the inferior Court, because this is where discussions like
this begin, not where they're actually decided at the
policy level. And I understand what the defendant says
about statutes being different than common law and
centuries of, of law established by other means, according
to the authorities. But in fact, I don't like activist

(707) 299-1194
90
judges, and activist judges, I think, are people who do
what they think is right, regardless of what the law is.
Whether you're Republic, Democrat or Libertarian, it
doesn't matter. So I try not to be an activist judge. I
try to simply follow the law that's laid down to me by the
executive branch, the legislative branch, and then the
higher courts within my branch, the judicial branch.
And the fact of the matter is, Sergeant Hunter had
probable cause under the law of the State of California, as
also interpreted by the Supreme Court of California, and
the Supreme Court of the United States, to stop the motor
vehicle that the defendant was driving, and very
temporarily detain that driver to conduct an investigation.
And the reason for that is that he had confirmed through
dispatch that the registration on the car was expired while
it was being driven down a public roadway by the defendant.
And that, like it or not, is defined as a violation of law
in California Vehicle Code section 4000.
And so the law is very clear, also, that once a car
stop like that is made, the officer making that car stop
has the right to ask the driver for his driver license, his
or her evidence of registration, and his or her evidence of
insurance, or other proper financial coverage. And so when
Sergeant Hunter did that, he was not doing anything wrong
under the law, as I understand it anyway.
There are lots and lots of people in this Country who
subscribe to the philosophy of the defendant. And I just
want to take a moment to thank you for presenting your

(707) 299-1194
91
position so articulately, and intelligently, and politely.
I appreciate that.
MR. MUNSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: I'm obviously disagreeing with some of
what you said, but we both got different jobs to do here, I
guess. So I will deny the defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence obtained against him. I do not think as the
defendant does that it violates the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, or any other laws of a similar
nature in the California Constitution, or in the State of
California.
And so the question then becomes, is he guilty or not
guilty of the crimes he's charged with. Penal Code section
15 defines a crime or public offense, and it says, a crime
or public offense is an act committed or omitted in
violation of a law, forbidding or commanding it into which
is annexed upon conviction, either of the following
punishment: One, death, two, imprisonment, three, fine,
four, removal from office, or five, disqualification to
hold and enjoy any office of honor, of trust or profit in
this State.
Penal Code section 16 says, crimes and public offenses
include one, felonies, two, misdemeanors, and three,
infractions, and Penal Code 19.7 says, accept as otherwise
provided by law. All provisions of law relating to
misdemeanors shall apply to infractions, including, but not
limited to powers of peace officers, jurisdiction of
courts, periods for commencing action, and for bringing a

(707) 299-1194
92
case to trial, and burden of proof. In fact, once the
officer, once Sergeant Hunter finished his preliminary
investigation after stopping the vehicle, he was presented
with, with probable cause to believe that the defendant was
in violation of Vehicle Code section 4000, an infraction,
for expired registration, Vehicle Code section 12500, being
an unlicensed driver, a misdemeanor, and Vehicle Code
section 1602(a), driving without proper proof of financial
ability to respond to damages or insurance the as People
phrase it in a summary fashion. And I believe he followed
all the statutory procedures properly, and I believe the
defendant is properly before the Court for this trial and
subject to its jurisdiction.
I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of Count One, Vehicle Code section
4000, and so he will be found not guilty of that, because
there is no proof before the Court -- once we ruled on the
evidentiary objections towards the end of the trial. There
is no proof before the Court that he was driving an
unregistered vehicle, so I find him not guilty of that
offense .
On the other hand, I am convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was driving without a license in violation of
Vehicle Code section 12500 subdivision (a), as charged.
And so he will be found guilty of that offense. And I am
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the
crime charged in Count Three, an infraction, Vehicle Code
section 16028, subdivision (a), and so I'll find him guilty

(707) 299-1194
93
of that offense.
Would you like to be sentenced today, sir, or at
another time?
MR. MUNSON: Well, I would move the Court for a stay
pending appeal.
THE COURT: I haven't sentenced you yet, so would you
like me to finish the trial and tell you what the
punishment is before we get to that issue?
MR. MUNSON: All right. If you like.
THE COURT: Do the People want to be heard on that?
THE COURT: Okay. And do you want to be heard on the
subject of sentencing?
MR. MUNSON: Nope.
THE COURT: Okay. Can I have a probation order,
please. I can't find page two in there yet. I've got page
two here.
THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANT: Thank you. I found it.
THE COURT: You found it. All right. As you may
know, the 12500 is punishable for up to six months in jail.
I certainly don't intend to do that. Instead, I'll put you
on probation for three years, suspend imposition of
sentence, and then grant you the fines of $206 for the
12500, and 825 for the 16028 violation. And I'll just give
you the minimum restitution fine of $100. It could be as
high as 1,000.
I'd like you to take a look at this probation order,
and see if you agree to the terms of it, and just fill out

