CS Indonesia PDF
CS Indonesia PDF
CS Indonesia PDF
Indonesia
a country study
Indonesia
a country study
Use of ISBN
This is the Official U.S. Government edition of this
publication and is herein identified to certify its
authenticity. Use of the ISBN 978-0-8444-0790-6 is
for U.S. Government Printing Office Official Editions
only. The Superintendent of Documents of the U.S.
Government Printing Office requests that any printed
edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic
work with a new ISBN.
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
ISBN 978-0-8444-0790-6
Foreword
David L. Osborne
Chief
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington, DC 20540–4840
E-mail: frds@loc.gov
iii
Acknowledgments
v
Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxix
William H. Frederick
ORIGINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Early Inhabitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Expanding Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EARLY HEGEMONIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Outside Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Commercial Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1602–19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
vii
The Cultivation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
COLONIAL AGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1900–1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Joel C. Kuipers
THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Geographic Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
COMMUNITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Population. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Family. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
viii
Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Christianity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Hinduism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Buddhism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Javanese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Balinese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
HEALTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Pharmaceuticals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
J. Thomas Lindblad
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Decentralization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
ix
INDONESIA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . 188
AGRICULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
MINERALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Blair A. King
THE POLITICAL DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
x
Muslim Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
John B. Haseman
HISTORICAL CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
xi
THE NATIONAL POLICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
List of Figures
1 Administrative Divisions of Indonesia, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . xxxviii
Eleventh Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Eighteenth Centuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
xii
Preface
xiii
spellings of some names, however, cannot be verified, as the BGN itself
notes. Indonesian spellings are given for all modern province names,
such as Jawa Tengah (Central Java). Similarly, the names Sumatera
Utara (North Sumatra) and Papua Barat (West Papua) are used to refer to
provinces on the islands of Sumatra and Papua, respectively. Conven
tional spellings of names referring more generally to portions of Java, for
example, are given in lower case and the form “eastern Java,” “southern
Sumatra,” and so on.
Because of the widespread use of acronyms and contractions in
Indonesia, the ones used in this edition are listed in a table along with
an English translation at the front of the book (see table A). A chronol
ogy of major historical events also is provided (see table B). Measure
ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to
assist readers wanting to convert metric measurements (see table C).
Readers are encouraged to consult the chapter bibliographies at the
end of the book, which include a number of general and specialized,
primarily English-language-source bibliographies that will lead read
ers to further resources on Indonesia. Also, brief comments on some
of the more valuable and enduring sources recommended for further
reading appear at the end of each chapter. A glossary also is included.
The body of the text reflects information available as of July 2010.
Certain other parts of the text, however, have been updated: the Chro
nology and Introduction discuss significant events that have occurred
since the completion of research, and the Country Profile and portions
of some chapters include updated information as available. Indonesia
completed its decennial census in May 2010, but the full results were
not available for inclusion in the main text of this book.
xiv
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia);
used from 1962 to 1999 and included the National Police; thereafter TNI (q.v.) has been
used.
AEC ASEAN (q.v.) Economic Community
AFTA ASEAN (q.v.) Free Trade Area
AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AJI Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists)
Akmil Akademi Militer (Military Academy)
Apodeti Associação Popular Democrática Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Associa
tion)
APRI Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia);
successor to APRIS (q.v.) in August 1950, used until 1962; APRI was identical to TNI
(q.v.), which was the more commonly used term.
APRIS Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of
Indonesia [RIS, q.v.]); used in 1949 and early 1950, when APRIS merged with KNIL
(q.v.).
ARF ASEAN (q.v.) Regional Forum
ASA Aksi Stop AIDS (Stop AIDS [q.v.] Action)
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary)
ASNLF Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front
Babinsa Bintara Desa (village NCO, q.v.)
Bais Badan Intelijens Stratejis (Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Body)
Bakin Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Coordinating Board)
BAN–PT Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi (National Accreditation Agency for
Higher Education)
Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Board)
Bareskrim Badan Reserse Kriminal (Crime Investigation Agency); also see Kabareskrim
Bimas Bimbingan Massal (Mass Guidance System)
BIN Badan Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Agency)
BKKBN Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (National Family Planning Coordinat
ing Agency)
BKPM Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (Capital Investment Coordinating Board)
BKR Badam Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Forces); used August 22–October 5,
1945, when it was succeeded by the TKR (q.v.).
BPK Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Finance Audit Board)
BPPN Badan Penyehatan Perbanken Nasional (Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency; also
abbreviated as IBRA, q.v.)
BPPT Badan Pusat Pengembangan Teknologi (Agency for the Study and Application of Tech
nology)
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Office; also referred to as Central Bureau of
Statistics and Statistics Indonesia)
BPTRI Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Institute for Higher
Education)
BPUPK Badan Penyelidik Usaha–Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Commission to Investigate
Preparatory Measures for Independence)
xv
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued)
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Bank)
BRR Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency)
Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (National Logistical Supply Organization)
Caltex California Texas Oil Company
CEMEX formerly Cementos Mexicanos
CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CMI Crisis Management Initiative
COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (Democratic Republic of Germany—or East
Germany)
Depdiknas Departmen Pendidikan Nasional (Department of National Education)
Dephan Departmen Pertahanan (Department of Defense; since 1999)
DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council)
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council)
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People’s Representative Council)
EU European Union
EYD ejaan yang disempurnakan (perfected, or new, spelling of Bahasa Indonesia language,
adopted in 1972)
FDI foreign direct investment
FMF Foreign Military Financing (U.S.)
FMS Foreign Military Sales (U.S.)
FNC Fabrique Nationale Carabine (National Factory Carbine, a carbine made by Fabrique
Nationale de Herstel, Belgium)
FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front)
FSPSI Federation Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesian Workers’ Union Federa
tion)
Fretilin Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Inde
pendent East Timor—see Glossary)
FY fiscal year (see Glossary)
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GDP gross domestic product (see Glossary)
Gerindra Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Movement, as in Partai Gerindra or Gerindra
Party)
Gestapu Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (September 30 Movement, also G30S)
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups—see Glossary)
GPK Gerakan Pengacauan Keamanan (Security Disturbance Movement)
Hankam Departmen Pertahanan dan Keamanan (Department of Defense and Security; prior to
1999)
Hankamrata Pertahanan dan Keamanan Rakyat Total (Total People’s Defense)
Hanura Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party, as in Partai Hanura or Hanura Party)
HIS Hollands–Inlandsche School (Dutch–Native Schools)
xvi
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued)
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
HIV human immunodeficiency virus
HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic University Student Association)
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negara (State Institute for Islamic Religion)
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (also BPPN, q.v.)
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association)
IGGI Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMET International Military Education and Training (U.S.)
IMF International Monetary Fund
Indra Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (Badan Restrukturalisasi Utang Luar Negeri
Perusahaan Indonesia, which in full translates as Agency for Structuring the Foreign
Debt of Indonesian Industries)
INTERFET International Force in East Timor
Interpol International Criminal Police Organization
IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of the Supporters of Indonesian
Independence)
IPTN Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (Archipelago Aircraft Industry)
ISDV Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (Indies Social-Democratic Association)
IVS Indonesische Verbond van Studerenden (Indonesian Student Association )
Jabodetabek Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi
Jabotabek Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi
JIL Jaringan Islam Liberal (Network for Liberal Islam)
Kabareskrim Kepala Badan Reserse Kriminal (head of Crime Investigation Agency); also see
Bareskrim
Kasum Kepala Staff Umum (Chief of the General Staff)
KNIL Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army)
KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee)
Kodam Komando Daerah Militer (Military Regional Command)
Kodim Komando Distrik Militer (Military District Command)
Kohanudnas Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional (National Air Defense Command)
Komnas Komite Nasional Pengendalian Flu Burung Kesiapsiagaan Menghadapi Pandemi Influ-
FBPI enza (National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza Pre
paredness)
Ko–Op Komando Operasi (Operations Command)
Kopassandha Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha (Army Special Forces Command); also see Kopassus
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Operational Command for
the Restoration of Security and Order)
Koramil Komando Rayon Militer (Military Subdistrict Command)
Korem Komando Resor Militer (Military Resort, or Garrison, Command)
Kostrad Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission)
xvii
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued)
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
KPPU Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (Commission for the Oversight of Business Com
petition)
KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections Commission)
LatGap Latihan Gabungan (Joint Exercise)
Lemhanas Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional (National Resiliency Institute)
LNG liquefied natural gas
LSM lembaga swadaya masyarakat (nongovernmental organizations), also sometimes ornop
(q.v.)
Lusi Lumpur Sidoarjo (Sidoarjo mud volcano)
Manipol Manifes Politik (Political Manifesto)
Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)
MDMA methylenedioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy)
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)
MPR(S) Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Sementara) (Provisional People’s Consultative
Assembly)
MRP Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Council)
NAD Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (State of Aceh, Abode of Peace, a name used from 2000 to
2009)
Nasakom Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme (Nationalism, Religion, Communism)
NCO noncommissioned officer
NGO nongovernmental organization; also see LSM and ornop
NHM Nederlandsche Handel–Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Association)
NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)
NMDP national medium-term development plan
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (see Glossary)
OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)
ornop organisasi nonpemerintah (nongovernmental organizations); also sometimes LSM
(q.v.)
OSVIA Opleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (School for Training Native Govern
ment Officials)
P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guide to Realizing and Experienc
ing the Pancasila)
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
panja panitia kerja (working committee)
pansus panitia khusus (special committee)
Panwaslu Panitia Pengawas Pemilu (Election Oversight Committee)
Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)
Partindo Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party)
PasMar Pasukan Marinir (Marine Corps Group)
xviii
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued)
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Star and Moon Party); also used for Perserikata Bangsa-Bangsa
(United Nations)
PBR Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party)
PD Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party)
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party)
PDI–P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle)
PDP Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan (Democracy Renewal Party)
PDS Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party)
Pelni Perusahaan Layaran Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Shipping Company)
Permesta Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Universal Struggle); also Piagam Perjuangan Semesta
Alam (Universal Struggle Charter)
Pertamina Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (State Oil and Natural Gas
Mining Company, but translated as State Oil Company by Pertamina itself)
Perti Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Educational Movement)
Peta Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland)
Petrus penembakan misterius (mysterious shootings) or pembunuhan misterius (mysterious
killings)—Both terms have been used in the Indonesian press.
PID Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Intelligence Service)
PIR Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (Nucleus People’s Estate)
PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKH Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia (Communist Association of the Indies)
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party; see Glossary)
PKPI Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)
PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PLN Perusahaan Listrik Nasional (National Electric Company)
PMI Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Muslim Party of Indonesia)
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
PNI–M Partai Nasional Indonesia–Marhaenisme (Indonesian Nationalist Party–Marhaenism)
Polda Polisi Daerah (Regional Police)
Polri Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (National Police of Indonesia)
PP Partai Pelopor (Pioneer Party)
PPKI Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Indonesian Independence Preparatory
Committee)
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party)
PRD Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Democratic People’s Party)
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of Indonesia)
PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia)
pungli pungutan liar (illegal levies, that is, kickbacks)
Putera Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Center of the People’s Power)
RCTI Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (Hawk Television Indonesia)
xix
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued)
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
Repelita Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (five-year economic development plan; see Glos
sary)
RIS Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia)
RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku)
ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (U.S.)
Rp rupiah (see Glossary)
Satelindo Satelit Palapa Indonesia
SBI Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia Certificate)
SBSI Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Prosperous Workers’ Union)
SBY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SCTV Surya Citra Televisi (Sun Television)
Sesko TNI Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI (TNI [q.v.] Command and Staff College)
SIJORI Singapore, Johor, and Riau
SIRA Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (Aceh Referendum Information Center)
SPSI Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesian Workers’ Union)
Stanvac Standard-Vacuum Oil Company
STOVIA School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (School for Training Indigenous Doctors)
Supersemar Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Letter of Instruction of March 11)
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TII Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of Indonesia)
Timtas Tim Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Coordinating Team for Eliminating
Tipikor Crimes of Corruption)
Tipikor Court Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Corruption Crimes Court)
TKR Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Army); used as of October 5, 1945, as
successor to BKR (q.v.); also Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat (People’s Security Army) as
of January 1, 1946.
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army); from 1947 to 1962 and again
starting in April 1999 but now usually translated as Indonesian National Armed Forces;
also see ABRI, APRI, and APRIS.
TNI–AD Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Darat (Army of the Republic of Indonesia)
TNI–AL Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Laut (Navy of the Republic of Indonesia)
TNI–AU Tentara Nasional Indonesia–Angkatan Udara (Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia)
TPI Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (Indonesian Educational Television)
TPN Timor Putra Nasional (National Son Timor)
TRI Tentara Republik Indonesia (National Army of the Republic of Indonesia); used as of
January 24, 1946, as successor to TKR (q.v.).
TVRI Televisi Republik Indonesia (Television of the Republic of Indonesia)
UIN Universitas Islam Negara (State Muslim University)
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
xx
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions (Continued)
Acronym or
Full Name
Contraction
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USDEK Undang–undang Dasar ‘45, Socialisme à la Indonesia, Demokrasi Perpimpin, Ekonomi
Terpimpin, Kepribadian Indonesia (1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided
Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity, usually paired with Manipol
[q.v.] to read Manipol–USDEK)
USINDO United States–Indonesia Society
UVI Universiteit van Indonesië (University of Indonesia; later changed to Universitas Indo
nesia [University of Indonesia])
VAT value-added tax
VCI Véhicule de Combat d’Infanterie (Combat Infantry Vehicle [France])
VOC Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (United East Indies Company)
YKP Yayasan Kesehatan Perempuan (Foundation for Women’s Health)
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
xxi
Table B. Chronology of Important Events
By ca. 1.8 million B.C.
Homo erectus, an early hominid, living in Java.
and Java).
archipelago.
kingdoms.
Ca. 820–50 Construction of the Hindu temple complex at Prambanan (central Java).
much of archipelago.
1405–33 Seven Chinese maritime expeditions led by Zheng He, some of which
1511 Portuguese occupy Melaka, on Malay Peninsula, and arrive a year later
1527 Final days of Majapahit as the small Muslim port state of Demak defeats
1610–80 VOC gradually extends dominance over eastern archipelago, for exam
ple in Ternate, Hitu, and southern Sulawesi.
1799–1800 VOC charter lapses following bankruptcy; holdings taken over by Neth
erlands state.
1808–16 Rule of Java and other Dutch territories in the archipelago by French
xxiii
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued)
1824 Anglo–Dutch treaty recognizes spheres of influence in Malay Peninsula
1825–30 Java War; last Javanese aristocratic resistance to Dutch rule; Prince
1870 Sugar Act and Agrarian Act enacted, end of the Cultivation System.
1907 Royal Dutch Shell established through merger of Dutch and British
companies.
established.
July 1927 Sukarno and others establish the Indonesian Nationalist Union (PNI) in
July 1936 Sutarjo Petition, calling for a conference on the possibility of Indies
March 1942 Dutch surrender control of Indies to Japanese military forces, Kalijati,
western Java.
defense force.
August 17, 1945 Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaim independent Republic of Indo
nesia.
September 29, 1945 First Allied troops (British and British Indian) land at Jakarta.
November 12, 1946 Linggajati Agreement initialed; recognizes Republican rule on Java and
July 21, 1947 First Dutch “police action” begins (ends August 4, 1947).
xxiv
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued)
September 18, 1948 Madiun Affair erupts in eastern Java, pitching the PKI against the
Republic.
December 19, 1948 Second Dutch “police action” begins (ends January 5, 1949).
Republican rule.
August 23–November 2, Round Table Conference held at The Hague prepares for formal transfer
1949 of sovereignty.
December 27, 1949 Dutch recognize sovereignty of Federal Republic of Indonesia (RIS).
January–April 1950 Separatist revolts begin in western Java and Maluku Islands.
August 17, 1950 RIS and other states form new unitary Republic of Indonesia under
April 18–24, 1955 Asia–Africa Conference held in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province.
December 1, 1956 Hatta resigns as vice president in protest against Sukarno’s growing
December 1957 Dutch nationals expelled; private companies nationalized; armed forces
February–May 1958 Anti-Sukarno revolts in Sumatra and Sulawesi; Sukarno accuses United
States of complicity.
August 17, 1959 Political Manifesto (Manipol) announced, gives ideological content to
Guided Democracy.
March 1960 New legislature organized with control given to functional groups,
May 1963 Indonesian authority established in West New Guinea (renamed Irian
Barat).
September 23, 1963 Sukarno issues statements threatening independence of new state of
1965
October 1965–March 1966 Decline of Sukarno, rise of Suharto; Guided Democracy eclipsed; mass
jailed.
March 12, 1967 Suharto appointed acting president by Provisional People’s Consultative
August 8, 1967 Indonesia joins four other countries in founding new Association of
severed.
xxv
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued)
September 1969 Irian Barat (Indonesian New Guinea) becomes Indonesia’s twenty-sixth
divided into three separate provinces (only two of which had been estab
lished as of 2010).
July 3, 1971 Golkar wins majority of popular vote in second general elections.
January 1973 Development Unity Party (PPP) and Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI)
formed.
March 12, 1973 Suharto reelected to second term as president, and Hamengkubuwono
July 15, 1976 East Timor becomes Timor Timur, Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province.
March 22, 1978 Suharto reelected to third term as president, Adam Malik elected vice
president by MPR.
suppressed.
March 11, 1983 Suharto reelected to fourth term as president, Umar Wirahadikusumah
March 10, 1988 Suharto reelected to fifth term as president, Sudharmono elected as vice
president, by MPR.
November 12, 1991 Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) troops fire on
Jakarta Summit.
March 10, 1993 Suharto reelected to sixth term as president, General Try Sutrisno
June 21, 1994 Governments bans Tempo and other prominent news magazines.
December 18, 1995 Indonesia and Australia sign security cooperation agreement.
July 27, 1996 Government closes ousted opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri’s
October 27, 1997 Amidst stock market panic, Indonesia–International Monetary Fund
of credit.
March 21, 1998 Suharto reelected to seventh term as president, Bacharuddin J. (B. J.)
xxvi
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued)
May 12–14, 1998 Following shooting of Trisakti University students by security forces,
rioting in Jakarta leads to mob-led destruction in Chinese Indonesian
community, closure of foreign embassies, and more than 1,000 deaths.
May 21, 1998 Suharto resigns from presidency; succeeded by Vice President B. J.
Habibie.
January 28, 1999 People’s Representative Council (DPR) approves major changes to elec
tion laws, sets scene for June 7 national legislative elections.
June 7, 1999 First democratic parliamentary elections since 1955 held; Megawati’s
PDI–P wins 34 percent, Golkar 22 percent.
August 30, 1999 78.5 percent of Timor Timur voters in UN-supervised referendum reject
broad autonomy from Indonesia, allowing province to become indepen
dent.
September 16, 1999 Indonesia abrogates 1995 security cooperation agreement with Australia
over latter’s involvement in East Timor.
October 20, 1999 Abdurrahman Wahid elected to presidency and Megawati Sukarnoputri
to vice presidency by MPR.
February 1, 2001 Wahid censured by DPR for involvement in financial scandals; censured
again April 30.
July 23, 2001 Wahid resigns amidst MPR impeachment proceedings; Megawati sworn
in as fifth president.
May 20, 2002 Timor Timur Province (East Timor) becomes independent nation of
Timor-Leste.
August 3, 2002 MPR amends constitution to allow direct election of president and vice
president; provides for new legislative body, the Regional Representa
tive Council (DPD).
October 12, 2002 202 die, more than 300 injured in terrorist bombings in Kuta tourist dis
trict in Bali.
August 5, 2003 14 killed, 149 injured in terrorist car bombing at JW Marriott hotel in
Jakarta.
April 5, 2004 Elections held for DPD, DPR, and representatives for all provincial,
regency, and municipality-level legislatures; Golkar wins 21 percent,
PDI–P 18 percent.
July 5, 2004 Initial round of Indonesia’s first direct popular election for president and
vice president held; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins 33 percent of
votes to Megawati’s 26 percent.
September 9, 2004 Terrorist suicide car bombing at Australian Embassy in Jakarta, kills 9,
wounds 180.
September 20, 2004 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono receives 60.9 percent of popular votes in
presidential runoff election.
October 20, 2004 Yudhoyono sworn in as sixth president of Indonesia, Muhammad Yusuf
Kalla sworn in as vice president.
December 26, 2004 Tsunamis devastate coastal areas throughout the Indian Ocean, killing
166,561 persons and displacing 203,817 in northern and western coastal
areas of Sumatra.
March 28, 2005 Earthquake strikes Nias and other nearby islands, Sumatera Utara Prov
ince, killing 1,300 and displacing 40,000.
October 1, 2005 26 die, 129 injured by suicide attacks in Jimbara and Kuta, Bali.
November 13, 2006 Indonesia and Australia sign security agreements.
September 6, 2007 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin signs arms agreement with Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono while visiting Jakarta.
December 3–14, 2007 UN Climate Change Conference held in Bali.
January 27, 2008 Former President Suharto dies in Jakarta hospital.
July 8, 2009 Yudhoyono reelected for second term as president with 60.8 percent of
the first-round vote.
xxvii
Table B. Chronology of Important Events (Continued)
July 17, 2009 Two suicide bombers kill 7, injure 53 at Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott
hotels in Jakarta.
September 30, 2009 7.6-magnitude earthquake strikes Padang, Sumatera Barat Province.
December 30, 2009 Former President Wahid dies in Jakarta hospital.
May 2010 Indonesia conducts national census.
August 2010 According to preliminary census data, population of Jakarta calculated
at 9.58 million or nearly 4 percent of the national population of 237.6
million, surpassing all forecasts. Authorities discuss eventually moving
government to new satellite town.
October–November 2010 Eruptions of Mount Merapi, Jawa Tengah Province, kill more than 300
and displace more than 135,000. Underwater earthquake of 7.7 magni
tude and tsunami near Mentawai Islands, Sumatera Barat Province, kill
more than 300 and displace 16,000.
April 15, 2011 Suicide bombing of a mosque inside a police compound in Cirebon,
Jawa Tengah, during Friday prayers.
July 2011 Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations—Nahdlatul Ulama and
Muhammadiyah—with combined memberships of 110 million, publi
cally condemn Islamic radicalism and use of violence.
August 2011 Following August 2 rallies in Jayapura, Papua Province, and other loca
tions, condemning 1969 Act of Free Choice and calling for referendum
on independence from Indonesia, Free Papua Organization (OPM)
attacks Indonesian armed forces troops.
xxviii
Table C. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
When you know Multiply by To find
Millimeters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.04 inches
Centimeters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 inches
Meters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 feet
Kilometers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.62 miles
Hectares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.47 acres
Square kilometers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 square miles
Cubic meters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.3 cubic feet
Liters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.26 gallons
Kilograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 pounds
Metric tons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.98 long tons
............................ 1.1 short tons
xxix
Country Profile
ASIA
3,
00
0N
2,
aut
00
0
ical
1,
Mi
00
0
les
Jakarta
Country
Formal Name: Republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia; the word
Indonesia was coined from the Greek indos—for India—and nesos—
for island).
Capital: Jakarta
xxxi
Geography
Size: Total area 1,904,569 square kilometers, of which land area is
1,811,569 square kilometers and water area 93,000 square kilometers.
Indonesia claims total sea area of 7.9 million square kilometers,
including an exclusive economic zone.
Society
Population: 245,613,043 estimated by U.S. government in July 2011
(237.6 million according to preliminary 2010 census figures released in
August 2010); annual growth rate of 1.1 percent. In 2011 birthrate esti
mated at 18.1 births per 1,000, death rate 6.2 per 1,000, sex ratio at
birth 1.05 males to each female. Approximately 52 percent of popula
tion living in urban areas, about 4 percent in Jakarta. Average popula
tion density 135 per square kilometer, with wide regional variation.
xxxii
kabau, and Sasak; also various Chinese dialects. English widely used in
government and business circles.
Economy
Major Features: Following fast-paced growth during most of the
New Order period (1966–98) and decline during and following 1997–
98 Asian financial crisis, Indonesian economy characterized by
decade of reform aimed at the financial sector and corrupt politicians
and managers. Recent improvements in international trade, aid, and
payments; in employment and income development; plus continued
reorientation from agriculture to industry; and within the industrial
sector itself, from oil and gas production to other manufacturing
branches. Services, transportation, and communication sectors making
greater contributions to economic growth.
xxxiii
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 2010 estimated at US$1.03 tril
lion; per-capita income based on GDP estimated in 2010 at US$4,200.
GDP by sector, based on 2010 U.S. Government estimates, agriculture
15.3 percent, industry 47.1 percent, and services 37.6 percent.
Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Prior to 2001, the fiscal year ran from
April 1 to March 31.
xxxiv
Roads: In 2008 total road network estimated at 437,760 kilometers;
59 percent paved, about 32 percent classified as highways.
Civil Aviation: 684 airports, 171 of which had paved runways, and 64
heliports in 2010. In 2004 more than 263 million kilometers flown,
26.7 million passengers carried (increased to 31 million in 2007), and
2.9 trillion tons-kilometers transported. State-owned domestic and
international carrier Garuda Indonesia; subsidiary, Merpati Nusantara
Airlines. Twenty-seven privately owned companies.
xxxv
(DPD). People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which formerly elected
the president and vice president, now joint sitting of the DPR and DPD
but retains separate powers restricted to swearing in president and vice
president, amending constitution, and having final say in impeachment
process. Newly decentralized power of subnational authorities en
shrined and delineated in amended constitution. Numerous political par
ties; Democrat Party (PD), Partai Golkar (Golkar Party), and Indonesian
Democracy Party–Struggle (PDI–P) gained largest number of DPR
seats in 2009 election.
