NATRES

CASES
ON NATURAL ARTICLE I
RESOURCES NATIONAL TERRITORY
MAGALLONA vs. ERMITA G.R. 187167
Date: August 16, 2011
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et al., Petitioners. Secretary, et. al., Respondents.
FACTS
· 1961: Congress passed RA 3046 which demarcated the maritime baselines of the Philippines and
codified the right of State parties under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)
over their territorial sea
o Breadth not determined
· 1968: RA 5446 – corrected typographical errors and reserved baselines drawn around Sabah
· 2009: Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 to comply with the terms of UNCLOS III
o UNCLOS III: prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic states
o RA 9522: shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints, and classified the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” which generate their
own maritime
zones
PETITIONERS’ contentions:
Petitioners assail constitutionality of RA 9522 on the ground that
o RA 9522 reduces the Philippine maritime territory in violation of Article 1, 1987 Constitution
§ It discards the demarcation of PH territory under the Treaty of Paris
§ Inconsistent with country’s claim of sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough shoal
§ Inconsistent with country’s claim over Sabah
§ Incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters
o RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landwards of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippines sovereignty and national security
§ Contends that the law unconstitutionally converts “internal waters” to
“archipelagic waters” subjecting these waters to the right of innocent passage

RESPONDENTS' contentions:
Respondents maintain that
o Petitioners lack the standing the bring the suit
o Writs of certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies to assail RA 9522’s
constitutionality
o RA 9522 complies with UNCLOS III’s terms, preserving PH territory over the KIG and Scarborough
Shoal

ISSUE/S PROVISION OF THE LAW INVOLVED
1. Whether or not the petitioners ARTICLE 1. The national territory comprises the
possess locus standi to bring this suit? Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
2. Whether or not the writs of certiorari embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
and prohibition are proper remedies Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
for this case? its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its
3. Whether or not RA 9522 is territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves,
unconstitutional? and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless
of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.

RATIO
1) Yes. Petitioners possess locus standi as citizens.
No standing as legislators and taxpayers
• No infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds
1
Citizen standing recognized.
• Citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the case
• Raises issues of national significance
2) Yes. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of
statutes.
· In ordinary civil proceedings:
o Writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of the respondents
· However, when Supreme Court exercises its power of judicial review, writs of certiorari and prohibition
are viewed as proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes and acts of other branches of
government
3) No. RA 9522 is not unconstitutional.
· RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and continental shelf under
UNCLOS III, not to delineate PH territory
o UNCLOS III is not concerned with the acquisition or loss of territory
§ It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous
zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits
o Baselines laws like RA 9522 are mere statutory mechanisms enacted to mark-out the
basepoints from which baselines are drawn to measure the breadth of maritime zones and
continental shelves
§ Gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of maritime
space and submarine areas within which States exercise rights like sovereignty over
territorial waters, jurisdiction to enforce laws, and right to exploit resources
o Baselines of the PH have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this law conforms to
UNCLOS III
o States acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and
not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

· RA 9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of KIG and
Scarborough Shoal are not inconsistent with the PH’s claim of sovereignty over these areas
o Under, RA 3046 and RA 9522 the KIG and Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
outside the
o RA 9522 which optimizes the location of basepoints even increased the PH’s total maritime space
contrary to petitioners’ claims that under RA 9522, PH lost about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters
o RA 9522 increased total maritime space through an Exclusive Economic Zone
§ Extended even beyond the waters demarcated under the Treaty of Paris
§ PH exclusively exploits resources within the zone
o RA 9522 which classified the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as "regime of islands" does not weaken
the Philippines' claim of sovereignty.
§ Sec. 2 of RA 9522 recognizes that the Philippines exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction over these areas
§ Decision to classify them as such shows PH’s observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation
under UNCLOS III
o IF RA 9522 enclosed KIG and Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, the Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III
§ Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago."
§ Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles."
§ Islands are too far from the general configuration of the archipelago, so can’t include
them in drawing the baselines
2

· Statutory claim over Sabah under RA 5446 is retained
o Sec. 2 of RA 5446 was not repealed keeping the door open for baselines around Sabah

· UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the constitution’s delineation of internal waters
o Whether referred to as "internal waters" or "archipelagic waters", Article 49 of the UNCLOS
recognizes that a State party has sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
o Sovereignty does not preclude the operation of international law subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to burdens of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation
consistent with the principle of freedom of navigation
§ Right of innocent passage is customary international law, automatically incorporated in PH
law
o To comply with international law, Congress may pass laws designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.
o Allow imposition of passage rights under UNCLOS III in exchange for State’s right to claim all
waters landward of their baselines as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty
o Not incompatible with delineation of internal waters because it still allows the right of
innocent passage to be regulated by Congress

· Petitioners also hold the view that Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522
o True BUT without the UNCLOS compliant baselines law, PH would be devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines leading to disaster:
§ Seafaring powers can freely enter and exploit resources around the archipelago
§ Weakens the country’s case in any int’l dispute over PH maritime space
RULING
Petition is DISMISSED.

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 16, ARTICLE II

RESOURCES DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999
HILARION HENARES V. LTFRB G.R. No. 158290
Date: October 23, 2006
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF
ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
HENARES, petitioners. respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid
droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners
particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to other
pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with
sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric
acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to
3
petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the
atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects
the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of
CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing
small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel
because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since in contrast to a discretionary act, a
ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done. The Solicitor General also notes that nothing
in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor
vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence
of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: Under R.A. 8749 and with all the available information provided by the DOE
on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG
and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline
and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty
which the law enjoins

I. Whether or not petitioners REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8749, SECTION 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a)
have legal personality to bring The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set
this petition pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission
standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the
II. Whether or not mandamus standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the
should issue against maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement
respondents to compel PUVs in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
to use CNG as alternative fuel
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs,
shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution
from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework

RATIO
I. Yes. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even
respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of
petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a
procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the
importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it
concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor
vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners.

II. No. The plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, a writ of mandamus commanding
the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB
and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not generally lie from
one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by
4
orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to
address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. It appears to us that more
properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION 16, ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN G.R 101083.
JULY 30, 1993
Ponente: J. DAVIDE JR.
FACTS
The petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology, which the petitioners
associate with the twin concepts of “intergenerational responsibility” and “inter-generational justice.”A
“taxpayers’ class suit,” petitioners, claim their right to the “full benefit, use and enjoyment of the country’s
virgin tropical rainforests” as citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines. Said complaint was filed in behalf of
themselves and all others who are equally concerned about the preservation of the country’s natural resources
– both in their generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Claiming that: Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will
work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors —
who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure. This act of
defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

And by enumerating the effects if such action is not quickly taken which would then lead to the following:
(a) Water shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well
as of rivers, brooks and streams,
(b) Salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples
of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite,
(c) Massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna,
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures,
(f) The siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to
a critical reduction in marine resource productivity,
(g) Recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country,
(h) Increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) The flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests,
(j) The siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
5
(k) The reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."

