CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION v COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C.

PALAD

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152894 August 17, 2007

CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 12 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.

The Facts

On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad

(Palad) as "fish cleaner" at petitioner’s tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on
17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement3 with petitioner. Palad received an
apprentice allowance of ₱138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its
apprenticeship program for approval to the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship
program.4

According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15

November 1997, where petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or "needs
improvement" since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance
indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred
numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a
termination notice5 dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her
termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.

Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and
non-payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.

On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit
but ordered petitioner to pay Palad her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month
pay. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that

the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by the complainant against the
respondents in the above-entitled case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. However, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the
complainant the amount of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
PESOS (₱1,632.00), representing her last salary and the amount of SEVEN
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (₱7,228.00) PESOS
representing her prorated 13th month pay.

All other issues are likewise dismissed.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with

modification the Labor Arbiter’s decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25

February 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered
to pay complainant’s backwages for two (2) months in the amount of ₱7,176.00
(₱138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the
dispositive portion of his decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.7

Upon denial of Palad’s motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is

hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered, to wit:

(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;

(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in

wages;

(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position

without loss of seniority rights and to pay her full backwages computed from
the time compensation was withheld from her up to the time of her
reinstatement;

(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorney’s fees equivalent

to ten (10%) per cent of the monetary award herein; and

(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed
was not valid and binding because it was executed more than two months before
the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program. The Court of Appeals
cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,9 where it was
held that prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a
condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into.

The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court
of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of
the required standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that
Palad was not afforded due process because petitioner did not comply with the
twin requirements of notice and hearing.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN
APPRENTICE; and

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY
PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE
SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.10

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program

Required Before Hiring of Apprentices

The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written

apprenticeship agreement with an employer.11 One of the objectives of Title II
(Training and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is to establish
apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.12 In line with this
objective, Articles 60 and 61 of the Labor Code provide:

ART. 60. Employment of apprentices. — Only employers in the highly

technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable
occupations approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. (Emphasis
supplied)

ART. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. — Apprenticeship agreements,

including the wage rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the
Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed
six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the
legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the
applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with
apprenticeship programs duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of
apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied)

In Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,13 the Court cited

Article 61 of the Labor Code and held that an apprenticeship program should first
be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the
person hired will be considered a regular employee. The Court held:

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and

private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter
as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an
apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the
Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship agreement
was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced the day it was signed.

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements
of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the
employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment.

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed

apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine qua non before an
apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of
Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does
not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and
government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into
existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be
secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement
can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private

respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship
program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s assertion that he was
hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante")
deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of
petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code x x x. (Emphasis supplied)14

Republic Act No. 779615 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred
the authority over apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment
of the DOLE to the TESDA.16 RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of the
apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such
intent is clear under Section 4 of RA 7796:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

xxx

j) "Apprenticeship" training within employment with compulsory related

theoretical instructions involving a contract between an apprentice and an
employer on an approved apprenticeable occupation;

k) "Apprentice" is a person undergoing training for an approved

apprenticeable occupation during an established period assured by an
apprenticeship agreement;

l) "Apprentice Agreement" is a contract wherein a prospective employer

binds himself to train the apprentice who in turn accepts the terms of
training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the
rights, duties and responsibilities of each party;

m) "Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a

tripartite body and approved for apprenticeship by the Authority
[TESDA]; (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties
before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval.
Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997
wherein it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end
approximately in December 1997.17 On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for
approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on
26 September 1997.18 Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even
before the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program. Thus, the
apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked prior approval from the
TESDA.

The TESDA’s approval of the employer’s apprenticeship program is required

before the employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the
TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technical
industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations.19
Thus, under RA 7796, employers can only hire apprentices for apprenticeable
occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved
for apprenticeship by the TESDA.1avvphil This is to ensure the protection of
apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective employers who may
want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and circumvent
the right of the employees to be secure in their employment.