National Security
Armed Forces: Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia—TNI) had about 302,000 active-duty personnel in 2009,
with army (TNI—Angkatan Darat), 233,000; navy (TNI—Angkatan
Laut), 45,000, of which 20,000 marines and 1,000 part of naval avia
xxxvi
tion; and air force (TNI—Angkatan Udara), 24,000, of which 4,000
“quick-action” paratroopers.
xxxvii
THAILAND 100 110 120 PHILIPPINES 130 140
xxxviii
Pacific
St
BRUNEI
rai
t
1
MALAYSIA Ocean
of
Sulawesi Sea
M
IA
ala
NATUNA S
AY
cca
ISLANDS AL
2 5 M SULAWESI
23
SINGAPORE 27 28 HALMAHERA
30
4
it
0 20 26 0
3 KALIMANTAN
Stra
32
MA
BANGKA NEW GUINEA
ssar
LU
6 21
ka
9 24 SERAM
KU
Ma
Indian 22
7 8
Ocean BELITUNG 25 29
BURU 33
31
SUMATRA 10 GREATER SUNDA ISLANDS PAPUA
11 KAI ARU NEW
International boundary t Java Sea Banda Sea ISLANDS ISLANDS
rai GUINEA
Province or special region d a St 12 � MADURA
boundary Sun 13 14 TANIMBAR
National capital 16 17 SUMBAWA ISLANDS
� JAVA
Province or special region
capital 15 Sape Stra FLORES 19
10 18 it Arafura Sea 10
Aceh and Yogyakarta are special regions.
Lombok Strait TIMOR-LESTE
SUMBA
Jakarta Raya is a special capital city region. Timor Sea
0 200 400 Kilometers
NUSA TENGGARA AUSTRALIA
Boundary representation (Lesser Sunda Islands)
0 200 400 Miles not necessarily authoritative
100 110 120 130 140
xxxix
newspaper, The Jakarta Post, and the foreign community, curiously
enough, has generally marveled over the changes of the past decade
more than Indonesians themselves. Whatever the case, his point was
well taken. Since the late 1990s, Indonesia has shifted politically from
being the world’s largest military-dominated authoritarian state to being
the world’s third-largest civilian democracy (after India and the United
States) and the largest Muslim-majority democracy, holding the world’s
largest direct presidential elections. It has gone economically from the
heights of the “Asian miracle” of the 1960s to the 1990s to the depths of
the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98—in which the national currency
lost as much as 70 percent of its value, and income per capita fell an
estimated 40 percent—and back, by mid-2009, to heights of growth at
which it was deemed the best-performing Asian market for the year and
third-fastest-growing economy, placed by some analysts in the com
pany of the “emerging giants” of Brazil, China, India, and Russia.
Administratively, Indonesia has moved from being one of the world’s
most centrally controlled regimes to being one of the most decentral
ized. Finally, contrary to the expectations of many careful observers,
both foreign and domestic, Indonesia has succeeded in the past decade
in preserving the territorial state virtually intact against the considerable
forces of separatist movements. The exception is East Timor—now the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste—acquired by force in 1976 and
relinquished under pressure in 1999. Indonesia has also faced severe
ethnic and religious violence, growing internationally influenced
Islamic terrorism, tension over—and within—the armed services, and a
series of natural disasters of which the most devastating was the 2004
tsunami that killed more than 166,500 Indonesians, mostly in the trou
bled region of Aceh, in northern Sumatra.
Trying to account for these enormous accomplishments has for
some time occupied Indonesia watchers ranging from serious, aca
demic specialists to commentators with varied and comparatively
casual interests in the country and its people, to say nothing of Indone
sians themselves. One result has been a wave of academic and journal
istic writing, much of it sharply divided ideologically and theoretically.
Indonesians from the political elite to ordinary citizens have also
plunged into a period of unprecedented—and unprecedentedly open—
introspection, raising a vibrant public discourse. There is no broad con
sensus, but the principal analyses tend to fall into four main types.
The first takes a long-term view. According to this explanation, Indo
nesia’s dramatic shift to a successful democratic political process con
firms what some had argued all along: democracy began to take root in
the years immediately following the National Revolution (1945–49), but
this natural, often disorderly development was nipped in the bud by the
xl
imposition of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957–65) and further sup
pressed by Suharto’s military-backed New Order (1966–98). Proponents
of this view dismiss arguments that newly independent Indonesians in
the early 1950s were not “ready” for representative democracy, or that
democracy along Western lines (what Sukarno called “free-fight liberal
ism” and “50 percent + 1 democracy”) is somehow antithetical to both
Indonesia’s needs and its traditions. They also suggest that previous gov
ernments’ attempts to deal with the specter of ethnic and religious con
flict by smothering the expression and discussion of differences rather
than channeling and protecting them only made matters worse. The fall
of the New Order, and with it the fall from favor of the old political elite
and the military, made possible what was in fact a kind of “back-to-the
future” movement: returning to what began so promisingly nearly two
generations earlier, and this time doing it right. Indonesia’s achievement
since 1998, then, was as possible 40 years ago as it has now proven to be.
A second explanation looks at matters from a mid-range perspec
tive, focusing on the previous 20 years or so. The success of Indone
sia’s transformation thus appears due largely to the influence of
internal dissidents and progressives—particularly educated young peo
ple—during the last half of the New Order and the subsequent period
of reformasi (reform—see Glossary), coupled with pressure from both
a general globalization and specific outside sources. Advocates credit
this combination of forces not only with weakening and eventually
bringing an end to Suharto’s rule, but also, even more important, with
persisting during the subsequent period of upheaval in championing
and providing the ideas and manpower necessary for genuinely demo
cratic reforms. Seen in this way, Indonesia’s post–New Order achieve
ment is to a very large degree a generational one, which, as many
reformers are quick to point out, is very much in the tradition of Indo
nesia’s original struggle for independence.
A still shorter field of vision defines a third perspective, which
focuses for the most part on the past decade. This view emphasizes the
importance of the political and military leadership after the resignation
of Suharto in May 1998, arguing that without it Indonesia might easily
have continued as previously, under the sway of an authoritarian figure.
Instead, as it happened, the individuals who followed the New Order
president had neither the inclination nor the opportunity to attempt to
reassemble the strongman pattern. Military leaders made conscious
decisions to forego any thoughts of reinstating—by force or other
means—the armed forces’ self-declared dual responsibilities as both
governors and enforcers. However great a role the architects of reform
may have played, according to this argument, their efforts could have
been derailed by powerful civilians and soldiers if they had been so
xli
inclined. But they were not derailed, and it is therefore to current mili
tary and political leaders, with all their strengths and weaknesses, that
the success of the past decade must ultimately be attributed.
A final theory suggests that the great transformation at issue has not
(or at least not yet) taken place, and that the changes that have occurred
are in many respects superficial. For example, a prominent analyst of
Indonesian affairs examined the three pairs of candidates in the 2009
presidential election and found they were all “creatures of Indonesia’s
past.” Yusuf Kalla, a “classic Suharto-esque businessman” and conser
vative political supporter, was allied with Wiranto, a retired general who
was Suharto’s former adjutant and was indicted by the United Nations
for crimes against humanity in East Timor. Megawati, a “woman long
ing for a return to the glory days of her father,” had as a running mate
Prabowo Subianto, another general (and former son-in-law of Suharto),
who was dismissed by the military for brutal treatment of political activ
ists. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, yet another former general, although
one with a reputation for liberal tendencies and indecisiveness, chose as
his vice presidential candidate a career government economist—Budi
ono—who had most recently headed Bank Indonesia. All of this sug
gests that at best modest and largely cosmetic change has taken place
since 1998, and that, furthermore, the prospects for deep, meaningful
reforms in the immediate future are perhaps considerably dimmer than
most enthusiasts are willing to admit.
Each of these sorts of explanations has strengths as well as obvious
weak points, and none can stand entirely on its own. Beyond the op-ed
pieces and academic studies, in their everyday thinking most Indone
sians probably borrow from all of them in assembling their own con
clusions. Even taken together, however, it is startling that in their
combined field of vision, the 32 years of New Order governance
scarcely figure except as a source of obstacles to political moderniza
tion, a decidedly negative force in any effort to explain the advances of
the past decade. Recently, however, a handful of commentators have
quietly begun to raise the possibility that a powerful explanation of the
undeniably rapid, and apparently successful, transformation since
1998 may lie precisely where least suspected: in the policies and reali
ties of the New Order itself.
A full consideration of this fifth theory would require a thorough
reexamination of Indonesia’s history in the last half of the twentieth
century, which has yet to be undertaken. For the present, however,
some principal points of the argument seem clear enough. The basic
notion is that the “amazing” transformation after 1998 is not quite as
amazing as has generally been suggested because the New Order
regime was never as powerful and monolithic, in some views even
xlii
totalitarian, as many believed, and that its ability to control the way
people thought and behaved was overestimated. (In the same vein, the
military was never as unified or free to assert its will as most assumed.)
From this perspective, for example, the New Order censorship about
which critics constantly complained was on the whole much milder
than portrayed, and at best erratic and incomplete; it certainly did not
entirely smother public debate or expressions of discontent. Similarly,
the regime’s signature efforts to inculcate the ideology of Pancasila (see
Glossary), which critics decried as so much self-interested, statist pro
pagandizing, were surprisingly ineffective, producing more cynicism
and questioning than acquiescence, and certainly not blind adherence.
Individuals’ ability to think or act independently in political matters,
although indeed limited under the New Order regime, was far less
severely damaged than imagined, and did not require a miracle to
revive.
This explanation also suggests that the New Order may have con
tributed to the post-1998 transformation in a more positive manner. It
is not, for example, quite so astonishing that Indonesia was able to
hold complex and reasonably peaceful elections in 1999, 2004, and
2009 if we recall that, in fact, the nation had practice doing so for a
quarter of a century under New Order auspices in 1971, 1977, 1982,
1987, 1992, and 1997. This notion may be repellent to critics who
spent years pointing out how the New Order political process was any
thing but free, manipulated as it was by numerous means, including
dishonest management of elections, curtailment of party indepen
dence, manipulation of parliament through large appointed member
ships, and the like. Nevertheless, elections were routinely held and
order maintained until the process became familiar, even taken for
granted; it was by no means new in 1999, even though the all-impor
tant political context had changed. Furthermore, it seems likely that
the millions of Indonesians who participated in those New Order elec
tions came to understand that process’s shortcomings and to develop
ideas about how it could be improved. There was no dearth of ideas
when the time came to make changes, and the journey to democracy
required modest hops rather than great leaps.
The larger implication of this fifth sort of explanation is that what
took place between roughly 1998 and 2004 in Indonesia was on the
one hand not the revolution or near-revolution some saw or wished
for, and on the other hand not the ephemeral, surface phenomenon oth
ers feared. There was neither miracle nor mirage but rather a complex
transition in which continuity figured as importantly as change, and
the two were often very closely intertwined. This insight is useful in
understanding other aspects of contemporary Indonesia beyond elec
tions and democratic procedure.
xliii
One illustration concerns the promotion of Pancasila ideology, a
widely criticized hallmark of the New Order that appeared to have
been summarily abandoned in 1998. Beginning in about 2002, how
ever, there was a revival of interest in Pancasila and in honoring it as a
kind of national creed and summation of national identity. Even prom
inent intellectuals who had considered New Order leaders’ interest in a
national ideology an anathema, and the Pancasila itself as shallow and
outdated, appeared at symposia and on op-ed pages as advocates of a
“revitalization,” emphasizing the ways in which the message of the
Pancasila is not only appropriate for post–New Order Indonesia, but
indeed even necessary. In 2006 President Yudhoyono made a point of
giving a major national speech on the then-neglected Birth of Pan
casila Day (June 1), recommending that politicized niggling over the
historical origins and other details surrounding the Pancasila—which
he described as the “state ideology”—cease and that greater attention
be paid to its precepts. There were numerous calls for making June 1 a
national holiday, and the minister of education said that the Pancasila
would remain part of the curriculum. It looked very much as if a key
element of the New Order was about to be reinstated.
The president made a special effort, however, to emphasize that he
did not intend to return to the past. The authoritarian Suharto govern
ment had, he said, “twisted the ideology to promote conformity and
stifle dissent” with what he termed “Pancasila brainwashing,” which
caused the populace to turn against it and its sponsors. But in reality,
he said, the Pancasila is “not an absolute doctrine but a compromise
reached by the nation’s founding fathers,” and it should be accepted as
such, not as a sacred document used to enforce uniformity. It is a com
promise that sees all Indonesians as equal and protects pluralism and
tolerance; it supports democratic reform and human rights, at the same
time as it promotes a sense of unity under a common sense of social
justice. This is precisely what is needed, Yudhoyono argued, at a time
when rapid political decentralization and vigorously competing ethnic
and religious identities threaten national unity. Whatever the degrees
of public trust in Yudhoyono’s message, it will, of course, be some
time before it is clear where it will lead. Nevertheless, making the
effort to see elements of change where continuity is most apparent at
least brings observers closer to the realization that an easy, either/or
reading is inadequate.
A second illustration concerns contemporary Indonesian public cul
ture. By mid-2009, after a comparatively short period of growth
beginning around 2006, by far the most popular television genre in the
nation was the reality show—dating shows, talent contests, extreme
home makeovers, and the like—which are widely seen as being Amer
xliv
ican in origin (although in fact British and Dutch producers were the
true pioneers); nearly 80 different shows of this type were being pro
duced by local companies. To both outsiders and many Indonesians,
this seemed to be a sign of an abrupt change. The Indonesian scholar
and public intellectual Ariel Heryanto, for example, suggested that the
pendulum had swung away from a post-1998 interest in Islamic popu
lar culture, and he talked about American culture being suddenly “in”
among Indonesians at all economic and social levels. One reality-
show producer even suggested that what viewers consider American
values are in fact universal ones, and that Indonesians are now part of
a world in which everyone shares “the same dream, no matter who
you are and what nationality you are.” Not surprisingly, some Western
commentators took this as another confirmation that Indonesia had
moved definitively into the liberal democratic camp.
There is an important “continuity” side to this story as well. For one
thing, as New York Times reporter Norimitsu Onishi pointed out, the
reality show is not the first American genre to attract attention. Ameri
can sitcoms ranging from “I Love Lucy” to “The Golden Girls,” as
well as series such as “McGyver,” filled Indonesian television sched
ules beginning in the mid-1970s but then lost ground to shows with
Islamic themes and to telenovelas from Latin America and soap
operas from Asia; the current fascination with televised reality shows
is thus part of a longer evolution and should be interpreted in that light.
The careful foreign viewer might also notice that a number of the most
popular Indonesian reality shows focus on themes markedly not found
in America—for example, transplanting wealthy or upper-middle
class Indonesians into poor, rural settings, and vice versa, focusing on
the tribulations each group faces in making adjustments and attempt
ing to understand an altogether different way of life. These produc
tions tend to validate the values of modern, urban middle-class
Indonesians at the same time as they highlight the importance of
empathy for others, reflecting in part a longstanding mainstream
nationalist populism and in part a Muslim morality and sensitivity to
the plight of the poor. The analysis that the popularity of such reality
shows is evidence of a recent and dramatic social change—“Ameri
canization,” even—is neither as accurate nor, truth be told, as interest
ing as the more complicated view that notices a more complex story of
adaptation.
Since the previous edition of this volume in the Country Study
Series appeared in 1993, Indonesia has experienced enormous changes
of great significance. The purpose of this revised version is not merely
to point them out but also to attempt to show them in their proper per
spective, in which changes are never without roots and continuities
xlv
never untouched by innovation. Particularly for a country as large,
diverse, and historically intricate as Indonesia, this approach seems
both necessary and sensible.
* * *
xlvi
bureaucrats and civilians. But by early 2009, the KPK had begun to take
aim at more important targets, especially in the higher ranks of the
National Police of Indonesia (Polri) and the Attorney General’s Office.
The KPK also became increasingly involved in investigation of the con
troversial US$700 million bailout in 2008 of the nation’s thirteenth-largest
bank—Bank Century—to which the new Yudhoyono government’s
finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, and vice president, Budiono,
were connected.
These initiatives appear to have persuaded many prominent indi
viduals, perhaps because they themselves were potential targets, that
the KPK was too powerful. Representatives of Polri and the Attorney
General’s Office and groups of legislators launched a seemingly con
certed effort to deflate the KPK. The first important victim was the
KPK head himself, Antasari Azhar, who in May 2010 was accused of
masterminding a bizarre love-triangle murder plot, for which he was
later convicted and sentenced to 18 years in prison. (As of late June
2010, the case was still under appeal.) The next major erstwhile targets
were two KPK commissioners, Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra
Hamzah, arrested in October 2009 on accusations of accepting bribes
in what by that time had become a bitter feud between the KPK and
Polri. (That case, after an even more tortuous journey through the
courts, was in limbo more than eight months later.) In addition, the
Bank Century case brought accusations of wrongdoing and, implicitly,
corruption on the part of a range of principals involved, some of whom
were connected to KPK and Polri scandals. In all of these cases, there
was widespread public suspicion that many of the targets had been
framed by police, as indeed several police officers publicly testified.
The long-term significance of these scandals is still uncertain, but
there is general agreement about several consequences. First, President
Yudhoyono’s standing in many circles was at least temporarily weak
ened, as he appeared to vacillate in the face of the legal disputes and
interdepartmental dissension. Forced by public pressure to take action,
he was unable to fully fend off legislators’ attacks on the authority of
the KBK and Tipikor, which, despite the retention of wiretapping and
prosecution rights, was in other ways diluted. Yudhoyono also lost the
political battle to keep reform-minded Minister of Finance Sri Mul
yani, who resigned in May 2010. (She soon accepted a high post with
the World Bank and has been mentioned as a likely future presidential
candidate.) The president had repeatedly complained that the scandals
were being used to discredit him personally and remove him from
office (impeachment was indeed being discussed in the legislature);
however, the broad public did not appear to share this conclusion.
Second, and probably of more lasting importance, is the unprece
dented degree to which high-level corruption and the struggle against it
xlvii
were opened to public scrutiny. Ordinary Indonesians devoured pub
lished accounts and watched televised news programs offering, for
example, coverage of court proceedings and sensational whistle-blower
testimonies, for up to three hours a day by January 2010, commanding
more than four times the earlier viewer share of broadcast news. And it
did not escape the notice of government bureaucrats and politicians that
the Internet was quickly and skillfully used to mobilize public opinion,
generally against government authorities. The most impressive mobili
zation arose in July 2009 when Polri commissioner general and head of
the Crime Investigation Agency (Kabareskrim) Susno Duaji com
mented derisively to a journalist that the KPK trying to stand up to the
police and Attorney General’s Office was like a tiny house lizard
(cicak) confronting a crocodile (buaya): opposition was foolish and
doomed. Published by Tempo, the nation’s foremost news magazine
and online news source, the remark was endlessly repeated and soon
triggered an enormous public reaction. The Internet, Facebook, and
Twitter were used to gather hundreds of thousands of supporters of the
KPK, while T-shirts and demonstrators’ banners appeared with slogans
such as “I’m a cicak!” and “Say no to the crocodile!” The police were
especially humiliated, but public officials everywhere took uneasy
notice of a newly powerful public that seemed to know what corruption
was when they saw it and that vigorously supported efforts to combat
both corruption and the types of authority that allowed it to exist. Sen
sational turns in the case by mid-2010 led to Susno, recently jailed in a
military facility, now being praised as a heroic whistle-blower by some
and even suggested as the next head of the KPK. Some people, how
ever, accused him of being deeply involved in graft and other corrupt
practices.
How did these developments affect public attitudes generally?
According to one respected polling source, in the last quarter of 2009
public distrust of the government was lower overall (28 percent) than
it had been in the past five years but higher (33 percent) in the cities.
The poll also found that confidence that “democracy is working” was
nearly as high as it had ever been (78 percent), but that such confi
dence suffered slightly more in the cities. The conclusion that corrup
tion was the major problem facing the nation was reached by nearly as
many people as ever (86 percent). Polling for the first quarter of 2010
seemed likely to show slippage, which many in the business commu
nity feared would, in turn, have unwelcome economic effects.
The power of the Internet was demonstrated not only in the corrup
tion scandals but also in the case of Prita Mulyasari, a young mother
whose e-mailed complaints about a large Jakarta hospital’s services
circulated online beginning in mid-2009. Sued for defamation by the
xlviii
hospital, she was also taken to court in civil and criminal suits under
the 2008 antipornography law. Public outcry, organized via Facebook,
Twitter, and various blogs and glogs, resulted in her being found not
guilty in the criminal suit, but Prita refused to settle the civil suit out of
court because she felt that doing so was an admission of guilt. She lost
the case in December 2009 and was fined more than US$20,000. An
online campaign raised several times that amount in donated coins to
pay her expenses and fines. The case underscored in several ways the
enormous potential power of social networking in Indonesia, where
the number of Facebook users is said to have increased from fewer
than 1 million to more than 21 million (compared with Britain’s 24
million) between early 2009 and mid-2010.
One government response came from the conservative minister of
communication and information, Tifatul Sembiring, who, in February
2010, drafted regulations widely seen as limiting freedom of expres
sion; public outcry was so immediate and forceful that President Yud
hoyono felt compelled to warn his minister to tone down the proposed
regulations. Some legislators agreed with Tifatul, however, calling for
strengthened limitations in laws governing multimedia use, violations
of which are already subject to greater penalties than those in print
media. There has been considerable pushback on the issue from a vari
ety of groups, among them the Alliance of Independent Journalists,
and the debate gathered momentum in May 2010. During the follow
ing month, a sensational case developed around an explicitly sexual
video allegedly showing the male pop singer Nazril (Ariel) Irham and
two female media celebrities (they claimed that the individuals
depicted simply looked like them), which was widely circulated on the
Internet. Police scrambled to find out who uploaded the clips and
whether the photos were indeed of the people everyone thought they
were. (In late June, Ariel was arrested and charged with violating the
2008 antipornography law.) Tifatul commented that the public debate
over these “sex tapes” was like the dispute between Muslims, who
believe that Jesus Christ was not crucified but rather that someone
resembling him was, and Christians, who believe that Jesus Christ was
crucified. He was immediately engulfed by a barrage of messages
from angry Twitterers suggesting, for example, that he had been drunk
when he made the comment; Tifatul’s response (via his own Twitter
account) was that his accuser himself must have been drunk. The con
troversy escalated so rapidly and in such dangerous directions that
President Yudhoyono felt constrained to offer an opinion. In late June
2010, he appeared to back Tifatul’s call for, among other things, an
Internet “black list” and general regulation of Internet use, lest society
and the nation be damaged.
xlix
The threat of terrorist attacks against Indonesia continues, but gov
ernment forces appear to have successfully disrupted some significant
sources of terror activity. On “Black Friday,” July 17, 2009, a little more
than a week after the presidential election, explosions were detonated by
suicide bombers at two American-owned hotels in Jakarta, the JW Mar
riott and the Ritz-Carlton, killing seven (one of whom was Indonesian)
and wounding 53. The bombings were widely condemned internation
ally and within Indonesia itself, where tolerance for terrorism had
already been dropping noticeably. President Yudhoyono suggested that
the terrorist acts were somehow connected to the election and directed at
him, an idea discounted by most analysts. (However, the police discov
ery in May 2010 of a plot to assassinate Yudhoyono on the coming Inde
pendence Day, August 17, lent the earlier suggestion some retrospective
credence.) Heightened police efforts in succeeding months after the
hotel bombings paid off. In September 2009, commandos killed Noor
din Muhammad Top, the Malaysian-born Islamist militant thought by
police to have been responsible for major bombings in Indonesia since
2002, including the recent JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton explosions. In
March 2010, counterterrorism forces killed Dulmatin, a Javanese bomb
ing mastermind who played a prominent role in the militant Jemaah
Islamiyah and was also connected to the Abu Sayyaf group in the Phil
ippines. The police received widespread approval for these efforts—as
opposed to their involvement in various corruption scandals—and it was
clear that the militants and their followers attracted little sympathy. Two
Javanese villages, whose native sons were followers of Noordin and
were also killed, refused to have them buried on village land. Finally, in
June 2010 police killed former Indonesian soldier Yuli Harsono, sus
pected of planning, among other things, an attack on the Danish
Embassy in Jakarta, and arrested Abdullah Sunata, wanted for establish
ing a terrorist training camp in Aceh and suspected of planning to assas
sinate President Yudhoyono.
Issues having to do with the public practice of Islam continue to fea
ture in national news, especially in the Special Region of Aceh, where
implementation of sharia (syariah in Bahasa Indonesia—see Glossary)
began in 2000 and has caused intense debate since then. During the
2009 elections, Golkar Party candidates attempted to make the wearing
of the jilbab (Muslim woman’s head covering) a political issue, in
which the vast majority of Indonesians seemed to show no real interest.
Polri announced a plan on August 21, 2009, to monitor sermons given
at mosques and public gatherings, presumably for their potential to
incite hatred or violence. There was, however, a strong public outcry,
and the order was quickly rescinded.
The most sensational development occurred in mid-September
2009, when the Aceh legislative council introduced new Islamic crimi
l
nal bylaws (qanun jinayat), calling for, among other things, adulterers
(both Muslim and non-Muslim) to be stoned to death. The bylaws,
introduced before the recently elected, more moderate legislature could
officially be seated, drew condemnation from many sources, including,
in early October, a council of 80 Muslim clerics, who said such laws
were foreign and called for a presidential review. Other legal experts
suggested, however, that the bylaws were reasonable, in that they
reflected Indonesia’s effort to recognize diversity in legal sanctions.
Under pressure from civil society and both foreign and indigenous
human-rights groups, the provisions had not yet been fully enacted and
signed by the provincial governor as of mid-2010. The Department of
Home Affairs announced its intention of requesting a Supreme Court
review of Aceh’s Islamic criminal code but had not yet done so, and
the law remained officially in a suspended state. In the meantime, how
ever, Aceh’s syariah police appear to have been emboldened, enforc
ing conservative standards of women’s dress and, in several instances,
carrying out public and brutal punishments for suspected moral crimes
such as having premarital sex, intrusions the majority of Acehnese
appear to resent. The struggle between religious conservatism and
more moderate ideas and the search for a less-tense relationship
between Aceh’s autonomy—extended in 2006 as part of the settlement
of the armed conflict there—and the requirements of the Indonesian
state and constitution seem likely to continue for some time.
Another controversial legal issue also attracted widespread attention.
The controversy concerned Indonesia’s 1965 Blasphemy Law, a section
of the Criminal Code that prohibits both expression of hostility toward
or contempt of the recognized religions and the advocacy of unorthodox
interpretations of those religions. The law can be used to hand down
sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment, and to disband any group
deemed unorthodox or heretical. In October 2009, a group of prominent
Muslim intellectuals (including former President Abdurrahman Wahid),
human-rights activists, and civic leaders requested that the Constitu
tional Court review the Blasphemy Law, suggesting that it violates
guarantees of freedom of religion and threatens the tolerance and plural
ism fundamental to maintaining a democratic Indonesia. In April 2010,
after several months of public debate and demonstrations, the court
refused to conduct a full judicial review of the law, thereby upholding it.