PETITIONER'S CONTENTION
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution On June 22, 1990, the original defendant, Sec. Factoran Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on: (1) the lack of a valid cause of action against him and (2) the issue (of logging) being a political
question, of which recourse is not to file an action in court, but perhaps to lobby before Congress for the
passage of an appropriate legislative measure, the judge then granted such motion to dismiss. Now bringing
the case to the cognizance of the Supreme Court.
1) Whether or not the civil case ARTICLE II, SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the
instituted is a valid class suit ( right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
and do the petitioners have locus with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
standi)
2) Whether or not the petitioners This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
have cause of action against the the preceding section of the same article:
defendant
3) Whether or not the civil case ARTICLE II, SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the
raises a political question rather right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
than a justiciable question them." While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation.
RATIO
• YES – it is a class suit, involving a common and general interest not just to several but to ALL CITIZENS
of the Philippines. All the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Sec 12 Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present in both the civil and in the instant petition. HOWEVER, this case, has a
SPECIAL and NOVEL ELEMENT. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. The minor petitioners’ assertion of their
environmental right constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their responsibility to ensure the
protection of that same right for the succeeding generations. (“The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.”)
• YES – Concept of Intergenerational Responsibility - The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners
can for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
• NO – Civil Case No 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. What is principally involved is
the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.

RULING
The instant Petiton is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged ORDER of respondent Judge dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby SET ASIDE.

No procurement as to costs.

6
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. vs. THE DEPUTY GR No. 79538
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF Date: 18 October 1990
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE Ponente: CORTES, J.
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., Petitioners. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents.
FACTS
After the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter to the Office of the President and to
Minister Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corp. without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations;
and (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area.
Acting on petitioner’s letter, the MNR issued and order denying the request. The Ministry ruled that a timber
license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against
in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the order, reiterating among others, its request that TLA No. 356 issued to
private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR denied this motion.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied the revocation of
TLA No. 356.

Respondents contend that they did not act with grave abuse of discretion when they denied the revocation of
TLA No. 356.
Whether a petition for certiorari should be ARTICLE II, SECTION 16. The State shall protect and
granted advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
RATIO
NO. The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not avail of its remedies
under the law for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner
sent its letter to the MNR, these matters were already settled as far as petitioner was concerned. Petitioner is
precluded from availing certiorari because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period. Although no
specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari, the same must nevertheless
be done within a “reasonable time”. In this case, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a
petition to attack the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.

Finally, as there was an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, the
courts are in a position to not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training
of such agencies.

The Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.
RULING

7
CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 2, ARTICLE XII
RESOURCES National Economy
MATEO CARIÑO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT 212 U.S. 449
Date: 23 February 1909
Ponente: HOLMES, J.
MATEO CARIÑO, Petitioner-appellant. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-appellee.
FACTS
In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed a petition for him to be granted a certificate of title over a 40 hectare land in
Baguio, Benguet. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the land lies.
For more than fifty years before the treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff
and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His ancestors had been recognized as owners by the Igorots,
and he had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom.

The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information obtained in 1901.
By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it
produced only those effects which the laws give to mere possession.

The land registration court granted his petition, but the government, through the Solicitor General, opposed
said grant on the ground that Mateo Cariño and his ancestors failed to register said land during the Spanish
Era. It was argued that in 1880, the Spanish government decreed that all privately held land must be registered
or else they will be reverted back to the public domain, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine.

The case reached the Philippine Supreme Court. The latter ruled against Mateo Cariño hence Cariño further
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be
acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880,
required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered,
and therefore became, if it was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain,
and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
Whether or not plaintiff owns the land. Article II, Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes
the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
RATIO
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from
the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to
the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that, in legal
theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United
States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength,
and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the
head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his argument, characterized as a
savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems
probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the
registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his
title beyond question good.
When as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
RULING
Judgment reversed.

8
CRUZ v. NCIP GR No. 135385
Date: 6 December 2000
PER CURIAM
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
Petitioners, RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Respondents.
FACTS
This is a suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371 (Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The Court en banc deliberated on the petition and the votes
gathered were equally divided with no majority vote obtained. Seven (7) members voted to dismiss the
petition. Seven (7) other members voted to grant the petition. After re-deliberation, the voting remained the
same (7 to 7). Thus, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was dismissed.
1) Whether or Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, Article II, SECTION 22. The State recognizes and
8, and 57, and 58 of Republic Act No. 8371 promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
(IPRA) and its IRR are unconstitutional for within the framework of national unity and development.
unlawfully depriving the State of its
ownership over lands of the public ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are
domain, minerals, and other natural classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands
resources therein, violating the regalian and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII may be further classified by law according to the uses to
of the Constitution. which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
2) Whether or not Sections 51 to 53, 59, domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
NCIP and making customary law exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
applicable to the settlement of disputes twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
involving ancestral domains and ancestral hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not
lands, violate the due process clause of the more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
Constitution. twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
3) Whether Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of ecology, and development, and subject to the
1998, which provides that the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
administrative relationship of the NCIP to determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
the Office of the President is characterized which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
as a lateral but autonomous relationship conditions therefor.
for purposes of policy and program
coordination, infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution
RATIO
1) Justice Kapunan: No. Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples of their ancestral
lands and domains by virtue of native title (definition: lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial) do not diminish the State’s ownership of lands within the public domain, because said
ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public
domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño v. Insular Government. Section 3(a) does not confer
or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title. Section 57 only grants “priority rights” to ICCs/IPs in
the utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. The State retains full control
over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the grant of said
9
rights exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral
domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency.
Justice Puno: No. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The classification of lands in the public domain under
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by
native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. Both modes presume or recognize the
land as private and not public. The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Section 7(a) involves
“lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains”, not
“waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources” enumerated in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the State. Small-
scale utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3, section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution. Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of RA 8371/IPRA
is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution since only “priority
rights” (which does not necessarily mean ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs. However, by
including “natural resources”, Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond Section
7(a) and therefore unconstitutional.
Justice Panganiban: Yes. Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain encompasses natural
resources found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands as those possessed by ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial] contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which declares that the State owns all
lands of the public domain, minerals, and natural resources – none of which, except agricultural lands,
can be alienated. In addition, mere possession or utilization of land, however long, does not
automatically convert them into private properties. IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral
lands and domains. IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the State’s power under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution of full control of natural resources in ancestral lands and ancestral domains in favor of
ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these rights without any time limit. In addition, they are also given the right
to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources under Section
7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to the State.
Justice Vitug: Yes. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount
to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of
the country and its patrimony
2) Justice Kapunan: No. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it
is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2,
Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution
Justice Vitug: Yes, but only on making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution allows Congress to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this
statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that customary laws shall
govern and end it there.
3) Justice Kapunan: No. Since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP
under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and supervision with
respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of
the NLRC and the SEC.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
RULING
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

10
CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES SEC. 25, ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA GR No. 156052
Date: 7 March 2007
Ponente: CORONA, J.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of
T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, the City of Manila, Respondent.
Petitioners.
FACTS
SJS filed the original petition for mandamus which compelled then Manila Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 in November 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 is a zoning ordinace which reclassified the areas of Pandacan
and Sta. Ana from Industrial II to Commericial I. The gasoline stations in these areas were given six months to
terminate their operations. After the promulgation of the ordinance, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies, declaring that the scaling
down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable option.

