25 Almuete Vs People
25 Almuete Vs People
25 Almuete Vs People
FACTS:
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as
amended. On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioners counsel informed the trial
court that petitioner and Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. The
RTC, however, found their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled.
On its September 8, 1998 decision, they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months
and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum
period.
The RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren and issued warrants of arrest against them.
Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation,
the factual and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed. The RTC denied
their motion for lack of merit.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari. The CA granted the
Petition and imposed the following:
Accused Efren S. Almuete should be acquitted. The RTC is ordered to re-promulgate the decision in the
presence of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly assisted by counsel of their own choice, after notice and allow
them to appeal.
The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This Court reversed petitioners acquittal and reinstated the RTCs decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but his motion was denied by this Court. This Court issued an Entry of Judgment.
Petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied. Petitioner then filed
a Motion for Clarification on whether he could still appeal the RTCs decision but the Court did not give
action. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation of the decision.
Petitioners Arguments
1) Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly convicted by the RTC because his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial
and hearsay evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck containing the lumber. Thus,
he contends that his earlier acquittal by the CA was proper, and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed
without violating the principle of double jeopardy.
2) Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment against him since it was
made in his absence. He insists that he had a valid reason for not attending the promulgation of the
judgment as he was suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and thus, was
advised to rest.
3) He also claims that the RTCs denial of his Motion for Repromulgation was not proper. Hence, a
repromulgation of the judgment should be made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.
Respondents Arguments
1) The Solicitor General contends that the issues and arguments raised by petitioner may no longer be
entertained as they are already the "law of the case."
2) He likewise points out that the promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under Section 6 of Rule
120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that the denial of petitioners Motion for Repromulgation
of the September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the same is in accordance with Administrative Circular No.
16-93.45
3) Respondent opines that petitioners right to appeal has prescribed as the same should have been filed
within 15 days from the time he or his counsel received a copy of the September 8, 1998 Decision instead
of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
4) Respondent recommends that the penalty be modified by reducing the same to six (6) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).
HELD:
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its
authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors
of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by
writ of error. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged
is a nullity.
A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of
law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent
Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate courts decision.
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
The penalty imposed by the RTC in decision must be modified. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
E.O. No. 277, provides that the Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
without License shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article 310
which is two degrees higher than those specified in Article 309. This is erroneous considering that the
penalty prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following
circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the
plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
None of these circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be
that which is prescribed under Article 309.
In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in its maximum period
plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000 pesos in excess of P22,000.00 or three more
years.59 Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed
by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.