12/3/2018 Amper vs Sandiganbayan : 120391 : September 24, 2997 : J.

Francisco : Third Division

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120391. September 24, 1997]

SIMPLICIO  AMPER,  petitioner,  vs.  SANDIGANBAYAN  and  PEOPLE  OF  THE

D E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:

The petitioner, SIMPLICIO AMPER, was charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti­Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides as follows:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:

x x x x x x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The Information against him reads:

That on or about August 7, 1988, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, a public officer, being then the Assistant City Engineer of Davao City,
taking advantage of his official position, with manifest partiality and bad faith in the discharge of his official
duties, did then and there wilfully- (sic) unlawfully, and criminally, cause undue injury to the Republic of the
Philippines by using for his personal benefit and advantage, to treasure hunt, one (1) unit Allis Backhoe,
belonging to the City Government of Davao, without the knowledge, consent and authority from the latter, to the
damage and prejudice of the City Government of Davao.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

Upon arraignment the petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. The prosecution presented its
witnesses  whose  testimonies  are  succinctly  summarized  in  the  Comment  filed  by  the  Office  of  the
Solicitor General (OSG), the pertinent portions of which we quote hereunder with approval.

On August 1, 1988, Filemon Cantela was visiting his two sisters-in-Christ near the vicinity of the Guzman Estate
at Matina District, Davao City when he chanced upon petitioner Simplicio Amper, Assistant City Engineer,
Davao City, together with two others, scanning the area with the use of detector. After petitioner had left, he
inquired and gathered from the landowner, Emilio Alvarez-Guzman, that petitioner and his companions were
looking for hidden treasure and that they were planning to operate in the area with the use of a backhoe which is
a heavy equipment used for excavating. Apprehensive that appellant, being the Assistant City Engineer, and as
such had at his disposal the use of the city government-owned backhoe, might actually make use of the said
equipment, he advised his sister-in-Christ to inform him if and when petitioner would actually resume his
treasure hunting operation in the area. (TSN, April 11, 1991, pp. 14-19).

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On August 6, 1988, around 6:00 oclock in the afternoon (sic), Cantela was informed by his sister-in-Christ that
petitioner and five others were earlier in the area clearing the premises and preparing to resume their treasure
hunting operation that night. Together with Mike Lusenara and Marcelo Gervacio, Jr. of the Civil Security Unit,
he prepared to conduct a surveillance on petitioner and his companions that evening (Ibid., pp.19-20).

They went to the area at about 8:30 in the evening and discreetly waited for the arrival of petitioner and his
companions. Around 11:30 in (sic) the same evening, petitioner arrived on board a Toyota Land Cruiser, together
with two others who were on board another vehicle. Shortly, after the arrival of petitioner and his companions, a
backhoe, bearing inscription on its sides that it is owned by the city government of Davao City, arrived (Ibid., pp.
22-26). The backhoe was being operated by Tobias Porta, a heavy equipment operator assigned at the City
Engineers Office, who was with his assistant, Timoteo Borongan. Thereafter, Porta, upon the instruction of
petitioner, began to excavate the area with the use of the backhoe. Cantela requested Henry Adriano to go to the
house of Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte and inform him of petitioners illegal activity (Ibid., pp. 27-30).

Around 2:15 in the morning of August 7, 1988, Mayor Duterte arrived, together with several policemen, and
surprised petitioner and his companions who were still in the act of excavating the area. However, before the
Mayor could actually order their arrest, some of petitioners companions scampered, leaving only petitioner, Porta
and Borongan (Ibid., p. 31).

Thereupon, Mayor Duterte ordered Porta to stop the engine of the backhoe and confronted him as to what he was
digging in the area. Porta replied that he was ordered by appellant to dig for gold. Mayor Duterte likewise
confronted Borongan, who upon being asked the same question, gave the same reply (Ibid.).

Duterte ordered one of the members of the Civil Security Unit to pick up petitioner, who was then sitting in his
vehicle parked nearby. Mayor Duterte confronted petitioner and shortly thereafter, ordered petitioner, Porta and
Borongan to follow him to the Tolomo Police Station (Ibid., p. 32).

Mayor Duterte declared that there are four (4) backhoes owned by the city government of Davao City including
the subject backhoe; that he checked it out with the Office of the City Engineer and he found out that no
permission was granted to petitioner to use the subject backhoe for private purposes (TSN, April 29, 1993, p.
12).