(707) 299-1194
94
the highlighted portion of that if you agree to abide by
those terms of probation. I understand you may want to
file a notice of appeal and challenge everything, but this
is just what we need to do for this portion.
MR. MUNSON: I understand. And I'm going to reject
the probation offer.
THE COURT: You realize you can go to jail if you --
MR. MUNSON: Yes, I'm quite aware of it. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then on Count Two, let
me just say that I thought it was valuable in this case to
put you on probation, because it's just another way of
encouraging you, until -- until the issue is decided by the
supreme court someday, it's another way of encouraging you
to abide by the law -- and a little bit worried about you
continuing to violate the law. So we need to make a
statement here that this is a violation of the law as I
understand it, and you can't continue to violate that law.
So I'll give you a chance to change your mind if you
wish. I'm still going to impose those two fines, but I'm
going to put you in jail for 10 days on 12500 violation.
You won't go to jail now. I'll give you a date to report
in the future, and if you file a notice of appeal, then
under law, that 10-day period would be stayed pending that
appeal. But that's what I intend to do. On the other
hand, if you want to agree to be on probation, I won't
impose the 10 days jail.
MR. MUNSON: No, thank you.
THE COURT: You still don't want to do that?

(707) 299-1194
95
MR. MUNSON: I'm not going to agree to anything.
THE COURT: Gotcha. Okay. Well, then, because the
defendant does not want to be on probation, and that's your
privilege and right as I understand it, not to be placed on
probation, then on Count Two, the VC 12500, I will sentence
you to 10 days in jail. You'll begin serving that time by
going to the jail at 8:00 in the morning on April the 8th,
and follow their directions about exactly when and exactly
how to serve that time.
MR. MUNSON: If it please the Court --
THE COURT: Hold on just a second. Let me finish
this. The fine on Count Two is $206, and then probation is
denied on Count Three as well. And the fine on that charge
is simply $825. And then I need to impose the minimum $100
restitution fine on Count Two, as well.
So we're going to give you some paperwork. You'll
need to take it down to the big counter on the first floor,
and they will tell you what to do next in terms of setting
up a payment schedule, or delaying that until you file a
notice of appeal, or whatever is appropriate. I can't stay
any portion of this sentence right now, because I'm
powerless to do that. You'll have to file an appeal of the
judgment of the Court within 30 days of today to --
MR. MUNSON: I understand that.
THE COURT: -- appeal that. Otherwise, you might lose
your right to appeal if you wait beyond that 30 days.
MR. MUNSON: Right. I understand.
THE COURT: Did you want to say something else?

(707) 299-1194
96
MR. MUNSON: Well, yeah. I do intend to appeal. And
a number of reasons, but you, you use 19.7 of the Penal
Code to, to extrapolate the authority of the Penal Code to
apply to the Vehicle Code. The original 19.7 stated,
absent the law to the contrary. The procedures that apply
to misdemeanors also apply to infractions, including the
power of police officers, etcetera. The current one that
you just read into the record basically says except as
otherwise provided by law. And I believe that the, that
the holding Wohlleben, and in People v. Superior Court,
Simon, are both very clear. The procedures applicable to
the Vehicle Code are those contained in the Vehicle Code
and not the Penal Code, so we do have a lot to the
contrary.
THE COURT: I understand that principle.
MR. MUNSON: And I want to thank you. I think that
you've been very diligent. You've been very reasonable,
and I've never seen you before, but you have gained my
respect. And I want to thank you, because not very many of
them do.
THE COURT: Thank you.
One more thing on the record that -- I neglected to
say this, because you probably already know this, but I
have to say this out loud. I told you how you appeal this
thing by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days. Because
one of the charges is a misdemeanor, you're entitled to a
lawyer on appeal. And if you can't afford a lawyer, you're
entitled to a free lawyer on appeal, and a free copy of the

(707) 299-1194
97
transcript if the proper documents are filed, and the Court
becomes convinced you're entitled to those things. I just
needed to tell you that on the record.
MR. MUNSON: I appreciate that. And there was, I
think, one issue, and I think the date was conflicted with
another appearance that I have. But I can -- we can deal
with that with the State. And so I don't need to address
it now. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
THE COURT: All right.
//
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
--000--