The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of
apprentices was further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of
Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department Order No. 68-04,
which provides the guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and
Employment Program of the government, specifically states that no enterprise
shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its apprenticeship program is
registered and approved by TESDA.20

Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship

agreement was enforced before the TESDA’s approval of petitioner’s
apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job
of a "fish cleaner." Clearly, the job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioner’s
business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 28021 of the Labor Code,
an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer.

Illegal Termination of Palad

We shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.

Under Article 27922 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of
an employee for just causes23 or for authorized causes.24 Furthermore, under
Article 277(b)25 of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is
about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and
must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus,
to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the
dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.26

In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual
absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book
II of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor
efficiency of performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may
terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the probationary period.

However, the NLRC reversed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on the issue of the
legality of Palad’s termination:

As to the validity of complainant’s dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice

to state that the findings of the Arbiter that complainant was dismissed due to
failure to meet the standards is nebulous. What clearly appears is that
complainant already passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship
agreement of 200 hours at the time she was terminated on 28 November 1997
which was already the fourth month of the apprenticeship period of 1000 hours.
As such, under the Code, she can only be dismissed for cause, in this case, for
poor efficiency of performance on the job or in the classroom for a prolonged
period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice.

We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her

dismissal as an apprentice during the agreed period. Besides the absence
of any written warnings given to complainant reminding her of "poor
performance," respondents’ evidence in this respect consisted of an
indecipherable or unauthenticated xerox of the performance evaluation
allegedly conducted on complainant. This is of doubtful authenticity and/or
credibility, being not only incomplete in the sense that appearing thereon is
a signature (not that of complainant) side by side with a date indicated as
"1/16/98". From the looks of it, this signature is close to and appertains to
the typewritten position of "Division/Department Head", which is below the
signature of complainant’s immediate superior who made the evaluation
indicated as "11-15-97."

The only conclusion We can infer is that this evaluation was made belatedly,
specifically, after the filing of the case and during the progress thereof in
the Arbitral level, as shown that nothing thereon indicate that complainant
was notified of the results. Its authenticity therefor, is a big question mark,
and hence lacks any credibility. Evidence, to be admissible in administrative
proceedings, must at least have a modicum of authenticity. This, respondents
failed to comply with. As such, complainant is entitled to the payment of her
wages for the remaining two (2) months of her apprenticeship agreement.27
(Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiter’s conclusion that petitioner validly
terminated Palad was based mainly on the performance evaluation allegedly
conducted by petitioner. However, Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of
the performance evaluation conducted and that she was not even informed of the
result of the alleged performance evaluation. Palad also claims she did not
receive a notice of dismissal, nor was she given the chance to explain. According
to petitioner, Palad did not receive the termination notice because Palad allegedly
stopped reporting for work after being informed of the result of the evaluation.

Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that
the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.28 Petitioner failed to
substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the
NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance
evaluation which petitioner claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad
received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the
performance evaluation to prove Palad’s inefficiency. It was likewise not shown
that petitioner ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the
company. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not
clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal.29
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct
a performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged
poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance
evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that
Palad did not receive the notice of termination30 because Palad allegedly stopped
reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever
gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two
requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this case.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the

Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate
Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
3
CA rollo, pp. 57-58.
4
Id. at 63.
5
Id. at 59.
6
Id. at 32-33.
7
Id. at 42.
8
Rollo, p. 29.
9
G.R. No. 114337, 29 September 1995, 248 SCRA 654.
10
Rollo, p. 70.
11
Article 58(b) of the Labor Code.
12
Article 57(3) of the Labor Code.
13
Supra note 9.
14
Id. at 660-661.
15
Otherwise known as the TESDA Act of 1994.
16
Sections 5 and 18 of RA 7796 provide:

SEC. 5. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority,

Creation. — To implement the policy declared in this Act, there is
hereby created a Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA), hereinafter referred to as the Authority, which
shall replace and absorb the National Manpower and Youth Council
(NMYC), the Bureau of Technical and Vocational Education (BTVE)
and the personnel and functions pertaining to technical-vocational
education in the regional offices of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and the apprenticeship program of the
Bureau of Local Employment of the Department of Labor and
Employment. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 18. Transfer of the Apprenticeship Program. —The

Apprenticeship Program of the Bureau of Local Employment of
the Department of Labor and Employment shall be transferred to
the Authority [TESDA] which shall implement and administer said
program in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied)
17
CA rollo, p. 57.
18
Id. at 63.
19
See Article 60 of the Labor Code.
20
DOLE Department Order No. 68-04: Guidelines in the Implementation
of the Kasanayan at Hanapbuhay Program (An Apprenticeship and
Employment Program) pertinently provides:

B. Definition of Terms

1. Apprenticeship – training within employment involving a contract

between an apprentice and an enterprise on an apprenticeable
occupation.

2. Apprentice – a person undergoing training for an approved

apprenticeable occupation during an established period and
covered by an apprenticeship agreement.

3. Apprenticeship Agreement – a contract wherein a prospective

enterprise binds himself to train the apprentice who, in turn, accepts
the terms of training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation
emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each party.
 4. Apprenticeable Occupation – an occupation officially approved
for apprenticeship by TESDA.

xxxx

G. Registration of Apprenticeship Program

The enterprise shall register its apprenticeship program with any of the
TESDA Provincial Offices. It shall submit the following:

1. Letter of Application;

2. Certification that the number of apprentices to be hired is not more

than 20 percent of the total regular workforce; and

3. Skills Training Outline.

No enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its

apprenticeship program is registered and approved by TESDA.

H. Apprenticeship Agreement

No apprenticeship training will commence until an Apprenticeship

Agreement has been forged between an enterprise and an apprentice.
(Emphasis supplied)
21
Article 280 of the Labor Code reads:

ART. 280. Regular and casual employment. — The provisions of

written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer except where the employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by

the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
22
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
23
ART. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the

lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the

person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

24
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title x x x.
25
ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. — x x x

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure

and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written
notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so
desires in accordance with company rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor
and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of
his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that
 the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on
the employer. (Emphasis supplied)
26
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, G.R. No. 166363, 15 August
2006, 498 SCRA 639.
27
CA rollo, pp. 41-42.
28
Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr., G.R. No. 167462, 25 October 2005,
474 SCRA 323; Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153180, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA
353.
29
Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010, 21 June 2005,
460 SCRA 514.
30
The termination notice reads:

DATE: NOV. 22, 1997

GLORIA C. PALAD
105 LOT 1 BLK. 6, PRK. 7
B. TANYAG, TAGUIG, METRO MANILA

Dear Ms. PALAD,

After a thorough evaluation of your work, attitude and performance, the

management found out that you have been performing below the standard
established by the company. As such, we regret to inform you that your
employment shall be terminated effective at the close of business hours of
NOV. 28, 1997.

Please proceed to the HRD office for your clearance.

NINA B. LLAGAS
Recruitment/Benefits Supervisor

Noted by:

BERNARDO O. JUNIO JR.

Human Resources Development Manager

Atlanta Industries Inc. v Sebolino, et.al.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187320 January 26, 2011

ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. and/or ROBERT CHAN, Petitioners,

vs.
APRILITO R. SEBOLINO, KHIM V. COSTALES, ALVIN V. ALMOITE, and
JOSEPH S. SAGUN, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For resolution is the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 and
the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered on November 4, 2008 and
March 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 99340.4

The Antecedents

The facts are summarized below.