Another resolution was passed by the City granting special permits to the oil companies, but this did not hinder
the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027, and they were still prohibited from operating in the Pandacan
area.

A case arose, resulting to the Court deciding in favor of the enforcement of the ordinance. The oild companies
filed a motion for reconsideration assailing its constitutionality and the Regional Trial Court of Manila enjoined
the parties to maintain the status quo.

In 2006, Manila CIty issued another ordinance, Ordinance No. 8119 which gave rise to another dispute among
the parties. FInally, the court decided to first tackle the validity of Ordinance 8027.
Whether or not the mayor of the City of Manila ARTICLE II, SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the
has the power to issue Ordinance No. 8027? autonomy of local governments.
RATIO
YES. It is well-settled that the Local Government Code imposes upon the respondent mayor the duty to enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.
He has no other choice because it is his ministerial duty to do so. The court in the case of Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.
ruled that, "these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it." The
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Following the attack on the Twin Towers
of the World Trade Center in New York City, there is no reason why such a protective measure should be
delayed in the City of Manila.
RULING
Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

CASES ON NATURAL ARTICLE III, BILL OF RIGHTS
RESOURCES
CHAVES V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND GR No. 133250
AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT Date: 9 July 2002
CORPORATION Ponente: CARPIO, J.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, and AMARI COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents
FACTS
HISTORY AND LANDS HELD BY PEA:
11
On November 30, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with
the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila—Cavite
Coastal Road. On February 4, 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1084
creating Public Estates Authority (PEA) to “"to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, . . . lease and sell any and all kinds of lands” and pursuant to PD No. 1085,
transferred to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay " under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). President Marcos issued a memorandum directing
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP so that “All future works in MCCRRP… shall be funded and owned by
PEA.” On January 19, 1988, President Corazon Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring
to PEA “the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project …”
Corresponding Transfer Certificate of Titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Municipality of Parañaque
in the name of PEA covering reclaimed islands known as “Freedom Islands” located at the southern portion of
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PRESENT CASE:
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands.; it was entered without a public bidding. The JVA required the reclamation of
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surround the islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.

On November 29, 1996, Senate President Ernesto Maceda in his privilege speech in the Senate called the JVA as
the “grandmother of all scams” which prompted the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations to conduct an
investigation. The result of the investigation are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under
the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3)
the JVA itself is illegal.

On April 4 and 5, 1998, PEA and AMARI entered into renegotiations under an order issued by President Fidel
Ramos.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank Chavez, as a tax payer, filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner prays that PEA
to publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA invoking Section 28, Article II, and Sec 7, Article
III, of the 1987 Constitution. On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA and President
Joseph Estrada approved it.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: PEA argues that in cases of on-going negotiations, the right to information is
limited to “definite propositions of the government” and it does not include “intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the ‘exploratory stage,” AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right to
information during the pre-decisional stage and can only invoke it where there is already a consummated
contract.

Whether the constitutional right Article II, Section 28 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Subject to
to information includes official reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
information on on-going a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
negotiations before a final interest.”
agreement
Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
RATIO
YES. Before consummation of the contract, PEA must disclose to the public matter relating to the disposition of
its property (i.e size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and
conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information.) The
disposition of these details is required because Government Auditing Code requires public bidding.
12

The right to information contemplates the inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a contract.
However, information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. This is because while the
evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no “official acts, transaction, or decision” on the bids or
proposals. Only when the committee makes its official recommendation that there arises a “definite
proposition” on the part of the government to which the public’s right to information attaches.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents
attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel
PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only
affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them at
one’s own expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of
the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to
conduct the inspection and copying. In addition, the information petitioner seeks is not one of those under
recognized exceptions like privileged information under the separation of powers to which the right to
information does not extend.

RULING
The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions e.g privileged information.

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 7, ARTICLE III
RESOURCES BILL OF RIGHTS
VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE G.R. No. 74930
Date: February 13, 1989
Ponente: CORTES, J.
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO
OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING,
JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL, Petitioners.
FACTS
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a)to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and
PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b)to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c)to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. I

1) Whether or not petitioners are entitled to Under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution: The right of
access to the documents evidencing loans the people to information on matters of public concern
granted by the GSIS. - Yes, shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
2) Whether or not documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
mandamus lies to compel respondent to transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
perform the acts sought by petitioners to research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be be afforded the citizen, subject to
done, in pursuance of their right to such limitations as may be provided by law.
information. - No
RATIO
1) The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions
involving public
interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it
must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law
13
from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee.

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang
Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the
February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. The GSIS is
a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. Respondent maintains
that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of
confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, respondent has failed to cite any
law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is,
and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power

Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy
in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party
and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature

2) However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." Although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire information or matters of public concern

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform
the act required.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may
specify, inspection, not incompatible with this
decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

CASES ON NATURAL ARTICLE III
RESOURCES BILL OF RIGHTS - RIGHT TO INFORMATION
LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-72119
Date: 29 May 1987
Ponente: CORTES, J.
VALENTIN LEGASPI, Petitioner. Civil Service Commission, Respondent.
FACTS
· Government employees Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians, and are employed by the
Cebu City Health Department.

14
· Valentin Legaspi claims his right to be informed of the eligibilities of the sanitarians, and prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel respondent Civil Service Commission to
disclose such.

· OSG challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any
clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned.
He notes the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular
information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish
the petitioner with the information he seeks.

1. Whether or not petitioner has ARTICLE III, SECTION 7. The right of the people to
standing? information on matters of public concern shall be
2. Whether or not agencies may prohibit recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
access to the information? and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
3. Whether or not it is proper to issue a decisions, as well as to government research data used as
writ of mandamus? basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
a) Whether or not information sought by subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
petitioner is within the ambit of
constitutional guarantee?
b) Whether or not the information
sought is among the species of the
information exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional
guarantee?
RATIO
· STANDING - YES
• petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal
right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed
• “when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the law” (Tanada v Tuvera
• when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
"public" which possesses the right.
o “Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person.
To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in
the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction.” (Subido v Ozaeta)
• DISCRETION BY THE AGENCY TO PREVENT ACCESS - NO
· Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of
public concern—it is the legislation which states which information to disclose or not.
· It is, however, the job of the government agencies charged with the custody of public records to
regulate access to, and to prevent undue interference and damage to such.
· Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper
case.

