47

Al-Hikmat
Volume 26 (2006), pp. 47-62

WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCEPT
OF LANGUAGE GAMES
ROSHAN ARA*

Abstract. By the time Wittgenstein wrote The Philosophical

Investigations he rejected the three assumptions of his early period
namely that language is used for one purpose the presenting of facts,
that sentence acquires meaning in one way that is through picturing
and that language essentially has a clear and firm structure of the
formulae in a logical calculus.
In the later development of his thought Wittgenstein seems to
repudiate the earlier notion of the uniformity of language, which
would restrict the word to a rigid and demarcated use, a use which
would suit all cases. He came to think that language is flexible,
subtle and multiform.
Wittgenstein’s remarks on “Games and Definitions” could be
applied to aesthetics. The nature of art is like that of the nature of
games. If we look carefully and see what it is that we called 'art' we
will find no common properties but discern strands of similarities.
Knowing what art is not discovering some manifest or latent essence
but being able to recognize, describe and explain those things we
call art by virtue of these similarities.
The basic resemblance between these concepts is their open texture.
In elucidating them certain (paradigm) cases can be given to which
we conveniently apply the word 'art' or game but no exhaustive set
of cases can be given. It is so because one can always envisage new
cases, which can be added to it.

In the Philosophical Investigations, published in 1953,

Wittgenstein expressed the view: “Our language can be seen as an

*Dr. Roshan Ara is Associate Professor and Chairperson of the Department of

Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh-202002, UP (India).
48 R. ARA

ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and
this surrounded by a multitude of new borough with straight
regular streets and uniform houses.”1
The book contains loosely connected paragraphs as
Wittgenstein himself says: “it travels over a wide field of thought
criss-cross in every direction.” The book carries many un-
answered questions, implicit hints, imaginary dialogues, images,
metaphors and epigrams.2
By the time he wrote, The Philosophical Investigations, he
rejected the three assumptions of his early period namely that
language is used for one purpose, the presenting of facts, that
sentence acquires meaning in one way that is through picturing
and that language essentially has a clear and firm structure of the
formulae in a logical calculus.
In the Tractatus, he has expressed the view that language is
as complex as a living organism. So in order to grasp the meaning
and essence of language one must make it clear and lucid. One
should make a distinction between surface grammar that is
grammar as it appears on the surface and ‘depth grammar’ that is
a thorough analysis of complete forms of language as are
discovered in factual language.3
In the later development of his thought, Wittgenstein seems
to repudiate the earlier notion of the uniformity of language
which would restrict the word to a rigid and demarcated use, a use
which would suit all cases. He came to think that language is
flexible, subtle and multiform. This paradigm for explaining the
multiformity of language is discussed in much detail in the Brown
Book by Wittgenstein in 1934-35. He makes use of words like
‘bricks’, ‘slabs’ which refer to objects and prima facie it looks
like logical atomism with its concept that the elements of
language reflect data in reality. It happens to be a language game
when a builder utters the word ‘slab’ and his assistant brings him
the object that is needed. A great deal of training is needed in
order to understand that on hearing a certain word one is to carry
out a certain task just as a child learns the use of words on the
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 49

basis of demonstrative teaching. A kind of rapport is established

between the builder and the assistant with, such phrases as ‘Five
bricks’, ‘that slab’, ‘First Slab’, ‘ten brick’ etc.4
A counter example can be given of shooting a movie where
the director gives command to his team in the following manner:
● Camera
● Lights
● Action
There is no static reflection of things in words, but a total
dynamic pattern of words and actions. ‘Brick’ is not a description,
but an order or an appeal. It is in this way that language game that
Wittgenstein put forward in his later work and that forms a
critique of the logical period.
Words are not names of isolated objects, separate
constituents, but part of human actions. Words are like levers that
can be used for different purposes one may be used as a crank, as
a switch or as a pump handle. If not put to a specific use, they are
rods of a similar kind. It is only in their use that they have
meaning as levers.5
The functioning of words is as varied as the functioning of
objects. If one takes the example of tools in a toolbox one finds a
hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue pot, glue,
nails and screws. There is no single use of these tools. It is not
even adequate to say that all tools are used to modify something.
Wittgenstein thus argues that there are different kinds of use of
what one calls symbols, words, and sentences. And this variety is
not something fixed.6
When one speaks of use one may think of rules which are
employed in language. One has learned what a piece of language
means by observing what other people do because one knows that
people who speak the language will use it in that way. For
example, if one teaches someone the meaning of a colour word by
showing him samples of the colour, he will understand and will
use in new situations as he has been taught.
50 R. ARA

