This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed

by [herein petitioners] Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra,

Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt,
Republic of the Philippines
Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R. Jongco, Jr. and Joel Jongco
Supreme Court against [herein respondent]. In said complaint for unlawful detainer,
Manila it was alleged that they are the lessors of a residential house located
at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City
[subject property] which was leased to [respondent] at a monthly
FIRST DIVISION rental of P17,000.00. The action was instituted on the ground of
[respondents] failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to December
22, 1998 despite repeated demands. [Respondent] denied the non-
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, G.R. No. 171365 payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment
FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J. of P825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the leased
CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO property.
R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and Present:
JOEL JONGCO, After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) decided in
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J., favor of [petitioners] by ordering [respondent] to (a) vacate the
Chairperson, premises at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon
VELASCO, JR., City; (b) pay [petitioners] the sum of P306,000.00 corresponding to
- versus - NACHURA,* the rentals due from May 23, 1997 to November 22, 1998, and the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and sum of P17,000.00 a month thereafter until [respondent] vacates the
PEREZ, JJ. premises; and (c) pay [petitioners] the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys
ISMAEL VELOSO III, fees.
Respondent.
Promulgated: On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [Branch 88,
Quezon City], the MeTC decision was reversed. [Respondent] was
October 6, 2010 ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x decision but he was also given an option to choose between staying
in the leased property or vacating the same, subject to the
reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the
DECISION improvements which it found to be in the amount
of P120,000.00. [Respondent] was also given the right to remove
said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: [petitioners] refuse to pay P60,000.00.

When both parties moved for the reconsideration of the

RTC decision, the RTC issued an Order dated February 23, 2001
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] dated modifying its previous ruling by increasing the value of the
improvements from P120,000.00 to P800,000.00.
January 31, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610, which affirmed with

modification the Resolution[2] dated September 2, 2003 of Branch 227 of the Regional After successive appeals to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, the decision of the RTC dated November 29, 2000
Trial Court (RTC-Branch 227) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. which reversed the decision of the MeTC, became final and
executory.[3]

Whilst respondents appeal of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) judgment in

We partly reproduce below the facts of the case as culled by the Court of
the unlawful detainer case was pending before the RTC-Branch 88, respondent filed
Appeals from the records:
before the RTC-Branch 227 on November 26, 2002 a Complaint for Breach of Contract
and Damages[4] against the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-48341. The
The petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion [6] on February 18, 2003 praying for,
said complaint alleged two causes of action. The first cause of action was for damages
among other reliefs, the dismissal of respondents complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-
because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when
48341.Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action against them
petitioners distributed copies of the above-mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful
because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was a matter of public record
detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondents appeal was
and its disclosure to the public violated no law or any legal right of the
still pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 88. The second cause of action was
respondent. Moreover, petitioners averred that the respondents present Complaint for
for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing repairs on
Breach of Contract and Damages was barred by prior judgment since it was a mere
the subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable. Thus, respondent sought the
replication of respondents Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the unlawful
following from the court a quo:
detainer case before the MeTC. The said unlawful detainer case was already judicially

PRAYER decided with finality.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that

after hearing the court render a decision against the [herein
On September 2, 2003, the RTC-Branch 227 issued a Resolution dismissing
petitioners] and in favor of the [herein respondent] by
respondents complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 for violating the rule against
1. Ordering [petitioners] to pay [respondent] the following amounts:
splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of
a) P1,500,000.00 as moral damages and
consequential damages; a related case. The RTC-Branch 227 adjudged that Civil Case No. Q-02-48341

involved the same facts, parties, and causes of action as those in the unlawful detainer
b) P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
case, and the MeTC had already properly taken cognizance of the latter case.
c) P425,000.00 representing the difference of the
expenses of the improvements of P825,000.00
and P400,000.00 pursuant to Art. 1678 of the Civil Code;
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 decision in Civil Case No. Q-02-
d) P594,000.00 representing interest for three (3) 48341 on September 26, 2003. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7] of said
years from 1998 to 2000 on the P825,000.00 advanced by
the [respondent] at the rate of 24% per annum; judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in an Order[8] dated

e) P250,000.00 as compensation for the December 30, 2003.