While in the past, the use of the city government-owned backhoe for private purposes was allowed upon
payment of the corresponding rental, Mayor Duterte disallowed the same during his administration because the
city government which had so many projects to undertake needed those equipment for the aforesaid projects. He
allowed the lease of the city-government-owned backhoes to private individuals but not as matter of policy and
only in extreme cases upon payment of rental (Ibid.).[2]

The  petitioner  denied  the  allegations  against  him  and  asserted  that  contrary  to  Mayor  Dutertes
claim that the use of the subject backhoe was unauthorized, the same was in fact officially leased by
the  Davao  City  government  to  Francisco  Chavez  of  F.T.  Chavez  Construction,  thus,  its  use  on  the
private property of Segundo Tan was proper.[3] Public respondent Sandiganbayan found the foregoing
asseveration  to  be  without  merit  considering  that  petitioner  was  caught  en flagrante delicto  directing
the use and operation of the said backhoe for his own treasure hunting operations. Furthermore, the
petitioner failed to present either Francisco Chavez or Segundo Tan to corroborate his testimony that
the backhoe subject of the instant case was the same backhoe which Francisco Chavez rented from
the city government.[4]
In  a  decision  promulgated  on  March  6,  1995,  the  Sandiganbayan  convicted  the  petitioner  of
violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX
(6) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) day, to further suffer perpetual special disqualification from
public office, and to pay the costs.[5]
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and find nothing therein to warrant a reversal
of the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan.

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The petitioners conviction was anchored mainly on the prosecution witnesses uniform testimonies
that  they  saw  him  in  the  actual  perpetration  of  the  crime  charged.  Filomeno  Cantela  attested  to  the
petitioners presence at the scene of the crime from the inception of the treasure hunting operation at
around  11:30  in  the  evening  of  August  6,  1988  until  his  subsequent  apprehension  by  the  group  of
Mayor  Duterte  at  around  2:00  oclock  in  the  morning  of  the  next  day.  Petitioners  participation  in  the
commission  of  the  said  crime  was  categorically  established  also  by  Filomeno  Cantela  who  further
testified that the backhoe began to operate upon the instructions of the petitioner.[6] And no less than
the  Mayor  of  Davao  City  whose  group  effected  the  petitioners  arrest  corroborated  this  eyewitness
account.[7] Furthermore, even the backhoe operator, Tobias Porta, belied the petitioners futile denials
when he testified that on the night of August 6, 1988, the petitioner asked him to proceed to the vacant
lot  in  front  of  the  A­Mart  in  Matina  District,  Davao  City  on  the  pretext  that  they  were  going  to  install
concrete culverts but upon reaching the said lot, petitioner ordered him to excavate the area for gold.[8]
No ill­motives have been shown to induce the abovementioned witnesses to falsely testify against
the  petitioner  and  maliciously  implicate  him  in  the  said  crime.  The  petitioners  representation  that
Mayor  Duterte  had  an  axe  to  grind  against  him  because  he  did  not  support  the  latter  in  the  past
elections is unsupported by evidence and cannot, thus, be accorded any iota of consideration. At the
risk  of  being  repetitious,  we  state  here  the  well  established  rule  that  absent  a  showing  that  the
prosecution  witnesses  were  actuated  by  any  improper  motive,  their  testimony  is  entitled  to  full  faith
and credit.[9] This being so, the petitioners claim of non­involvement must necessarily fail, for denial, to
reiterate, cannot prevail over positive identification.[10]
Moreover,  what  the  petitioner  ultimately  assails  are  the  factual  findings  and  evaluation  of
witnesses credibility by the trial court. It is a settled tenet, however, that the findings of fact of the trial
court is accorded not only with great weight and respect on appeal but at times finality, provided that it
is supported by substantial evidence on record, as in this case. With respect to who as between the
prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be believed, the trial courts assessment thereof enjoys a
badge of respect for the reason that the trial court has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testify.[11]
Anent the petitioners attempt to obtain a new trial of his case on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, suffice it to state that it simply cannot be allowed as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan
for  the  undeniable  reason  that  the  testimonies  of  Francisco  Chavez  and  Segundo  Tan  which  the
petitioner seeks to belatedly present do not constitute newly discovered evidence. Under the Rules of
Court,[12] the requisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for new trial are: (a) the evidence
was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial  with  reasonable  diligence;  and  (c)  that  it  is  material,  not  merely  cumulative,  corroborative  or
impeaching,  and  is  of  such  weight  that,  if  admitted,  will  probably  change  the  judgment.  All  three
requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.[13] Unfortunately, by
petitioners own admission, it is not clear on the record why were (sic) they (testimonies of Francisco
Chavez  and  Segundo  Tan)  not  presented  (but)  the  accused  (herein  petitioner)  had  manifested  that
they  should  have  been  presented  x  x  x.[14]  Aside  from  the  petitioners  bare  assertion  that  the  non­
presentation  of  these  testimonies  was  not  due  to  his  fault  or  negligence,  he  miserably  failed  to  offer
any  evidence  that  the  same  could  not  have  been  discovered  and  produced  at  the  trial  despite
reasonable diligence.[15] We also agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which accurately
observed that the testimonies sought to be introduced as newly discovered evidence would not alter
the judgment even if admitted, thus:

Petitioner himself testified that he asked Tobias Porta to operate the backhoe at the behest of Segundo Tan, who
about one or two days before August 7, 1988, requested him to look for a backhoe operator, because he would be
installing reinforced concrete culverts along his property at the J.P. Laurel, McArthur Highway, Davao City.
However, Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, City Mayor of Davao City caught petitioner en flagrante delicto directing the
use and operation of the backhoe, not for the purpose of installing reinforced concrete culverts but for his own
personal gold treasure hunting operation (TSN, April 29, 1993, p.9). Assuming, therefore, that the testimonies of

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Francisco Chavez and Segundo Tan may be admitted as newly discovered evidence, petitioner can still be held
liable for unauthorized use of the backhoe, because he was not himself authorized to use the backhoe for treasure
hunting operation; thus, causing the government of Davao City undue injury because of the undue wear and tear
caused to the said equipment.[16]

As  a  last  recourse,  the  petitioner  insists  that  the  testimonies  of  Francisco  Chavez  and  Segundo
Tan should be admitted as newly discovered evidence since the Sandiganbayan relied on the adverse
presumption  arising  from  their  non­presentation  in  convicting  him.  This  contention  is  unfounded  and
misleading.  It  is  true  that  according  to  the  Sandiganbayan,  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  defense  to
present  these  vital  witnesses  without  offering  any  valid  reason  therefor,  raised  the  presumption  that
the testimonies of Francisco Chavez and Segundo Tan would be adverse to petitioners interest if they
were actually presented. However,  as  discussed  earlier,  the  petitioners  conviction  was  based  on  the
overwhelming and unrebutted evidence of his positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, and
not, as petitioner would have us believe, on the presumption that the testimonies of Francisco Chavez
and Segundo Tan if presented would be adverse to the defenses case. There is, in fact, only one short
paragraph in the entire nineteen (19) page decision of the Sandiganbayan which adverts to the non­
presentation of Francisco Chavez and Segundo Tan as witnesses for the defense.[17] A close scrutiny
of the assailed decision reveals that the antecedent facts of this case as culled from the testimonies of
the  witnesses  were  painstakingly  established  by  the  ponente[18]  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  correct
conclusions both of fact and of law. We cannot, thus, subscribe to the petitioners view and reduce the
said decision into a conviction premised on an erroneous presumption.
By taking advantage of his official position as Assistant City Engineer of Davao City, the petitioner
was  able  to  use  for  his  personal  gain,  a  city  government  owned  Allis  Backhoe  without  any
consideration and without any authority from the city government, thereby causing undue injury to the
Davao City government consisting in the undue wear and tear caused to the said equipment and its
use without consideration.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

[1] DECISION promulgated March 6, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 14197, p.1; Rollo, p.28.

[2] COMMENT in G.R. No. 120391 dated March 4, 1996, pp. 2­5; Rollo, pp. 98­101.

[3] PETITION FOR REVIEW in G.R. No. 120391 dated July 25, 1995, p.9; Rollo, p.21.

[4] Supra, p.15; Rollo, p.42.

[5] Supra, p.18; Rollo, p.45.

[6] Supra, pp.12­13; Rollo, pp.39­40.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Supra, p.11; Rollo, p.38.

[9] People of the Philippines vs. Piandiong Y Calda, et al., G.R. No. 118140, February 19, 1997; People of the Philippines
vs. Calvo, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 91694, March 14, 1997; People vs. De la Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 [1994]; People  vs.
Perciano, 233 SCRA 393 [1994].
[10] People vs. Calvo, Jr., ibid.; People vs. Herbieto, et al., G.R. No. 103611, March 13, 1997; People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA
19 [1996]; People vs. Porras, 255 SCRA 514 [1996].
[11] Pat.  Rudy  Almeda  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  120853,  March  13,  1997;  People  vs.  Sumalpong,  G.R.  No.
123404, February 26, 1997; People vs. Herbieto, et al., ibid.; People vs. Panlilio, 255 SCRA 503 [1996]; People vs.
Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995].
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[12] Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court; also Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.

[13] Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue  vs.  A.  Soriano  Corporation,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.113703,  January  31,  1997;  Dapin vs.
Dionaldo,  209  SCRA  38  [1992];  Bernardo  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  216  SCRA  224  [1992];  Tumang  vs.  Court  of
Appeals, 172 SCRA 328 [1989].
[14] REPLY TO PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMENT, p.3.

[15] Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. A. Soriano Corporation, et al., supra.

[16] Supra, p.6; Rollo, p.102.

[17] Supra, p.15; Rollo, p.42.

[18] Sandiganbayan Justice, Sabino R. De Leon, Jr.

[19] Supra, p.19; Rollo, p.46.

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