Interestingly enough a bull may charge at a red flag and rats

may be trained to react in one way to red lights and in other way
to blue lights but neither the bull nor the rats know what red is. In
other words, neither of them has the concept of red or has the
concept of colour.7
It may be pointed out that there has to be an agreement in
one’s reactions and this makes communication possible. People
take note of the fact whether their reactions tally and this need
considerable comprehension. It is on account of one’s agreement
in our reactions that makes possible for one to teach anything and
for someone to understand anything. Thus, the consensus of
reactions is in this sense prior to language.8
A central theme of Wittgenstein’s Investigations rests on the
concept of meaning. Wittgenstein asserts that to use the same
word is not meant to have the same meaning. The meaning of a
Bishop in a game of chess is not attained by finding out the
material of which the piece is made. One must follow the moves
that can be made with the Bishop and the rules it is governed by
‘Bishop’ is not the name of a piece of ivory, but a function within
a context of rules.
A counter example can be given of a game like long tennis in
which the word ‘love’ has nothing to do with the emotion but is
used as zero.
There is still one more theme which may one mentioned in
this regard and which has been emphasized by writers such as
Miss Anscombe. Intention may be defined variously. It may
signify motive disposition, decision, prediction, desire, purpose
etc. The grammar suggests that intend functions as an auxiliary
than as a verb, something is needed to complete it. It is like a
variable which may be filled in by the object of intention.9
As far as Wittgenstein’s views are concerned he enquires if
intention were a feeling like a tickle, or a group of many feelings
that can be remembered or repeated to some one else. He rejects
the idea that intention is any sort of feeling.
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 51

Ewing is of the view that there is a hidden circularity as

regards the meaning of the term intention. For example, ‘X is
good’ implies that one ought to have a favourable attitude
towards it. But favourable includes the notion of good thus
yielding “X is good” means one ought to have a good attitude
towards it.
Ross is of the view that certain acts are self-evidently good
when one has attained a sufficient mental maturity. But maturity
contradicts the notion of self-evidence and includes the notion of
good.
Wittgenstein regards intention as a concern for something to
take place in future. But it may be pointed out that it is the total
past, present and future situations which are important in
determining intentions and thus intention become defeasible.10
Melden is of the view that intention includes the whole
history of an event. In intending one must take into account:
(a) circumstances,
(b) further avowals and disavowals made,
(c) further actions,
(d) feelings betrayed, and
(e) interests exhibited etc.
Thus, intention is not a single occurrence and so cannot be a
cause.11
An intention may be regarded as a pattern of behaviour.
Melden thinks that a pattern which arranges the chaos of events
provides one with a better understanding of an agent. Miss
Anscombe claims that to give a motive is to regard action as one
of the possible patterns of behaviour. Wittgenstein envisaged
intention — as a pattern of behaviour we construct and observe
and not an internal state which acts in a causal manner.
If intention is based on Wittgenstein’s notion that the
meaning of a word is its use in a language game, it may be said
that intention gains meaning both from the language and context
52 R. ARA