[respondents] labor and efforts in overseeing and attending
the needs of contractors the repair/renovation of the leased
premises; Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his Motion
f) P250,000.00, plus 20% of all recoveries from for Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal [9] on March
[petitioners] and P2,500.00 per hearing as attorneys fees;
1, 2004. However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order[10] dated March 23, 2004,
g) Cost of suit.
dismissed respondents appeal for being filed out of time.
[Respondent] further prays for such other reliefs and
remedies which are just and equitable under the premises. [5]
 documents, distribution of the same during the pendency of an
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order dismissing his appeal was clearly intended to cause [respondent] some form of
harassment and/or humiliation so that [respondent] would be
appeal on April 30, 2004 and he filed a Motion for Reconsideration [11] of the same on
ostracized by his neighbors. The appeal may have delayed the
May 3, 2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in another Order[12] dated May 31, 2004, granted attainment of finality of the determination of the rights of the parties
and the execution in the unlawful detainer case but it did not justify
respondents latest motion because it was convinced that it is but appropriate and fair [herein petitioners] pre-emption of the outcome of the appeal. By
distributing copies of the MeTC decision, [petitioners] appeared to
to both parties that this matter of whether or not the Appeal was filed on time, be have assumed that the MeTC decision would simply be affirmed and
therefore they tried to cause the early ouster of [respondent] thinking
resolved by the appellate court rather than by this Court. The RTC-Branch 227 then
that a humiliated [respondent] would scurry out of the leased
ordered that the records of the case be forwarded as soon as possible to the Court of premises.Clearly, there was evident bad faith intended to mock
[respondents] right to appeal which is a statutory remedy to correct
Appeals for further proceedings. errors which might have been committed by the lower court.

Thus, moral damages may be awarded since [petitioners]

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution[13] dated February 8, 2005, resolved to acted in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
give due course to respondents appeal. Said appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
82610. fraud. However, an award of moral damages would require certain
conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. (2) second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
CV No. 82610. The Court of Appeals fully agreed with the RTC-Branch 227 in is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
(4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
dismissing respondents second cause of action (i.e., breach of contract) in Civil Case stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
No. Q-02-48341. The appellate court, however, held that RTC-Branch 227 should have But it must again be stressed that moral damages are
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the first cause of action (i.e., damages) in Civil emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably
Case No. Q-02-48341, because [a]lthough [herein respondent] may have stated the and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court
same factual antecedents that transpired in the unlawful detainer case, such allegations judge. For this reason, this Court finds an award of P30,000.00 moral
damages sufficient under the circumstances.
were necessary to give an overview of the facts leading to the institution of another

case between the parties before the RTC acting in its original jurisdiction. [14] On the other hand, to warrant the award of exemplary
damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and
an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Accordingly,
The Court of Appeals then went on to find that petitioners were indeed liable exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 is appropriate.[15]
to respondent for damages:
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
No doubt, distributing the copies was primarily intended to
embarrass [herein respondent] in the community he mingled in. We
are not unmindful of the fact that court decisions are public WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
documents and the general public is allowed access thereto to make AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the case is dismissed only
inquiries thereon or to secure a copy thereof. Nevertheless, under as to the second cause of action. As to the first cause of action,
the circumstances of this case, although court decisions are public [herein petitioners] are ordered to pay [herein respondent] moral
damages of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00.[16]
 Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that his appeal of the September

Hence, the instant Petition for Review. 2, 2003 Resolution of the RTC-Branch 227 to the Court of Appeals was timely filed and

that the same was aptly given due course. In addition, respondent asserts that the

Petitioners assert that respondents appeal of the RTC-Branch 227 Resolution appellate court was correct in holding petitioners liable for damages even without any

dated September 2, 2003, which dismissed the latters complaint in Civil Case No. Q- hearing or trial since petitioners, in filing their omnibus motion praying for the dismissal

02-48341, was filed out of time. Respondent received a copy of the said resolution of respondents complaint on the ground of no cause of action, were deemed to have

on September 26, 2003, and he only had 15 days from such date to file his appeal, or hypothetically admitted as true the allegations in said complaint.

until October 11, 2003. Respondent, instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the

resolution on October 10, 2003, which left him with only one more day to file his The petition is partly meritorious.

appeal. The RTC-Branch 227 subsequently denied respondents Motion for

Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received We note, at the outset, that the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch

on February 20, 2004.Respondent only had until the following day, February 21, 2004, 227 of respondents second cause of action against petitioners (e.g., for breach of

to file the appeal. However, respondent filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 1, contract) was no longer disputed by the parties. Thus, the present appeal pertains only