An eight-to-one decision by the court argued that, without anything to
immediately replace it, the law is necessary in order to maintain social
order and prevent religious conflicts. Conservative Muslims, who
feared among other things that more liberal interpretations of Islam
might be encouraged, were heartened by the decision, but an array of
opponents feared that religious freedom, especially of minority groups,
li
would be further threatened. While the Constitutional Court’s ruling
suggests that legislative review and modification of the law might be
pertinent, it seems unlikely that lawmakers will accept such a sensitive
undertaking anytime in the near future.
Eastern and western Indonesia have continued to experience
repeated earthquakes. The largest of these occurred in western Java in
early September 2009 (7.0 magnitude and at least 72 deaths), in Sumat
era Barat later the same month (7.6 magnitude with at least 1,100
deaths and more than 2,180 injured), and offshore from Sumatera Utara
in April 2010 (7.8 magnitude, no deaths). In Jawa Timur, the notorious
Lumpur Sidoarjo (Lusi) mud volcano, which in 2006 killed 13 and
destroyed the homes of tens of thousands of residents, was still oozing
in 2010. International researchers argued in February that new data
confirmed the disaster was man-made and not caused by an earthquake
as the gas-exploration company Brantas Lapindo claimed. President
Yudhoyono reiterated in March 2010 that he expected Lapindo to ade
quately reimburse all victims (the government itself had allocated more
than US$210 million for the purpose in 2008 and 2009), but the case
has been increasingly embroiled in legal and political controversy, and
protests by the victims continued.
In May 2010, scientists announced the discovery of previously
unknown species of gecko, pigeon, and bat in the remote Foja Moun
tains in Papua Province, described as “perhaps the least disturbed ...
tropical forest block on earth.” On the same day, the government of
Norway announced a US$1 billion grant to the Indonesian govern
ment to reduce deforestation through a series of ongoing, verifiable
projects. Days later, President Yudhoyono issued a moratorium on
new forest and peatland concessions, considered an encouraging first
step in an aggressive, long-term campaign.
Despite the many political and social problems its people face,
Indonesia’s economy appeared to perform remarkably well in 2009
and early 2010. In May 2010, the International Institute for Manage
ment Development in Zürich placed Indonesia thirty-fifth on its annual
list of the most competitive economies, jumping it ahead of seven
other nations (the Philippines was listed thirty-ninth, and Malaysia was
listed tenth). The economy grew a respectable 4.5 percent in 2009, and
it was estimated to achieve 5.8 to 6 percent growth in 2010. Consumer
expenditures were growing, but even the top strata were spending cau
tiously; government spending was strong, offsetting declining exports.
Average per-capita income rose from US$1,180 in 2004 to US$4,200
in 2010. Most important, statistics indicated that poverty was declin
ing: the nation’s poorest stratum, earning US$65 or less a month,
declined during roughly the same period, from about 40 percent of
lii
society to slightly more than 20 percent. According to the latest Gini
index (see Glossary), which measures inequality of wealth, Indonesia
enjoyed considerably more equitable income distribution (0.36) than
neighboring Thailand (0.42), Singapore (0.43), or Malaysia (0.46),
although the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) in all those
countries was higher. As had been the case two decades earlier, such
figures did not go entirely unchallenged but were widely accepted
among economists.
“Culture wars” also were underway. In a series of disputes with
neighboring Malaysia over traditional cultural heritage, public voices—
many on the Internet—became surprisingly shrill, including character
izations of Malaysia as “a nation of thieves,” and threats of war. In mid
2009, a Malaysian Ministry of Tourism advertisement aired internation
ally on the Discovery Channel portrayed a Balinese dance as part of
Malaysia’s cultural heritage; the government subsequently withdrew
the advertisement and apologized for what it said had been a production
error. But the uproar nevertheless gathered steam, and by September,
despite some Indonesian commentators’ dismissal of the issue as trivial
and an indication of Indonesian feelings of inferiority, it had become a
cause célèbre threatening diplomatic relations. Some of the sharp feel
ings on the Indonesian side were apparently assuaged in October when
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) declared batik to be part of Indonesia’s intangible cultural
heritage, adding to a similar declaration in 2008 for shadow puppet the
ater (wayang kulit) and the keris, an asymmetrical dagger, which many
Malaysians had felt were at least equally theirs.
There also were some prominent deaths. W. S. Rendra, major poet
and playwright who achieved fame during the New Order for taking
stands against the government, died at age 74 on August 6, 2009. For
mer president of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid, who served from
1999 to 2001, died at age 69 on December 30, 2009. Gesang, composer
of many keroncong (songs), among them the world-famous “Ben
gawan Solo,” died at the age of 92 on May 20, 2010. Hasan di Tiro,
best known for founding the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the 1976–
2006 movement aimed at achieving Acehnese independence, died at
age 84 on June 3, 2010, one day after being officially reinstated as an
Indonesian citizen.
July 1, 2010
* * *
liii
After the manuscript for this book was completed in the summer of
2010, a number of important events took place. One of the most significant
was the ongoing struggle against corruption, particularly that involving pol
iticians and government bureaucrats. Public opinion appeared to stiffen fur
ther against corruption. In August 2010, not long before the traditional time
of forgiveness at the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, Presi
dent Yudhoyono issued pardons and remissions of sentences for a number
of individuals convicted of graft, most of whom had served 75 percent or
more of their sentences. Although such pardons are generally seen as cus
tomary, in this instance Yudhoyono was strongly criticized, and the ques
tion was asked more sharply than in the recent past whether he was indeed
committed to the struggle against corruption. The Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK), which had been viewed by many as seriously weak
ened in early 2010 by legislative efforts to rein in its powers, appeared to be
holding its own. Despite a call in July 2011 by People’s Representative
Council (DPR) speaker Marzuki Alie (from President Yudhoyono’s own
Democrat Party) for the dismantling of the agency, the People’s Consulta
tive Assembly (MPR) moved to establish the KPK more firmly with a con
stitutional amendment.
Meanwhile, the KPK itself continued to pursue suspects and attempt
to bring them to justice. The case of former police commissioner Susno
Duaji, the self-proclaimed whistle-blower suspected of widespread cor
rupt practices, proceeded with many sensational twists. Formally
charged in late September 2010 as the ringleader in a number of impor
tant graft cases, Duaji’s trials were just beginning 10 months later in
mid-2011. The most important new case was that of Gayus Halomoan
Tambunan, a midlevel tax official who said he was a witness who had
been prepared to testify against corrupt officials but was betrayed by
the KPK. He claimed he altered the tax forms of 149 corporations,
including Chevron and Ford, and received Guyanese passports from a
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent working for the KPK.
Gayus was sentenced to seven years in prison in one case, but, as of late
July 2011, three other cases against him were still pending. Another
major suspect in multiple corruption charges was former Democrat
Party treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin, who had spectactularly eluded
arrest and even had the entire country scanning television commercial
jingles for clues as to his whereabouts.
The legal troubles of male pop singer Nazril (Ariel) Irham, who was
charged with violating the 2008 Information and Electronic Transaction
Law for appearing in sexually explicit videos that were widely circulated
online, held the attention of many Indonesians in late 2010 and 2011.
The reason for the high degree of interest was that it revealed many lev
els of hypocrisy in society’s views of sex and morality, and more broadly
liv
because it tested the limits of openness and personal freedoms in the new
democracy. Arrested in mid-2010, Ariel was tried in January 2011 in a
Bandung court, where 1,000 police officers were deployed to maintain
security and order. He was sentenced to three and a half years in prison
and a fine equivalent to US$27,500; an appeal was rejected in April. The
case was used by the conservative minister of the Department of Com
munications and Information, Tifatul Sembiring, to garner support for
his efforts to force Internet providers to filter out pornographic content.
Providers complained that filtering would cost them more than US$110
million to implement and was, in any case, ineffective technologically.
Nevertheless, the government persisted, even pressing the Canadian
company, Research in Motion, to block porn from its Blackberry ser
vice. The government also attempted to enforce more widely a 2008 law
that criminalizes viewing, owning, downloading, and distributing por
nography, with sentences of up to six years in jail and fines of up to
US$115,000.
But, by April 2011, it was unclear whether Indonesia’s efforts to
control Internet usage and public morality in this way could be sus
tained. The government’s attempts—not least those by Minister Tifatul
himself—were widely ridiculed, and the department was forced to
admit publicly both that filters did not work very well and that it had
only 40 staff available to monitor the issue—a clearly inadequate num
ber. Respected lawmaker Arifinto of the Prosperous Justice Party
(PKS), which had strongly supported the 2008 antipornography law,
was caught watching pornography during a legislative session; he
promptly resigned, but columnists and others wondered aloud why an
entertainer had gone to jail but a legislator had not been charged, and
they mused that a high percentage of the Indonesian population was
now in danger of being declared criminals.
In early 2011, the aforementioned Jakarta housewife, Prita Mulya
sari, was partially vindicated by the Supreme Court, which overturned
a 2010 ruling that, although she was declared not guilty in a criminal
suit, she was liable in a civil suit that fined her more than US$20,000.
In 2009 the Supreme Court had also denied the hospital’s libel suit ask
ing US$250,000 in damages, but in July 2011 it granted a prosecutor’s
request for an appeal and reversed its opinion, finding Prita guilty and
sentencing her to six months in prison. Prita immediately filed for a
case review, but there was such widespread condemnation of the deci
sion and of the judicial system as a whole that some editorials foresaw
that the case might eventually force both abandonment of the 2008 law
and broad judicial reform.
There is evidence that views of the Suharto era are being modified
in public memory and thinking about contemporary society. Calls for
the promotion of Pancasila, which had become a hated feature of the
lv
Suharto era, continue to surface, and the government has announced
its intention to revitalize the philosophy, but without saying how it
would do so. The humanist thinker Radhar Panca Dahara acknowl
edged that most Indonesians still do not understand Pancasila, but he
cautioned that interpretation has to be individual rather than codified
to be effective. A member of the government commission overseeing
culture and education initiatives suggested that Pancasila could best be
revived by encouraging exemplary behavior rather than endless dis
cussion. Youth activist Melki Lakalena proposed that, rather than any
sort of rigid indoctrination, popular music and other forms of mass
culture could be used as vehicles for reawakening interest in Pan
casila. He said his suggested approach was a more “relaxed” way of
recognizing “the political role of culture in disseminating the value of
the state ideology,” a statement with an oddly back-to-the-future ring.
Another feature of both the Old Order and the New Order that, after
a brief eclipse, showed signs of returning was the government’s use of
book banning as a tool of social control. Between 1998 and 2006, no
books had been banned, although the Sukarno-era law sanctioning
such action remained in force. But after 2006 the practice saw some
revival. In December 2009, the attorney general invoked a 2004 law
(which had replaced a 1969 law based on a 1963 presidential decree)
that did not address “banning books” but rather “supervising the circu
lation of printed materials” to ban five books. Among them was the
Indonesian translation of John Roosa’s Pretext for Mass Murder: The
September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia, a
publication that the Attorney General’s Office deemed disturbing to
public order, even though it had already been in circulation in Indone
sia for nearly two years. By mid-2010, the Department of Justice and
Human Rights was reviewing about 200 books considered potential
“threats to the country’s unity,” 20 of them seriously. On October 13,
2010, however, in a case brought by a group of prominent authors, the
Constitutional Court ruled against the original 1963 decree that gave
the Attorney General’s Office the authority to place bans on specific
titles or on an author’s entire oeuvre, declaring instead that any calls
for bans had to be made through the court system. The government
can still proscribe certain works under a 1966 anticommunist law, and
under the 2008 antipornography law, but the practice of book banning
now is far more limited than in most of the past half-century.
All of these developments suggest that Indonesians are busy adjust-
ing—and often moderating—their views of the pre-1998 period,
reconsidering some aspects and rejecting others. Perhaps the most sur
prising evidence of this process was the nomination, in mid-October
2011, of former President Suharto as a “national hero,” one of 10 per
lvi
sons put forward by local officials. This suggestion, which was first
made by a Jawa Tengah district head on the 1,000-day anniversary of
Suharto’s death, elicited a vigorous debate in which there was unex
pectedly strong support for Suharto’s rehabilitation and recognition.
Public-opinion polls noted that, although the approval rating of Indo
nesia’s new democracy had grown from 42 percent in 1999 to 70 per
cent by late 2010, and few expressed any desire to return to the New
Order, Suharto now seemed to command growing respect. In a May
2011 survey, 41 percent named him “Indonesia’s Best President.” The
government finessed the national-hero issue by choosing only two
minority candidates connected in some way with Indonesia’s struggle
for independence, former cabinet minister Johannes Leimena, a Chris
tian from Maluku, and military officer Johannes Abraham Dimara, a
Christian from Papua.
The struggle against terrorism continues to occupy the government,
both within the country and in cooperation with Asian neighbors. In
March 2011, for example, Indonesian police representatives traveled to
Pakistan with fingerprints and DNA samples to identify the recently
arrested Umar Patek, a Jemaah Islamiyah member thought to be one of
the masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bombings and suspected of con
nections to many other incidents, including an explosion in an Islamic
boarding school in Bima, Nusa Tenggara Barat, on July 11, 2011. As of
that date, however, Indonesia was still one of three countries vying to
extradite him. The radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (also known as
Abu Bakar Bashir), who was accused of intellectual leadership of
Jemaah Islamiyah, charged in the Bali bombings, and served two years
in prison before his conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court,
was again arrested in August 2010 and later charged with funding and
coordinating a training program for a militant jihadist group in Aceh. He
was tried in June 2011 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Antiterrorist
forces maintained pressure on other suspected networks and individuals,
but were unable to prevent several local attacks, the most disturbing of
which probably was the April 2011 suicide bombing in Cirebon, Jawa
Tengah Province, where a young man purportedly angry at karaoke bars
and unregistered places of Christian worship blew himself up and
wounded many others in a mosque located in a police station. Because it
occurred in a place of Muslim worship and during Friday prayers, this
event is said to have particularly shocked public opinion.
News commentators and columnists agree that intolerance is on the
rise. The hardline group Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) appears
increasingly in reports of intimidation and often violent vigilantism.
Its members have involved themselves in local efforts to close down
“immoral” businesses, enforce fasting during Ramadan, and protest
lvii
against or close down political meetings and other activities sus
pected—often wildly erroneously—of being communist. Apparently
spontaneous outbreaks of violence also have occurred, such as a Feb
ruary 2011 incident in Banten, Jawa Barat Province, in which a crowd
of 1,500 people attacked and killed three members of the unorthodox
Muslim group Ahmadiyah while police stood by. In the eventual trial,
prosecutors charged 11 participants jointly with inciting violence and
committing assault leading to death, but no individuals were charged
with the actual killings. Such events pose a dilemma for both law-
enforcement and justice officials, not only because, as Muslims, they
often find it difficult to act against “protectors of Islam,” but also
because it is often difficult, in Indonesia’s still relatively recently
democratized society, to determine the proper boundary between free
dom of expression and intolerance.
Public reaction to violent and oppressive behavior by religious zeal
ots appears to be increasingly negative. Growing disapproval is most
notable where efforts to implement sharia are concerned. In Aceh,
where in 2010 more than 800 detentions were carried out by the sharia
police and men were forced to marry and women to have virginity
tests, public dissatisfaction arose, and activists complained of viola
tions of human rights. In the Bekasi area near Jakarta, polls taken
between April 2009 and March 2010 showed that individuals in favor
of the local government implementing sharia dropped from 43 percent
to 36 percent, and those who believed that thieves should have their
hands cut off declined from 38 percent to 32 percent. This and other
pieces of evidence may have encouraged police in some areas to take
stronger stances with regard to civilian organizations such as the FPI.
In July 2011, for example, the Jakarta police announced they would
take firm steps to prevent such groups from attacking businesses and
individuals who failed to observe government regulations on certain
kinds of entertainment during Ramadan, emphasizing that only the
police are permitted to take such action when warranted.
Concerns over rising intolerance and the violence it generates also
brought Indonesia’s most important Muslim associations to strengthen
and better publicize their stands against radicalism. In its centennial
year and with a membership of 29 million, Muhammadiyah (Followers
of Muhammad) strongly affirmed the ideas of former leader Ahmad
Syafii Maarif, who now promotes tolerance. Five years earlier,
Muhammadiyah appeared to be turning in a more uncompromising
direction. In July 2011, Muhammadiyah announced that it “conveys an
Islam that says no to conflicts between civilizations, an Islam that fos
ters cooperation, dialog, a cosmopolitan Islam [that is] a golden bridge
for a dialog between East and West.” Barely a week later, Nahdlatul
lviii
Ulama (Council of Scholars), Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization,
with 80 million followers, celebrated its eighty-fifth anniversary by
announcing that it would begin a campaign for a peaceful, tolerant
Islam, and argued that “Democracy is the best tool to improve people’s
welfare and to keep the nation united.” Nahdlatul Ulama’s youth orga
nization—Ansor (Helpers of Muhammad)—also announced that, in
response to the Cirebon mosque bombing, it was forming a special
antiterrorist unit called Detachment 99, after the antiterrorism branch
of the national police, Detachment 88.
Neither unresolved social problems nor threats of turbulence seem to
have affected economic performance. In 2010 Indonesia’s economy
grew 6.1 percent, foreign investment rose 52 percent to US$16.2 billion,
the stock market rose 20 percent in the first half of the year, and the
rupiah (Rp—see Glossary) appreciated nearly 5 percent against the U.S.
dollar. In the first quarter of 2011, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
raised the nation’s sovereign debt rating to BB+, or just one level below
investment grade. Strength within the Asian sphere was particularly
marked. For example, the largest share of foreign investment came from
member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN—see Glossary), and, as of late 2010, Indonesia was poised to
become the world’s largest manufacturer of footwear, as more companies
from Taiwan and South Korea relocated there.
Still, 15 percent of Indonesia’s population lives below the poverty
line of US$1 per day. In recognition of this disparity, President Yud
hoyono began 2011 by outlining the government’s “growth with equity”
philosophy of planning. Then, in a powerful and well-received special
address entitled “The Big Shift and the Imperative of 21st Century Glo
balism,” delivered at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzer
land, on January 27, 2011, he called for a new sense of globalism that is
“open-minded, pragmatic, adaptive and innovative,” a globalism in
which regional groupings play a crucial role in supplying both dyna
mism and restraint. The world economy, he stated, should be managed
“so that it functions to meet our needs rather than satisfying our greed,”
and he repeated Indonesia’s own national goal of “growth with equity,”
implying that the world community could well aim for something simi
lar. Indonesia took up the chair of ASEAN in 2011, and it was clear on
the eve of the organization’s annual meeting in late July 2011 that Indo
nesia would use that opportunity to emphasize the same themes and
enhance its growing international reputation as a political and economic
power to be reckoned with.
The United States has recognized the growing importance of Indone
sia, as well as a deepening rivalry with China for influence there. In
November 2010, the U.S. president, Barack Obama, visited Indonesia to
lix
underscore the significance of improved relations between the two coun
tries, and to launch what was termed a U.S.–Indonesian Comprehensive
Partnership, which, it was emphasized, should be a partnership of equals,
covering, among other things, a much-expanded program of educational
exchange, expanded cooperation in security issues, and efforts to
improve trade. President Obama’s twice-postponed visit, although brief,
was special because he was returning to the place he had lived for four
years as a boy. His speech at Universitas Indonesia included lofty ideas
on development, democracy, and religious tolerance and was quickly
compared to his inspiring “New Beginning” speech in Cairo in 2009. But
what the majority of Indonesians seemed to notice and appreciate most
was that when Obama spoke about the changes that had taken place in
Indonesia since the late 1960s, he did so first-hand and in colorful detail.
Above all, perhaps, it was noticed that he appeared to have a genuine
attachment to the country and its people; when he said simply, “Indonesia
is a part of me,” a great many Indonesians, including press and television
pundits, responded emotionally.
Indonesia continued to experience a high level of volcanic activity.
In late August 2010, Mount Sinabung, near Karo, Sumatera Utara
Province, erupted for the first time in 410 years, and in 2011 notewor
thy eruptions occurred in Java and Sulawesi. The extended series of
eruptions at Mount Merapi in late 2010 caused evacuations of more
than 135,000 people and more than 300 deaths near Yogyakarta. In
addition, there were earthquakes, the largest of which occurred in Octo
ber 2010, when an underwater quake off the Mentawai Islands, Suma
tera Barat Province, registered a magnitude of 7.7 and produced a tsu
nami estimated to have killed more than 300 people.
Finally, several important personalities who helped define modern
Indonesia passed from the scene. Akhdiat Miharja, a key figure in liter
ature during the 1940s and 1950s, died at age 99 on July 8, 2010. Iwan
Tirta (also known as Nusyirwan Tirtaamijaya), who had revitalized
batik design and brought Indonesia batik international recognition, died
at the age of 75 on July 31, 2010. Des Alwi, one of the last figures of
the revolutionary period (he was the adopted son of Mohammad Hatta
and a close associate of Sutan Syahrir), and later diplomat and writer,
died just before his eighty-third birthday on November 13, 2010. Rosi
han Anwar, legendary reporter, columnist, and public intellectual, was
88 when he died on April 14, 2011. And Franky Sahilatua, who played
an important role in popularizing voguish music of social criticism dur
ing the Suharto era, died at 57 on April 20, 2011.
lx
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Relief panel at Borobudur showing a trading ship, ca. AD 800
DEBATE ABOUT THE NATURE of Indonesia’s past and its rela
tionship to a national identity preceded by many decades the Repub
lic’s proclamation of independence in 1945, and it has continued in
different forms and with varying degrees of intensity ever since. But
beginning in the late 1990s, the polemic intensified, becoming more
polarized and entangled in political conflict. Historical issues took
on an immediacy and a moral character they had not earlier pos
sessed, and historical answers to the questions, “What is Indonesia?”
and “Who is an Indonesian?” became, for the first time, part of a
period of widespread public introspection. Notably, too, this was a
discussion in which foreign observers of Indonesian affairs had an
important voice.
There are two main views in this debate. In one of them, contem
porary Indonesia, both as an idea and as a reality, appears in some
degree misconceived, and contemporary “official” readings of its his
tory fundamentally wrong. In large part, this is a perspective originat
ing with the political left, which seeks, among other things, to correct
its brutal eclipse from national life since 1965. But it also has been,
often for rather different reasons, a dominant perspective among
Muslim intellectuals and foreign observers disenchanted with the
military-dominated government of Suharto’s New Order (1966–98)
or disappointed with the perceived failures of Indonesian nationalism
in general. The foreign observers, for example, increasingly empha
sized to their audiences that “in the beginning there was no Indone
sia,” portraying it as “an unlikely nation,” a “nation in waiting,” or an
“unfinished nation,” suggesting that contemporary national unity was
a unidimensional, neocolonial, New Order construction too fragile to
long survive the fall of that government.
An alternative view, reflecting government-guided textbook ver
sions of the national past, defines Indonesia primarily by its long
anticolonial struggle and focuses on integrative, secular, and tran
scendent “mainstream” nationalist perspectives. In this epic, linear,
and often hyperpatriotic conception of the past, Indonesia is the out
come of a singular, inevitable, and more or less self-evident histori
cal process, into which internal difference and conflict have been
absorbed, and on which the national character and unity depend.
Some foreign writers, often without fully realizing it, are inclined to
accept, without much questioning, the essentials of this story of the
development of the nation and its historical identity.
Both of these views came into question in the first decade of the
twenty-first century. On the one hand, Indonesia’s persistence for
3
Indonesia: A Country Study
Origins
Early Inhabitation
Indonesia consists of parts of the Sunda Shelf, extending from
mainland Asia and forming the world’s largest submerged continen
tal shelf; a deep-water channel charting what is known as Wallace’s
Line roughly running between the islands of Kalimantan and
Sulawesi, and between the islands of Bali and Lombok; and parts of
the Sahul Shelf, an extension of Australia (see The Geographic Con
text, ch. 2). Despite arcs of frequent volcanic activity and patterns of
rising and falling sea levels, this has been a favored region for mod
ern humans and their hominid predecessors for nearly 2 million
years. Today Indonesia is of crucial importance to the study of
human origins and evolution. Sites in central Java, such as Sangiran
and Ngandong, now account for about 75 percent of the world’s
examples of homo erectus, an early hominid type. Most recently, the
2004 announcement of discoveries on the island of Flores (between
Bali and Timor) created international controversy because they sug
gested an entirely new, locally evolved, and distinctively smaller
hominid form overlapping chronologically with both homo erectus
and modern humans.
4
Historical Setting
5
Indonesia: A Country Study
6
Historical Setting
Early Hegemonies
The Earliest Historical Records
Although some Indonesian peoples probably began writing on perish
able materials at an earlier date, the first stone inscriptions (in Sanskrit
7
Indonesia: A Country Study
using an early Pallava script from southern India) date from the end of
the fourth century AD (in the eastern Kalimantan locale of Kutai) and
from the early or mid-fifth century AD (in the western Java polity
known as Taruma). These inscriptions offer a glimpse of leaders newly
envisioning themselves not as mere chiefs (datu) but as kings or over
lords (raja, maharaja), taking Indic names and employing first Brah
manical Hindu, then Buddhist, concepts and rituals to invent new
traditions justifying their rule over newly conceived social and political
hierarchies. In addition, Chinese records from about the same time pro
vide scattered, although not always reliable, information about a number
of other “kingdoms” on Sumatra, Java, southwestern Kalimantan, and
southern Sulawesi, which, in the expanding trade opportunities of the
early fifth century, had begun to compete with each other for advantage,
but we know little else about them. Historians have commonly under
stood these very limited data to indicate the beginnings of the formation
of “states,” and later “empires” in the archipelago, but use of such terms
is problematic. We understand that small and loosely organized commu
nities consolidated and expanded their reach, some a great deal more
successfully than others, but even in the best-known cases we do not
have sufficient specific knowledge of how these entities actually worked
to compare them confidently with, for example, the states and empires of
the Mediterranean region during the same period or earlier. More gener
alized terms, such as “polities” or “hegemonies,” are suggestive of social
and political models that are more applicable.