4) MANDAMUS – YES
· In every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the
nature of the information sought:
o (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest
It is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
Public office being a public trust, citizens must ensure that government positions requiring
civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are
15
at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions.
§ (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible
list of civil service exam passers are released to the public, hence there being “nothing
secret” about one’s civil service eligibility
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of
sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said
position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 4, ARTICLE X
RESOURCES LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ALFREDO TANO VS. GOVERNOR SALVADOR G.R. No. 110249
SOCRATES Date: August 21, 1997
Ponente: Davide, JR. J.
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF
ROMUALDO TANO, et al., petitioners. SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN,
respondents.
FACTS
The petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1,
1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.
To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of
1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN
ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE,
OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH
A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa
Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations
[sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued
by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the
matter.
On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution
No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING
AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE
(MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA),
LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA
(MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-
BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE
(TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments
power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]),
and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
16
the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi),
Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such
powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where
fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further
asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance
and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition
was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.
There was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public
hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and
employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who
catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at
all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance
applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7
of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition
under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute
authority to determine whether or not to issue permit. Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan
altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral
dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method,
the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar
as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from
pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out
their business endeavors to a successful conclusion. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to
be dismissed.
Whether or not the challenged ordinances are ART. XII, SEC. 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The State
unconstitutional? shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

ART. XIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
SECTION 2. The promotion of social justice shall include
the commitment to create economic opportunities based
on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
xxx
SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of
subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to
the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The State
shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.
The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in
the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces
with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
17
cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.

SECTION 16. General Welfare. - Every local government
unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and
social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
RATIO
Yes. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447
(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the
validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or
purposes: (1) to establish a “closed season” for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
It is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable
because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would
be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing
and fisheries in municipal waters. In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to
enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing In the
herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall
now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our
legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove
disastrous, if not, irreversible.
RULING

CASES ON NATURAL Sec. 15, ARTICLE X
RESOURCES Local Government
CHIONGBIAN ET AL. VS. ORBOS ET AL. G.R. No. 96754.
Date: 2 June 1995

Ponente: MENDOZA, J
FACTS
Petitioners challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative
determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive
Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative
Regions in Mindanao.”, The following areas have been called to vote on whether they would like to join the
merger Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of
Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga, to which
18
only the following agreed to the merger four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region, these
are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
President Aquino then enacted EO 429 to have the following districts, even those who did not take part in the
plebiscite join the ARMM
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotabato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS:
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions
— some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental
and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the
other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "provinces and cities which
in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions.
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION:
The Solicitor General on behalf of the president claims that such order is a power which is "traditionally lodged
in the President," as stated in the case of Abbas. He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not
have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of
Binangonan, in which power of the Governor-General to x municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground
that such power is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and
townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in
development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action
but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

1) Whether or not the President of the ARTICLE X. SECTION 15. There shall be created
Philippines by an Executive order merge autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
administrative districts Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
ARTICLE X. SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an

organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives appointed by
the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall
be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special
courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective

when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
19
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
ART. XIX, SEC. 13 OF R.A. NO. 6734. That only the

provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite
do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided,
however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
RATIO
NO. While Art. XIX, Sec. 13 RA.6734 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in
the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
quali cation that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means
that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of
the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions
as the exigency of administration may require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redenition of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units
by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local
governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao
del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of
local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units
to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.
RULING
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 15, ARTICLE X
RESOURCES LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SULTAN MOHAMAD ALI B. DIMAPORO and GR Nos. 93201-04, 93205, 93502.
NURHUSSEIN UTUTALUM vs. COMMISSION ON Date: 26 June 1990
ELECTIONS, ZACARIA CANDAO and BENJAMIN T. Ponente: FELICIANO, J.
LOONG
SULTAN MOHAMAD ALI B. DIMAPORO and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ZACARIA CANDAO and
NURHUSSEIN UTUTALUM, Petitioners. BENJAMIN T. LOONG, Respondents.
FACTS
This is a consolidated petition crafted by the petitioners against the respondents in relation to the February 17,
1990 election for Regional Governor, Regional Vice-Governor and members of the Regional of Muslim
Mindanao Assembly for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Petitioners were candidates of the
United Opposition (KBL-NP) coalition party, while the private respondents were the candidates of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party.

I. G.R. Nos. 93201-04
Petitioners raised the objections to the inclusion in the canvass of certain election returns, on the ground that
the questioned election returns were “spurious, obviously manufactured and/or statistically improbable.”
Upon dismissal of the petitions, petitioners appealed to the COMELEC En Banc.

II. G.R. No. 93205
Petitioners objected to the inclusion of election returns from 36 precincts in the Municipality of Languyan,
Tawi-Tawi, upon the same ground that such returns were “obviously manufactured” because the results
20
reflected therein were “statistically improbable”. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Tawi-Tawi overruled
the objections of petitioners for failure to present evidence aliunde of the fraud alleged. Petitioners appealed to
the COMELEC.

III. G.R. No. 93602
Petitioners object to the election returns from certain precincts in 6 municipalities. They appeal the rulings of
the Maguindanao Provincial Board of Canvassers to the COMELEC. Petitioners asked the COMELEC to order the
voter’s affidavits and of voters in the contested precincts to be subjected to expert examination of the
signatures and thumbmarks of the registered voters therein.

I. G.R. Nos. 93201-04
The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed all the appeals for lack of merit and for lack of jurisdiction, on the
grounds that the objections raised against the election returns were “merely generalizations”; that the
petitioners had failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish the factual basis of their objections; and that
the petitioners had not filed a written intent to appeal from the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Upon appeal of petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution which modified the First Division’s
Resolution by ordering the exclusion from the canvass of the election returns from 88 precincts for being
statistically improbable.

II. G.R. No. 93205
Second Division of the COMELEC reversed the decision of the Provincial Board of Canvassers by ordering the
exclusion of 15 election returns under the doctrine of “statistical improbability”. The inclusion of the remaining
election returns from 21 other precincts were sustained.