2004. Hence, petitioners conclude that the dismissal of respondents complaint in Civil to respondents first cause of action (e.g., for damages), and in connection therewith,

Case No. Q-02-48341 already attained finality. we are called upon to resolve the following issues: (1) whether respondent timely filed

his appeal of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 before

Petitioners argue in the alternative that the award of damages in respondents the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether respondent is entitled to the award of moral and

favor has no factual and legal bases. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in exemplary damages.

awarding moral and exemplary damages to respondent based on the bare and We answer the first issue on the timeliness of respondents appeal

unproven allegations in the latters complaint and without the benefit of any hearing or affirmatively.

trial. While the appellate court declared that RTC-Branch 227 should have proceeded

with the trial on the merits involving the action for damages, it surprisingly went ahead Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an

and ruled on petitioners liability for said damages even without trial. Even assuming for ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of

the sake of argument that respondents allegations in his complaint are true, he still has the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the

no cause of action for damages against petitioners, for the disclosure of a court original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court

decision, which is part of public record, did not cause any legal and compensable injury dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran

to respondent. v. Damaso,[17] we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule:

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared

in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the
Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in
all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates
which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or should be counted from receipt of notice of
motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order"
periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to appealed from.
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court
stated: Taking our bearings from Neypes,
in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly
either file his notice of appeal within 15 days filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the
from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's 15-day period within which to file the notice of
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the
the order (the "final order") denying his motion therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be We followed suit in Elbia v. Ceniza,
availed of only if either motion is filed; wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh
otherwise, the decision becomes final and period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
executory after the lapse of the original appeal appeal, counted from receipt of the order
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, to wit: Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders,
Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September either within fifteen days from receipt of the original
2005 while the present Petition was already decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of
pending before us. x x x. the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

xxxx In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat,

we applied the same principle of "fresh period
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," expostulating that procedural law refers to
rule" parties who availed themselves of the the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms
remedy of motion for reconsideration are now of procedure in order that courts may be able to
allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen administer justice. Procedural laws do not come
days from the denial of that motion. within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against the retroactive operation
The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of procedural, prescribing the manner in which the
Court which states that the appeal shall be taken appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or
"within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or determined and, therefore, can be made
final order appealed from." The use of the applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity,
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and such as the present case, without danger of
independence of one thing from another. It should, violating anyone else's rights.[18] (Emphases
as a rule, be construed in the sense which it supplied.)
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the
above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period
notice of the "final order," x x x.
rule to cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity:
xxxx
 The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the
period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the
Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the

"fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action,
retroactively apply in cases where the period for
appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no
when Neypes was promulgated. That question
other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is
may be answered with the guidance of the
general rule that procedural laws may be given whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment
retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein. [20]
there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are
procedural or remedial in character as they do not Respondent made the following allegations in support of his claim for
create new or remove vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or damages against petitioners:
confirmation of rights already
existing.[19] (Emphases supplied.)
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

28. After the promulgation of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated its Decision dated August 3, 1999, ordering the [herein respondent]
and all person claiming rights under him to
September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, (a) Vacate the leased premises;
(b) pay the [herein petitioners] the sum
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 of P306,000.00 as unpaid rentals from May 23,
1997 to November 22, 1998; and
denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, (c) pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;
which the respondent received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just
But while said Decision was still pending appeal with the Regional
after nine daysfrom receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, Trial Court, the [petitioners], through [petitioner] Manaloto, already
distributed copies of said Decision to some of the homeowners of
respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, Horseshoe Village, who personally know the [respondent]. This act
is a direct assault or character assassination on the part of the
respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days, [respondent] because as stated in the said decision, [respondent]
has been staying in the premises but did not or refused to pay his
and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV
monthly rentals for a long period of time when in truth and in fact was
No. 82610. untrue.