(707) 299-1194
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss.
COUNTY OF NAPA )
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, LINDA SHRYACK, CSR No. 12104 a duly qualified
and acting Official Shorthand Reporter of the Superior
Court of the State of California, in and for the County of
Napa, do hereby certify:
That on Monday, March 8, 2010 I acted as the
Official Shorthand Reporter on the proceedings of the case
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA versus RIK WAYNE
MUNSON, No. CRl49l44.
That I took down in shorthand the testimony and
proceedings had therein.
That thereafter I transcribed the same into
longhand typewriting, and that the foregoing pages 1
through 97, inclusive, comprise a full, true and correct
transcript of proceedings had, as requested by Appellant
and as required by the First Appellate District Court of
Appeal.
Dated this 19th day of July, 2010.
Official Shorthand Reporter

Napa, California

March 8, 2010 Trial Napa

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NAPA SUPERIOR COURT

PEOPLE VS. MUNSON CR749144

DOCUMENT: BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Napa County District Attorney

RICHARD D. FELDSTEIN, Court Executive Officer

TO: DON LAUGHRIDGE

DATE: December 14, 2010 TIME: 4:00 pm ROOM: D e p a r t m e n t C

LOCATION: 825 Brown Street, 2nd Floor, N a p a

Due dates for filing of briefs:

.. Respondenf s Brief Due

mailed (first class postage pre-paid) in a sealed envelope

Date: 7/22/2010 Richard D. Feidstein, Court Executive Officer

Notification of Filing of Appeal;

Correspondence. 511112010 ..................................................................................

Notification of Filing of Appeal;

Correspondence. 5/4/20 10....................................................................................

Minute Order: ReturnISurrender on Warrant. 5/3/2010 .........................................7

Bench Warrant. Filed. 5/3/2010 ......................

Notice of Failure to Remand & Order. 4/27/2010 ................................................

Bench Warrant. Issued. 4/27/2010 ............................................................... 12

Notification of Filing of Appeal;

Order on Request for Court Appointed Lawyer. 4/20/2010 ..................................

Certificate of Mailing: Notice of Appeal. 4/6/2010 ........................ .

Request for Court-Appointed Lawyer

Notice of Appeal (Misdemeanor). 4/2/2010 .........................................................

Confidential: Financial Declaration. 41212010 ................................................. 26

Confidential: Defendant's Financial Statement

Promise to AppearICSB Referral. 5/8/20?0 ........................................................32

Minute Order: Readiness Conference. 3/3/2010.................................................

Minute Order: Court Trial. 3/8/2010 ....................................................................

Order Denying Rik Wayne Munson's Disqualification

Minute Order: Settlement Conference. Amended. 2/2/2010 ............................ 38

Reply to Verified Answer. 2/9/2010 .....................................................................

Verified Answer Denying All Allegations in

Minute Order: Settlement Conference. 2/2/2010.................................................

Minute Order: Settlement Conference. 2/2/2010................................................ 53

Proof of Service .Civil. 1/25/2010......................................................................

Demand for Judicial Notice Auto Equity Sales. Inc.

Verified Statement of Disqualification. CCP $170.1;

Minute Order: Motion to Quash;

Bench Warrant. Filed. 12/14/2009 ............................ ........................................

Record of Faretta Warnings. 12/7/2009 ............................................................

Own Recognizance & Bail Agreement. 12/7/2009 ............................................

Arraignment Form. 12/7/2009 ........................................................................

Minute Order: Return/Surrender on Warrant. 12/7/2009 ...................................

Notice of Special Appearance. 12/7/2009 .........................................................146

Bench Warrant. Issued. 12/2/2009....................................................................

Minute Order: Arraignment: Citation. 11/30/2009..............................................

Notice of Entry of Plea; Demand for Verified

Citation S 069836. 1O/29/2009..........................................................................

--000-- JUL 1 9 2010

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY AND PROCEEDINGS

For the People: GARY LIEBERSTEIN

For the Defendant: In Propria Persona

Cross-Examination By Mr. Munson 34

t h i s day f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Honorable STEPHEN T .

GARY LIEBERSTEIN, D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y , County

of Napa, 931 Parkway Mall, Napa, C a l i f o r n i a 94559,

r e p r e s e n t e d by KATHRYN SUSEMIHL, Deputy D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ,

The Honorable STEPHEN T . KROYER, Judge