In the months of February and March 2005, complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino,

Khim V. Costales, Alvin V. Almoite, Joseph S. Sagun, Agosto D. Zaño, Domingo
S. Alegria, Jr., Ronie Ramos, Edgar Villagomez, Melvin Pedregoza, Teofanes B.
Chiong, Jr., Leonardo L. dela Cruz, Arnold A. Magalang, and Saturnino M.
Mabanag filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization,
underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners
Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief Operating Officer
Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
steel pipes.

The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig,
but were later transferred to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.

The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were
allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a
purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They
claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement
expired.

In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to
regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as
apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company
offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular
positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also
claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List)5
prior to their engagement as apprentices.

On May 24, 2005, dela Cruz, Magalang, Zaño and Chiong executed a Pagtalikod
at Pagwawalang Saysay before Labor Arbiter Cajilig.
 The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

On April 24, 2006, Labor Arbiter Medroso dismissed the complaint with respect to
dela Cruz, Magalang, Zaño and Chiong, but found the termination of service of
the remaining nine to be illegal.6 Consequently, the arbiter awarded the dismissed
workers backwages, wage differentials, holiday pay and service incentive leave
pay amounting to ₱1,389,044.57 in the aggregate.

Atlanta appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In the

meantime, or on October 10, 2006, Ramos, Alegria, Villagomez, Costales and
Almoite allegedly entered into a compromise agreement with Atlanta.7 The
agreement provided that except for Ramos, Atlanta agreed to pay the workers a
specified amount as settlement, and to acknowledge them at the same time as
regular employees.

On December 29, 2006,8 the NLRC rendered a decision, on appeal, modifying the
ruling of the labor arbiter, as follows: (1) withdrawing the illegal dismissal finding
with respect to Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Pedregoza; (2) affirming the
dismissal of the complaints of dela Cruz, Zaño, Magalang and Chiong; (3)
approving the compromise agreement entered into by Costales, Ramos,
Villagomez, Almoite and Alegria, and (4) denying all other claims.

Sebolino, Costales, Almoite and Sagun moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, but the NLRC denied the motion in its March 30, 20079 resolution. The
four then sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. They charged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in: (1) failing to recognize their prior employment with Atlanta; (2)
declaring the second apprenticeship agreement valid; (3) holding that the
dismissal of Sagun, Mabanag, Sebolino and Melvin Pedregoza is legal; and (4)
upholding the compromise agreement involving Costales, Ramos, Villagomez,
Almoite and Alegria.

The CA Decision

The CA granted the petition based on the following findings:10

1. The respondents were already employees of the company before they

entered into the first and second apprenticeship agreements – Almoite and
Costales were employed as early as December 2003 and, subsequently,
entered into a first apprenticeship agreement from May 13, 2004 to October
12, 2004; before this first agreement expired, a second apprenticeship
agreement, from October 9, 2004 to March 8, 2005 was executed. The
same is true with Sebolino and Sagun, who were employed by Atlanta as
early as March 3, 2004. Sebolino entered into his first apprenticeship
agreement with the company from March 20, 2004 to August 19, 2004, and
his second apprenticeship agreement from August 20, 2004 to January 19,
2005. Sagun, on the other hand, entered into his first agreement from May
 28, 2004 to October 8, 2004, and the second agreement from October 9,
2004 to March 8, 2005.

2. The first and second apprenticeship agreements were defective as they

were executed in violation of the law and the rules.11 The agreements did
not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be
trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).

3. The positions occupied by the respondents – machine operator, extruder

operator and scaleman – are usually necessary and desirable in the
manufacture of plastic building materials, the company’s main business.
Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were, therefore, regular employees
whose dismissals were illegal for lack of a just or authorized cause and
notice.

4. The compromise agreement entered into by Costales and Almoite,

together with Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, was not binding on Costales
and Almoite because they did not sign the agreement.