Srivijaya and Mataram
Srivijaya
Two great hegemonies dominate the period from about the mid-
sixth to eleventh centuries. The first is known as Srivijaya, a Bud
dhist trading kingship centered on the region of today’s city of
Palembang, on the Musi River in present-day Sumatera Selatan
Province. At its zenith in the ninth and tenth centuries, Srivijaya
extended its commercial sway from approximately the southern half
of Sumatra and the Strait of Malacca to western Java and southern
Kalimantan, and its influence as far away as locations on the Malay
Peninsula, present-day southern Thailand, eastern Kalimantan, and
southern Sulawesi (see fig. 2). It probably arose out of policies of
war and alliance applied, perhaps rather suddenly, by one local entity
to a number of trading partners and competitors. The process is
thought to have coincided with newly important direct sea trade with
China in the sixth century, and by the second half of the seventh cen
tury Srivijaya had become a wealthy and culturally important Asian
8
Historical Setting
Mataram
The second great hegemony, known as Mataram, arose as Srivi
jaya began to flourish in the early eighth century, in south-central
Java on the Kedu Plain and southern slopes of Mount Merapi
(Gunung Merapi). Mataram’s early formation is obscure and compli
cated by the rivalry of two interrelated lines of aspiring paramount
rulers, one supporting Shivaist Hinduism (the Sanjaya) and the other
supporting Mahayana Buddhism (the Sailendra, who had commer
cial and family connections with Srivijaya). At some point between
824 and 856, these lines were joined by marriage, probably as part of
a process by which the leaders of local communities (rakai or
rakryan) were incorporated into larger hierarchies with rulers, pal
aces, and court structures. In this process, the construction of elabo
rately carved stone structures (candi) connecting local powers with
Buddhist or Hindu worldviews played an important role. The best
known and most impressive of these are the Borobudur, the largest
Buddhist edifice in the ancient world (constructed between about
770 and 820 and located northwest of present-day Yogyakarta) and
the magnificent complex of Hindu structures at Prambanan, located
east of Yogyakarta and completed a quarter-century later. These and
hundreds of other monuments built over a comparatively short
stretch of time in the eighth and ninth centuries suggest that Javanese
and Indic (Buddhist and Hindu) ideas about power and spirituality
9
Indonesia: A Country Study
CHA
M PA
Andaman
Sea KHM ER
KING DO M S
787
767
774
M
AL
South
AY
China
PE
Sea
NI
NS
UL
Str
ait
A
of
S
Ma
lac
ca
U
M
A
KALIMANTAN
T
R
A
BANGKA
Srivijaya
Mataram, 8th and 9th Palembang
99
927
centuries
1–
92
A BALI
Sumatran military fleets Borobudur (a N E
ft e S E
r 9 KI
Javanese military fleets Mt. Merapi Kediri 29 N G
) DO
Prambanan MS
0 150 300 Kilometers
Source: Based on information from Jan M. Pluvier, Historical Atlas of South-East Asia (New
York, 1995), Map 5; and Robert B. Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (Honolulu,
2000), Map 3.5.
Figure 2. Sumatra and Java from the Seventh Century to the Eleventh
Century
10
Historical Setting
was linked from a very early date to a larger world of commerce and
culture, through connections with ports not far away on Java’s north
coast. Like Srivijaya, Chinese, Indian, and other students of Buddhist
and Hindu thought visited Mataram, and Javanese ships traded and
made war against competitors in the archipelago (including Srivijaya)
and as far away as present-day Cambodia, Vietnam, and probably the
Philippines. Mataram was certainly not isolated from the wider
world, and in some respects its commercial life may have been more
sophisticated than that of its Sumatran contemporary, as it made com
mon use of gold and silver monetary units by the mid-ninth century,
some 200 years earlier than Srivijaya. Politically, the two hegemonies
were probably more alike than different. The rulers of both saw them
selves and their courts (kedatuan, keratuan, or kraton) as central to a
land or realm (bhumi), which, in turn, formed the core of a larger,
borderless, but concentric and hierarchically organized arrangement
of authority. In this greater mandala, an Indic-influenced representa
tion of a sort of idealized, “galactic” order, a ruler emerged from con
stellations of local powers and ruled by virtue of neither inheritance
nor divine descent, but rather through a combination of charisma
(semangat), strategic family relationships, calculated manipulation of
order and disorder, and the invocation of spiritual ideas and supernat
ural forces. The exercise of power was never absolute, and would-be
rulers and (if they were to command loyalty) their supporters had to
take seriously both the distribution of benefits (rather than merely the
application of force or fear) and the provision of an “exemplary cen
ter” enhancing cultural and intellectual life. In Mataram, overlords
and their courts do not, for example, appear to have controlled either
irrigation systems or the system of weekly markets, which remained
the purview of those who dominated local regions (watak) and their
populations. This sort of political arrangement was at once fragile and
remarkably supple, depending on the ruler and a host of surrounding
circumstances.
Very little is known about social realities in Srivijaya and Mataram,
and most of what is written is based on conjecture. With the exception
of the religious structures on Java, these societies were constructed of
perishable materials that have not survived the centuries of destruc
tive climate and insects. There are no remains of either palaces or
ordinary houses, for example, and we must rely on rare finds of jew
elry and other fine metalworking (such as the famous Wonosobo
hoard, found near Prambanan in 1991), and on the stone reliefs on the
Borobudur and a handful of other structures, to attempt to guess what
these societies may have been like. (The vast majority of these
remains are Javanese.) A striking characteristic of both Srivijaya and
Mataram in this period is that neither—and none of their smaller
11
Indonesia: A Country Study
12
Historical Setting
13
Indonesia: A Country Study
14
Historical Setting
significantly altered the diet of Maluku at this time), spread the use of
Malay (not Javanese) as a lingua franca, and brought news of the
kingdom’s urban center at Trowulan, which covered approximately
100 square kilometers and offered its inhabitants a remarkably high
standard of living. Majapahit’s writers continued the developments in
literature and wayang (see Glossary) begun in the Kediri period. The
best-known work today is Mpu Prapañca’s Desawarnaña, often
referred to as Nāgarakertāgama, composed in 1365, which provides
us with an unusually detailed view of daily life in the kingdom’s cen
tral provinces. Many other classic works also date from this period,
including the famous Panji tales, popular romances based on the his
tory of eastern Java that were loved and borrowed by storytellers as
far away as Thailand and Cambodia. Many of Majapahit’s administra
tive practices and laws governing trade were admired and later imi
tated elsewhere, even by fledgling powers seeking independence from
Javanese imperial control.
The image of Majapahit as a glorious empire united under a pow
erful ruler has captured the imagination of many Indonesian nation
alists since the 1920s. The modern national motto Bhinneka Tunggal
Ika (roughly, “Unity in Diversity”) was drawn from Mpu Tantular’s
poem “Sutasoma,” written during Hayam Wuruk’s reign; indepen
dent Indonesia’s first university took Gajah Mada’s name, and the
contemporary nation’s communication satellites are named Palapa,
after the oath of abstinence Gajah Mada is said to have taken in order
to achieve unity throughout the archipelago (nusantara). Construc
tion of a “Majapahit Park” (Taman Majapahit) on the Trowulan site
began in 2008, with the purpose of raising pride in the nation’s past.
(Some Indonesians interpret things rather differently and see the
park as an unwelcome reminder of Javanese dominance over the rest
of the archipelago, historically as well as in more recent times.)
Majapahit did not unify the archipelago in any modern sense, how
ever, and its hegemony proved in practice to be fragile and short-
lived. Beginning shortly after Hayam Wuruk’s death, an agricultural
crisis; civil wars of succession; the appearance of strong trading
rivals, such as Pasai (in northern Sumatra) and Melaka (on the Malay
Peninsula); and restive vassal rulers eager for independence all chal
lenged the political-economic order from which Majapahit had drawn
much of its legitimacy. Internally, the ideological order also began to
falter as courtiers and others among the elite, perhaps following pop
ular trends, abandoned Hindu-Buddhist cults centered on a supreme
kingship in favor of ancestral cults and practices focused on salvation
of the soul. In addition, new and often intertwined external forces
also brought significant changes, some of which may have contrib
uted to the dissolution of Majapahit’s paramountcy.
15
Indonesia: A Country Study
Outside Influences
China
One of these external forces was the growing influence of China.
After the Mongol incursions, the early Majapahitan state did not
have official relations with China for a generation, but it did adopt
Chinese copper and lead coins (pisis or picis) as official currency,
which rapidly replaced local gold and silver coinage and played a
role in the expansion of both internal and external trade. By the sec
ond half of the fourteenth century, Majapahit’s growing appetite for
Chinese luxury goods such as silk and ceramics, and China’s
demand for such items as pepper, nutmeg, cloves, and aromatic
woods, fueled a burgeoning trade. China also became politically
involved in Majapahit’s relations with restless vassal powers
(Palembang in 1377) and, before long, even internal disputes (the
Paregreg War, 1401–5). At the time of the celebrated state-sponsored
voyages of Chinese Grand Eunuch Zheng He between 1405 and
1433, there were large communities of Chinese traders in major trad
ing ports on Java and Sumatra; their leaders, some appointed by the
Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) court, often married into the local popu
lation and came to play key roles in its affairs.
Islam
Another external force of great importance was Islam, which had
been known in the archipelago since the eighth century but does not
appear to have begun to take hold until the beginning of the thirteenth
century at the earliest. The first Indonesian Islamic ruler in the archi
pelago for whom we now have clear evidence was Sultan Sulaiman
of Lamreh (northern Sumatra), who died in 1211; several other
Sumatran kings, probably influenced by traders and intellectuals
arriving from Gujarat and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, became
Muslims later in the thirteenth century. Javanese do not appear to
have begun conversion until well into the fifteenth century, despite
several centuries’ presence there of foreign Muslims. Much of this
story may not yet be clear to historians, however, for graves at
Trowulan and Tralaya near the eastern Java heart of Hindu-Buddhist
Majapahit strongly suggest that some members of that state’s elite,
perhaps even of the court, had converted to Islam as early as 1368, a
time when Majapahit and its state orthodoxies were still very much in
the ascendent. The small trading port states on the Pasisir—Java’s
north coast—many of which later broke away from Majapahit’s con
trol, do not appear to have begun to convert to Islam until at least the
mid-fifteenth century. This probably developed from the influence of
16
Historical Setting
17
Indonesia: A Country Study
Portugal
A third external force came into play with the arrival of the Portu
guese in the archipelago. They reached the rich and expanding
Melaka, on the Malay Peninsula, in 1509 and sought trading rights
there. Some in Melaka’s cosmopolitan trading community wanted to
accept them (perhaps as a counterweight against Sultan Mahmud’s
controversial imperial policies), but others did not, heightening exist
ing political tensions. When the Portuguese returned in 1511 com
manded by the more demanding Alfonso de Albuquerque, they
defeated Melaka militarily, soon establishing themselves in the trad
ing ports of Banten (western Java) and Ternate (Maluku), and con
tacting the much reduced Majapahit kingdom at Kediri in eastern
Java. These events do not, as is sometimes suggested, mark the begin
ning of Western colonial rule, or even European primacy, in Indone
sia; that lay far in the future. Rather, the “Western intrusion” was at
this stage merely one dynamic bound up, in often unpredictable ways,
with many others. Thus, the final days of Majapahit, weakened by
internal division, were determined by Trenggana, the half-Chinese
Muslim ruler of its former vassal port Demak, who in 1527 con
quered Kediri for reasons that had as much to do with economic and
political rivalry (with Banten, the Portuguese, and Majapahit’s rem
nants) as they did with religious struggle (with both Christianity and
Hindu-Buddhist ideology).
18
Historical Setting
19
20
S u lawesi S ea
Ternate HALMAHERA
1607,1683 1669
a n
it
Tidore
ra
(ceded to Dutch by Ternate 1677) 1657,1667
(Sp 1606
St
occ
ish –63)
upa
KU
sar
LU
ntio
MA
kas
Sea
SULA OBI
Ma
ESI 1682
L AW
SU Luwu 1652
1667
Seram Sea
Piru
ku
1647
1658 SERAM
Indonesia: A Country Study
alu
BURU
1657 1653
M
Ambon
1605
BUTUNG BANDA
1613,1667 ARCHIPELAGO
Bone (sovereignty renounced by 1609–21
1669
1667 Gowa 1667, by Ternate 1683) a Sultanate of Ternate until 1677
Makassar Se
Gowa da Sultanate of Tidore
1667 Ban Makassar (Gowa) kingdom and
dependencies recognizing
its suzerainty until 1667
Flores S ea
Portuguese and territories
claimed by Portugal
Area under Dutch control
FLORES before 1803
Dili
1683) 1605 Dates refer to Dutch influence,
Ternate
e d fr o m occupation, establishment of
(seced
SUMBAWA effective control, or formal
1673–74 SU Sawu Sea suzerainty
175MBA
Kupang
OR 0 100 200 Kilometers
7 SAWU M
1653 TI
1676 0 100 200 Miles
Source: Based on information from Jan M. Pluvier, Historical Atlas of South-East Asia (New York, 1995), Map 24.
21
Indonesia: A Country Study
22
Historical Setting
23
Indonesia: A Country Study
a high price for their assistance and whose loyalty could never be
taken for granted. It was also the case that even when it had its way—
for example, by gaining control of specific trading ports or routes, or
of the main areas in which particular spices were produced—inter
ventions by the VOC often had unintended short- and long-term con
sequences that it could do little to control. Finally, of course, the
VOC’s fortunes were subject to the vagaries of a trading system that
stretched far beyond the archipelago, including the rise and fall in
world demand for spices and, later, for other products on which it
came to depend, such as coffee. In the course of nearly two centuries,
the company failed to control the spice trade and establish the stable
conditions necessary for mercantile growth, and came to rule over
only minute patches of territory, except for small areas in Maluku in
the seventeenth century and Java in the eighteenth.
Nevertheless, the VOC had a shaping influence in the archipelago.
In what today is eastern Indonesia, the company—with, it is important
to reiterate, the help of indigenous allies—between 1610 and 1680
fundamentally altered the terms of the traditional spice trade by forci
bly limiting the number of nutmeg and clove trees, ruthlessly control
ling the populations that grew and prepared the spices for the market,
and aggressively using treaties and military means to establish VOC
hegemony in the trade. One result of these policies, exacerbated by
the late-seventeenth-century fall in the global demand for spices, was
an overall decline in regional trade, an economic weakening that
affected the VOC itself as well as indigenous states, and in many
areas occasioned a withdrawal from commercial activity. Others were
the rise of authoritarian rulers dependent on VOC support and unrest
among groups—traditional leaders, merchants, religious and military
figures—who opposed one or the other or both. Among the most
prominent examples are those found in the histories of Ternate in the
time of Sultan Mandar (r. 1648–75) and the wars against Hitu and
Hoamoal (1638–56), and of southern Sulawesi in the era of the ambi
tious Buginese (Bone) prince Arung Palakka (1634–96) and the wars
against the Makassarese (Gowa) and others. By the end of the seven
teenth century, the glories of the spice trade had faded, and the vitality
of the large and small states of the post-Majapahit era had been
sapped; the weight of affairs had again begun to shift west, to Java.
The Javanese and the VOC, 1619–1749
In 1619 the VOC had seized Jayakerta (Sunda Kelapa), a small but
well-protected west Javanese port it had originally contracted from a
disgruntled vassal of the sultanate of Banten, renaming it Batavia,
forerunner of today’s Jakarta. The resolute Governor General Jan
24
Historical Setting
25
Indonesia: A Country Study
sway. He was not, however, able to dislodge the VOC, and after the
failed campaign of 1628–29 he appears to have accepted the Dutch
presence as a minor irritant. Contemporaneous Javanese historical
works treated the company more as a potential ally than as a serious
threat, a view that persisted among many in court circles for another
century or more. And, indeed, at the time the VOC was neither inter
ested in nor capable of tackling the full force of Mataram, which
despite the destruction and political tensions wrought by nearly 40
years of expansion remained a formidable military power. The com
pany saw itself as a maritime power, a rival for the control of produce
and trade rather than territory, and it sought stable conditions for its
activities rather than upheaval (see fig. 4).
Conditions began to change, however, during the disastrous reign
of Sultan Agung’s son, Amangkurat I (r. 1646–77), who lacked his
father’s talents but sought to further strengthen the realm by central
izing authority, monopolizing control of resources, and destroying
all real or imagined opposition. His misguided efforts to control
trade revenues by twice closing the ports of the Pasisir, and even
destroying Javanese trading vessels and forbidding Javanese travel
overseas, had the opposite effect, in addition to alienating the com
mercial community and damaging the wider economy of producers.
His obsessive fear of opposition led him to kill more than 5,000
Muslim leaders and their families in a single, well-planned massa
cre, and to murder hundreds of court officials and members of the
aristocracy, including his own family, actions that of course only
increased the hatred and intrigues aimed at removing him. His atti
tude toward the VOC was ambivalent, for, on the one hand, he
admired its apparent wealth and power and considered it a potential
ally and protector, yet on the other hand he sought to bend it to his
will and to extract all he could from its representatives in Batavia.
Beginning in the early 1670s, rebellions began to rise, the most pow
erful of which was led by Raden Trunajaya (ca. 1649–80), a
Madurese aristocrat conspiring with a disaffected son of Amangku
rat I and allied with Makassarese and other forces. Trunajaya’s
armies won a decisive victory in 1676 and looted the capital the fol
lowing year. Mataram was disintegrating.
In the course of this conflict, both sides requested assistance from
the VOC, which now faced a momentous decision. The company
sought political stability and a reliable supply of such key products
as rice and teak, and it determined for the first time in more than a
half-century that, in order to obtain them, intervention in Mataram’s
internal affairs was necessary. Company officials viewed Javanese
kingship through a European lens as a relatively absolutist, central
ized form of rule that legitimated succession by, if not strict primo
26
Historical Setting
27
28
SU
M
AT
R A
Java Sea
Banten Jayakerta 1611–18/Batavia 1619
1619
Banten
Jepara
1684–1809 Cirebon 1610–1708 Rembang
Demak Northeast Coastal MADURA
Priangan Region Cirebon Pekalongan
Indonesia: A Country Study
Source: Based on information from Robert B. Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (Honolulu, 2000), Maps 3.21, 3.25, 3.26, and 3.50; Jan M. Pluvier, Historical
Atlas of South-East Asia (New York, 1995), Maps 22 and 23; and D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (New York, 1981), 351.
who reigned but refrained from meddling too deeply. It was a strange
conquest.
The peace was in many respects also strange, for rather than set
tling Java into a calm “traditional” existence, it provided the setting
for ongoing social and cultural ferment as Javanese reassessed not
only their past but also their present. The literary reflections of this
crisis have been insufficiently studied, but works ascribed to the Sura
karta court poets Yasadipura I (1729–1803) and his son Yasadipura II
(? –1844), for example, suggest that efforts to reexamine and revital
ize old histories failed, not least because the ability to read them accu
rately had been lost, and that attempts to understand the Java—and,
we might say, “Javaneseness”—of their own day led frequently to
searing critiques of their own social hierarchy and customs, as well as
those of foreigners and Islam. This sort of questioning and restless
ness was not necessarily fatal, however, and might under different cir
cumstances have permitted a continuation of the equilibrium already
achieved or even conceivably have led to a kind of Javanese renais
sance and a different, more advantageous relationship with the Dutch.
But changes in the larger world determined otherwise.
In the early 1780s, the last in a series of wars with the British cost
the Netherlands, including the VOC and its far-flung interests,
dearly. Nearly half the company’s ships were lost, and much of their
valuable cargoes; enormous debts accumulated, which, despite state
loans, could not be repaid. While the company certainly was bur
dened with other fiscal and administrative problems, among them a
high level of corruption among its employees, the British war seems
to have been the critical factor in its fiscal collapse. In 1796 the VOC
was placed under the direction of a national committee until the end
of 1799, when it was liquidated, its debts and possessions absorbed
by the Dutch government.
By this time, however, the Napoleonic wars had brought the Neth
erlands under French control, and in rapid succession the former
VOC territories fell under the direction of leaders appointed by
France—the military officer Herman Willem Daendels from 1808 to
1811—and, after Napoleon’s defeat, by Britain, which appointed an
East India Company official, Thomas Stamford Raffles, for the
period 1811–16. Daendels and Raffles saw themselves as liberal
reformers, enemies of feudal privilege and practices such as forced
labor and delivery of produce, proponents of the welfare of the com
mon folk, and opponents of corruption and inefficiency. Raffles
sought to “free” Javanese laborers by instituting a system of land
rent, in which farmers grew cash crops and sold them in order to pay
the government for the use of the land. But the sharpest break with
VOC practice lay in the assumption by the new powers of sovereign
29
Indonesia: A Country Study
rights over the Javanese courts, treating rulers and courtiers not as
allies but as clear subordinates, and their representatives not as local
lords but as mere bureaucratic officeholders. Both men interfered
directly in court affairs. Daendels replaced Yogyakarta’s ruler (on
suspicion of rebellion) and annexed territory by force of arms. Raf
fles actually bombarded and looted the Yogyakarta court (for the
same reason), establishing the Pakualaman from some of its appa
nage lands, and exiled an unruly Surakarta prince. These acts, and
the attitudes behind them, foreshadowed nothing less than a new age
for the archipelago, an age of Dutch colonial rule.
30
Historical Setting
31
Indonesia: A Country Study
Sulawesi Sea
1889
t
r ai
A
St
AL
ssar
Gulf of Tomini
DONGG
Maka
I Maluku Sea
GA
G
N
CLAIMED A
B
BY LUWU
(1905)
N
Gulf of
DAR
(190 ATIO
Tolo
7)
LUWU
MAN
6–
ER
FED
(1906)
L
A
MASENREMPULU IW
FEDERATION U
ADJATAPPARANG WAJO
I
FEDERATION Gulf of
Bone
SOPENG
BONE BU
(1905)
(19
T
U Banda Sea
Makassar 0 5– N
6)
G
1860
GOWA
1911
Source: Based on information from Jan M. Pluvier, Historical Atlas of South-East Asia (New
York, 1995), Map 40.
rulers and they are the ruled.” The resulting colonial state did not come
suddenly into existence, however, but developed in stages, from hybrid
arrangements of convenience to a modernizing administrative struc
ture, over the course of more than a century.
32
Historical Setting
33
Indonesia: A Country Study
Among the last conflicts were those in Bali and Lombok, where
the intervention of colonial forces after 1840 had been limited, in
part by fierce Balinese resistance. After the mid-1880s, however,
warfare and rebellion in a number of Balinese kingdoms, and Dutch
interest in controlling the important, ongoing local trade in slaves
and opium, led the colonial state to apply increasing military pres
sure. It conquered Lombok in 1894, and, between 1906 and 1908,
the last independent Balinese rulers submitted. In the kingdoms of
Badung, Tabanan, Klungkung, and others, the rajas and their fami
lies and followers sacrificed themselves in dramatic frontal assaults
on the KNIL guns. These puputan, or ritual suicides, killed hundreds
of men, women, and children, decimating the aristocracy and obliter
ating all meaningful further resistance to the expansion of colonial
rule in Bali. With smaller campaigns to establish claims of colonial
sovereignty in Timor and Flores between 1908 and 1910, the Nether
lands East Indies reached, at least in outline, its final extent, includ
ing far-off territories such as the Kai Islands (in southeastern
Maluku) and Papua (on the island of New Guinea).
The Cultivation System
A colonial state aimed at managing the territories and people
acquired as a result of these conquests—or “pacifications,” as some
preferred to describe them—emerged gradually and piecemeal. It
first began to take shape around the time of Diponegoro’s defeat,
with the inauguration in Java of policies that came to be known as
the Cultivation System (Cultuurstelsel). This was the brainchild of
Johannes van den Bosch, a military man and social reformer who
became governor general (1830–34) and later minister of colonies
(1834–39). He sought to solve the fiscal problems of Batavia and the
Netherlands, both of which were on the brink of bankruptcy, as well
as those of a populace devastated by warfare on Java. Van den Bosch
believed that Java was a rich but underproductive land, primarily
because Javanese farmers, even when their own prosperity was at
stake, would not or could not produce beyond a subsistence level
unless guided, even compelled, to do so. “Force,” he wrote, “is
everywhere the basis of industry ... where it does not exist there is
neither industry nor civilization.”
Van den Bosch’s plan forced Java’s farmers either to use existing
agricultural lands or open new ones in order to cultivate crops for
export, deliver them to the government at fixed prices, and utilize the
income to offset or pay the government taxes on their land. The
crops first targeted were sugar and indigo, but coffee and pepper
were soon added, followed by newer crops, such as tea, tobacco, and
34
Dutch official’s home in Surabaya, 1854
Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division,
LC–USZ62–105190, digital ID cph 3c05190
cinnamon. Unlike the system that Raffles had contemplated, van den
Bosch proposed dealing with whole villages rather than individuals,
and using government officials and local authorities (who received a
percentage of revenues their areas generated) to regulate which
crops would be grown, on which and how much land, with which
and how much labor, and at what prices. Bringing the produce to the
world market through the Netherlands became the monopoly of the
Netherlands Trading Association (NHM), a private company in
which the Dutch king was a major stockholder. Entrepreneurs in
general were locked out of the state-run system. This approach, van
den Bosch argued, would assure production and profits great enough
not only to subsidize the colonial administration and contribute
handsomely to the treasury of the Netherlands but also to substan
tially improve the well-being of the Javanese. Scholars and politi
cians alike have been arguing ever since over what exactly the
results were.
There is little doubt that fiscally, and from a government perspec
tive, the Cultivation System was an enormous success. Between 1830
and 1870, Java’s exports increased more than tenfold, and profits
nearly sevenfold; the colonial government regained solvency almost
immediately and between 1832 and 1877 remitted a budgetary surplus
35
Indonesia: A Country Study
(batig slot) totaling 823 million Dutch guilders to the treasury of the
Netherlands, on average about 18 million guilders annually, about a
third of the national budget. It is no exaggeration to say that nine
teenth-century Dutch prosperity rested very largely upon these funds.