III. G.R. No. 93602
Second Division of the COMELEC dismissed petitioners’ appeal, except for one, with respect to election returns
from Precincts 9 & 10 of the Municipality of Talayan, Maguindanao, which returns were objected to as
incomplete, and which the COMELEC Second Division excluded from the canvass.
G.R. Nos. 93201-04 & G.R. No. 93205 Article X, Section 15. There shall be created autonomous
4) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
discretion in not excluding the returns consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
from the remaining 21 election returns geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
from the remaining 171 contested historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
precincts in Sulu and the remaining 21 structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
election returns in Tawi-Tawi, inclusion of framework of this Constitution and the national
which was allowed pursuant to the sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
COMELEC’s strict and restrictive of the Philippines.
application of the doctrine of “statistical
improbability”;
5) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in disregarding other evidence
submitted by petitioners in their effort to
show that the contested election returns
were “obviously manufactured”
G.R. Nos. 93201-04 & G.R. No. 93205
discretion when it refused to order the
expert technical examination of the
signatures and thumbmarks of the
registered voters affixed to their voter’s
affidavits and to the lists of voters in the
voting records in the contested precincts;
discretion when it rejected as filed out of
time petitioners’ appeal from adverse
rulings of the Maguindanao Provincial
Board of Canvassers relating to certain
assailed election returns from certain
municipalities
21
RATIO
G.R. Nos. 93201-04 & G.R. No. 93205
1) NO. Whatever conclusion the Court might have reached on this issue would merely constitute dictum. If the
court were to nullify all the returns objected to by the petitioners on grounds of “statistical improbability”,
private respondents would still show a very substantial margin over the total votes of petitioners. Such
nullification will not materially affect the results of the election per the official certificates of canvass.
2) NO. Petitioners correctly resorted to the proper remedy. The principal remedy is to file election protests
before the appropriate agency of the government—COMELEC—and there to litigate all the issues raised by
them in as much detail as they might deem necessary or appropriate. Another remedy open to petitioners is the
filing of criminal charges for election offenses against those who, petitioners believe, are responsible for the
frauds and assorted trickery alleged to have been committed.

G.R. Nos. 93201-04 & G.R. No. 93205
1) NO. The examination of voter’s affidavits and voting records on the ground that there was massive
substitute voting or that no elections were held, has been definitely ruled out by the Supreme Court. For to
accept the grounds cited, and to allow the procedure suggested, is to expand the narrow and exclusive grounds
defined by law for initiating and sustaining pre-proclamation controversies.

2. NO. There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in so ruling.
RULING
Petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RESOURCES NATIONAL ECONOMY
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS GR No. 122156
Date: 3 February 1997
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Petitioner. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Respondents.
FACTS
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. In
a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent
a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm.


In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
22
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of
the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer
of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.


Respondents except. They maintain, inter alia, that, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s).

Moreover, they also claim that, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under
the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
1) Whether or not the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 (2), of the 1987 Constitution
Sec. 10, Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is provides:
a self-executing provision. “Sec. 10. xxx In the grant of rights, privileges, and
2) Whether or not Manila Hotel is part of the concessions covering the national patrimony, the State
national patrimony. shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
3) Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents Article XII, Sec. 1, of the 1987 Constitution provides:
in refusing the matching bid of the Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more
petitioner. equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to
raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full
employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets.
However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy
and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of
their ownership.
RATIO
I. YES. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
23
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
II. YES. As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explains
-
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in
arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to
the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what
is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands.
III. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
RULING
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

24

RESOURCES National Economy
ARANDA VS. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 172331
Date: August 24, 2011
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.
RAMON ARANDA, Petitioner. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) filed a petition for original registration of a9,103-square meter parcel of
land in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Office of the Solicitor General
opposed the petition, saying that the land is part of the public domain and the applicant has not acquired a
registrable title thereto. ICTSI-WI later amended the application to make the petitioner Ramon Aranda, the
vendor. Aranda alleged open, continuous, public, and adverse possession of the subject land in the concept of
owner for more than 30 years. Petitioner’s sister, Merlita A.Enriquez, testified that their father, Anatalio
Aranda, donated the land to petitioner in 1965. The document signifying the donation was however eaten by
rats. Witness, Luis Olan, testified that they had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of owner until his father, Lucio Olan, sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio. Luis had no copy of the
document of sale since it was given by his mother to Anatalio. The trial court granted the petition but the Court
of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court.

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
trial court and dismissing the application for "Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
judicial confirmation of title? coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or product-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.prLL
RATIO
NO. The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for original registration of land in an
ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section14(1) thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance
with the following requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. In this case, the status of the land applied for as
alienable and disposable was not clearly established. Moreover, the court found out that petitioner started
paying taxes on the land just three years before the filing of the application for original registration. As a
rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. Petitioner thus failed to
meet the quantum of proof required by law and his petition must be denied.
RULING
Petition is DENIED.

25
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHIL., INC. GR No. 156052
v. FACTORAN, JR. Date: 7 March 2007
Ponente: CORONA, J.
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of
Petitioner. Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D.
MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau,
Respondents.
FACTS
With the adoption of the concept of jura regalia 1987 Constitution, there is no longer a need for a license,
concession or lease for the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain. President Corazon Aquino
promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in
order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral
resources. She also promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements
involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals.
Pursuant to E.O. 279, the DENR Secretary issued DENR Administrative Order No. 57, ("Guidelines of Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279). Under the transitory provision of said DENR
Administrative Order No. 57, all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those
pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty hectares or less, shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within one year from the effectivity of the guidelines.
DENR Secretary then issued Administrative Order No. 82 (Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation.) Sec. 3 of A.O. 82 enumerates the persons or
entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within
two years from the effectivity of DENR A.O. 57.
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. contends that respondent
Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not
conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-
impairment of contract provision under Article III, Sec10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that A.O. 57
unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing
agreements within one year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, A.O. 82 declares that failure to submit
Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two years from the date of effectivity of
said guideline shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.

Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. ARTICLE XII, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
57 and 82 contravene the provisions of the All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
matters not covered by said laws? energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or product-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
26
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.prL
RATIO
NO. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its
implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession, or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and
other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In
other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern.
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or lease"
granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. After
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution until the first Congress under said Constitution, E.Os. 211 and 279 were
promulgated to govern the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals. To carry out the purposes of said laws, A.Os. 57 and 82 were issued by the DENR
Secretary.
It is clear from the transitory provision that A.O. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements
which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to E.O. 211.
On the non-impairment clause
Under E.O. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and
conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non- impairment of contract clause under Article
III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution. They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve
the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
E.O. 279 has the force and effect of a statute or law passed by Congress. It validly modified or altered the
privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases and agreements under E.O. 211 after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the DENR Secretary. Regardless of the reservation
clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of
the State.
As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the
quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people.
The State, in the exercise of its police power, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
P.D No. 463, as amended, pursuant to E.O. 211. Police Power, being co- extensive with the necessities of the
case and the demands of public interest extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into
effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

27
HON. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES INC. GR No. 162243
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES
ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the (PICOP), respondent.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
petitioner,
PICOP RESOURCES INC. v. HON. ALVAREZ GR No. 164516
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON.
ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
respondent.
HON. REYES v. PICOP GR No. 171875
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. PICOP RESOURCES, INC., respondent.
Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioner
FACTS
PRESENT CASE:
Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines (PICOP) filed with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). During the processing of PICOP’s application, PICOP refused
to attend further meetings with the DENR and instead, on September 2, 2002, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez, seeking to
compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. The RTC granted PICOP’s petition;
the decision was affirmed upon appeal by the Court of Appeals (CA). Both parties filed separate Petitions for
Review of the CA Decision. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the CA in so far as it
affirmed the decision of the RTC. PICOP filed a motion for reconsideration.