The petitioners themselves admitted that Costales and Almoite were initially
planned to be a part of the compromise agreement, but their employment has
been regularized as early as January 11, 2006; hence, the company did not
pursue their inclusion in the compromise agreement.12

The CA faulted the NLRC for failing to appreciate the evidence regarding the
respondents’ prior employment with Atlanta. The NLRC recognized the prior
employment of Costales and Almoite on Atlanta’s monthly report for December
2003 for the CPS Department/Section dated January 6, 2004.13 This record
shows that Costales and Almoite were assigned to the company’s first shift from
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The NLRC ignored Sebolino and Sagun’s prior
employment under the company’s Production and Work Schedule for March 7 to
12, 2005 dated March 3, 2004,14 as they had been Atlanta’s employees as early
as March 3, 2004, with Sebolino scheduled to work on March 7-12, 2005 at 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m., while Sagun was scheduled to work for the same period but
from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. The CA noted that Atlanta failed to challenge the
authenticity of the two documents before it and the labor authorities.

Atlanta and Chan moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in a
resolution rendered on March 25, 2009.15 Hence, the present petition.

The Petition

Atlanta seeks a reversal of the CA decision, contending that the appellate court
erred in (1) concluding that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were
employed by Atlanta before they were engaged as apprentices; (2) ruling that a
second apprenticeship agreement is invalid; (3) declaring that the respondents
 were illegally dismissed; and (4) disregarding the compromise agreement
executed by Costales and Almoite. It submits the following arguments:

First. The CA’s conclusion that the respondent workers were company employees
before they were engaged as apprentices was primarily based on the Monthly
Report16 and the Production and Work Schedule for March 7-12, 2005,17 in total
disregard of the Master List18 prepared by the company accountant, Emelita M.
Bernardo. The names of Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun do not appear as
employees in the Master List which "contained the names of all the persons who
were employed by and at petitioner."19

Atlanta faults the CA for relying on the Production and Work Schedule and the
Monthly Report which were not sworn to, and in disregarding the Master List
whose veracity was sworn to by Bernardo and by Alex Go who headed the
company’s accounting division. It maintains that the CA should have given more
credence to the Master List.

Second. In declaring invalid the apprenticeship agreements it entered into with the
respondent workers, the CA failed to recognize the rationale behind the law on
apprenticeship. It submits that under the law,20 apprenticeship agreements are
valid, provided they do not exceed six (6) months and the apprentices are paid
the appropriate wages of at least 75% of the applicable minimum wage.

The respondents initially executed a five-month apprenticeship program with

Atlanta, at the end of which, they "voluntarily and willingly entered into another
apprenticeship agreement with the petitioner for the training of a second skill" 21 for
five months; thus, the petitioners committed no violation of the apprenticeship
period laid down by the law.

Further, the apprenticeship agreements, entered into by the parties, complied with
the requisites under Article 62 of the Labor Code; the company’s authorized
representative and the respondents signed the agreements and these were
ratified by the company’s apprenticeship committee. The apprenticeship program
itself was approved and certified by the TESDA.22 The CA, thus, erred in
overturning the NLRC’s finding that the apprenticeship agreements were valid.

Third. There was no illegal dismissal as the respondent workers’ tenure ended
with the expiration of the apprenticeship agreement they entered into. There was,
therefore, no regular employer-employee relationship between Atlanta and the
respondent workers.

The Case for Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun

In a Comment filed on August 6, 2009,23 Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun

pray for a denial of the petition for being procedurally defective and for lack of
merit.
The respondent workers contend that the petition failed to comply with Section 4,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which requires that the petition be accompanied by
supporting material portions of the records. The petitioners failed to attach to the
petition a copy of the Production and Work Schedule despite their submission that
the CA relied heavily on the document in finding the respondent workers’ prior
employment with Atlanta. They also did not attach a copy of the compromise
agreement purportedly executed by Costales and Almoite. For this reason, the
respondent workers submit that the petition should be dismissed.

