N.D.Cal. 3 18-cv-06810-JST 37 0
N.D.Cal. 3 18-cv-06810-JST 37 0
N.D.Cal. 3 18-cv-06810-JST 37 0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. i
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Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities ......................................................................................... 1
4 Statement of Issues ......................................................................................................................... 1
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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CASES
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3 various federal officials and offices (collectively, the “Government”) to enjoin the Government’s
4 actions regarding immigration matters under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.
12 Realty statute did) or does not include such groups’ expenditures within the zone of interests that
22 by IRLI staff from IRLI’s affiliate, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, because
23 the Board considers IRLI an expert in immigration law. For these reasons, IRLI has direct
at 1-7.
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2 ARGUMENT
4 Before a federal court can even consider the underlying merits, plaintiffs must establish
5 their standing to obtain a preliminary injunction. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103
6 (1983). As the Government argues, Plaintiffs lack constitutional and prudential standing. Gov’t
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Memo. at 7-9 (Article III standing), 9-11 (zone of interests).
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Plaintiffs premise their organizational standing on the theory that the Government’s
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actions will cause Plaintiffs to expend additional resources to combat the Government’s rule.
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Compl. ¶¶ 78-99. Because such diverted-resource injuries are entirely self-inflicted and outside
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12 the INA’s zone of interests, amicus IRLI respectfully submits that such injuries do not suffice.
13 This type of diverted-resources standing derives from Havens Realty; as Judge Millett of
14 the U.S. Court of Appeals and Judge Chhabria of this Court have explained, “[t]he problem is
15 not Havens[; the] problem is what our precedent has done with Havens.” People for the Ethical
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Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 797 F.3d 1087, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
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(Millett, J., dissenting); accord Animal Legal Def. Fund v. USDA, 632 F. App'x 905, 909 (9th
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Cir. 2015) (Chhabria, J., concurring3). Under the unique statutory and factual situation in Havens
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Realty, a housing-rights organization’s diverted resources provided it standing, but in most other
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21 settings such diverted resources are mere self-inflicted injuries. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
22 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1152-53 (2013); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976).
23 Moreover, if mere spending could manufacture standing, any private advocacy group could
24 establish standing against any government action. But that clearly is not the law. Sierra Club v.
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Judge Chhabria was sitting on the Ninth Circuit panel by designation.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (organizations lack standing to defend “abstract social
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2 interests”). To avoid overstepping its constitutional authority, this Court should not count the
4 Relying on Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 102-09 (1979), Havens Realty
5 held that the Fair Housing Act at issue there extends “standing under § 812 … to the full limits
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of Art. III,” so that “courts accordingly lack the authority to create prudential barriers to standing
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in suits brought under that section,” 455 U.S. at 372, thereby collapsing the standing inquiry into
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the question of whether the alleged injuries met the Article III minimum of injury in fact. Id. The
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typical organizational plaintiff and typical statute lack several critical criteria from Havens
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11 Realty.
12 First, the Havens Realty organization had a statutory right (backed by a statutory cause
13 of action) to truthful information that the defendants denied to it. Because “Congress may create
14 a statutory right[,]
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… the alleged deprivation of [such rights] can confer standing.” Warth v. Seldin, 422
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U.S. 490, 514 (1975). Under a typical statute, a typical organizational plaintiff has no claim to
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any rights related to its own voluntarily diverted resources.
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Second, and related to the first issue, the injury that an organizational plaintiff claims
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20 must align with the other components of its standing, Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman,
21 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996), including the allegedly cognizable right. In Havens Realty,
22 the statutorily protected right to truthful housing information aligned with the alleged injury
23 (costs to counteract false information, in violation of the statute). By contrast, under INA (or any
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typical statute), there will be no rights even remotely related to a third-party organization’s
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discretionary spending.
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Third, and most critically, the Havens Realty statute eliminated prudential standing, so
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2 the zone-of-interest test did not apply. When a plaintiff — whether individual or
3 organizational — sues under a statute that does not eliminate prudential standing, that plaintiff
4 cannot bypass the zone-of-interest test or other prudential limits on standing.4 Typically, it would
5 be fanciful to suggest that a statute has private, third-party spending in its zone of interests.
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Certainly that is the case for the INA.
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II. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WAIVE ANY OF THE ARGUMENTS RAISED
8 IN THIS BRIEF.
9 Although the zone-of-interests test is a prudential doctrine that a defendant can waive by
10 failing to raise it, City of Los Angeles v. Cty. of Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009), the
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Government’s memorandum of law not only argues that Plaintiffs fall outside the INA’s zone of
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interests but also distinguishes Havens Realty. Accordingly, the Government has not waived any
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of the arguments that IRLI makes because IRLI’s brief supports issues that the Government
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already has raised. As such, the Government could raise these arguments on appeal, Yee v.
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16 Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1992), so it would be passing strange if this Court cannot
18 CONCLUSION
19 This Court should deny the request for interim relief because Plaintiffs lack standing.
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For example, applying Havens to diverted resources in Action Alliance of Senior Citizens
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v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.), then-Judge Ginsburg correctly
25 recognized the need to ask whether those diverted resources fell within the zone of interests of the
Age Discrimination Act. 789 F.2d at 939. There was no such inquiry here or in most diverted-
26 resource decisions.
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/s/ Lawrence J. Joseph
3 Lawrence J. Joseph (SBN 154908)
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