CASE BACKGROUND:
PICOP’s cause of action for Mandamus is rooted on the so-called Presidential Warranty (Warrant and
Agreement of July 29, 1969) approved by then President Marcos in favor of PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest,
Bislig Bay Lumber Company, Inc. PICOP insists that the government is obligated by contract to issue an IFMA in
its favor because of the Presidential Warranty. PICOP argues that by not awarding its IFMA, the DENR
Secretary impaired the obligation of contract under the said Warrant and Agreement of July 29, 1969 by
refusing to respect PICOP’s:
a) Tenurial rights over TLA No. 23
b) Its exclusive right to cut, collect, and remove sawtimber and pulpwood therein
c) Peaceful and adequate enjoyment of said area under the Warranty and Agreement of July 29, 1969

Presidential Warranty content in dispute:
“… We further confirm that your tenure over the area and exclusive right to cut, collect and remove sawtimber
and pulpwood shall be for the period ending on April 26, 1977; said period to be renewable for another 25
years subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on
timber concessions … “

PICOP was already engaged in the area having exclusive right to cut, collect and remove saw timber and
pulpwood for a period of 25 years ending on April 26, 1977. The TLA No. 43, as amended, was renewed for
another 25 years to expire on April 26, 2002. They were already engaged for a total period of 50 years. PICOP
interprets that the Presidential Warranty covers the initial 25 year period and is renewable for periods
of 25 years provided the project continues to exist and operate and that so long as the legal
requirements are met, the term of warranty is not limited to 50 years but another 25 years.

1) Whether or not the Presidential ARTICLE XII, SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain,
28
Warranty/1969 Document a contract enforceable waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
under the Non-Impairment Clause of the all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
Constitution, so as to make the signing of the wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
IFMA a ministerial duty owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
2) Whether or not PICOP comply with all the legal The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
and constitutional requirements for the issuance resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of an IFMA of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture,
or product-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant .
RATIO
1) NO. As held in PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, the Presidential
Warranty/1969 Document is not a contract protected by the non-impairment clause. The Court ruled that the
Presidential Warranty “ … simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment to uphold the terms and
conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the
areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex … ” and that, as held in
Oposa v Factoran, “… a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause; it is
only a license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare …”

2) NO. PICOP’s claim that the term of the warranty is not limited to 50 years but it extends to another 50 years,
perpetually, violates section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. IFMAs are production-sharing agreements
concerning the development and utilization of natural resources. As such, these agreements "may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law". The maximum trend of agreement to develop and
utilize natural resources like forest products is 25 years plus another 25 years or a total of 50 years.
Any superior "contract" requiring the State to issue TLAs and IFMAs whenever they expire clearly circumvents
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which provides for the only permissible schemes wherein the full
control and supervision of the State are not derogated: coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements within the time limit of twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years. Any
interpretation extending the application of the 1969 Document beyond 26 April 2002 and any concession that
may be granted to PICOP beyond the said date would violate the Constitution
RULING
The Motion for Reconsideration of PICOP Resources, Inc. is DENIED.

RESOURCES NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
CRUZ v. NCIP GR No. 135385
PER CURIAM
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
Petitioners, RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Respondents.
FACTS
This is a suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371 (Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied
29
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The Court en banc deliberated on the petition and the votes
gathered were equally divided with no majority vote obtained. Seven (7) members voted to dismiss the
petition. Seven (7) other members voted to grant the petition. After re-deliberation, the voting remained the
same (7 to 7). Thus, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was dismissed.
6) Whether or Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are
8, and 57, and 58 of Republic Act No. 8371 classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands
(IPRA) and its IRR are unconstitutional for and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
unlawfully depriving the State of its may be further classified by law according to the uses to
ownership over lands of the public which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain, minerals, and other natural domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
resources therein, violating the regalian corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
of the Constitution. exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
7) Whether or not Sections 51 to 53, 59, twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand
52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
NCIP and making customary law twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
applicable to the settlement of disputes Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
involving ancestral domains and ancestral ecology, and development, and subject to the
lands, violate the due process clause of the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
Constitution. determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
8) Whether Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of conditions therefor.
1998, which provides that the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to Article II, SECTION 22. The State recognizes and
the Office of the President is characterized promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
as a lateral but autonomous relationship within the framework of national unity and development.
for purposes of policy and program
coordination, infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution
RATIO
4) Justice Kapunan: No. Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples of their ancestral
lands and domains by virtue of native title (definition: lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial) do not diminish the State’s ownership of lands within the public domain, because said
ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public
domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño v. Insular Government. Section 3(a) does not confer
or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title. Section 57 only grants “priority rights” to ICCs/IPs in
the utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. The State retains full control
over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither does the grant of said
rights exclude non-indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral
domains upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency.
Justice Puno: No. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The classification of lands in the public domain under
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by
native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. Both modes presume or recognize the
land as private and not public. The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Section 7(a) involves
“lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains”, not
“waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources” enumerated in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the State. Small-
scale utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed under paragraph 3, section 2, Article XII of
30
the Constitution. Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of RA 8371/IPRA
is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution since only “priority
rights” (which does not necessarily mean ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs. However, by
including “natural resources”, Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond Section
7(a) and therefore unconstitutional.
Justice Panganiban: Yes. Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain encompasses natural
resources found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands as those possessed by ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial] contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which declares that the State owns all
lands of the public domain, minerals, and natural resources – none of which, except agricultural lands,
can be alienated. In addition, mere possession or utilization of land, however long, does not
automatically convert them into private properties. IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral
lands and domains. IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the State’s power under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution of full control of natural resources in ancestral lands and ancestral domains in favor of
ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these rights without any time limit. In addition, they are also given the right
to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources under Section
7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to the State.
Justice Vitug: Yes. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount
to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of
the country and its patrimony
5) Justice Kapunan: No. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it
is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2,
Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution
Justice Vitug: Yes, but only on making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution allows Congress to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. I do not see this
statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that customary laws shall
govern and end it there.
6) Justice Kapunan: No. Since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP
under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and supervision with
respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of
the NLRC and the SEC.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
RULING
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

RESOURCES NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
REPUBLIC vs. NAGUIAT G.R. No. 134209
Date: January 24, 2006
Ponente: GARCIA, J.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner. CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
FACTS
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales,
more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with
the Regional
Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired
the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no
31
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or
in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on
the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of
title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide
acquisition of the
lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of (an) owner; that the applicant's claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant can no longer be
availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
IaAScD
1) whether or not the areas in question have ARTICLE XII, SECTION 2. which embodies the Regalian
ceased to have the status of forest or other doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
inalienable lands of the public domain — the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain pacheeseart of the inalienable public
domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the
prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the
public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive
Branch of the government and not the court.
RATIO
In the present case, the RTV and CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable.
The principal reason for the appellate court's disposition, finding a “registerable” title for respondent, is her
and her predecessor-in-interest's open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more
than 30 years.

However, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or
official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. Aside from tax receipts, respondent
submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state,
provided no
information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are
not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been
in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For,
unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent's application for
original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales,
Branch 69, is DENIED.

PROVINCE OF RIZAL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 129546
32
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, et. al, Petitioners EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al, Respondents
FACTS
• On 17 November 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the DPWH and DENR and the Governor of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement providing the
immediate utilization by the MMC as a sanitary landfill site
• On 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote Gov. Elfren Cruz of the MMC et
al., pointing out that it had recently passed a Resolution banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila
garbage within its jurisdiction and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold operations with
respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite (No action was taken on these letters.)
• It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and owned by the DENR was part of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation Area which is agricultural in nature
• Illegal Dumping Site operation inside Watershed Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705 aka the Revised
Forestry Code
• Recommendation in the Memorandum: dumping site must be stopped to save healthy ecosystem
• On Jan 22, 1990, the CENRO submitted another report which states that: the areas used as Dumping Site of
the MMC are found to be within the Marikina Watershed which are part of the Integrated Social Forestry
Project (ISF)
o It also stated that: a) no permit issued to the MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping
purposes and b) the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and
environmental factors in this community.
• On Feb 19, 1990, the DENR granted Metro Manila Authority an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
for the operation of a 2 1/2-hectare garbage dumpsite.
• The ECC was sought and granted in compliance with PD1586 EIS System Sec 4
o “No persons, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate”
• Proclamation No. 2146, which “designates all areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves,
wildlife preserves, and sanctuaries as Environmentally Critical Areas.”
• On July 31, 1990, USEC Roque suspended the ECC in a letter which states in part that: “Upon site
investigation conducted by Environmental Management Bureau staff on development activities at the San
Mateo Landfill Site, it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper
development of the site. We believe that this will adversely affect the environmental quality in the area if
the proper remedial measures are not instituted in the design of the landfill site.”
• Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies aforementioned,
the Office of the President signed and issued Proclamation No 635. Said Proclamation was issued “to cope
with the requirements of the growing population in Metro Manila and the adjoining provinces and
municipalities, certain developed and open portions of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources should now be
excluded from the scope of the reservation”
• “Section 2. Purpose The areas being excluded from the Marikina Watershed Reservation are hereby placed
under the administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, for development as Sanitary
Landfill, and/or for use in the development of such other related waste disposal facilities that may be used
by the cities and municipalities of Metro Manila and the adjoining province of Rizal and its municipalities.”
• Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction.
• The MOA entered into by DENR, DPWH and MMC is valid
• Proclamation 635 further validates the legality of the dumpsite in San Mateo Rizal
• The respondents next point out that the Marikina Watershed Reservation and thus, is located in the public
domain.
• The Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo has passed a Resolution banning the creation of dumpsites in its
jurisdiction
• The ECC granted by the Secretary of DENR was already suspended and so the continuous use of the land as
a dumpsite is illegal
33
1. Whether or not the reorganization act of the ARTICLE XII, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
DENR defines and limits its powers over the "The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law
country’s natural resources the specific limits of forest lands and national parks,
2. Whether or not the local government code marking clearly their boundaries on the ground.
gives to local government units all the Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be
necessary powers to promote the general conserved and may not be increased nor diminished,
welfare of their inhabitants. except by law. The Congress shall provide, for such period
3. Whether or not waste disposal is regulated by as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in
the ecological solid waste management act of endangered forests and watershed areas.”
2000.
RATIO
1. Whether or not the reorganization act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the country’s natural
resources. -YES
• Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources: State ownership of natural resources was seen as
a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization. (Regalian Doctrine)
• Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192, otherwise known as The Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, to be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain. It is also responsible for the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
• Oposa v. Factoran: right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country’s resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR
under the aforequoted Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192.
• With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public respondents have
vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their
corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
2. Whether or not the local government code gives to local government units all the necessary powers to
promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. - YES
• The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates Rep. Act No. 7160, or the
Local Government Code.
• Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local
Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
• Lina, Jr. v. Pao: we held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government
units, should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the
particular community implementing the project.
• Local Government Code: two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with
the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent
either of these is illegal.
3. Whether or not waste disposal is regulated by the ecological solid waste management act of 2000. - YES
• The respondents would have us overlook all the abovecited laws because the San Mateo site is a very
expensive - and necessary - fait accompli.
• These concerns are addressed by Rep. Act No. 9003. Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act of 2000 was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a
systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the
protection of public health and environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize the
utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery.
• It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the
collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of solid
wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of
solid waste management projects.
• The said law mandates the National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should include, the
method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity
of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater
reservoir or watershed area.
34
• Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section
40, specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local
government unit, and must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not detrimentally affect
environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.
RULING
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby
made permanent

CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES SEC.5, ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY

Executive Order No. 561
NICASIO ALCANTARA V. COMMISSION ON G.R. No. 145838

SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
Date: July 20, 2001
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, petitioner. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS, SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES ANTONIO
CERILLES, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, ROLANDO PAGLANGAN, ET AL.,
respondents.
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Under said FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease Nine
Hundred Twenty-Three hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for
grazing purposes for a period of twenty-five years to expire on 31 December 2018.
As early as 1990, however, private respondent Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop
filed a letter-complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the
cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the Blaan and Maguindanaoan
tribes.
Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since the dispute involved
a claim for recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case should have been filed with the DENR
since it is the latter which has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands, including grazing lands.
The COSLAP issued a Decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542. Petitioner appealed the same to the
Court of Appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Petition should be dismissed since the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
in the Court of Appeals was filed out of time. Rolando Paglangan also contended that the COSLAP has the power
to entertain cases involving indigenous cultural communities when the DENR or the NCIP fails or refuses to act
on a complaint or grievance brought before them.
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: The appellate court should have considered that the COSLAP does not possess
the historical, genealogical and anthropological expertise to act on ancestral land claims, and that it is the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, under the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 which has
jurisdiction over such claims.
35
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 561, SEC. 3. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS.
committed any reversing error in the
assailed decision The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to
the Commission: Provided, That the Commission, may, in the
following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering,
for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement
holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands
of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
RATIO
I. No. The Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the COSLAP since he participated actively in the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer, a Motion
for Reconsideration of the COSLAPs decision and a Supplement to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court also notes the appellate courts observation that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of
the COSLAP only when he realized that his period to appeal the COSLAPs decision had already lapsed. It has
been repeatedly held by this Court that the active participation of a respondent in the case pending against
him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to a recognition of that courts or bodys recognition
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the
courts or body’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the the land area
being claimed by private respondents belongs to the Blaan indigenous cultural community since they have
been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a fact has
not been disputed by petitioner.[12] It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542
granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands
of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and
disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.
RULING
Petition is hereby DENIED.