The respondents posit that the CA committed no error in holding that they were
already Atlanta’s employees before they were engaged as apprentices, as
confirmed by the company’s Production and Work Schedule.24 They maintain that
the Production and Work Schedule meets the requirement of substantial evidence
as the petitioners failed to question its authenticity. They point out that the
schedule was prepared by Rose A. Quirit and approved by Adolfo R. Lope, head
of the company’s PE/Spiral Section. They argue that it was highly unlikely that the
head of a production section of the company would prepare and assign work to
the complainants if the latter had not been company employees.

The respondent workers reiterate their mistrust of the Master List25 as evidence
that they were not employees of the company at the time they became
apprentices. They label the Master List as "self-serving, dubious and even if
considered as authentic, its content contradicts a lot of petitioner’s claim and
allegations,"26 thus -

1. Aside from the fact that the Master List is not legible, it contains only the
names of inactive employees. Even those found by the NLRC to have been
employed in the company (such as Almoite, Costales and Sagun) do not
appear in the list. If Costales and Almoite had been employed with Atlanta
since January 11, 2006, as the company claimed,27 their names would have
been in the list, considering that the Master List accounts for all employees
"as of May 2006" – the notation carried on top of each page of the
document.

2. There were no entries of employees hired or resigned in the years 2005

and 2006 despite the "as of May 2006" notation; several pages making up
the Master List contain names of employees for the years 1999 - 2004.

3. The fact that Atlanta presented the purported Master List instead of the
payroll raised serious doubts on the authenticity of the list.

In sum, the respondent workers posit that the presentation of the Master List
revealed the "intention of the herein petitioner[s] to perpetually hide the fact of
[their] prior employment."28

On the supposed apprenticeship agreements they entered into, Costales, Almoite,

Sebolino and Sagun refuse to accept the agreements’ validity, contending that the
company’s apprenticeship program is merely a ploy "to continually deprive [them]
of their rightful wages and benefits which are due them as regular employees." 29
They submit the following "indubitable facts and ratiocinations:"30

1. The apprenticeship agreements were submitted to TESDA only in 2005

(with dates of receipt on "1/4/05" & "2/22/05"31 ), when the agreements were
supposed to have been executed in April or May 2004. Thus, the
submission was made long after the starting date of the workers’
apprenticeship or even beyond the agreement’s completion/termination
date, in violation of Section 23, Rule VI, Book II of the Labor Code.

2. The respondent workers were made to undergo apprenticeship for

occupations different from those allegedly approved by TESDA. TESDA
approved Atlanta’s apprenticeship program on "Plastic Molder"32 and not for
extrusion molding process, engineering, pelletizing process and mixing
process.

3. The respondents were already skilled workers prior to the apprenticeship

program as they had been employed and made to work in the different job
positions where they had undergone training. Sagun and Sebolino, together
with Mabanag, Pedregoza, dela Cruz, Chiong, Magalang and Alegria were
even given production assignments and work schedule at the PE/Spiral
Section from May 11, 2004 to March 23, 2005, and some of them were even
assigned to the 3:00 p.m. – 11:00 p.m. and graveyard shifts (11:00 p.m. –
7:00 a.m.) during the period.33

4. The respondent workers were required to continue as apprentices

beyond six months. The TESDA certificate of completion indicates that the
workers’ apprenticeship had been completed after six months. Yet, they
were suffered to work as apprentices beyond that period.

Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun resolutely maintain that they were illegally
dismissed, as the reason for the termination of their employment – notice of the
completion of the second apprenticeship agreement – did not constitute either a
just or authorized cause under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code.

Finally, Costales and Almoite refuse to be bound by the compromise agreement34

that Atlanta presented to defeat the two workers’ cause of action. They claim that
the supposed agreement is invalid as against them, principally because they did
not sign it.