Whether the Javanese benefited from or were impoverished by the
Cultivation System, however, is much less clear. Generalization about
this question is made particularly difficult by the fact that the system
as actually implemented was not very systematic and varied consider
ably according to time, place, and circumstance. In some regions, for
example, 40 percent of the adult population labored for the system
and in others, 100 percent; in some areas, less than 4 percent of agri
cultural land was used and in others, 15 percent. Abuses of the sys
tem’s provisions, including official corruption, also varied sharply by
locale. The principal criticisms were, and continue to be today, moral
ones. The Cultivation System was portrayed as having been founded
on greed and as being not only coercive and exploitative but also
prone to a range of abuses, all of which produced, for the average vil
lager, only impoverishment. This view was put forth most memorably
in the 1860 Dutch novel Max Havelaar by Eduard Douwes Dekker
(1820–77), an embittered former colonial official who wrote under
the pseudonym Multatuli (“I have suffered much”). Douwes Dekker’s
account was widely understood, probably not entirely accurately, as a
thoroughgoing indictment of colonial rule in general and the Cultiva
tion System in particular, which he accused of having created a uni
formly desperate, destitute peasantry. This, or something much like it,
became the received view. Recent studies, however, based on reread
ings of old evidence as well as on archival information that became
available only in the mid-twentieth century, suggest a far more com
plex picture. While acknowledging that the burdens of the Cultivation
System fell on the laboring Javanese populace, they also argue that
the majority probably saw at least limited economic improvement and
took advantage of new economic opportunities, although at the cost
of a more regimented and government-controlled existence, and with
the added risk of dependency on world markets. This was a form of
circumscribed change that shaped Java’s village world far into the
future.
The Cultivation System had not required an elaborate state appa
ratus. It was deliberately a form of indirect rule using an existing
hierarchy of the Javanese priyayi (see Glossary) elite, especially the
upper ranks of traditional local officeholders known as the pangreh
praja (rulers of the realm) and village heads. As late as the mid
1850s, European officials and regional supervisors numbered fewer
than 300 for an indigenous population of more than 10 million. A
36
Rubber plantation workers, Java, between 1900 and 1923
Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Frank and
Frances Carpenter Collection, LC–USZ62–100045, digital ID cph 3c00045
37
Indonesia: A Country Study
38
Historical Setting
rule and lessening of European influence, this was not the case. They
aimed at modernizing the imperial state, which also meant Europe
anizing, or at least Westernizing, it. It is fair to say that in technical
matters the Ethicists were more successful than with social and polit
ical questions: food production generally kept pace with population
growth, and distribution improved; efforts to combat the plague and
other diseases were moderately effective; and irrigation and trans
portation facilities (roads, railroads, and shipping lines) grew rap
idly. The problem of administrative dualism could not be resolved,
however, largely because European officialdom was unwilling to
surrender its position. Political decentralization and the introduction
of some form of representation for Europeans and indigenes edu
cated in Europe were limited by, among other things, the central
government’s reluctance to surrender its ultimate control of budget
ary and legal affairs. Likewise, legal standardization foundered on
the increasingly heated debate over whether non-Europeans should
be subject to Western law or to other legal principles such as those of
local unwritten custom (adat) or the sharia (see Glossary), Islamic
law, called syariah in Bahasa Indonesia.
The Racial Issue
The unresolved issue of greatest importance was that of racial classi
fication, which the modern Dutch historian Cees Fasseur has identified
as both the “cornerstone and stumbling block” of the colonial state.
Under the VOC, people were classified mainly on the basis of religion
rather than race, Christianized indigenes generally falling under the
same laws as Protestant Europeans. In the early nineteenth century,
however, “enlightened” ideas began to emphasize—often on “humani
tarian” grounds that sought protection of indigenous peoples—a separa
tion between native and European rights, and the Cultivation System,
with its clear distinction between rulers and ruled, emphasized that
divide. In practice, if not yet in law, non-Europeans were treated very
differently from Europeans in judicial and penal matters, and in 1848
legal and commercial codes appeared that were applicable to Europeans
only. Statutes of 1854 made a formal (but not very specific) distinction
between Europeans and natives (inlanders), at the same time as offering
them “equal” protection. Everyday understanding and practice, how
ever, was that “equal” did not mean “the same,” and that, in particular,
Europeans and Asians occupied separate legal spheres. Almost immedi
ately, however, there were difficulties. The category of Asians was fur
ther divided into “natives” and “foreign orientals,” among whom the
Chinese, ostensibly for business reasons, in 1885 were determined to
fall under European commercial law. The category “European” did not
39
Indonesia: A Country Study
40
Historical Setting
41
Indonesia: A Country Study
42
Historical Setting
43
Indonesia: A Country Study
44
Historical Setting
45
Indonesia: A Country Study
46
Historical Setting
47
Indonesia: A Country Study
48
Royal Netherlands Indies Army
soldiers in training during
World War II
Courtesy Library of Congress
Prints and Photographs Division,
U.S. Office of War Information
Collection, LC–USE613–D–
010623, digital ID fsa 8b13123
likely. The Netherlands fell to Hitler’s forces on May 10, 1940, leav
ing the colony more or less to its own devices. Six months later, the
colonial government made it clear that it was unalterably opposed to
Indonesia merdeka—a free Indonesia—and therefore to the Indone
sian national idea as it had developed to that time; no real accommo
dation was possible. Little wonder that by that time a great many
thoughtful Indonesians, even the most moderate, had concluded that
only the shock and dislocation of war in the archipelago might—
possibly—bring about changes favorable to them.
49
Indonesia: A Country Study
50
Historical Setting
51
Indonesia: A Country Study
52
Historical Setting
God”) was recognized in the fifth principle, one religion was point
edly not favored over another, and the state would be neither secular
nor theocratic in nature. Thirty-nine of 60 voting members of the
BPUPK voted to define the new state as comprising the former
Netherlands East Indies as well as Portuguese Timor, New Guinea,
and British territories on Borneo and the Malay Peninsula. Spirited
debate on the structure of the state led finally to the acceptance of a
unitary republic. An informal subcommittee, in a decision subse
quently dubbed the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), suggested that
Muslim concerns about the role of Islam in the new state be
addressed by placing Sukarno’s last principle first, requiring that the
head of state be a Muslim, and adding a phrase requiring all Muslim
citizens to follow the sharia. This declaration was to be the source of
continuing misunderstanding.
The United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Naga
saki, respectively, on August 6 and 8, 1945, and the Japanese rushed
to prepare Indonesian independence. Vetoing the “Greater Indonesia”
idea, military authorities required that the new state be limited to the
former Netherlands East Indies and called for the establishment of an
Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI) with
Sukarno as chairman. This group was established on August 12,
1945, but Japan surrendered three days later, before it had an opportu
nity to meet. The established Indonesian leadership, led by Sukarno
and Hatta, greeted the surrender with initial disbelief and caution, but
some pemuda, many of them followers of Sutan Syahrir, took a more
radical stance, kidnapping Sukarno and Hatta on the night of August
15–16 in an effort to force them to declare independence immediately
and without Japanese permission. Their efforts may actually have
delayed matters slightly, as Hatta later accused, but in any case, in a
simple ceremony held before a small group in the front yard of his
home at 10:00 AM on August 17, 1945, Sukarno, after a brief speech,
delivered a two-sentence statement officially proclaiming indepen
dence and noting that “details concerning the transfer of authority,
etc., would be worked out as quickly and thoroughly as possible.”
The next day, the PPKI met for the first time to adopt a constitu
tion. Some key stipulations of the Jakarta Charter were cancelled,
with the suggestion that such issues be revisited later, but the version
of Pancasila that now became the official creed of the Republic of
Indonesia began with the principle of “belief in [one supreme] God,”
followed by humanitarianism, national unity, popular sovereignty
arrived at through deliberation and representative or consultative
democracy, and social justice. Such was the idealistic vision of a
national civic society with which Indonesia began its independent life.
53
Indonesia: A Country Study
54
Street scene with a military truck and walls with slogans,
55
Indonesia: A Country Study
56
Historical Setting
its affiliated militia (laskar) were humiliated, and yet greater criti
cism of the government arose, now even from within the military
itself and from Muslim leaders.
The Republic had from the start of the Revolution pursued a vig
orous if informal diplomacy to win other powers to its side, efforts
that now bore fruit. The UN listened sympathetically to Prime Min
ister Syahrir’s account of the situation in mid-August 1947, and a
month later announced the establishment of a Committee of Good
Offices, with members from Australia, Belgium, and the United
States, to assist in reaching a settlement. The result was the Renville
Agreement, named for the U.S. Navy ship—considered neutral terri
tory—on which it was negotiated and signed between January 17
and 19, 1948. But this accord proved even less popular in the Repub
lic than its predecessor, as it appeared to accept both the Van Mook
Line, which in fact left numbers of TNI troops inside Dutch-claimed
territories, requiring their withdrawal, and the Dutch notion of a fed
eration rather than a unitary state pending eventual plebiscites.
Republican leaders reluctantly signed it because they believed it was
essential to retaining international goodwill, especially that of the
United States. In the long run, they may have been correct, but the
short-term costs were enormous.
Internally the Republic was threatening to disintegrate. Public
confidence in the Republic began to erode because of the worsening
economic situation, caused in part by the Dutch blockade of sea trade
and seizure of principal revenue-producing plantation regions, as
well as by a confused monetary situation in which Dutch, Republi
can, and sometimes locally issued currencies competed. Conflict
became more frequent between the TNI and laskar and among
laskar, as they competed for territory and resources or argued over
tactics and political affiliation. The KNIP initiated a reorganization
and rationalization program in December 1947, seeking to reduce
regular and irregular armed forces drastically in order the better to
supply, train, and control them. To patriots as well as those with other
motives, this move seemed no better than treason, and the result was
chaos. In addition, tensions mounted rapidly and at all levels between
Muslims and both the government and leftist forces. Local clashes
were reported in eastern and western Java after early 1948, but the
most immediate challenge to the Republic was the movement led by
S. M. Kartosuwiryo (1905–62), a foster son of H. U. S. Cokroamin
oto, who had supported the 1928 Youth Pledge and pemuda national
ists in 1945 but later felt betrayed by the Renville Agreement and
took up arms against the Republic, with himself at the head of an
Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII). In the Garut-Tasikmalaya region of
57
Indonesia: A Country Study
58
People’s Security Forces machine gunner, 1946
Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division,
LC–USZ62–137192, digital ID cph 3c37192
59
Indonesia: A Country Study
and army, produced within five months a dissolution of the RIS into
a new, unitary Republic of Indonesia, which was officially declared
on the symbolic date of August 17, 1950. Only the breakaway
Republic of South Maluku (RMS) resisted this incorporation. TNI
forces opposed and largely defeated the RMS in the second half of
1950, but about 12,000 of its supporters were relocated to the Neth
erlands, and there and in Maluku itself separatist voices were heard
for the next half-century.
The Road to Guided Democracy, 1950–65
Recovery
Developments during the first 15 years of Indonesia’s indepen
dent history have been comparatively little studied in recent years
and tend to be explained in rather simple, dichotomous terms of, for
example, a struggle between “liberal democracy” and “primordial
authoritarianism,” between pragmatic “problem solvers” and idealis
tic “solidarity builders,” or between political left and right. These
analyses are not entirely wrong, for Indonesia was indeed polarized
during these years, but they tend to oversimplify the poles, and to
ignore other parts of the story, such as the remarkable flourishing of
literature and painting that drew on the sense of personal and cultural
liberation produced by the National Revolution. The new govern
ment also had extraordinary success, despite a lack of funds and
expertise, in the field of education: in 1930 adult literacy stood at
less than 7.5 percent, whereas in 1961 about 47 percent of those over
the age of 10 were literate. It was a considerable achievement, too,
that Indonesia in 1955 held honest, well-organized, and largely
peaceful elections for an eligible voting public of nearly 38 million
people scattered throughout the archipelago, more than 91 percent of
whom cast a ballot. Still, it is fair to characterize the period as one of
heavy disillusion as well, in which the enormously high expectations
that leaders and the public had for independence could not be met,
and in which the search for solutions was both intense and frag
mented. While it may be true, as historian Anthony Reid has sug
gested, that the Revolution succeeded in “the creation of a united
nation,” in 1950 that nation was still no more than a vision, and it
remained to be seen whether the same ideas that had brought it to life
could also be used to give it substance.
Perhaps the greatest expectation of independence, shared by mid
dle and lower classes, rural as well as urban dwellers, was that it
would bring dramatic economic improvement. This hope had been
embedded in the nationalist message since at least the 1920s, which
60
Historical Setting
Economic Pressures
In the early 1950s, Indonesia’s economy experienced a boomlet,
principally as a result of Korean War (1950–53) trade, especially in
oil and rubber; taxes on this trade supplied nearly 70 percent of the
government’s revenues. Between 1950 and 1955, the gross national
product (GNP—see Glossary) is thought to have grown at an annual
rate of about 5.5 percent, and it increased 23 percent between
1953—when real GDP again reached the 1938 level—and 1957. In
retrospect, economists seem agreed that, against heavy odds, the
immediate postcolonial economy was not hopeless. Nevertheless,
what most Indonesians saw and felt did not seem like economic
progress at all: wages rose, but prices rose faster, and the growing
ranks of urban workers and government employees were especially
vulnerable to the resulting squeeze. The government also was
squeezed between falling trade-tax revenues and rising expenses,
especially those required to support a bureaucracy that nearly dou
bled in size between 1950 and 1960. Infrastructure, badly needing
rehabilitation, was neglected, adversely affecting production and
trade. Corruption and crime spread. In 1956 rice made up 13 percent
of Indonesia’s imports, compared to self-sufficiency in 1938; by
1960 only 10 percent of the national income derived from manufac
turing, compared to 12 percent in 1938. In economists’ terms this
was “structural regression,” but in everyday experience it meant that
61
Indonesia: A Country Study
62
Historical Setting
63
Indonesia: A Country Study
64
Historical Setting
Political Paralysis
Symbolic of the paralysis that gripped political life at the time, the
Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), which had been elected in late
1955 and began meeting a year later, by mid-1959 had failed to
reach agreement on major issues that had troubled the BPUPK and
PPKI a decade earlier: whether the form of the state should be feder
ative or unitary and whether the state should be based on Islam or
Pancasila. In May, Jakarta granted the northern Sumatra province of
Aceh semiautonomous status (and thus the freedom to establish gov
ernment by Islamic law) as the price of at last ending the struggle
there with Darul Islam forces. The way seemed open for a dissolu
tion of the unitary state. Sukarno’s response on July 5, 1959, was
unilaterally to dismiss the Constituent Assembly and to declare that
the nation would return to the constitution of August 18, 1945, point
edly without the Jakarta Charter and its Islamic provisions. Illegal
although it may have been, this was not an entirely unwelcome
move. Many, although by no means all, Indonesians believed that
their nation had lost its way, and a return to first principles and senti
ments—now rather romantically misimagined—sounded in many
ways attractive.
What followed, however, was the rapid development of an authori
tarian state in which tensions were not reduced but greatly exacerbated.
On August 17, 1959, Sukarno attempted to give Guided Democracy
some precise content by announcing his Political Manifesto (Manipol),
which included the ideas of “returning to the rails of the Revolution”
and “retooling” in the name of unity and progress. Manipol was sup
plemented with the announcement of a kind of second Pancasila
describing the foundations of the new state: the 1945 constitution,
65
Indonesia: A Country Study
Worldview
Indonesian nationalists had the strong expectation that indepen
dence would also bring Indonesia international recognition and a
place in the family of nations. Admission to the UN in September
1950 was a first step, and Indonesia quickly adopted an “indepen
dent and active” foreign policy, first articulated in 1948 by then Vice
President Mohammad Hatta, who wished to steer a course between
the Cold War powers but to do so in a way that was not merely “neu
tral.” The first fruit of this outlook was the Asia–Africa Conference
held in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province, in April 1955. This gathering
of 29 new nations sought to avoid entanglement in the Cold War and
to promote peace and cooperation; to many it represented the sudden
coming of age of the formerly colonized world. It is generally con
sidered the beginning of the Nonaligned Movement (see Glossary),
although the movement itself was not formalized until 1961.
Sukarno was in his element at Bandung, speaking eloquently
about ex-colonial peoples “awakening from slumber” and propos
66
Sukarno, president of Indonesia from 1945 to 1967.
This photograph was taken during his trip to Washington, DC, on May 16, 1956.
67
Indonesia: A Country Study
Years of Crisis
These tensions had escalated by late 1964, to the point that gov
ernment was paralyzed and the nation seethed with fears and rumors
of an impending explosion. In the countryside, especially in Java and
Bali, the “unilateral actions” the PKI began a year earlier to force
fully redistribute village agricultural lands had resulted in the out
break of violence along both religious and economic class lines.
Especially in Jawa Timur Province, Nahdlatul Ulama mobilized its
youth wing, known as Ansor (Helpers of Muhammad), and deadly
fighting began to spread between and within now thoroughly polar
ized villages. ABRI increasingly revealed divisions among pro-PKI,
anti-PKI, and pro-Sukarno officers, some of whom reportedly began
to involve themselves in rural conflicts. In the big cities, demonstra
tions against the West reached fever pitch, spilling over into intellec
tual and cultural affairs as poets and artists confronted each other
with diametrically opposed views on the nature and proper social
role of the arts. The domestic economic crisis deepened as the price
of rice soared beyond the means of most urban residents, especially
those of the middle classes on government salaries, and the black-
market rate of exchange exceeded the official rate by 2,000 percent.
Sukarno was furious that the newly formed Malaysia had been
granted a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council, and
on January 1, 1965, he withdrew Indonesia from the UN, and later
from other world bodies such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. In April, China announced that it sup
ported the idea, proposed earlier by Aidit, of arming a “fifth force” of
peasants and workers under PKI leadership to balance the power of
ABRI’s four armed services, and that it could supply 100,000 small
68
Historical Setting
arms for the purpose. Then on August 17, 1965, Sukarno, who two
weeks earlier had collapsed during a public appearance and was
thought to be gravely ill, delivered an Independence Day speech,
which addressed joining a “Jakarta–Phnom Penh–Beijing–Hanoi–
Pyongyang Axis” and creating an armed fifth force in order to com
plete Indonesia’s revolution. It seemed to many that the PKI was
poised to seize power, at the same time that the whole constellation
of competing forces swirling around Sukarno was about to implode,
with consequences that could only be guessed. On September 27, the
army chief of staff, Ahmad Yani (1922–65), who was close to
Sukarno and shared his anti-neo-imperialist outlook, nevertheless
informed him that he and Nasution unequivocally refused to accept a
“fifth force,” a stand that brought them in direct opposition to the
PKI, Sukarno, and even some ABRI officers. Air Force Vice Marshal
Omar Dhani (1924–2009), for example, had begun to offer paramili
tary training to groups of PKI civilians, apparently at Sukarno’s urg
ing. The balancing act was over.
The “Coup” and Its Aftermath, 1965–66
In the early morning hours of October 1, 1965, troops from four
ABRI companies, including one from the Cakrabirawa Presidential
Guard, deployed in air force motor vehicles through the streets of
Jakarta to the homes of Nasution, Yani, and five other generals
known to be opposed to the PKI. Three were killed resisting capture,
and three were later murdered at the nearby Halim Perdanakusuma
Military Air Base, where, it was later learned, their bodies were
thrown into an abandoned well in an area known as Lubang Buaya
(Crocodile Hole). The remaining general, then-Minister of Defense
Nasution, narrowly escaped, but his adjutant was captured instead
and also murdered at Lubang Buaya, and Nasution’s daughter was
injured in the intrusion and later died. Not long thereafter, Jakartans
awoke to a radio announcement that the September 30 Movement
(Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, later referred to by the acronym
Gestapu by opponents) had acted to protect Sukarno and the nation
from corrupt military officers, members of a Council of Generals
that secretly planned, with U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
help, to take over the government. The announcement stressed that
the action was an internal ABRI affair. At noon a Decree No. 1 was
broadcast, announcing the formation of a Revolutionary Council as
the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia.
Faced with the news of this apparent coup attempt, the com
mander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), General
Suharto (1921–2008), who had not been on the list of those to be
69
Indonesia: A Country Study
captured, moved swiftly, and, less than 24 hours after events began,
a radio broadcast announced that Suharto had taken temporary lead
ership of ABRI, controlled central Jakarta, and would crush what he
described as a counterrevolutionary movement that had kidnapped
six generals of the republic. (Their bodies were not discovered until
October 3.) When the communist daily Harian Rakjat published an
editorial supportive of the Revolutionary Council on October 2,
1965, it was already too late. In Jakarta, the coup attempt had been
broken, and anti-PKI, anti-Sukarno commanders of ABRI were in
charge. Within a few days, the same was true of the few areas out
side of the capital where Gestapu had raised its head.
These momentous events, which triggered not only a regime
change but also the destruction of the largest communist party out
side the Soviet Union and China, hundreds of thousands of deaths,
and a generation of military rule in what was then the world’s fifth
(now fourth) most populous country, have long eluded satisfactory
explanation by scholars. Debate over many points, both in and out
side of Indonesia, continues to be stubborn, polarized, and domi
nated by intricate and often improbable tales of intrigue. The
circumstances and available data are such that a wide variety of
explanations are equally plausible. Scholarly opinion has been espe
cially skeptical of the conclusion drawn almost immediately by
Suharto (and later the government he headed) and the CIA, that the
PKI was to blame for Gestapu. Experts have offered numerous sce
narios instead, suggesting that the (anti-PKI) military, and perhaps
even Suharto himself, were in fact the real masterminds.
More recently, however, a view that has gained credence (origi
nally posited in an early CIA report and raised by captured PKI lead
ers) is that Gestapu was in fact the result of highly secret planning—
secret even within the PKI leadership structure—by party head D. N.
Aidit and his close friend since pemuda days in 1945, “Syam”
Kamaruzaman (ca. 1924–86), head of the party’s supersecret Special
Bureau. For reasons that are not entirely clear but were probably
connected with Aidit’s fears that Sukarno was near death and that
without his protection the party could not survive, Syam was given
responsibility for constructing a plot to neutralize army opposition. It
is generally acknowledged that the plans were ill-conceived and so
poorly executed that investigators often found comparatively simple
errors unbelievable, taking them instead as clues to hidden conspira
cies. The movement collapsed almost instantaneously, more from its
own weaknesses than as a result of any brilliance or preparation that
might be ascribed to Suharto’s response.
Whether or not the Aidit–Syam thesis is accepted, there remains
the very important question of who, or what factors, should bear
70
Historical Setting
responsibility for the mass killings that took place, mostly between
October 1965 and March 1966 and then in occasional outbursts for
several years thereafter. Although there are no satisfactory data on
which reliable national calculations can be made, and Indonesian
government estimates have varied from 78,500 to 1 million killed, a
figure of approximately 500,000 deaths was accepted in the mid
1970s by the head of the Operational Command for the Restoration
of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) and is widely used in Western
sources. As many as 250,000 persons may have been imprisoned as
well. As to who carried out these killings, the available evidence is
meager and mostly anecdotal and suggests a complex picture. In
some areas, clearly Muslim (in central and eastern Java, predomi
nantly Nahdlatul Ulama) vigilantes began the murders spontane
ously and, in a few places, even had to be reined in by army units. In
others, army contacts either acquiesced to or encouraged such
actions, and in a number of these there was a clear coordination of
efforts. In what seems to have been a smaller number of places, army
units alone were responsible. People participated in the killings, or
looked the other way, for a wide variety of reasons, personal, com
munity-related, and ideological.
Whatever the case, the mass killings amounted to a cataclysmic
ideological cleansing in which not only communists but also sus
pected communists (and in some areas miscellaneous other per
ceived enemies, including Chinese) lost their lives. Violence of this
type and on this scale, although perhaps foretold in episodes of the
National Revolution, was new to Indonesia. It is perhaps true, as his
torian Robert B. Cribb has suggested, that after the disillusionment
of the struggle for independence, and the deprivations and hostilities
of Guided Democracy, Indonesians were “ready for a culprit,” but
the fury unleashed seems too intense and too broad to be explained
in this way alone. Similar questions about the origins of extreme vio
lence in Indonesia were to arise a generation later, at the end of the
regime that in 1965–66 was just beginning to take hold.
The abrupt narrative break of the violent events that immediately
followed Gestapu gives the impression that the transition from the
Old Order to the New Order (as they came to be called, first by anti-
PKI, anti-Sukarno student protesters) was swift. In reality, Sukarno’s
power and Guided Democracy policies dissolved more slowly,
despite fierce opposition in some circles to his continued defense of
the PKI and his refusal to concede that Guided Democracy had
failed. Suharto and his supporters were aware that Sukarno contin
ued to have loyal followers, and they did not wish to risk more
upheaval, much less a backlash against the army. Military tribunals
began holding well-managed trials of PKI figures, and a gradual
71
Indonesia: A Country Study
Contemporary Indonesia
Rise of the New Order, 1966–85
On the surface, and particularly through a Cold War lens, the New
Order appeared to be the antithesis of the Old Order: anticommunist
as opposed to communist-leaning, pro-Western as opposed to anti-
Western, procapitalist rather than anticapitalist, and so on. As new
head of state, Suharto seemed to reflect these differences by being,
as historian Theodore Friend put it, “cold and reclusive where
Sukarno had been hot and expansive.” And certainly many Indone
sians saw the change of regime as representing a great deal more
than a mere shift or transition. Separated from the Old Order by a
national trauma, the New Order was unabashedly dominated by the
military, focused on economic development (pembangunan), and
determined to create stability. The promoters of the New Order saw
72
Historical Setting
73
Indonesia: A Country Study
Political Structure
What came to be called Pancasila Democracy appears to have
been constructed principally by Ali Murtopo (1924–84), a long-time
army associate of Suharto. Of modest social and educational back
ground, Ali Murtopo rose to prominence in the military, primarily as
an “operator” with strategic sense and a “can do” attitude. His role as
a leading military intelligence officer earned him a reputation as an
unscrupulous and rather mysterious manipulator, but in some
respects he mirrored views held far beyond a small group of military
leaders and shared among the civilian middle classes, and his activi
ties were widely known. His plan had three key elements. First, gov
ernment control of the parliamentary process would be achieved by
stipulating that a certain percentage of the membership of the chief
legislative body, the People’s Representative Council (DPR), and the
chief representative body, the People’s Consultative Assembly
(MPR), were to be government civilian appointees, with an addi
tional group of appointed members from the armed forces. Second,
control of the electoral process would come by limiting the number
of political parties and prying them away from ethnic, religious,
regional, or personal identities, as well as by establishing a govern
ment-backed parliamentary representative group (pointedly not a
“political party”) of government employees and other groups, such as
Golkar (see Glossary), an organization of functional groups, to partic
ipate in elections. Third, control over the majority of the voting pub
lic would result from limiting the periods of political campaigning
and restricting such activities to the district level. The inhabitants of
villages and small towns—the majority of Indonesians—were to be
“freed” from mass political mobilization, manipulation, and polariza
tion, becoming instead a more or less depoliticized “floating mass.”