29. That from the time the said decision was distributed to
said members homeowners, the [respondent] became the subject of
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC-Branch 227 should conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which [respondents]
good name within the community or society where he belongs was
not have dismissed respondents complaint for damages on the ground of failure to state
greatly damaged; his reputation was besmirched; [respondent]
a cause of action. suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety.[Respondent], who is
the grandson of the late Senator Jose Veloso and Congressman
Ismael Veloso, was deprived of political career and to start with was
to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman within their area which
 was being offered to him by the homeowners but this offer has The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article,
started to fade and ultimately totally vanished after the distribution of departs from the classical theory that he who uses a right injures no
said Decision. Damages to his good names and reputations and one. The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and
other damages which he suffered as a consequence thereof, may be traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where
reasonably compensated for at least P1,500,000.00 as moral and there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.
consequential damages.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by
30. In order to deter [petitioners] and others from doing as granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
abovementioned, [petitioners] should likewise be assessed wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide
exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.[21] specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in ones acts
can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of
good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest
A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render
the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
faith as understood by men of affairs.
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the declaration of principle, the cardinal law on human conduct
expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. [22] We find where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly
or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty
that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have specifically and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an
abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty;
identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the allegations in his
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
complaint. or injuring another.[25]

First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and Petitioners are also expected to respect respondents dignity, personality,

reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name. This privacy and peace of mind under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides:

right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs,
ART. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct.[23] privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondents good name even other relief:

though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
Code requires, [e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. We (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from
his friends;
expounded in Sea Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[24] that:
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
 Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since

Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records.

for acts and actions referred to in Article 26, among other provisions, of the Civil Code.
It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records

In Concepcion v. Court of Appeals,[26] we explained that: and documents.[28] However, this is not a case of the public seeking and being denied

access to judicial records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its
dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe
inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The Village homeowners, who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus,
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of
every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system purportedly affecting negatively respondents good name and reputation among said
of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from homeowners. The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute between petitioners
being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted
and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was then still pending
- then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners intentions for
violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind. distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the case. While petitioners

It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not were free to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the
constitute any of those enumerated in Arts. 26 and 2219. In this question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying
respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal
provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not the latters good name and reputation in the community.
preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are
allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane,
insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical Nevertheless, we further declare that the Court of Appeals erred in already
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched awarding moral and exemplary damages in respondents favor when the parties have
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be not yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-Branch 227. In civil
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission.[27] cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of

evidence. It is incumbent upon the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to

And third, respondent alleged that the distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe convincingly prove its claim. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not

Village homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case, equivalent to proof under our Rules. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.[29]

which was adverse to respondent and still on appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had

no apparent lawful or just purpose except to humiliate respondent or assault his At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the

character. As a result, respondent suffered damages becoming the talk of the town and part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad

being deprived of his political career. faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is

manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain

from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on

the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports

a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach
WE CONCUR:
of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of

fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an

intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[30]

RENATO C. CORONA
We cannot subscribe to respondents argument that there is no more need for Chief Justice
Chairperson
the presentation of evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal

of respondents complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondents

allegations. The hypothetical admission of respondents allegations in the complaint

only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be dismissed on the

ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently

states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it

shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
presentation of evidence by the parties. Associate Justice Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CV No. 82610 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of moral and JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
exemplary damages made by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondent Ismael
Veloso III is DELETED. The complaint of respondent Ismael Veloso III in Civil Case

No. Q-02-48341 is hereby REINSTATED before Branch 227 of the Regional Trial Court CERTIFICATION

of Quezon City only in so far as the first cause of action is concerned. The said court Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
is DIRECTED to hear and dispose of the case with dispatch.
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice * Per Raffle dated September 27, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 5-13; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon with Associate
Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member
of this Court), concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 186-187.
[3] Rollo, pp. 6-7.
[4] Records, pp. 1-109.
[5] Id. at 16-17.
[6] Id. at 112-130.
[7] Id. at 189-196.
[8] Id. at 205.
[9] Id. at 209-210.
[10] Id. at 214.
[11] Id. at 215-217.
[12] Id. at 224-225.
[13] CA rollo, pp. 158-159.
[14] Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 12.
[17] G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 450, 455-459.
[18] Id. at 455-457.
[19] Id. at 457-458.
[20] Associated Bank v. Montano, Sr., G.R. No. 166383, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA

134, 144.
[21] Records, pp. 12-14.
[22] Vergara v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 336, 341 (1999).
[23] Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568, 571 (2004).
[24] 377 Phil. 221 (1999).
[25] Id. at 229-230.
[26] 381 Phil. 90 (2000).
[27] Id. at 99.
[28] Hilado v. Judge Reyes, 496 Phil. 55, 68 (2005).

[29] Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 561, 567.
[30] Arra Realty Corporation v. Guarantee Development Corporation and Insurance
Agency, G.R. No. 142310, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 441, 469.