The Court’s Ruling

The procedural issue

The respondent workers ask that the petition be dismissed outright for the
petitioners’ failure to attach to the petition a copy of the Production and Work
Schedule and a copy of the compromise agreement Costales and Almoite
allegedly entered into — material portions of the record that should accompany
and support the petition, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In Mariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. v. Arturo J. Garchitorena35

where the Court addressed essentially the same issue arising from Section 2(d),
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,36 we held that the phrase "of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record xxx as would support the allegation of the
petition clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner
in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. The
crucial issue to consider then is whether or not the documents accompanying the
petition sufficiently supported the allegations therein."37

As in Mariners, we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently

support the petitioners’ allegations. The accompanying CA decision38 and
resolution,39 as well as those of the labor arbiter40 and the NLRC,41 referred to the
parties’ position papers and even to their replies and rejoinders. Significantly, the
CA decision narrates the factual antecedents, defines the complainants’ cause of
action, and cites the arguments, including the evidence the parties adduced. If
any, the defect in the petition lies in the petitioners’ failure to provide legible
copies of some of the material documents mentioned, especially several pages in
the decisions of the labor arbiter and of the NLRC. This defect, however, is not
fatal as the challenged CA decision clearly summarized the labor tribunal’s
rulings. We, thus, find no procedural obstacle in resolving the petition on the
merits.

The merits of the case

We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error in nullifying

the NLRC decision42 and in affirming the labor arbiter’s ruling,43 as it applies to
Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun. Specifically, the CA correctly ruled that
the four were illegally dismissed because (1) they were already employees when
they were required to undergo apprenticeship and (2) apprenticeship agreements
were invalid.

The following considerations support the CA ruling.

First. Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales,
Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company as
employees before they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The company itself
recognized the respondents’ status through relevant operational records – in the
case of Costales and Almoite, the CPS monthly report for December 200344 which
the NLRC relied upon and, for Sebolino and Sagun, the production and work
schedule for March 7 to 12, 200545 cited by the CA.

Under the CPS monthly report, Atlanta assigned Costales and Almoite to the first
shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) of the Section’s work. The Production and Work
Schedules, in addition to the one noted by the CA, showed that Sebolino and
Sagun were scheduled on different shifts vis-à-vis the production and work of the
company’s PE/Spiral Section for the periods July 5-10, 2004;46 October 25-31,
2004;47 November 8-14, 2004;48 November 16-22, 2004;49 January 3-9, 2005;50
January 10-15, 2005;51 March 7-12, 200552 and March 17-23, 2005.53

We stress that the CA correctly recognized the authenticity of the operational

documents, for the failure of Atlanta to raise a challenge against these documents
before the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA itself. The appellate court, thus,
found the said documents sufficient to establish the employment of the
respondents before their engagement as apprentices.

Second. The Master List54 (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as
proof of their position that the respondents were not Atlanta’s employees, at the
time they were engaged as apprentices, is unreliable and does not inspire belief.

The list, consisting of several pages, is hardly legible. It requires extreme effort to
sort out the names of the employees listed, as well as the other data contained in
the list. For this reason alone, the list deserves little or no consideration. As the
respondents also pointed out, the list itself contradicts a lot of Atlanta’s claims and
allegations, thus: it lists only the names of inactive employees; even the names of
those the NLRC found to have been employed by Atlanta, like Costales and
Almoite, and those who even Atlanta claims attained regular status on January
11, 2006,55 do not appear in the list when it was supposed to account for all
employees "as of May 6, 2006." Despite the "May 6, 2006" cut off date, the list
contains no entries of employees who were hired or who resigned in 2005 and
2006. We note that the list contains the names of employees from 1999 to 2004.

We cannot fault the CA for ignoring the Master List even if Bernardo, its head
office accountant, swore to its correctness and authenticity.56 Its substantive
unreliability gives it very minimal probative value. Atlanta would have been better
served, in terms of reliable evidence, if true copies of the payroll (on which the list
was based, among others, as Bernardo claimed in her affidavit) were presented
instead.1âwphi1

Third. The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already
rendering service to the company when they were made to undergo
apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship
agreements irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. This reality is highlighted
by the CA finding that the respondents occupied positions such as machine
operator, scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and
desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade as manufacturer of plastic building
materials.57 These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they were dismissed
without just or authorized cause, without notice, and without the opportunity to be
heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.58

Even if we recognize the company’s need to train its employees through

apprenticeship, we can only consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the
purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the
employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of
their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon
them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even
mentioned in the agreement itself,59 is a violation of the Labor Code’s
implementing rules60 and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the
least. This we cannot allow.