They would be encouraged to vote for whichever party or group they
thought might best answer their needs at the moment, but not to make
their choices on the basis of “primordial” or personal identifiers.
An additional component, designed initially under the direction of
Ruslan Abdulgani (1914–2005), who had served as Sukarno’s chief
ideological adviser a decade earlier, was a national indoctrination
program intended to give Pancasila clarity and application, and to
ensure that all Indonesians uniformly understood and accepted it. The
74
Suharto, president of
Indonesia from 1967 to 1998
Courtesy Embassy of
Indonesia, Washington, DC
75
Indonesia: A Country Study
76
Historical Setting
public feared unrest and had made a certain peace with the supposi
tion, long nursed in both military and some civilian circles, that
potential enemies to national order included not only communism and
Islam but also unfettered Western-style liberal democracy.
Economic Growth
The New Order’s primary goal and justification was rapid economic
growth, to be achieved not by a thorough-going reversal from Guided
Democracy’s state-centered socialist ideals to liberal capitalism, but by
finding a realistic, flexible way to deliver results without entirely aban
doning those ideals. This was a formidable task. Economic historian
Pierre van der Eng has estimated that at the start of the New Order,
Indonesia’s per capita GDP was below what it had been in 1940, and
probably below the level of 1913. The country was also saddled with
an enormous foreign debt and crippling inflation (see The Role of
Government, ch. 3). The strategy drawn up and managed by a team of
Western-educated economists headed by Wijoyo Nitisastro (1927–
2005) was ambitious but fiscally cautious and uninterested in eco
nomic nationalism or dogma. Beginning in 1969, Repelita (see Glos
sary)—five-year plans that were really more guidelines than economic
plans—laid out broad priorities but left much room for policy maneu
vering and adjustment to changing conditions. The focus was squarely
on alleviating poverty, and in the simplest terms the approach was to
improve agricultural productivity and rural incomes. Successes there
would then provide the dynamic for industrialization, which would in
turn bring the nation to a point of “takeoff” to full and self-sustaining
modernization.
Remarkably, and despite widespread skepticism, the New Order
did succeed in bringing about a rapid transformation of Indonesia’s
economy. During the roughly 30-year period, for example, Indonesia
averaged a real GDP growth of roughly 5 percent. and real per capita
GDP trebled. Average caloric intake increased by 70 percent, aver
age life expectancy rose from about 47 to 67 years, and the manufac
turing and industrial sectors’ combined share of GDP rose from 19
percent to roughly 65 percent while agriculture’s share dropped from
53 percent to 19 percent. The incidence of poverty dropped from 61
percent to 10 percent on Java, and from 52 percent to 7 percent else
where in the country. In 1993 the World Bank placed Indonesia
among the highest-performing developing economies and pointed to
its success in achieving both rapid growth and improved equity.
This was an astounding performance, and understanding it has
occasioned heated and continuing academic debate. Some scholars
point out that Indonesia’s accomplishments must be evaluated in a
77
Indonesia: A Country Study
78
Historical Setting
the New Order than at its start. (Nor were these gains entirely erased
by the economic crisis of the late 1990s, as some predicted.) Several
problems, however, rooted as much in the development program’s
successes as in its failures, were of great long-term significance. The
most obvious was corruption, the scale of which burgeoned as the
economy grew. A notorious harbinger of things to come was the fis
cal scandal surrounding Colonel Ibnu Sutowo (1914–2001), head of
the State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company (Pertamina), who by
1975 had sunk the corporation into enormous international debt while
personally enjoying a luxurious lifestyle that reportedly included a
US$1 million wedding for his daughter. By the early 1990s, the finan
cial dealings of Suharto’s own children, particularly his eldest daugh
ter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, better known as Tutut (born 1949), and
youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, nicknamed Tommy (born
1962), attracted widespread attention because of their scale and their
family conglomerates’ dependence on privilege. And, well beyond
financial circles, corruption extended far into the bureaucracy, the
courts, and the police. Despite numerous campaigns proposing to
deal with corruption in various corners of society, government task
forces and investigations made little headway; corruption ate corro
sively at the New Order from the inside.
Other difficulties were less straightforward. For example, New
Order technocrats had sought to address the economic imbalance
between Java and the Outer Islands, whose natural resources had
contributed disproportionately to the national income, a source of
rebellion in the 1950s and early 1960s. New Order industrialization
policies, depending heavily on the relatively cheap labor available in
densely populated Java, changed this. By the mid-1990s, Java pro
duced 40 percent of the country’s exports, double the figure of only a
decade earlier and, for the first time since independence, contributed
a portion of the national economic output—roughly 60 percent—
equivalent to its share of the population. But this shift produced its
own imbalance as the economy of the Outer Islands slipped compar
atively and some regions began to see widening poverty, a new
source of heightened tension between the regions and Jakarta. A
similar irony can be seen in the changing role of the private sector of
the economy, a goal sanctioned by the New Order government and
pushed especially hard by the IMF and World Bank. During the first
four Repelita (1969–88), private investment, foreign as well as
domestic, provided a very modest percentage of national investment
funding, but by the end of Repelita V in 1993, it made up more than
70 percent of the total, a rapid shift. The change was particularly sig
nificant, however, because it went unaccompanied by appropriate
reforms in fiscal regulation. The economy became increasingly
79
Indonesia: A Country Study
80
Historical Setting
81
Indonesia: A Country Study
82
Historical Setting
83
Indonesia: A Country Study
84
Historical Setting
85
Indonesia: A Country Study
86
B. J. Habibie, president of
Indonesia, 1998–99
Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia,
Washington, DC
87
Indonesia: A Country Study
88
Historical Setting
89
Indonesia: A Country Study
90
Historical Setting
It can be argued that even the controversies over Islam have been
carried out very much in the public view (not possible a decade
before), and neither the nation nor national society has been torn
apart, as some have feared. In many respects, Indonesian society
appears to have settled on new and calmer middle ground, relatively
comfortable with new freedoms and also with the debate and even
conflicts that come with them (see Islam, ch. 2). On the whole, Indo
nesians of the younger generation seem more at ease than their par
ents with plurality and individuality, and less in need of old-
fashioned nationalism, ideological guidance, or state leadership.
Some of these attitudes are reflected in the enormously popular 2005
novel Laskar Pelangi (Rainbow Warriors) by Andrea Hirata, who
refuses to reveal his age but is a child of the New Order era; a film
version appeared in 2008. Hirata’s work is autobiographical and
traces his childhood and education in a poor Muslim community and
a run-down Muhammadiyah school on the tin-mining island of Beli
tung. It is essentially a personal success story of overcoming pov
erty, making the most of schooling under difficult conditions, and
(we learn in three later volumes) becoming a modern Indonesian
who is also a citizen of the world. Government, bureaucracy, and
hierarchy are of little relevance; neither, in the end, are ethnicity,
gender, and religion. What matters is understanding that all people
have talent, and that individual determination, education, and the
bonds of common humanity can develop it. Anyone can succeed,
and success is not necessarily defined by wealth or power or social
status. Some commentators have seen this novel as a key to the new
values of the post-Suharto, post-reformasi generation; others have
gone much further, suggesting that it shows clearly for the first time
that Indonesian hopes for the future are, in fact, universal and not
merely national ones, and that Indonesians, after 65 years of inde
pendence, are at last joining the world.
* * *
The literature on Indonesian history is quite large, and includes
materials in many languages. This bibliographic essay mentions only
works in English. The most satisfactory summaries of Indonesian
history are Colin Brown’s A Short History of Indonesia: The
Unlikely Nation? and the short but sophisticated chapter by Robert
B. Cribb, “Nation: Making Indonesia.” The basic reference works
any serious student of Indonesian history will find indispensable are
Cribb’s and Audrey R. Kahin’s Historical Dictionary of Indonesia,
Cribb’s Historical Atlas of Indonesia, and the relevant portions of
Jan M. Pluvier’s Historical Atlas of South-East Asia.
91
Indonesia: A Country Study
92
Historical Setting
93
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Papuan pontoon boat
INDONESIA’S SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT is
one of the most complex and varied in the world. By one count, at
least 731 distinct languages and more than 1,100 different dialects are
spoken in the archipelago. The nation encompasses some 17,508
islands; the landscape ranges from rain forests and steaming man
grove swamps to arid plains and snowcapped mountains. Major
world religions—Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism—are
represented, as well as many varieties of animistic practices and
ancestor worship. Systems of local political authority vary from the
ornate sultans’ courts of central Java to the egalitarian communities
of hunter-gatherers in the jungles of Kalimantan. A variety of eco
nomic patterns also can be found within Indonesia’s borders, from
rudimentary slash-and-burn agriculture to highly sophisticated com
puter microchip industries. Some Indonesian communities rely on
traditional feasting systems and marriage exchange for economic dis
tribution, while others act as sophisticated brokers in international
trading networks operating throughout the world. Indonesians also
have a variety of living arrangements. Some go home at night to
extended families living in isolated bamboo longhouses; others return
to hamlets of tiny houses clustered around a mosque; still others go
home to nuclear families in urban high-rise apartment complexes.
There are, however, striking similarities among the nation’s diverse
groups. Besides citizenship in a common nation-state, the single most
unifying cultural characteristic is a shared linguistic heritage. Almost
all of the nation’s estimated 240 million people speak at least one of
several Austronesian languages, which, although often not mutually
intelligible, share many vocabulary items and have similar sentence
patterns. Most important, an estimated 83 percent of the population
can speak Bahasa Indonesia (see Glossary), the official national lan
guage. Used in government, schools, print and electronic media, and
multiethnic cities, this Malay-derived language is both an important
unifying symbol and a vehicle of national integration.
The national average population density, according to the 2000 cen
sus, was 109 persons per square kilometer. However, in 2007 some 50
percent of Indonesians lived in cities, defined by the government’s
Central Statistical Office (BPS; for this and other acronyms, see table
A) as areas with population densities greater than 5,000 persons per
square kilometer or where fewer than 25 percent of households are
employed in the agricultural sector. The percentage of Indonesians
who live in rural areas, and who are closely associated with agriculture,
97
Indonesia: A Country Study
98
The Society and Its Environment
99
100 110 120 130
TH
International boundary
100
A
VIETNAM PHILIPPINES
IL
National capital
AN
Sulu Sea �
D
Philippine Sea
South China Sea Populated place
St
rai
t
Spot elevation in meters
BRUNEI
of
MALAYSIA 0 200 400 Kilometers
M
A
a
I Sulawesi Sea 0 200 400 Miles
lac
Lake Toba YS
ca
LA
Sea
MA
SINGAPORE 2,000
luku
Pacific Ocean
t
Ma
Equator Pontianak Equator
trai
Halm
a NEW
Padang Sea hera
ar S
GUINEA FOJA
3,800 MOUNTAINS
kass
S
Indonesia: A Country Study
Ma
3,019
SU
Musi 3,440
M
AT
Palembang KALIMANTAN Seram
R
Teluk
A
Java Sea Bone t z PAPUA
5,030
GREATER SUNDA ISLANDS Banda Sea ren
Jakarta Lo NEW
Indian Ocean SULAWESI
trait � Surabaya GUINEA
da S
Sun o
Sol Madura Strait 3,142 Flores
Bali Sea 3,726
Sea
Yogyakarta JAVA 3,265
ait
it
tra TIMOR-LESTE
Str
Bali Lombok
S R Arafura Sea
pe Sawu Sea
bok
10 Sa MO 10
TI Timor Sea Torres Strait
Lom
NUSA TENGGARA
Boundary representation (Lesser Sunda Islands) AUSTRALIA
not necessarily authoritative 100 110 120 130 140
101
Indonesia: A Country Study
Climate
The main variable in Indonesia’s climate is not temperature or air
pressure but rainfall. The almost uniformly warm waters that make
up 81 percent of Indonesia’s area ensure that temperatures on land
remain fairly constant. Traversed by the equator, the archipelago is
almost entirely tropical in climate. Temperatures average 28˚ C on
the coastal plains, 26˚ C in inland and mountain areas, and 23˚ C in
the higher mountain regions. Winds are moderate and generally pre
dictable; monsoons usually blow in from the south and east between
June and September and from the northwest between December and
March. Typhoons and other large storms pose little hazard to mari
ners in Indonesia’s waters; the primary danger comes from swift cur
rents in channels such as the Lombok, Sape, and Sunda straits.
Extreme variations in rainfall are linked with the monsoons.
There is a dry season (June to September), influenced by the Austra
lian continental air masses, and a rainy season (December to March)
that is influenced by air masses from mainland Asia and the Pacific
Ocean. Local conditions in Indonesia, however, can greatly modify
these patterns, especially in the central islands of the Maluku group.
This oscillating seasonal pattern of wind and rain is related to Indo
nesia’s geographic location as an archipelago between two conti
nents and astride the equator. During the dry monsoon, high pressure
over the Australian deserts moves winds from Australia toward the
northwest. As the winds reach the equator, the Earth’s rotation
causes them to veer off their original course in a northeasterly direc
tion toward the Southeast Asian mainland. During the wet monsoon,
a corresponding high-pressure system over the Asian mainland
causes the pattern to reverse. The resultant monsoon is augmented
by humid breezes from the Indian Ocean, producing significant
amounts of rain throughout many parts of the archipelago.
Prevailing wind patterns interact with local topographic condi
tions to produce significant variations in rainfall throughout the
archipelago. In general, the western and northern parts of Indonesia
experience the most precipitation because the northward- and west
ward-moving monsoon clouds are heavy with moisture by the time
they reach these more distant regions. The average annual rainfall
for Indonesia is around 3,175 millimeters. Western Sumatra, Java,
Bali, and the interiors of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua are the
most consistently damp regions of Indonesia, with rainfall measur
ing more than 2,000 millimeters per year. In part, this moisture orig
inates on certain high mountain peaks that, because of their location,
trap damp air and experience more than 6,000 millimeters of rain a
year. The city of Bogor, near Jakarta, has a high rainfall rate of 3,500
102
Small fishing boats with view of Manado Tua volcano,
Sulawesi Utara Province
Courtesy Anastasia Riehl
103
Indonesia: A Country Study
104
The Society and Its Environment
105
Indonesia: A Country Study
forces fought each other, and thousands died or fled to West Timor
(Nusa Tenggara Timur Province) to avoid the fighting. The violence
began shortly after President Bacharuddin J. (B. J.) Habibie announced
the referendum and continued until well after the vote. On October 25,
1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
was established, and on May 20, 2002, East Timor, as the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste, became fully independent of Indonesia. Most
of the estimated 200,000 refugees who went to West Timor had
returned by 2003 (see Relations with Neighboring Nations, ch. 4; East
Timor, ch. 5).
Two other regional struggles in recent times were in the Special
Region of Aceh, in northwestern Sumatra, and in Papua. In Aceh,
the long-standing conflict between the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM—see Glossary) and the Indonesian military intensified into
an open secessionist effort. The struggle escalated in 1998, but two
years later secret negotiations held in Geneva led to a Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement signed on December 9, 2002.
The parties had agreed to a dialogue leading to democratic elec
tions and a cessation of hostilities. Within six months, however, the
agreement had broken down, and martial law was declared in the
province until May 2004. Following the December 2004 earthquake
and tsunami, a much more comprehensive peace agreement, brokered
by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, was officially signed in
Helsinki on August 15, 2005, by chief Indonesian negotiator Hamid
Awaluddin and GAM leader Malik Mahmud. The Indonesian govern
ment agreed to facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political
parties and to allow 70 percent of the income from local natural
resources to stay within Aceh. On December 27, 2005, GAM leaders
announced that they had disbanded their military wing and GAM
itself was dissolved the next month (see Separatist Rebellions, ch. 5).
Another important challenge to Indonesia’s sovereignty comes
from the Free Papua Organization (OPM). After years of sabotage,
secret meetings, and public demonstrations, OPM gained consider
able international attention in January 1996 when members of the
group kidnapped 14 members of a multinational World Wildlife
Fund for Nature scientific expedition. All except two hostages were
freed following negotiations; later a rescue operation was conducted
in which six OPM members and the two remaining Indonesian hos
tages were killed. Although in 2001 local leaders were granted more
financial and political autonomy and had been permitted a year ear
lier to change the name of their province from Irian Jaya to the
locally more acceptable Papua, tension persists. (In 2003 Papua was
subdivided into Papua and Irian Jaya Barat provinces; the latter was
106
The Society and Its Environment
107
Indonesia: A Country Study
2009
AGE-GROUP
80 and older
75–79
70–74
65–69
60–64
MALES FEMALES
55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
25–29
20–24
15–19
10–14
5–9
0–4
12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
POPULATION IN MILLIONS
2029
AGE-GROUP
80 and older
75–79
70–74
MALES FEMALES
65–69
60–64
55–59
50–54
45–49
40–44
35–39
30–34
25–29
20–24
15–19
10–14
5–9
0–4
12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
POPULATION IN MILLIONS
Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Commerce, Census Bureau,
International Programs Center, International Data Base Population Pyramids (Indonesia)
(Washington, DC, 2008), http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb.
108
The Society and Its Environment
109
Indonesia: A Country Study
110
The Society and Its Environment
111
Indonesia: A Country Study
112
Javanese dancer at the Exposition
universelle in Paris, 1889
Courtesy Library of Congress
Prints and Photographs Division,
Lot 6634, LC–USZ62–109527,
digital ID cph 3c09527
113
Indonesia: A Country Study
ever before. This trend was linked in part to the steep increase in the
number of motor vehicles, from 3.0 per 1,000 population in the 1960s
to 26.2 in 1980, 46.3 in 1990, 78.1 in 2000, and 132 in 2007. With the
widespread availability of public bus transportation connecting cities
and villages, many workers commute 50 kilometers or more daily to
work. Others live away from their homes for several days at a time in
order to work. The World Bank has estimated that 25 percent of rural
households have at least one family member working for part of the
year in an urban area.
In part because of increasing migration, Indonesians of different
ethnic backgrounds and occupations are increasingly intermingling.
They more frequently find themselves in circumstances in which
they cannot rely on kin and village networks for social support, and
so they look to government services for help, particularly in the areas
of education and health care (see Education; Health, this ch.).
Social Class
The experience of population mobility in the archipelago has not
necessarily resulted in social mobility in terms of social class.
Indeed, recent studies underscore the continuing importance of
social stratification in Indonesia, as least as measured by regional
inequalities in income and consumption. However, scholars and pol
icy analysts continue to debate the degree to which social classes can
be defined in ethnic, economic, religious, or political terms. While it
is clear that Indonesia is a highly stratified society, and that sensitiv
ity to prestige or status (gengsi) is widespread, it is nonetheless diffi
cult to identify an upper class. Hereditary ruling classes and
traditional elites reinforced by their positions in the Dutch colonial
bureaucracy no longer possess unchallenged access to political
power and wealth (see Modernism and Nationalism in the Colonial
Age, ch. 1). Indeed, they cannot even claim to form an elite. The real
power holders—generals, politicians, and wealthy capitalists of the
postindependence period—are newcomers to their positions, and,
apart from extravagant conspicuous consumption and cosmopolitan
ism, they demonstrate few clear institutional and cultural patterns
that suggest they constitute a unitary group.
Defining a lower class in Indonesia is equally difficult. Even
before the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI—see
Glossary) in 1966, Indonesia’s poor formed alliances that had less to
do with class than with economics, religion, and community ties. In
some cases, the poor peasantry identified across class lines with
orthodox Muslim landowners on the basis of their common religious
ideologies or aliran kepercayaan (streams of belief). This alliance
114
The Society and Its Environment
115
Indonesia: A Country Study
116
The Society and Its Environment
117
Indonesia: A Country Study
Jakarta on May 12, 1998. The cumulative casualty toll was in the
thousands, and the number of displaced persons rose to more than
500,000, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees.
The predominant theme to this unrest, according to some analysts,
was not religion, ethnicity, or politics, but rather a tendency to use
extralegal means to exact vengeance and retaliate against enemies.
As the Suharto administration began to assume power, it was
involved in a bloody retaliation against alleged communist actions
during 1965–66; for the next 30 years, vigilante neighborhood watch
groups consisting of young men routinely captured and killed
alleged thieves without legal process but with the implicit approval
of the government. Because the court system was viewed as corrupt
and susceptible to bribery, and many law enforcement agencies were
nearly bankrupt because of the financial crisis, many Indonesians
came to believe that violence was the only route to justice. The vio
lence of 1996–2003 represented a continuation and intensification of
these patterns.
118
Cows being readied for slaughter for the Muslim holiday Idul Adha
(Feast of Sacrifice at the end of Hajj), in front of al Istiqlal Mosque,
Manado, Sulawesi Utara Province
Courtesy Anastasia Riehl
119
Indonesia: A Country Study
used to refer to the Christian God and other gods) is both a pervasive
presence and a somewhat distant figure. The Prophet Muhammad is
not deified but rather is regarded as a human who was selected by
God to spread the word to others through the Quran, Islam’s holy
book, the revealed word of God. Islam is a religion based on high
moral principles, and an important part of being a Muslim is com
mitment to these principles. Islamic law (sharia, or syariah in Indo
nesian) is based on the Quran; the sunna, which includes the hadith
(hadis in Indonesian), the actions and sayings of Muhammad; ijma,
the consensus of local Islamic jurisprudence and, sometimes, the
whole Muslim community; and qiyas, or reasoning through analogy.
Islam is universalist, and in theory there are no national, racial, or
ethnic criteria for conversion.
Over the course of the mostly peaceful introduction of Islam to
Indonesia beginning in the ninth century AD, tensions periodically
arose between orthodox Muslims and practitioners of more syncretis
tic, locally based religions. These tensions are still evident in the early
twenty-first century. In Java, for instance, they are expressed in the
contrast between a santri (see Glossary), a pious Muslim, and an
abangan (see Glossary), an adherent to a syncretistic blend of indige
nous, Hindu-Buddhist beliefs with Islamic practices, sometimes
called kejawen (Javanism), agama Jawa (Javanese religion), or keba
tinan (mysticism—see Glossary). In Java, santri not only refers to a
person who is consciously and exclusively Muslim, but also describes
persons who have removed themselves from the secular world to con
centrate on devotional activities in Islamic schools called pesantren—
literally, the place of the santri, but meaning Islamic school. Although
these religious boarding schools, typically headed by a charismatic
kiai (Muslim religious scholar), provide education for only a minority
of Indonesian children (less than 10 percent), they remain an impor
tant symbol of Muslim piety, particularly in rural areas.
There is also a long history of religious practice associated with
more mystical and often highly syncretistic beliefs. Drawing vari
ously on Hindu-Buddhist ideas about self-control and intellectual
contemplation, as well as more animistically inclined ideas about the
spiritual character of nature, and often based on miraculous revela
tions, various kinds of hybrid Islamic beliefs flourished in Java until
a presidential decree in 1965 urged consolidation under the rubric of
the main scriptural religions (agama), including Islam, Christianity,
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Several of the more mysti
cal varieties of Islam continued to flourish under the Suharto regime,
and some continued to struggle for autonomy and recognition by the
government, eventually receiving recognition in 1973 as keper
120
The Society and Its Environment
121
Indonesia: A Country Study
122
Nativity scene in front of a Roman Catholic Church on Sulawesi
Courtesy Anastasia Riehl
lic. Catholic congregations grew less rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s,
in part because of the church’s heavy reliance on European personnel.
These Europeans experienced increasing restrictions on their mission
ary activities imposed by the Muslim-dominated Department of Reli
gion (later called the Department of Religious Affairs).
Hinduism
Indonesian Hinduism, an amalgam of related traditions and cults
that explains the nature of the universe in terms of interactions among
numerous gods, is strongly associated with Bali. In 1953, in response
to the central government’s exclusion of Balinese Hinduism from its
list of officially recognized religions, religious leaders on that island
sought official recognition of Agama Hindu Bali (Hindu Balinese
Religion) as a creed equivalent to Islam, Catholicism, and Protestant
ism. Led by Pandit Shastri, various Hindu reform organizations on
Bali agreed in 1958 on the Hindu Dharma (Principles of Hinduism),
which emphasized the Catur Veda (religious poems), the Upanishads
(treatises of Brahmanic knowledge), and the Bhagavad Gita, as well
as two Old Javanese texts (Sarasamuccaya and Sanghyang Kama
hayanikan). Together, these works came to form the holy canon of
Balinese Hinduism. Other Hindu sacred texts, such as the Puranas
123
Indonesia: A Country Study
124
Ruins of a Hindu temple in Yogyakarta
Courtesy Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division,
Lot 11356, LC–USZ62–95443, digital ID cph 3b41593
125
Indonesia: A Country Study
126
Altar in a Buddhist temple, Tomohon, Sulawesi Utara Province
Courtesy Anastasia Riehl
127
Indonesia: A Country Study
Language
The major languages of Indonesia belong to the Austronesian fam
ily, a group of agglutinative languages spoken in the area bounded by
Madagascar in the western Indian Ocean and Easter Island in the
eastern Pacific Ocean. There is a considerable diversity in the lan
guages used in Indonesia. No fewer than 731 languages—the vast
majority Austronesian, the rest Papuan and used in parts of Timor,
Papua, and Halmahera—existed in the early twenty-first century.
Based on reports of ethnic self-identification in the 2000 census,
the primary languages spoken by 2 million or more people were Java
nese (83 million), Sundanese (30 million), Malay/Indonesian (17 mil
lion), Madurese (6.7 million), Batak (6.1 million), Minangkabau (5.4
million), Buginese (5.1 million), Balinese (3 million), and Acehnese
(2.2 million). In addition, some 2 million inhabitants spoke one of
several dialects of Chinese. Arabic and languages of India and Europe
also are used.