in which it is used. Stuart Hamshire, following Wittgenstein,

asserts that if at the age of ten one takes a lifetime vow in
religious faith it is bound to be unrealistic because it ignores
future particulars and actual situations.12
Reverting to our theme that the forms and uses of language
are flexible and numerous it may be added that words are used in
giving commands describing things, expressing wishes in play-
acting, translating, telling stories in inquiring, thanking, cursing,
greeting praying etc. Thus, there is no set of definite rules, no one
pattern to be laid, and no single explanation to be given.
It is misconceived that since they are all uses of language
there must be something in common. Wittgenstein in the Blue
Books speaks of our craving for generality which is generated
because of our tendency to look for something in common to all
the entities which we commonly assume under a general term. In
the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein suggested a
solution which is made explicit in his use of the example of
games. We are led to think that there is something in common to
all games and this common property is the justification for
applying the general term ‘game’ to many kind of games. There
is, a matter of fact, some likeness or similarity, some common
features which they all share.13
He talks about games like board games, card games, ball
games, Olympic games and so on. It will be superfluous to say
that there is something in common in them or they would not be
called games. There is nothing in common to them but
similarities and relationships by virtue of which they are all
termed games. If one looks carefully at board games or card
games one finds many correspondences but many points
eliminated and others added. There are games in which there is no
amusement but a lot of patience and concentration is needed.
There is not always winning or losing in a game when a child
throws his ball and catches it again. There is great deal of
ingenuity and luck in games like chess but there is a difference
between ingenuity in chess and that in tennis. Games like ring-a-
ring-a-roses and taking an instance from our Indian context of a
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 53

game like flying a kite where there is an element of amusement

but still a lot of concentration is required.
If one takes the example of books and tries to find out the
common features they share one will fail. A given set of books
may not be on the same subject or written by the same author or
published by the same firm and yet they are all called books. It is
not because what one is looking for lies deeply hidden, but
because it is too obvious to the seen.
Wittgenstein maintains that there is no better expression to
describe these characteristics than ‘family resemblances’. There
are various resemblances between the members of a family: build,
gait, features, colour of eyes, eyebrows, temperament etc and’
these points overlap and criss-cross in the same way as features of
games. This can be compared to the idea that properties are
ingredients of the things which have the properties for example
that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful objects as alcohol is of
beer or wine.14
The nominalist talks of resemblances until he acknowledges
that resemblance is unintelligible except as resemblance in a
respect and to specify the respect in which objects resemble one
another it to indicate a quality or property. The realist talks of
properties and qualities and points to the resemblances between
the objects that are characterized by such and such a property or
quality.
Wittgenstein is neither a realist nor a nominalist. He affirms
at one and the same time the realist claim that there is an
objective justification for the application of the word ‘game’ to
games and the nominalist claim that there is no element that is
common to all games. Further more the question if resemblances
or properties are ultimate is a perverse question if it is meant to
have a simple single answer.15
Thus, language is safeguarded from this ‘craving for
generality’ which occurs because of the misconception that there
is something common to all the entities which we associate with a
general term.
54 R. ARA

It is also misunderstood that language is something unique,

isolated and quite on its own. Making use of language is not
among the ordinary things we do like eating, drinking, playing,
walking etc. To think of language is to think of a form of life, so
the understanding of language must bring in to something non-
linguistic. One must take into account as to what people are, they
want, and do. For example, there is no such thing as giving and
obeying orders. The orders have to be about something, they have
meaning within a social context and this is a form of life.16
Form of life has been interpreted by J. F. M. Hunter in an
article entitled, “Forms of life” in Wittgensteins’ Philosophical
Investigations. Professor Hunter has explained it thus:
1. “A form of life is the same as a language game and
calling a language game a form of life is saying that it is
something formalized or standardized in our life, that is
one of life’s form.”
2. “A form of life is a sort of package of mutually related
tendencies to behave in various ways: to have certain
facial expressions and to make certain gestures, to do
certain things like count apples or help people and to say
certain things.”
3. “To say that something is a form of life is to say that it is
a way of life, or a mode manner, fashion or style of life,
that it has something important to do with the class
structure, the values, the religion, the type of industry
and commerce and of recreation that characterize a
group of people.”17
To put it differently it may be said that any action which is
established as belonging to a group and which has a common
meaning shared in by the members of that group is a form of life.
It covers all social or cultural behaviour in so far as it is
meaningful. This pattern of meaningful behaviour is distinguished
on the one hand from behaviour which does not carry such
meaning for example physical or biological happenings and on
the other hand from individual behaviour, which though
meaningful in some sense is not an established group meaning. It
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 55