Fourth. The compromise agreement61 allegedly entered into by Costales and

Almoite, together with Ramos, Villagomez and Alegria, purportedly in settlement
of the case before the NLRC, is not binding on Costales and Almoite because
they did not sign it. The company itself admitted62 that while Costales and Almoite
were initially intended to be a part of the agreement, it did not pursue their
inclusion "due to their regularization as early as January 11, 2006."63

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of

merit.1âwphi1 The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner Atlanta Industries, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 12-34; filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Id. at 42-63; penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, and
concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and Associate
Justice Sesinando E. Villon.
3
Id. at 65-66.
4
Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V. Costales, Alvin V. Almoite and Joseph S.
Sagun v. National Labor Relations Commission, Atlanta Industries, Inc.
and/or Robert Chan.
5
Rollo, pp. 192-216.
6
Id. at 89-99; Petition, Annex "N."
7
CA rollo, pp. 286-287.
8
Rollo, pp. 100-110; Petition, Annex "O."
9
Id. at 115-118; Petition, Annex "P."
10
Supra note 2.
11
Article 61 of the Labor Code, and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, Book II, Rule VI, Section 18.
12
CA rollo, p. 323; petitioners’ Comment, p. 31, last paragraph.
13
CA rollo, p. 78.
14
Id. at 92.
15
Supra note 3.
16
Supra note 13.
17
Supra note 14.
18
Supra note 5.
19
Rollo, p. 22; Petition, p. 11, par. 1.
20
Article 61 of the Labor Code.
21
Rollo, pp. 27-28; Petition, pp. 16-17.
22
CA rollo, p. 354; Annex "4" of Atlanta’s Comment.
23
Rollo, pp. 125-139.
24
Supra note 14.
25
Supra note 5.
26
Rollo, p. 127; respondents’ Comment, p. 3, par. 5.
27
Rollo, p. 189.
28
Id. at 151.
29
Id. at 130; Respondent’s Comment, p. 6, par. 12.
30
Ibid.
31
CA rollo, pp. 129-148 and 152-153.
32
Id. at 162, Annex "H."
33
Id. at 85-92-A; Petition for Certiorari, Annexes "JJ" to "RR."
34
Id. at 286, Annex "RRR."
35
G.R. No. 162253, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 80, citing Atillo v. Bombay,
404 Phil. 179 (2001).
36
SEC. 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7)
legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated
as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing
that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters
involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition.
37
Supra note 35, at 87.
38
Supra note 2.
39
Supra note 3.
40
Rollo, pp. 89-99; Petition, Annex "N."
41
Id. at 100-110; Petition, Annex "O."
42
Ibid.
43
Supra note 40.
44
Supra note 13.
45
Supra note 14.
46
CA rollo, p. 86.
47
Id. at 87.
48
Id. at 88.
49
Id. at 89.
50
Id. at 90.
51
Id. at 91.
52
Id. at 92.
53
Id. at 92-A.
54
Supra note 5.
55
Supra note 5, caption of each page of the list’s last line.
56
Rollo, p. 217; Bernardo’s Affidavit dated May 25, 2006.
57
Id. at 60; CA Decision, p. 19, par. 1.
58
Articles 279 & 277 (b) of the Labor Code.
59
Rollo, pp. 67-82; copies of the second apprenticeship agreements.
60
Section 18, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code.
61
CA rollo, pp. 286-287.
62
Supra note 12.
63
Rollo, p. 61; CA Decision, p. 20, last paragraph.