The central and most successful feature of the Indonesian national
culture is probably the Indonesian language. Malay was used for cen
turies as a lingua franca in many parts of the archipelago. The term
Bahasa Indonesia, which refers to a modified form of Malay, was
coined by Indonesian nationalists in 1928 and became a symbol of
national unity during the struggle for independence. Bahasa Indone
sia is spoken in more than 90 percent of households in Jakarta. Out
side the capital, only 10 to 15 percent of the population speaks the
language at home, but this number appears to be on the rise. In Java
nese areas, only 1 percent to 5 percent of the people speak Bahasa
Indonesia in the home. Nationwide, some 17 million Indonesians use
Bahasa Indonesia as a primary language, while more than 150 million
to 180 million others use it as a second language. It is now indisput
ably the language of government, schools, national print and elec
tronic media, and interethnic communication. In many provinces, it is
the primary language of communication between ethnic Chinese
shopkeepers and their non-Chinese patrons.
Bahasa Indonesia is infused with highly distinctive accents,
vocabularies, and styles in some regions (particularly Maluku, parts
of Nusa Tenggara, and Jakarta), but there are many similarities in
patterns of use across the archipelago. For example, it is common to
vary the use of address forms depending on the rank or status of the
individual to whom one is speaking. This variation is not as complex
as in the elaborately hierarchical Javanese language, but it is none
theless important. For instance, in Bahasa Indonesia respected elders
are typically addressed in kinship terms—bapak (father or elder) or
ibu (mother). The use of second-person pronouns in direct address is
128
The Society and Its Environment
129
Indonesia: A Country Study
130
The Society and Its Environment
131
Indonesia: A Country Study
vivid and attractive (if not always convincing) model for how the
Indonesian national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diver
sity, a Javanese slogan dating to fourteenth-century Kediri poet Mpu
Tantular’s poem “Sutasoma”) might be understood.
When Indonesians talk about their society in inclusive terms, they
are more likely to use a word such as budaya (culture) than adat.
One speaks of kebudayaan Indonesia, the “culture of Indonesia,” as
something grand, that refers to traditions of refinement and high civ
ilization. The dances, music, and literature of Java and Bali and the
great monuments associated with these islands’ religion are often
described as examples of “culture” or “civilization” but not “cus
tom” (or adat). However, as the following descriptions show, the
variety of sources of local identification underscore the diversity
rather than the unity of the Indonesian population.
Javanese
There are approximately 83 million Javanese, the majority of
whom live in Jawa Timur and Jawa Tengah provinces; most of the
rest live in Jawa Barat Province and on Sumatra, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, and other islands. (Altogether, some 110 million people
live on Java.) Although many Javanese express pride at the grand
achievements of the illustrious courts of Surakarta and Yogyakarta
and admire the traditional arts associated with them, most Javanese
tend to identify not with that elite tradition, or even with a lineage or
clan, but with their own village of residence or origin. These vil
lages, or desa, are typically situated on the edge of rice fields, sur
rounding a mosque, or strung along a road.
Most Javanese villages are divided into smaller administrative
units, each known as either a rukun kampung (village mutual assis
tance association) or rukun tetangga (neighborhood association).
Rukun is an important Javanese word of Arabic origin describing
both “state of being and a mode of action .... a state in which all par
ties are at least overtly at social peace with one another,” according
to anthropologist Robert Jay; it is “a process of sharing through col
lective action.” Anthropologist Mary Hawkins has argued that while
modern forms of contract labor and technology may have eroded the
rural communalism implied in earlier senses of rukun, the term
remains important as an ideological construct for representing val
ued aspects of collective life. Australian anthropologist Patrick
Guinness has written that the neighborhood is the “largest social
grouping, whose members participate in household rituals, gather for
rituals, organize working bees, whose youth band together for sports
teams and organizations, who maintain arisan (rotating credit asso
132
The Society and Its Environment
133
Indonesia: A Country Study
134
Javanese gamelan player
Javanese New Year festival, Ponorogo, Jawa Timur Province
Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, DC
135
Indonesia: A Country Study
136
The Society and Its Environment
137
Indonesia: A Country Study
138
The Society and Its Environment
Peoples of Sumatra
The large island of Sumatra forms the southwestern shore of the
Strait of Malacca. Although nearly all of the approximately 20 eth
nolinguistic groups of Sumatra are devout practitioners of Islam,
they nonetheless differ strikingly from one another, particularly in
their family structures.
Acehnese
Residing in the Special Region of Aceh, Sumatra’s northernmost
provincial-level jurisdiction, the more than 2 million Acehnese are
most famous throughout the archipelago for their devotion to Islam,
their militant resistance to colonial and republican rule, and their
tragic experience as victims of the tsunami that struck Aceh’s west
ern coast on December 26, 2004. Although the Acehnese were
renowned throughout the nineteenth century for their pepper planta
tions, most are now rice growers in the coastal regions.
Acehnese do not have large descent groups; the nuclear family
consisting of mother, father, and children is the central social unit.
Unlike that of the Javanese or Balinese, the Acehnese family system
shows marked separation of men’s and women’s spheres of activity.
Traditionally, males are directed outward toward the world of trade.
In the practice of merantau—going away from one’s birthplace in
order to return later—young adult males seek fortune, experience,
and commercial repute. This may involve travel to another village,
province, or island. This maturation process among males is viewed
as growing out of the domestic female-dominated world of sensory
indulgence and into the male world of reasoned rationality, the prac
tice of which is expressed through trade. One model of Acehnese
family life is that a woman sends a man out of the house to trade and
welcomes him back when he brings home money. When he has
exhausted his money, she sends him out again. Meanwhile, women
and their kin are responsible for working the fields and keeping the
gardens and rice fields productive. This oscillating pattern of migra
tion encountered some difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s as increas
ing numbers of men failed to return to the Acehnese homeland,
instead remaining and marrying in remote locations, such as Jakarta
or Kalimantan. In addition, many Acehnese felt pressure from the
continuing influx of temporary workers seeking employment in the
natural gas and timber industries, and the conflict between the Indo
nesian army and Acehnese separatists.
The August 16, 2005, peace agreement between the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian central government was pro
pelled by the desire on both sides to smooth the flow of aid to victims
139
Indonesia: A Country Study
Batak
The term “Batak” designates any one of several groups inhabiting
the interior of Sumatera Utara Province, south of Aceh: the Angkola,
Karo, Mandailing, Pakpak, Simalungun, Toba, and others. The
Batak number around 6 million and are mostly Christian, with some
Muslim groups in the south and east. Historically isolated from
Hindu-Buddhist and Muslim influence, they bear closer resemblance
culturally to highland swidden cultivators elsewhere in Southeast
Asia, even though most practice wet-rice farming. Unlike the Bali
nese, who have several different traditional group affiliations at
once, or the Javanese, who affiliate with their village or neighbor
hood, the Batak traditionally orient themselves primarily to the
marga, a landowning patrilineal descent group. Traditionally, each
marga is a wife-giving and wife-taking unit. Whereas a young man
takes a wife from his mother’s clan (men must seek wives outside
their own marga), a young woman marries into a clan within which
her paternal aunts live.
The marga has proved to be a flexible social unit in contemporary
Indonesian society. Batak who resettle in urban areas, such as Medan
or Jakarta, draw on marga affiliations for financial support and polit
ical alliances. While many of the corporate aspects of the marga
have undergone major changes, Batak migrants to other areas of
Indonesia retain pride in their ethnic identity. Batak have shown
themselves to be creative in drawing on modern media to codify,
express, and preserve their “traditional” adat. Anthropologist Susan
Rodgers has shown how audiotaped cassette dramas with some
soap-opera elements circulated widely in the 1980s and 1990s in the
Batak region to dramatize the moral and cultural dilemmas of one’s
kinship obligations in a rapidly changing world. In addition, Batak
have been prodigious producers of written handbooks designed to
show young, urbanized, and secular lineage members how to navi
gate the complexities of their marriage and funeral customs.
Minangkabau
The Minangkabau—who predominate in the coastal areas of
Sumatera Utara Province, Sumatera Barat Province, the interior of
Riau Province, and northern Bengkulu Province—number more than
140
The Society and Its Environment
5.4 million. Like the Batak, they have large corporate descent
groups, but unlike the Batak, the Minangkabau traditionally reckon
descent matrilineally. A young boy, for instance, has his primary
responsibility to his mother’s and sisters’ clans. It is considered
“customary” and ideal for married sisters to remain in their parental
home, with their husbands having a sort of visiting status. Not every
one lives up to this ideal, however. In the 1990s, anthropologist Eve
lyn Blackwood studied a relatively conservative village in Sumatera
Barat where only about 22 percent of the households were “matri
houses,” consisting of a mother and a married daughter or daughters.
Nonetheless, there is a shared ideal among Minangkabau in which
sisters and unmarried lineage members try to live close to one
another or even in the same house.
Landholding is one of the crucial functions of the suku (female lin
eage unit). Because Minangkabau men, like Acehnese men, often
migrate to seek experience, wealth, and commercial success, the
women’s kin group is responsible for maintaining the continuity of the
family and the distribution and cultivation of the land. These family
groups, however, are typically led by a penghulu (headman), elected
by groups of lineage leaders. With the agrarian base of the Minangka
bau economy in decline, the suku—as a landholding unit—has also
been declining somewhat in importance, especially in urban areas.
Indeed, the position of penghulu is not always filled after the death of
the incumbent, particularly if lineage members are not willing to bear
the expense of the ceremony required to install a new penghulu.
The traditions of sharia—in which inheritance laws favor males—
and indigenous female-oriented adat are often depicted as conflict
ing forces in Minangkabau society. The male-oriented sharia appears
to offer young men something of a balance against the dominance of
law in local villages, which forces a young man to wait passively for
a marriage proposal from some young woman’s family. By acquiring
property and education through merantau experience, a young man
can attempt to influence his own destiny in positive ways.
Increasingly, married couples go off on merantau; in such situa
tions, the woman’s role tends to change. When married couples
reside in urban areas or outside the Minangkabau region, women
lose some of their social and economic rights in property. One appar
ent consequence is an increased likelihood of divorce.
Minangkabau were prominent among the intellectual figures in
the Indonesian independence movement. Not only were they
strongly Islamic, they spoke a language closely related to Bahasa
Indonesia, which was considerably freer of hierarchical connotations
than Javanese. Partly because of their tradition of merantau,
141
Indonesia: A Country Study
Toraja
The Toraja of Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Barat, and Sulawesi
Tengah provinces are one minority group that has been successful in
gaining national and international attention. This group became
prominent in the 1980s, largely because of the tourist industry, which
was attracted to the region because of the picturesque villages and
the group’s spectacular mortuary rites involving the slaughter of
water buffalo.
Inhabiting the wet, rugged mountains of the interior of southern
Sulawesi, the Toraja grow rice for subsistence and coffee for cash.
Traditionally, they lived in fortified hilltop villages with from two to
40 houses featuring large, dramatically sweeping roofs resembling
buffalo horns. Until the late 1960s, many of these villages were
politically and economically self-sufficient. This autonomy devel
oped in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries partly as
protection against the depredations of the slave trade and partly as a
result of intervillage feuding associated with headhunting.
The Toraja have strong emotional, economic, and political ties to a
number of different kinds of corporate groups. The most basic tie is
that of the rarabuku, which might be translated as “family.” Toraja
view this grouping as encompassing relations of “blood and bone,”
that is, relations between parents and children—the nuclear family.
Since Toraja reckon kinship bilaterally, through both mother and
father, the possibilities for extending the concept of rarabuku in sev
142
The Society and Its Environment
143
Indonesia: A Country Study
Dayak
Another group of ethnic minorities struggling for recognition are
the peoples of southern, central, and eastern Kalimantan. From an
outsider’s perspective, most of the scattered ethnolinguistic groups
inhabiting the interior of the vast island have been referred to as
Dayak. The word is a collective term used by outsiders since 1836 to
indicate the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan. Among the people
labeled as Dayak, however, one finds Ngaju Dayak, Maanyan, and
Lawangan, among others. Although they reside in longhouses that
traditionally served as a means of protection against slave raiding
and intervillage conflict, the Dayak are not communalistic. They
have bilateral kinship, and the basic unit of ownership and social
organization is the nuclear family. The various Dayak peoples have
typically made a living through swidden agriculture. In regard to
religion, they tend to practice either Protestantism or Kaharingan, a
form of indigenous religious practice blending animism and ancestor
worship classified by the government as Hindu. The Dayak perform
elaborate death ceremonies in which the bones are disinterred for
secondary reburial.
Through its healing performances, Kaharingan serves to mold the
scattered agricultural residences into a community, and it is at times
of ritual that the Dayak peoples coalesce as a group. There is no set
ritual leader, nor is there a fixed ritual presentation. Specific ceremo
nies may be held in the home of the sponsor. Shamanic curing, or
balian, is one of the core features of these ritual practices. Because
illness is thought to result in a loss of the soul, the ritual healing
practices are devoted to its spiritual and ceremonial retrieval. In gen
eral, religious practices focus on the body, and on the health of the
body politic more broadly. Sickness results from giving offense to
one of the many spirits inhabiting the earth and fields, usually from a
failure to sacrifice to them. The goal of the balian is to call back the
wayward soul and restore the health of the community through
trance, dance, and possession.
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, reassertions of ethnic iden
tity and land claims caused tensions leading to violence with Muslim
migrants. Violent clashes between Dayaks and migrants had started
even earlier, in December 1996, when a Madurese migrant accused
of raping a Dayak woman was killed, and province-wide rioting
occurred. In the following months, violence escalated, troops were
flown in, a crackdown took place, and the cycle of violence contin
ued with schools, homes, and businesses burned by Dayaks and
migrants in retaliation against one another. Hundreds died in these
clashes, and thousands were displaced or reported missing.
144
Couple in wedding garb,
Nusa Tengarra Timur
Courtesy Embassy of
Indonesia, Washington, DC
Weyewa
The Weyewa inhabit the western highlands of Sumba and Nusa
Tenggara Timur Province, where they cultivate rice, corn, and cas
sava using both slash-and-burn methods and continuous irrigation of
paddy fields. They supplement this income through the sale of live
stock, coffee, vanilla, cloves, and their distinctive brightly colored
textiles.
There were few challenges to Weyewa notions of political and
religious identity until the 1970s. Because Sumba is a rather dry and
infertile island, located away from the ports of call of the spice trade,
it was comparatively insulated from the Hindu-Buddhist, Muslim,
and later Dutch influences, each of which helped shape the character
145
Indonesia: A Country Study
146
The Society and Its Environment
Asmat
The approximately 65,000 Asmat people of the south-central allu
vial swamps of Papua Province are of a Papuan genetic heritage.
They live in villages with populations that vary in size from 35 to
2,000 inhabitants. Until the 1950s, warfare, headhunting, and canni
balism were constant features of Asmat social life. The people would
build their houses along river bends so that an enemy attack could be
seen in advance. Houses in coastal areas still are generally built on
pilings two or more meters high, to protect residents from daily
flooding by the surging tides of the brackish rivers. In the foothills of
the Jayawijaya Mountains, Asmat live in tree houses that are five to
25 meters off the ground. In some areas, they also build arboreal
watchtowers as much as 30 meters above the ground.
The Asmat are primarily hunters and foragers who subsist by gath
ering and processing the starchy pulp of the sago palm, finding grubs,
and hunting down the occasional wild pig, cassowary, or crocodile.
Although the Asmat population has steadily increased since coming
into contact with missionaries and government health workers, the for
est continues to yield an adequate supply and variety of food. Accord
ing to anthropologist Tobias Schneebaum, “Some Asmat have learned
to grow small patches of vegetables, such as string beans, and a few
raise the descendants of recently imported chickens. The introduction
of a limited cash economy through the sale of logs to timber compa
nies and carvings to outsiders has led many Asmat to consider as
necessities such foods as rice and tinned fish; most have also become
accustomed to wearing Western-style clothing and using metal tools.”
Many Asmat have converted to Christianity, although a large
number continue to practice the religion of their ancestors. For
example, many believe that all deaths—except those of the very old
and very young—come about through acts of malevolence, either by
magic or actual physical force. Ancestral spirits demand vengeance
for these deaths. The ancestors to whom they feel obligated are rep
resented in shields, in large, spectacular wood carvings of canoes,
and in ancestor poles consisting of human figurines. Until the late
1980s, the preferred way for a young man to fulfill his obligations to
his kin and his ancestors and prove his sexual prowess was to take
the head of an enemy and offer the body for cannibalistic consump
tion by other members of the village.
The first Dutch colonial government post was not established in
Asmat territory until 1938, and a Catholic mission began its work
there only in 1958, but the pace of change in this once remote region
greatly increased after the 1960s. Beginning in the early 1990s,
many Asmat enrolled their children in Indonesian schools, and many
147
Indonesia: A Country Study
Chinese
Identifying someone in Indonesia as a member of the Chinese
(Tionghoa) ethnic group is not an easy matter, because the physical
characteristics, languages, names, areas of residence, and lifestyles
of Chinese Indonesians are not always distinct from those of the rest
of the population. The national census does not record the Chinese as
a special group, and there are no simple racial criteria for member
ship in this group. There are some people who consider themselves
Chinese but who, as a result of intermarriage with the local popula
tion, are less than one-quarter Chinese in ancestry. On the other
hand, there are some people who by ancestry could be considered
half-Chinese or more but who regard themselves as fully Indonesian.
Furthermore, many people who identify themselves as Chinese Indo
nesians cannot read or write the Chinese language.
The policy of the Indonesian government by the early 1990s
strongly advocated the assimilation of the Chinese population into
the communities in which they lived, but the Chinese had a long his
tory of enforced separation from their non-Chinese neighbors. For
nearly a century prior to 1919, Chinese were forced to live in sepa
rate urban neighborhoods and could travel out of them only with
government permits. Most Chinese continued to settle in urban areas
of Indonesia even after this “quarter system” was discontinued in
1919. In some areas, such as the city of Pontianak in Kalimantan
Barat and Bagansiapiapi in Riau Province, Chinese even came to
form a majority of the population. They began to settle in rural areas
of Java in the 1920s and 1930s, but in the 1960s the government
again prohibited the Chinese from exercising free choice of resi
dence, requiring them to live in cities and towns.
The Chinese who immigrated to Indonesia were not linguistically
homogeneous. The dominant languages among these immigrants
were Hokkien, Hakka, and Cantonese. There was great occupational
148
Papuan men,
Papua Province
Courtesy Embassy of
Indonesia, Washington, DC
diversity among the Chinese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, but Dutch colonial policies channeled them into trade, min
ing, or skilled artisanship. In the twenty-first century, Chinese con
tinue to dominate the Indonesian economy’s private sector, despite
central government policies designed to promote non-Chinese entre
preneurs. Nonetheless, Chinese are not a monolithic group. Not all are
rich and urban. They seldom share a common language besides Indo
nesian or Javanese. One of the historical distinctions among Indone
sian Chinese in the 1960s and 1970s—between the peranakan (local
born Chinese with some Indonesian ancestry) and totok (full-blooded
Chinese, usually foreign-born)—has begun to fade as fewer foreign-
born Chinese immigrate to Indonesia. Although the distinctiveness
and social significance of this division vary considerably from place
to place in the archipelago, ties to the Chinese homeland are weaker
within the peranakan community, and there is stronger evidence of
Indonesian influence. Unlike the more strictly male-dominated totok,
peranakan families recognize descent along both female and male
lines. Peranakan are more likely to have converted to Christianity
(although some became Muslims) and to have assimilated in other
ways to the norms of Indonesian culture. They typically speak Bahasa
Indonesia as their first language.
149
Indonesia: A Country Study
Education
The character of Indonesia’s education system reflects the country’s
diverse religious heritage, its struggle for a national identity, and the
challenge of resource allocation in a poor but developing archipelagic
nation with a population that is young (median age 27.6 years) and
growing (at an estimated annual rate of about 1.1 percent) in 2009.
Tremendous progress has been made toward the goal of universal edu
cation since 1973, when nearly 20 percent of youth were illiterate. At
that time, then-President Suharto issued an order to set aside portions
of oil revenues for the construction of new primary schools. This act
resulted in the construction or repair of nearly 40,000 primary-school
facilities by the late 1980s, and literacy rates improved significantly
nationwide. During 1997–98, the financial crisis affected the poorest
families the most, resulting in their selectively cutting back on their
education expenditures. Government funding struggled to keep up
with rising costs during this period, but by 2002, according to the
World Bank, only 2 percent of those between the ages of 15 and 24
could not read, and by 2009, the adult literacy rate was 90.4 percent.
Primary and Secondary Education
Indonesians are required to attend nine years of school. They can
choose between state-run, nonsectarian public schools supervised by
the Department of National Education (Depdiknas) or private or semi
private religious (usually Islamic) schools supervised and financed by
the Department of Religious Affairs. However, although 86.1 percent
150
The Society and Its Environment
151
Indonesia: A Country Study
152
Elementary school children on Madura, Jawa Timur Province
Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, used with permission
© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hawai’i
153
Indonesia: A Country Study
154
Muslim girls in school uniforms, Madura, Jawa Timur Province
Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, used with permission
© Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hawai’i
155
Indonesia: A Country Study
Health
Services and Infrastructure
As access to education has improved throughout the archipelago,
use of modern forms of health care also has increased. For example, in
2003 the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that 68
156
The Society and Its Environment
157
Indonesia: A Country Study
158
The Society and Its Environment
159
Indonesia: A Country Study
160
The Society and Its Environment
Society’s Prospects
As the world’s largest archipelago, and fourth most populous
country, the diverse nation of Indonesia faces environmental and
social challenges of breathtaking scope. While improved access to
education has resulted in lower birthrates, rising incomes, better
health, and greater levels of political participation, it has also come at
a severe cost to the environment. The preservation of the country’s
161
Indonesia: A Country Study
* * *
162
Chapter 3. The Economy
Perahu pinisi—indigenous trading vessels—moored in Jakarta’s old harbor
of Sunda Kelepa
THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY, BY MANY MEASURES, pros
pered during the New Order government of President Suharto, whose
long tenure, from 1966 to 1998, both began and ended in political and
social upheaval. Rapid growth of Indonesia’s gross domestic product
(GDP—see Glossary) endured over a long period of time, signifi
cantly raising the standard of living. Social achievements under the
New Order are widely considered to have been far less impressive,
however. The most urgent challenge facing Suharto’s four immediate
successors, who took office between 1998 and 2004, was to reignite
the fast-paced economic expansion of the New Order years.
The role of government has been absolutely crucial in the shaping of
economic development in Indonesia since the 1960s. The main themes
of government economic policy during the latter part of the Suharto
period were liberalization and deregulation, which in the 1980s and
1990s radically changed the economic landscape as well as the relation
ship between private capital and political power. The financial crisis
that started in Thailand in the summer of 1997 soon reached Indone
sia—and other Asian nations—and crisis management with interna
tional assistance became the most pressing topic of economic policy in
Jakarta over the next several years. In the early years of the new cen
tury, the government started putting economic reforms in place. Among
other new policies, these reforms included a far-reaching decentraliza
tion of economic authority and policy making. Central government
finance and the execution of monetary and exchange-rate policies now
drew special attention. A resumption of economic growth, though not
at the same torrid pace experienced prior to the 1997 crisis, accompa
nied the implementation of the reforms.
Three trends characterize the changes that have occurred in the Indo
nesian economy since the late 1960s: increasing integration with the
world economy, profound structural change, and intense diversifica
tion. These trends are highlighted in discussions about major aspects of
the Indonesian economy, such as international trade, aid, and payments;
employment and income development; and the main sectors of eco
nomic activity. The economy has experienced a fundamental reorienta
tion from agriculture to industry, and within the industrial sector itself,
from oil and gas production to other branches of manufacturing, both
labor-intensive (for example, textiles and food processing) and capital-
intensive (for example, chemicals and electrical and electronic goods).
Modernization has enabled the services sector and the transportation
and communication infrastructures to make a greater contribution to
165
Indonesia: A Country Study
166
The Economy
167
Indonesia: A Country Study
168
The Economy
169
Indonesia: A Country Study
170
Rush-hour traffic in Jakarta
Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, DC
171
Indonesia: A Country Study
172
The Economy
173
Indonesia: A Country Study
174
The headquarters of Bank Indonesia, Jakarta
Courtesy Yadi Jasin
175
Indonesia: A Country Study
176
The Economy
177
Indonesia: A Country Study
By 2002 the total amount needed for bailout and recapitalization had
reached Rp660 trillion (US$70.8 billion). The country then had 179
banks remaining, 93 of which were scheduled for restructuring,
including 31 state-owned, 57 joint ventures, and 5 privately owned.
Progress was slow, however, especially in terms of divesting the
assets that had been taken over from these institutions. By the time
the BPPN was dissolved in February 2004, it had recovered 28 per
cent of the nominal value of loans it had taken over but had been able
to return only 25 percent of the value of the bonds the government
had issued to pay the banks’ creditors. Remaining assets, carrying a
book value of US$8.3 billion, came directly under the auspices of the
Department of Finance. Assessments of BPPN’s performance pointed
out that it would have been unrealistic to expect the agency to get
more for assets that had been grossly overvalued in the first place.
Bank and debt restructuring in the period from 1998 to 2004 suf
fered from two problems beyond the strict confines of financial policy
and management. One problem was in the legal sphere and concerned
bankruptcy. A 1998 bankruptcy law finally replaced one dating from
Dutch colonial times, but it still proved very difficult to get debt-rid
den firms declared bankrupt. Creditors won very few cases, in a judi
cial system widely known to be rife with corruption. The other
problem concerned the divestment of seized corporate assets. When
assets were sold off, there was a real risk that the BPPN would come
across former owners trying to buy back their assets at low prices,
possibly under other names. Whenever foreign buyers were involved,
political opposition was likely in the legislature or through pressure
groups. In 2001 nationalist opposition in Sumatera Barat Province
successfully blocked the sale of a majority equity share in a state-
owned cement factory to the Mexican cement giant CEMEX (for
merly Cementos Mexicanos). Eventually, CEMEX bought 25 percent
of the shares, but it expressed a wish to pull out in 2006.