may be added that what Wittgenstein call forms of life are what
social philosophers call social facts or “institutional facts”. But it
is important to remember that established patterns of action are
not static. Wittgenstein illustrates this with an example. If one
takes up the criminal code of a country one cannot make out from
the code in what manner the inhabitants of that country deal with
a thief, for it is not a book of social anthropology. The rules
proceed from the decision people make to implement the rules.18
As far as the Wittgenstein’s example of shopping for five red
apples goes, we have one meaningful activity or form of life
carried out by three language games — in this case counting,
identifying colours, and picking out objects. One can imagine the
three games functioning by other different forms of life for
example awarding five red apples, painting a picture of five red
apples and teaching arithmetic with the help of five red apples.
There is deeper sense of the form of life and this is expressed
in persuasion sympathy, hope, expectation expressions of
incitements etc. This touches on a further question to which
Wittgenstein alluded in the Tractatus, survival after death. What
Wittgenstein calls the mystical and the unsayable now pervades
speech so much so that speech becomes inter-woven with action
and attitude of life, and yet able to give expression to the question
of the soul.
In other words, one believes in after life and hope for reward
if one adheres to a particular form of life and refuses to accept it
if one adheres to another form of life. It may be added that there
are five references to forms of life in the Philosophical
Investigations and these are interwoven with language. It is so
because speaking language is a part of a form of life.19
Wittgenstein’s remarks on “Games and Definitions” could be
applied to aesthetics. Morris Weitz in his article “The Role of
Theory in Aesthetics” propounds the view that Wittgenstein was
extra ordinarily gifted with artistic ability. He could design a
house, mould a statue, conduct an orchestra or write an imaginary
dialogue.
56 R. ARA

The function of words are diverse, so much so that even a

single word like beauty has a multiplicity of uses and this
multiplicity is not predetermined or fixed. We should therefore
admire the “open texture” of language affirming that a word has
an indefinite variety of meanings and that new and unprecedented
meanings will take birth as the contexts of life alter.
As mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein gives the example of
game. If one asks what a game is, one picks out sample games
and describes them. However, knowing what a game is not
providing some definition or theory but being able to recognize
and explain games and to decide which among imaginary and
new examples would or would not be called ‘games’.
The nature of art is like that of the nature of games. If we
look carefully and see what it is that we called ‘art’ we will find
no common properties but discern strands of similarities.
Knowing what art is not discovering some manifest or latent
essence but being able to recognize, describe and explain those
things we call art by virtue of these similarities.
The basic resemblance between these concepts is their open
texture. In elucidating them certain (paradigm) cases can be given
to which we conveniently apply the word ‘art’ or game but no
exhaustive set of cases can be given. It is so because one can
always envisage new cases which can be added to it.
A concept is open if its conditions of application are
emendable that is if a situation or case can be imagined or secured
which would expand the use of the concept to cover this or to
close the concept and invent a new case to deal with the new case.
If necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a
concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one. It happens in
logic and mathematics where concepts are clearly defined.
‘Art’ is one open concept. New conditions give rise to new
art forms which will demand decisions on the part of professional
critics whether the concept should be expanded or not.
Aestheticians present similar conditions but never sufficient ones
for the correct application of the concept. With ‘art’ its conditions
of application can never be exhausted or enumerated since new
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 57

cases can always be created by artists or even nature. This is true

of every sub-concept of art: tragedy, comedy, painting, opera etc.
What Morris Weitz is arguing is that the very fine and subtle
character of art, its changes and novel creations make it
impossible to ensure any set of defining properties. To choose to
close the concept is to infringe the possibility of creativity in the
arts.20
It may be said that Wittgenstein in his rejection of
philosophical theorizing in the sense of constructing definitions of
philosophical entities has provided contemporary aesthetics with
a starting point for future progress.
After an exposition and analysis of Wittgenstein’s
Philosophy one finds oneself, hesitatingly though, to quote
Goethe’s remark that if all the ideas he had got from other people
were taken away from his writings there would be nothing left. It
is indeed true that if all that Wittgenstein had to offer were
attributed to their source he would be an unoriginal philosopher
exceptionally gifted but in no way creative. However, this is not
quite the case, he did have the fecundity of mind to enrich the
ideas of other people.21
In all intellectual honesty, Wittgenstein acknowledged in a
note now published in the volume entitled Culture and Value
(pp. 18-19), “I think there is some truth in my idea that I really
think reproductively. I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of
thinking, I have always taken over from some one else. I have
simply straight away seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of
clarification. This is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer,
Frege, Russell, Kraus Loos, Weininger and Splenger Sraffa have
influenced me.”22
The influence of Schopenhauer on the later philosophy of
Wittgenstein is evident from the fact that he borrowed the
doctrines about language from Schopenhauer. Wittgenstein
explains meaning in terms of human actions, intentions and
purposes and through them in terms of patterns of interest and
behaviour and finally in terms of ways of life.
58 R. ARA

