The Instructor 98 - When To Trade
The Instructor 98 - When To Trade
The Instructor 98 - When To Trade
13 e4xf5 Bc8xf5
With his last move White probed a weak point in Black’s position – his g6-
pawn, and prevented 17…Nc5 (18 Nxc5 bc 19 Qc2). Therefore it is
natural that Black should want to defend the weak pawn with his king,
and at the same time to activate his king’s bishop.
17…Bg7-f6!?
By this time I had convinced myself that Black’s prospects were not after
all so cheerless, and I quickly went the other extreme – I began to
overrate my chances. I rejected the correct 20…g5, not wishing to allow
the perpetual check after 21 Bxg5 hg 22 Qxg5+ Kh8 23 Qh6+ Kg8 24
Qg5+ (but not 24 g5 Qh5, or 24 f4 Qe7).
21 Ra1-e1!
Now there is the extremely dangerous threat of f3-f4. For example, 21…
Qf7 22 f4 ef 23 Qxf4 g5 24 Bxg5 hg 25 Qxg5+ Kh8 26 Rxf6 Qxf6 27 Qh5
+, and mates (Kasparov).
21…Nc5-b3!?
27 Bg3xe5+
27…d6xe5 28 Bh7-b1
On 29 Qg2, Black could try 29…Rae8, for one thing. The exclamation
mark that Kasparov attaches to 29…h5? is wrong: Black is actually worse
after 30 gh+ Kh8 31 Qh2.
29…Rf8xf4!
30 Re1xe5 Ra8-f8
Only by activating his forces to the maximum can Black gain sufficient
counter-chances. There was no time to restore the material balance: 30…
Rxc4? 31 Re7+ Kf6 32 Rh7.
Instead of White’s last move in this line, he might also try 32 d6!?
(threatening 33 Nd5+), forcing his opponent to give up the exchange:
32…Rxc3 33 bc cd 34 Rh7+-. And Kasparov’s own recommendation is
just as good: on 32…Kg5, the quickest way to win would be 33 Ne4+!
(33 Rg7+ is good too – Bellin and Ponzetto) 33…Nxe4 34 fe Bxg4 35
Rg7+ Kh5 36 Bd3, followed by 37 Rf5+ or 37 Be2.
31 Re5-e7+
31…Rf8-f7
Unfortunately, he’s not going to avoid it that way, either. Let’s examine
Kasparov’s continuation: 31…Kg8?! (my assessment) 32 Ne4 Bxg4 33
Nxc5 bc.
The line 34 Rxc7? Bxf3 35 Rxc5 Rg4+ 36 Kh2 Rg2+ 37 Kh3 Rg7 (37…
Rg5!?) would, in fact, lead to a draw. But the other line he gives, 34 Be4
Bh3 35 Rf2 R8f7 36 Rxf7 Kxf7, is totally unconvincing.
I believe Kasparov played the correct line: White had more complex tasks
to solve in the actual game.
32 Re7xf7+ Kg7xf7
33 Nc3-e4 Nc5-b3?
34 Kg1-f2!
Answers
1) With 14 g4!, White drives the bishop off the b1-h7 diagonal (it’s
important to get this in before Black plays g6-g5). This establishes secure
control over the e4-square, guaranteeing White the better chances. Such a
ridiculous losing of opening battle upset me and, as the course of the
game shows, partly prevented me from making a sober assessment of
what was happening.
After 12…Bd7 13 b3, the theoretical main line is 13…h5. The young
grandmaster came up with a different plan: to push the f-pawn instead
(which is also quite feasible), but to do so before White plays b2-b3.
Clearly, with the pawn still on b2, Black no longer has the counterstroke
e5-e4.
2) Our first problem on the exchanging theme. Should we take on f6; and
if so, which piece should we take with?
The one thing we can say for certain is that trading off the bishop on h4 is
bad, as it leads to the weakening of White’s dark-squares. After 18 Bxf6?
Nxf6 19 Qd2 Nxe4 20 Nxe4 Kg7 (but of course not 20…Rf4?? 21 Qxf4!
ef 22 Nf6+), Black’s position is preferable – he intends Rf4 and Nc5.
22…Bf4 suggests itself, when the tempting 23 h5?! would allow Black to
begin a dangerous counterattack with 23…Ng5 24 hg Qc8! (threatening
25…Bxg4) 25 Qe2 Nxf3! 26 Qxf3 Bxg4. So White should reply 23 Ne2!,
keeping the better chances.
B) In the variations examined thus far, White’s bishop has had to move
from f2 to g3, in order to protect the f3-pawn. So why not play 18 Bg3!?
immediately, saving an important tempo?
Now the reply 18…Nc5 loses a considerable amount of its force: 19 Nxc5
bc 20 Qc2 Kg7 21 Rae1 (intending f3-f4) 21…Qf7 22 h4, and White
stands better.
Time to take stock. Kasparov was correct in saying that the text move was
safe, and deprived Black of counterplay. But was it enough to maintain
White’s advantage? I doubt it; and in the answer to my next question, I
shall try to demonstrate my assessment. But then the question arises:
shouldn’t White have chosen a more principled line, one where he
certainly would find it very easy to make a mistake and hand over the
initiative to his opponent, but also one in which, if he played accurately,
he could hold on to his advantage?
Kasparov continues 26 Ne4 Ncxe4 27 Bxe4 (27 fe? Rxg5 28 Qxg5 Rg8)
27…Qg7 28 Bxf6+ Qxf6 29 Rf2 Rh8, with chances for both sides.
Now White has no time to go after the pawn at b3. Here’s the line
Kasparov gave (with my corrections in parentheses): 23 Qd1? g5 24 Bg3
h5 25 h3 Qg6 26 Qxb3 hg 27 hg
However, even in the game, White still had the advantage, the
grandmaster’s opinion notwithstanding. With this in mind, we can
recommend 28…Rae8!? 29 Qc2 Kg8.
In the middlegame, the position remains almost even – I don’t see how
White can make progress here.
Whereas after 33 Ne4? Black has a clear draw by 33…Nxe4 34 Bxe4 (34
fe? Rxf1+ 35 Kxf1 Kf6, and it is only White who is in danger of losing)
34…Kf6! and …Ke5.
In order to neutralize the black king’s march to the center, White would
like to play Kf2-e3; but an immediate 35 Kf2 runs into 35…Bxg4! 36
Ke3 Ke5 37 Rg1, and now either 37…Bh5!? 38 Rg7 Bf7 (Bellin,
Ponzetto), or 37…Bf5!?.
And now White really does have to worry about losing the pawn at g4.
For example: 37 Rh1?! Bxg4! 38 Rg1 h5 39 Ke2 h3 40 fg hg=.
37 Ke3?! would also be premature: 37…h3 38 Rg1 (by defending the g4-
pawn, White prepares to return his king to f2) 38…Kh4 39 Kf2
(threatening Bd3-f1) 39…Rf4, and on 40 Bd3, Black has the unpleasant
40…Rd4.