36
CASES ON NATURAL SECTION 14,
RESOURCES
ARTICLE XIV OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION
CHEESEMAN v. IAC G.R. No. 74833
Date: January 21, 1991

Ponente: NARVASA, J
Thomas Cheesman, Petitioner. Intermediate Appellate Court and Estellita Padilla, Respondents.
FACTS
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul for lack of
consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla,
also a Filipino. Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974 A deed of sale was executed solely in favor of Criselda
without any protest from Thomas. In 1981 Criselda sold the land to Estelita. Upon finding out that the said
land was sold to Estelita, Thomas now seeks the annulment of the sale since it was sold without his consent.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: That the sale should have been done with his consent was such parcel of land
was acquired during their marriage
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION: (1) The property said was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda
with funds exclusively belonging to her, (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have
any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.

1) Whether or not the land can be SECTION 14, ARTICLE XIV OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION "Save
considered conjugal, therefore in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
requiring the cnosent of transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
Cheesman for the sale? associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
2) Whether or not Estallita is a domain."
buyer in good faith?
ART. XII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. SECTION 7. Save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
ART. XIII OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION SECTION. 5. All
educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and
subject to regulation by the State. The Government shall establish
and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education,
and shall provide at least free public primary instruction, and
citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to
develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and
vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional
religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as
now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts,
science, and letters for specially gifted citizens.
RATIO
1) To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial
interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This
is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
2) Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found
that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the
latter's wife, An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase,
particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter
37
and spirit of the Constitution itself.
RULING
Appealed decision is affirmed.

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 6, ARTICLE XIII
RESOURCES AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
CORPUZ vs. SPOUSES GROSPE GR No. 135297
Date: 8 June 2000
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
GAVINO CORPUZ, Petitioner. SPOUSES GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE,
Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Certificate of Land Transfer for two parcels of agricultural land were
issued to him. He mortgaged the subject land in favor of Virginia de Leon in order to pay for the hospital
expenses incurred for his wife. Upon the expiration of the mortgage, he again pledged the lands for a four-year
period for P32500 to respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe. A contract, which allowed the
respondents to cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage until December 05, 1990 was executed
between the parties. Corpuz subsequently instituted a complaint before the DAR Adjudication Board, wherein
he alleged that the respondents had entered the disputed land by force and destroyed the palay that he had
planted on it. The respondents then filed a response claiming that Corpuz had already executed a "waiver of
rights' over the landholding in their favor in consideration of the amount P54,394. This was denied by
petitioner and he alleged that his and his sons signatures appearing on the waiver were forged. PARAB
adjudicator Ernesto Tabar ruled that Corpuz had indeed abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the
Samahang Nayon of Nueva Ecija. Said Samahang Nayon even passed Resolution No. 16 and 27 recommending
the reallocation of said lots to the respondents, who were the most qualified farmer-beneficiaries. DARAB and
CA affirmed the decision.
4) Whether or not the waiver was null and ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 6 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
void for being contrary to agrarian laws. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
Assuming arguendo that the signatures in stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law,
the waiver were genuine. in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources,
5) Whether or not the petitioner abandoned including lands of the public domain under lease or
his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27. concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
6) Whether or not the petitioner forfeited his homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
right as a beneficiary by voluntary indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
surrender.
The state may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers
in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to
them in the manner provided by law.”
RATIO
1) YES. Jurisprudence provides that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate
of Land Transfer is generally void, unless the alienation is made in favor of the government or through
hereditary succession. This was intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the
landowners reacquire vast tract of land thus, negating the objective of the government's
program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.
2) NO. It is well settled that the surrender of possession does not amount to an abandonment.
Abandonment requires a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right
or property; and b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. Such
requisites must be coupled with an intent of never returning or claiming the said interests which is not
present in this case because there was an obligation on the part of the respondents to return possession
upon full payment of the loan
3) YES. In this case, the intention of the petitioner to surrender the possession and landholding was clear
and unequivocal as shown by his signing of the concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions. Such
voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government,
who then awarded the landholding to the respondents as part of the disposition and reallocation of
farm holdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.
38
RULING
Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioner’s
appeal. Costs against petitioner.

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 7, ARTICLE XIII
RESOURCES Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. GR No. L-32166
MAXIMO A. MACEREN ET.AL. Date: 18 October 1977
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
The People of the Philippines, Petitioner. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN, CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES,
BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLITO
DEL ROSARIO , Respondents.
FACTS
On March 7, 1969, respondents Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the Municipal Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna for
the violation of the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. The complaint alleged that on the morning of
March 1, 1969, the accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a
device or equipment to catch fish through electric current which destroyed any aquatic animal within its
current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and
the Court of First Instance affirmed the dismissal. Petitioner then filed this case assailing the validity of
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, promulgated by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
Whether or not the Fisheries Administrative Article XIII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Order No. 84-1 is valid. "The state shall protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The state
shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.
The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in
the utilization of marine and fishing resources.”
RATIO
NO. The court held that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro fishing and therefore, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking
body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in
the old Fisheries Law. It is well settled that, to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be
punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or
agency. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
RULING
Lower court’s decision is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the
MTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal case no. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

39

NATRES

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NATRES

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

NATRES

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASES

CASES ON NATURAL SEC. 16, ARTICLE II

ISSUE/S PROVISION OF THE LAW INVOLVED

Date: 2 June 1995

ISSUE/S PROVISION OF THE LAW INVOLVED

ARTICLE X. SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective

ART. XIX, SEC. 13 OF R.A. NO. 6734. That only the

On the non-impairment clause

CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES SEC.5, ARTICLE XII

NICASIO ALCANTARA V. COMMISSION ON G.R. No. 145838

Date: January 21, 1991

ISSUE/S PROVISION OF THE LAW INVOLVED

You might also like