Engel affirms that the influence is sometimes specific and

determinate as the direct borrowing of a key term family
resemblance which plays a vital role in Wittgenstein’s philosophy
and which Schopenhauer uses a number of times in his
philosophy. Engel further adds ‘forms of life’ which
Schopenhauer has taken from Kant and which Goethe had also
used when talking about Kant’s philosophy. As for the key term
paradigm’ used by Wittgenstein it is Schopenhauer’s much loved
and much quoted term.23
If it is pre-supposed that Wittgenstein out of vanity didn’t
give any sources to his work, it is only half-truth. He delved deep
into the thought of others so much so that it became the fibre of
his being. What he gathered from the thought of others was so
firmly assimilated into his own philosophy that it became
genuinely his own. This is combined with his own aphoristic and
condensed style of prose composition which made his ideas
highly original.
Wittgenstein style of writing is very enigmatic and it is
typical of him that he never says that this is what he is doing. He
just does it he pre-supposes, comments on, or argues with, revises
or rejects utterances of Schopenhauer but does not mention it.
In the light of all this it is no wonder that the philosophy of
Wittgenstein was to a large extent an attempt to revise and correct
Schopenhauer.
It may be added that Wittgenstein went out of his way to
draw his reader’s attention to his own forerunners, his way of
opening a dialogue on any important subject is to trace the
development of the concept by his predecessors in the history of
thought with ample quotation and full attribution. This approach
in no way undermines our appreciation of his work or lowers our
sense of distinctiveness of his philosophical personality.24
However, it may be pointed out that despite the electric
character of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the technique of linguistic
analysis engineered by him changed the very character and
conception of philosophy. Later Wittgenstein, denies that
philosophy and especially metaphysical philosophy does or can
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 59

study the nature of ultimate reality. Philosophy also does not

study those problems which are as yet unamenable to scientific
treatment. It also is not simply the most general of the sciences.
The prescriptive or ethical role classically assigned to philosophy
is also basically questionable. It is not the job of philosophy to
discover how we ought to live. Wittgenstein has also stubbornly
opposed to any assimilation of philosophy to science.
The basic thesis of later Wittgenstein is that philosophical
problems arise out of the confusion of grammar and logic of
various types of statements. For example, the grammar of
material-object words and names of abstract entities is very
similar. The subject/predicate sentences have the same form but
they are used in countless different ways. Declarative sentences
share the same mood, but we must not let this blind us to the
differences between various kinds of such sentences and their
roles in language. They can be logically diametrically opposite to
one another. When we confuse a statement like “The flower is
yellow”, with a statement like “The Reality is spiritual”,
metaphysical problems and paradoxes are generated. The
“yellow” does not qualify the flower the way “spiritual” qualifies
the Reality. The first predicate is descriptive while the second
predicate is interpretative. Furthermore, we do not know exactly
as to what “Reality” and “spiritual” are. However, by ascribing
spirituality to Reality, we shall be ending up with idealism-
materialism debate, thus generating a first-rate philosophical
paradox.
Similarly, the language embeds countless pictures, which can
lead to deep philosophical puzzlement. For example, the mind-
body problem may be generated by the “inner/outer” picture
embedded in the language. We may picture “time”, as a flowing
river or blowing wind and then ask as to whether time is pure
duration or a series of successive points. The simple grammatical
pronoun “I” may be projected on reality to yield the doctrine of
the soul.
If we assimilate philosophy to science, great philosophical
difficulties can be cultivated. According to Wittgenstein, the
archetype of explanation and intellectual progress that has been
60 R. ARA

provided in the last five centuries by science can play havoc when
applied to philosophy. For it inclines us to search for explanations
instead of describing grammatical conventions, to construct ideal
languages instead of describing our own, to conceive of
metaphysics as a super physics instead of searching for the roots
of metaphysical paradoxes in linguistic confusion.
It is the contention of later Wittgenstein that grand philoso-
phical systems can finally be traced to linguistic confusion.
Idealism and materialism, theism and pantheism, monism and
pluralism, etc., can be shown to be controversies generated by
linguistic confusion. We can also trace them to pictures
embedded in our language.
The traditional conception of philosophy viewed the subject
as the mother of all sciences or the most fundamental and
profound inquiry into the nature of reality etc. However, the later
Wittgenstein maintains that philosophy is a product of linguistic
confusion. It is to these confusions that endless and baffling
questions of philosophy can be traced to. The illusions of
philosophy are rooted in deep features of our language. These
deep and complex features of language determine our thought and
orientate our approach of looking at them.
Later Wittgenstein recommends a thorough analysis of
language to determine the sources of our philosophical troubles.
Wittgenstein deems different methods as different therapies with
a view to liberating the philosopher from deep and pervasive
puzzlement. According to Later Wittgenstein, the philosophical
problems do not have a solution like mathematical questions or
scientific queries. Assimilating philosophical problems to either
mathematical propositions or scientific theories smacks of highest
methodological confusion. We have to understand the genesis of
philosophical problems in the all-pervading linguistic confusion,
when we understand that philosophical problems are not real
problems but products of linguistic confusion. When we
understand the origin and development of philosophical
problems, our itch for asking philosophical questions dies down.
Philosophy is a battle of human intelligence against the
bewitchment of language. Philosophy traps us into muddles felt
 Wittgenstein’s Concept of Language Games 61

as problems. The job of linguistic analysis is to liberate the

philosopher from the traps language designs for us.
The early Wittgenstein also advocated the therapeutic
conception of philosophy. The atomistic analysis of early
Wittgenstein was also addressed to showing that philosophical
problems were nonsensical and hence did not really exist. The
later Wittgenstein also thought that the job of analysis was thera-
peutic. However, his view of how it ought to be accomplished
changed radically.
The early and later Wittgenstein in between them signify a
great disjunction or rupture — the early Wittgenstein being
essentially a modern philosopher in the Cartesian–Lockean–
Kantian tradition, advocating or espousing a realist, objectivist,
representationalist account of the world and therefore operating
within the world-view and value-system of Modern Europe, and
later Wittgenstein being one of the first categorical initiators of
Euro-American Postmodern turnaround. In the Tractatus, he is a
modernist at its methodological best, his logical atomist analysis
representing the pinnacle of realist-objectivist predilections or
orientations of Modern Europe and in the Investigations he
negotiates the twists and turns of anti-realist and anti-objectivist
account of language, of truth and of meaning.

REFERENCES
1 C. A. Van Peursen, Ludwig Wittgenstein (London: Faber and Faber),
p. 75.
2 Ibid, p. 75.
3 Ibid. p. 79.
4 Ibid. pp. 82-86.
5 Ibid. p. 100.
6 Ibid. p. 109.
7 Rush Rhees, Discussion of Wittgenstein (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1970), pp. 55-56.
8 Ibid, p. 57.
62 R. ARA

9 Warren A. Shibles, Wittgenstein Language and Philosophy (The

Language Press, Whitewater Wisconsin, 1996), p. 63.
10 Ibid, pp. 64-66.
11 Ibid, p. 71.
12 Ibid, pp. 74-75.
13 Modern Studies in Philosophy: Wittgenstein. The Philosophical
Investigations (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan and Company
Limited, 1970), pp. 188-89.
14 Ibid, p. 193.
15 Ibid, p. 198.
16 G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1990 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), pp. 72-73.
17 Henry Le Roy Finch, Wittgenstein: The Later Philosophy (Humanities
Press, 1977), pp. 89-90.
18 Ibid, p. 92.
19 Ibid, p. 94.
20 Rader, M. (ed.), A Modern Book of Aesthetics (3rd edition) (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 199-208.
21 Byran Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford University
Press, Walton Street, 1983), p. 297.
22 Ibid, p. 290.
23 Ibid, p. 302.
24 Ibid, pp. 309-310.