Good governance became a top priority of postcrisis reform, and
recent administrations have, in varying degrees, pledged to combat
corruption and enhance democracy and the transparency of govern
ment affairs. One of the most sweeping reforms entailed a far-reaching
delegation of authority to subnational levels of government (see
Decentralization, this ch.). Although implementation was quick and
complete, with maximum involvement of democratic institutions, suc
cess was limited, largely because of great variation in the capacity of
local governments to exercise their authority in taxation and fiscal pol
icy. Even though he supported democratic reforms, including arrange
ment of Indonesia’s first fully free general elections since 1955,
Habibie enjoyed little credibility, as he himself was the product of a
178
The Economy
179
Indonesia: A Country Study
Government Finance
Central Government Budget
Five-year development plans (Repelita—see Glossary) were an
important tool in economic planning beginning in the 1960s. These
plans offered broad guidelines and set general priorities. The empha
sis was on rehabilitation in Repelita I (1969–73), but it then shifted to
increasing productivity in agriculture and improving infrastructure in
particular during the 1970s. After the drop in oil prices in the early
and mid-1980s, consecutive Repelitas stressed industrialization and
export promotion. By the time of Repelita V (1989–93), the main
objectives included continued export diversification and reduced reli
ance on foreign aid. The 1980s and early 1990s also saw increasing
attention given to social development issues, such as education,
health, and family planning. Repelita VI (1994–98) stressed the
expansion of manufacturing and set growth targets that were over
taken by actual developments on the eve of the 1997–98 financial cri
sis. The government abandoned conventional Repelitas in the wake of
the crisis and thereafter replaced them with national medium-term
development plans (NMDPs), also set out in five-year increments.
The main objectives of the 2004–9 NMDP included a sharp reduction
in poverty and registered unemployment and an average annual rate of
growth of 6.6 percent.
The Repelitas served as general indicators of the direction of gov
ernment policy rather than concrete priorities (the latter being pro
vided by the annual budget of the central government). Indonesia
traditionally had a fiscal year that ran from April 1 to March 31, with
the national government’s draft budget for a particular year usually
submitted to the People’s Representative Council (DPR) in January,
only months before the budget was to become effective (see Legisla
tive Bodies, ch. 4). Beginning in 2000, the fiscal year coincided with
the calendar year, with the budget now sent to the DPR at mid-year.
As a consequence, the budget for 2000 covered only nine months.
Public spending historically was divided into two broad categories,
routine and development expenditures. Routine expenditures included
the salaries of civil servants and most spending on materials, opera
tions, and maintenance, whereas development expenditures consisted
180
The Economy
181
Indonesia: A Country Study
182
The Economy
183
Indonesia: A Country Study
184
Rambutan fruit seller, Jakarta
Courtesy of Anastasia Riehl
185
Indonesia: A Country Study
186
The Economy
187
Indonesia: A Country Study
188
The Economy
all other products on the other. The share of oil and natural gas
reached nearly 80 percent around 1980 but fell to about 50 percent in
the late 1980s, 32 percent in the early 1990s, and 22 percent by
1997. After the 1990s, scarcely more than 20 percent of Indonesia’s
export revenues originated from deliveries of oil and natural gas.
The export sector’s traditional reliance on the country’s rich natu
ral resources made the economy vulnerable to the vicissitudes of
changing world prices for these products. The need to shift to manu
factured exports became especially urgent when world oil prices fell
sharply in the mid-1980s. This shift having been successfully accom
plished, Indonesia now faces increasingly stiff competition from
other low-cost producers of manufactured goods, especially China.
Initially, plywood was the most important manufactured export, its
production having been facilitated by a total ban on log exports in the
early 1980s. However, by the late 1990s plywood accounted for only
10 percent of manufacturing exports, and textiles, in particular gar
ments, and electrical appliances were both of greater importance,
whereas paper products, footwear, and chemical goods each equaled
plywood among manufactured exports. In 2007 the total value of
manufactured exports amounted to US$76 billion, with three catego
ries of products accounting for 28 percent of this total: textiles at 13
percent and electrical goods and wood products at 7 and 8 percent
each. Although manufactured exports have come to dominate Indo
nesian deliveries to the world market, the emphasis has remained on
labor-intensive production. An estimate from just before the 1997–98
financial crisis suggested that only 15 percent of Indonesia’s manu
factured exports originated from industries characterized by an inten
sive use of technology and know-how. Access to local raw materials
and cheap labor have remained the main sources of competitiveness
for Indonesian manufactured exports in world markets.
Steady growth in non-oil exports has helped Indonesia to finance
imports, in particular inputs needed for manufacturing production for
exports. During the 1980s and early 1990s, imports increased more
rapidly than exports, but this trend reversed radically during the
financial crisis as the depreciated Indonesian currency effectively
reduced the volume of purchases from abroad. As a result, the sur
plus on the commodity balance of trade improved from about 20 per
cent of total export earnings in the first half of the 1990s to 47
percent in 1999, only to stabilize at a slightly lower level in the first
years of the twenty-first century. On the eve of the crisis, imports
consisted of about 71 percent raw materials and intermediate goods,
22 percent capital goods, and only 7 percent consumer goods. This
pattern has remained unchanged, reflecting an increasing dependence
189
Indonesia: A Country Study
190
The Economy
191
Indonesia: A Country Study
192
The Economy
193
Indonesia: A Country Study
194
Chili vendors, Karambosan market, Sulawesi Utara Province
Courtesy Anastasia Riehl
195
Indonesia: A Country Study
196
The Economy
Agriculture
Indonesia has followed a well-recognized trend among developing
nations, in which agriculture’s share of GDP has declined over time,
197
Indonesia: A Country Study
even though the sector still provides employment for a large propor
tion of the labor force. The agricultural sector in Indonesia has
remained vital for several reasons. A significant segment of the popu
lation lives and works in rural areas, and rice, the chief food crop, is the
staple nutrient for most households, urban and rural alike. Adequate
supplies of affordable rice are deemed essential to preventing political
instability.
The share of agriculture in GDP oscillated around 25 percent
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s but then fell sharply, reaching
16 percent by 1995. This trend was temporarily reversed with the
financial crisis, with agriculture’s contribution reaching almost 20
percent of GDP in 1999. Economic recovery reduced the share of
agriculture again; the average remained stable around 16 percent
during the first years of the twenty-first century and by U.S. govern
ment estimates was about 14.4 percent in 2008—as compared with
the Central Statistical Office figure for 2007, of 13.8 percent. Mean
while, the share of agriculture in the total labor force dropped, too,
from more than 50 percent to a little above 40 percent. Within agri
culture, food crops have always accounted for the predominant share
of output, leaving considerably smaller proportions to tree-crop cul
tivation, fisheries, and forestry.
Food Crops
A total land area of about 42 million hectares was being cultivated
for agricultural purposes in Indonesia around the turn of the twenty-
first century. Slightly more than 50 percent was dedicated to food-
crop cultivation, both intensive sawah (irrigated or wetland) cultiva
tion in Java (8.5 million hectares) and ladang (not irrigated) cultiva
tion on other islands (16.0 million hectares; see fig. 8). Estates (large
state-owned or private units of production with a high degree of spe
cialization of tasks) accounted for 25 percent of the land in use.
Since around 1960, expansion of output in food-crop cultivation has
been attained through intensified land use and application of high-
yield seed varieties. By 2000 total rice output exceeded 50 million
tons per year, largely realized in sawah cultivation. Ladang cultiva
tion was responsible for most of the non-rice food-crop output, in
particular the production of cassava and corn, which together
accounted for an annual yield of more than 25 million tons by 2000.
In the 1980s, rice cultivation covered a total of around 10 million
hectares, primarily on sawah land. About 60 percent was irrigated,
which was crucial to the productivity of land when planted with
high-yield seed varieties. Output grew at a spectacular rate of 7 per
cent annually from 1977 to 1982, and by 1985, Indonesia, once the
198
The Economy
199
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
Corn Estate rubber
200
Rice Smallholder rubber
Corn and rice Palm oil
Banda BRUNEI
Aceh MALAYSIA
Medan
SIA
LAY
SINGAPORE MA SULAWESI
Pontianak Samarinda
KALIMANTAN
Padang NEW GUINEA
MALUKU
Palembang
Indonesia: A Country Study
SUMATRA
PAPUA
Makassar NEW
Jakarta
GUINEA
� MADURA
Surabaya SUMBAWA
Yogyakarta
International boundary
JAVA BALI FLORES
� National capital TIMOR-LESTE
SUMBA
Populated place TIMOR
201
Indonesia: A Country Study
Fishing
Fish has traditionally been a main source of animal protein in the
average Indonesian diet, being generally far more available than meat.
The fishing industry engages more than 2 million households working
in Indonesia’s large archipelagic sea area, about 50 percent of them in
Java and 25 percent in Sumatra (see Geographic Regions, ch. 2). The
industry is divided into two widely different branches, marine and
inland, of which the latter includes harvesting from open water as well
as ponds and aquatic cages. Productivity is far greater in marine fisher
ies, which employ only 25 percent of the producer households but oper
ate 75 percent of all fishing boats and account for almost 80 percent of
total output. Total annual production of fish in Indonesian waters oscil
lated between 2 million and 3 million tons during the 1980s, reached
4.5 million tons in 1996, and continued to increase, albeit slowly, dur
ing the years of crisis. The annual total surpassed 5.6 million tons by
2003. Foreign-owned fishing enterprises, which must be licensed, oper
ate on a much smaller scale than the domestic industry. Fish exports
consist primarily of shrimp and tuna for the Japanese market.
Enormous changes have taken place in Indonesian fisheries since
around 1980, when the physical possibility of extending catch areas
began to be exhausted. The government designated offshore waters
as exclusive economic zones closed to fishing, and it banned trawl
ing in the waters surrounding Java and Bali. The frontier of expan
sion was thus literally closing, and output could increase only by
202
Planting rice, Banyumas, Jawa Tengah Province
Courtesy Eric Stein
A fishing boat under construction, Madura, Jawa Tengah Province
Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, used with permission
©Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Hawai’i
203
Indonesia: A Country Study
Forestry
Forests cover 110 million hectares, or 57 percent, of Indonesia’s
land area; two-thirds of the forested area is tropical rain forest in
Kalimantan and Papua. Estimates of the rate of depletion reached 1
million hectares per year during the mid-1980s, while targets for
reforestation and afforestation were set at 95,000 and 250,000 hect
ares, respectively. The government revised these targets significantly
downward in the late 1980s but increased them again during the
1990s, reaching a combined level of nearly 200,000 hectares by the
late 1990s. Official logging output fell by two-thirds during the
period 1998–2002, but targets for rehabilitation of forests were
reduced even further, being restored to 250,000 hectares in 2003,
339,000 hectares in 2004, and as little as 27,000 hectares by 2005. In
1999 estimates put the extent of endangered forest land at 23.2 mil
lion hectares, of which only 1.2 million hectares, or about 5 percent,
had been rehabilitated four years later. Forest Watch Indonesia, the
Indonesian Forum for Environment, and the Department of Forestry
estimated that the rate of deforestation rose to a staggering 4 million
hectares per year in 2003. Replenishment of forest resources in Indo
nesia clearly was lagging far behind both ecological and commercial
needs and official targets.
Uncontrolled expansion of logging operations, both legal and ille
gal, has magnified the ecological issues in Indonesian forestry. The
1970s witnessed a boom in logging concessions, both large-scale
and small-scale, whereas a ban on log exports put in place by the
government in 1983 fostered the emergence of timber conglomer
ates. The expansion was fueled by liberal regulation of concessions,
extremely low taxation, lax enforcement of reforestation obligations,
and widespread corruption. During the 1980s alone, large business
groups acquired concessions covering millions of hectares, and the
204
The Economy
Industry
Indonesia was a late starter in industrialization, lagging behind
regional neighbors such as Malaysia and Thailand by at least a decade.
This delay may be attributed to the generous revenues from exploiting
natural resources that effectively postponed a sense of urgency regard
ing rapid industrialization. The first phase of import substitution relied
on labor-intensive production with a low level of technological
sophistication and took place in the 1970s, but its impact on the econ
omy was limited. By the early 1980s, manufacturing not related to oil
and gas still accounted for only 11 percent of GDP, and production
catered almost exclusively to the domestic market. In the 1980s, a sec
ond phase of import substitution shifted the focus to selected key
upstream industries with a relatively high level of technological
sophistication, including heavy industries such as petroleum refining,
steel, and cement, in which state-owned enterprises often dominated.
205
Indonesia: A Country Study
206
The Economy
207
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
208
Lhokseumawe
Banda �� � BRUNEI
Aceh MALAYSIA
�� �
� Medan
NATUNA IA
ISLANDS YS
�� LA C
SINGAPORE MA C � SULAWESI
� Al
BINTAN HALMAHERA
� �
BATAM C �
KARIMUN C Bontang
� KALIMANTAN Ni
Padang Sn �
MA
Sn � C NEW GUINEA
C Balikpapan Ni �
LU
� BANGKA
C SERAM
KU
Palembang Sn �
Indonesia: A Country Study
C� � � � Au Cu
Sn BELITUNG Ambon
C Ni BURU Tembagapura
SUMATRA � B Amamapare PAPUA
Makassar NEW
C Kudus B
��� GUINEA
�Jakarta Jepara � MADURA
Surabaya SUMBAWA
C
International boundary JAVA Yogyakarta
BALI FLORES
� National capital TIMOR-LESTE
SUMBA
Populated place TIMOR
Ni Nickel Al Bauxite � Oil field Gas field Iron smelter Cement plant Petrochemical plant
Sn Tin C Coal mine Oil refinery Gas liquefaction plant Steel mill Thermoelectric Hydroelectric
power plant power plant
Au Gold Cu Copper B Bitumen Fertilizer plant Tin smelter
Island, and the project will likely lead to further development of these
facilities as well as others involving electronics, chemicals, precision
equipment, garments, and other manufactures.
In many industries, foreign firms have supplied technical assis
tance and arranged for domestic production under licensing agree
ments without direct equity participation in the domestic firm. For
example, domestic Indonesian plants have produced automobiles for
about 20 international car makers, foremost among them Toyota,
some of whose vehicles are built in Indonesia by Astra International,
the country’s largest auto manufacturer. Other Japanese companies,
as well as South Korean, European, and American firms, assemble
their vehicles in Indonesia. The Indonesian automotive industry has
grown amid heavily protected markets.
Foreign inputs of a different nature have been applied in high-tech
nology enterprises, particularly ones headed by B. J. Habibie, first as
minister of research and technology and later as president. IPTN,
established in 1976, assembled helicopters and small fixed-wing air
craft under licenses from French, German, and Spanish firms aided
by imported personnel and know-how. Many people considered
IPTN a premature leap into advanced technology. Extra-budgetary
support and credit privileges stopped at the request of the IMF in Jan
uary 1998, and operations at IPTN all but ceased subsequently.
Small-Scale Industry
The modern sector of large and medium-sized firms is the main
focus of government policy, but small-scale factories employing
fewer than 20 workers and cottage industries with up to five workers
are far more numerous and crucial in terms of providing employ
ment. Small-scale establishments engage in a wide range of activi
ties from traditional bamboo weaving to metal and leather working.
Many of these industries offer part-time employment to rural work
ers during off-peak seasons. In 1986 small-scale industries employed
3.9 million workers, corresponding to 67 percent of total industrial
employment, twice as many as in large and medium-sized firms.
Still, this figure reflected a significant decline from the 1970s, when
small-scale industry accounted for 86 percent of total industrial
employment. By 2004 the number of small-scale enterprises was
around 250,000, and together they employed 1.8 million workers, 16
percent of the industrial labor force. The foremost branches were
food and beverages, including tobacco, with about 33 percent of
these workers, followed by wood and textiles, including footwear,
each of which accounted for slightly more than 20 percent. Labor
productivity has remained relatively low in small-scale industry. In
209
Indonesia: A Country Study
Minerals
Indonesia is the leading producer of petroleum in Southeast Asia
and has the world’s tenth-largest proven natural gas reserves, 70 per
cent of which are offshore. It exported 16 percent of the world’s total
volume of LNG in 2005, but more recent reports indicate that the
share is diminishing. It also has significant reserves of other valuable
minerals, such as bauxite, coal, copper, gold, nickel, and tin. Much
of the nation’s industrial development, however, is based on the pro
cessing of oil and natural gas. Most mineral production, after some
degree of domestic processing, is exported to industrial nations,
especially Japan. Some of Indonesia’s own mineral-intensive indus
tries, notably, steel and aluminum, rely on imports of raw materials.
On balance, however, Indonesia is a net exporter of minerals, in
large part because of large-scale exports of LNG.
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Between 1962 and 2009, Indonesia’s oil production was formally
governed by a quota allocation from the Organization of the Petro
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC—see Glossary). In 2005 Indone
sian output of crude oil amounted to about 1.1 million barrels per
day, corresponding to 3.5 percent of OPEC’s total production. This
was about 20 percent less than the level of crude output in 1999 and
also failed to meet the allocated OPEC quota of 1.4 million barrels
per day. In 2006 the crude oil output fell below 1 million barrels per
day. Experts attribute the decline in output to a slowdown in invest
ment and declining productivity. With oil exports governed at least
210
The Economy
211
Indonesia: A Country Study
212
Freeport-McMoRan’s Grasberg copper and gold mine, Papua Province
A bulk carrier ship at Timika, upriver from the seaport of Amamapare
Courtesy Freeport-McMoRan
213
Indonesia: A Country Study
214
The Economy
Roads
Indonesia had some 437,760 kilometers of roads by 2008, of
which 59 percent were paved, and about 60 percent were located in
Java, Madura, Bali, and Sumatra (see fig. 10). There are less exten
sive networks of roads in Sulawesi and Kalimantan, while smaller
islands often have just a few roads within or connecting major settle
ments. About 40,000 kilometers of roads administered by the national
and provincial governments were considered to be in good condition;
another 35,000 kilometers were in varying stages of repair. About 32
percent of the nation’s roads are classified as highways.
215
Indonesia: A Country Study
The nation’s roads and highways are used annually by some 5.5
million passengers cars, 1.2 million buses, 2.9 million trucks, and
28.5 million motorcycles. Motor vehicles increasingly dominate
urban transit, and in major cities the policy is to increase the role of
larger public buses over that of privately owned, smaller-capacity
vehicles such as the nine-seat Opelet microbus and the six-seat
Bemo. The formerly ubiquitous becak has been largely replaced in
the major cities by the bajaj, a three-wheeled, multipassenger motor
cycle, which itself is losing ground to minibuses and automobiles. In
Jakarta the increased use of private vehicles contributes to urban
sprawl, ever-greater traffic congestion, and air pollution.
Vehicular congestion and automotive emissions are increasing,
particularly in urban areas. Some new toll roads were constructed in
the 1990s, such as the one between Jakarta city center and Sukarno-
Hatta International Airport to the west and the industrial areas around
Cikarang and Cikampek to the east. However, such developments fell
far short of keeping up with rapidly expanding demand, and new proj
ects were shelved altogether when the financial crisis struck in 1997,
resuming only after several years of recovery. A toll road opened in
2005 significantly reduced travel time between Jakarta and Bandung,
the nearest major city to the capital. Newly constructed toll roads con
nect Semarang and Surakarta (also known as Solo) in Jawa Tengah
Province and improve access to Pasuruan in Jawa Timur. Investment
in a mass public-transport system in Jakarta lagged behind develop
ments in other Southeast Asian capitals such as Bangkok, Kuala Lum
pur, Manila, and Singapore. A system of priority bus lanes introduced
in 2005 has offered a temporary solution. In 2004 construction started
on an elevated, two-line monorail serving Jakarta’s central business
district and suburban areas east and west of the city. Completion of
the monorail, scheduled for 2007, was delayed with construction
barely underway in 2008, and little progress was made thereafter.
Administrative hurdles and disputes over land generally are cited as
factors that severely slow down investment in the transportation infra
structure in Indonesia.
Railroads
In 2008 Indonesia had 8,529 kilometers of railroad track, all of it
owned by the government and operated by the Department of Trans
port, a gain of more than 30 percent since 2006. About 75 percent of
railroad track is located in Java. In 2006 most of the track (5,961 kilo
meters) was 1.067-meter narrow gauge, 125 kilometers of which was
electrified in 2006; the rest (497 kilometers) was 0.750-meter gauge.
Although trains are used mostly for passenger transportation, freight
216
The Economy
Shipping
Maritime transportation experienced major investments and various
reforms in the 1980s after growing increasingly restrictive and bureau
cratic during preceding decades. The Indonesian National Shipping
Company (Pelni) had been established in 1952 but gained the upper
hand in interisland shipping only after the nationalization of the
Dutch-owned shipping company in 1959. By 1965 Pelni accounted for
50 percent of tonnage in interisland shipping, but its market share
declined sharply despite a virtual monopoly on passenger travel. In
1982 a “gateway policy” was introduced in order to discourage trans
shipment via Singapore and direct Indonesia’s nonbulk exports
through four designated deep-sea ports: Tanjung Priok (Jakarta), Tan
jung Perak (Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province), Belawan (Medan,
Sumatera Utara Province), and Makassar (formerly Ujungpandang, in
Sulawesi Selatan Province). The protectionist measures were accom
panied by a US$4 billion investment plan launched in 1983 that in par
ticular favored upgrading facilities at the four gateway ports.
However, such a gateway policy became irrelevant as exports were
increasingly handled by container shipping. By 1987 Indonesia’s trade
with North America and Europe moved almost exclusively via trans
shipment in Singapore. In fact, the closing of Indonesian ports to
feeder vessels denied Indonesian shippers the benefits of lower freight
rates made possible by the cargo consolidation at Singapore. By the
late 1980s, the gateway policy had been abandoned.
Total freight volume handled by some 95 commercial Indonesian
ports reached a total of 1.2 billion tons by 2004, 75 percent of which
went to foreign destinations. The greatest volume passed through
ports adjacent to oil refineries: 30 million tons at Dumai, Riau Prov
ince, and 22 million tons at Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur Province.
By contrast, the four main ports in Java—Tanjung Priok (Jakarta),
Tanjung Perak (Surabaya), Semarang, and Cilacap—were together
responsible for just 30 million tons. In addition to major ports, there
are more than 30 other significant ports supporting interisland mari
time trade throughout the archipelago.
217
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
218
Bireuen BRUNEI
Banda
Aceh MALAYSIA
�
� Belawan
Medan Tanjungbalai IA
S
L AY
Rantauprapat SINGAPORE Manado
Paloh MA Sangkulirang Bitung
Sibolga Dumai Poigar
Singkawang KALIMANTAN Gorontalo Kotamobagu
Pekanbaru Pontianak Sintang Samarinda
Telukbatang Balikpapan Donggala Palu Luwuk Biak
Padang Rengai NEW GUINEA
Jambi Belinyu Jayapura
Sarmi
Pangkalpinang Kendawangan Kolonodale MALUKU
SUMATRA Palembang Malili
Lubuklinggau
Indonesia: A Country Study
Toboali Majene
Bengkulu Banjarmasin Palanro Amamapare
Kolaka Kendari
Tanjungkarang- PAPUA
Telukbetung Makassar
Cirebon � � NEW
Jakarta � Semarang � SULAWESI
Merak GUINEA
� Surabaya �
Bandung Solo Pasuruan Labuhanbajo
Sumbawa Larantuka
Cilacap
International boundary Major road
� Yogyakarta Banyuwangi Raba Maumere
JAVA Denpasar
� National capital Major airport TIMOR-LESTE
Labuanbalat
Populated place � Major port Kupang
BALI
Major railroad TIMOR
0 200 400 Kilometers AUSTRALIA
Boundary representation
0 200 400 Miles not necessarily authoritative
Civil Aviation
Although passenger transportation by sea still exceeded domestic
air travel in 2002, with 17 million passengers compared to 12 million,
by 2007 civil aviation had become of far greater importance. In that
year, 31 million passengers boarded an airplane compared with only
6 million using sea transport. The phenomenal increase in domestic
air travel in the early twenty-first century was caused by a prolifera
tion of private budget airlines linking all parts of the archipelago and
making air travel affordable for large groups of new customers. By
comparison, international arrivals by air increased from 4.3 million
passengers in 2000 to 5.3 million in 2004 and then declined to 4.5
million by 2007. Civil aviation is handled by the state-owned national
carrier, Garuda Indonesia, which dates from 1949; its subsidiary,
Merpati Nusantara Airlines; and a host of private budget airlines,
which expanded from three in 2000 to 29 by 2005.
The enlargement of physical infrastructure in the late 1970s and
early 1980s included construction of airports throughout the archipel
ago so that every provincial capital was within hours of Jakarta. The
hub, Sukarno-Hatta International Airport at Jakarta, opened in 1985
and was followed by international airports in Denpasar, Bali (Ngurah
Rai), Surabaya, Jawa Timur (Juanda), and Medan, Sumatera Utara
(Polonia). In 2009 Indonesia had 683 airfields, 164 of which were
full-fledged airports, including at least 22 designated as international.
There also were 36 heliports. The largest numbers of passengers dis
embarked at Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and Denpasar. Runways at
least 3,000 meters long were available in Medan, Padang, Jakarta,
Surabaya, Denpasar, and Biak (Papua Barat Province). Besides these
major airports, Indonesia is well served by 35 or more significant air
ports. In this regard, Papua is particularly well served.
Post and Telecommunications
The national postal system is the most important means of commu
nication for the majority of citizens. Postal services are available in all
subdistricts, and, by the first years of the twenty-first century, the total
number of post offices had increased to 7,000 from fewer than 3,000 in
1980. Having invested early in satellite communications, since the
1980s Indonesia has possessed a sophisticated telecommunications
infrastructure. It is supported by the Palapa system of satellites (the
name signifies unity). The first two Palapa-A satellites were launched
in 1976; they were successfully replaced by Palapa-B satellites in
1987. The first Palapa-C was launched in January 1996, and a second
in May 1996, providing coverage not only for the Indonesian archipel
ago but also for Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Formerly
219
Indonesia: A Country Study
220
The Economy
Economic Prospects
The big challenge for Indonesia in the early twenty-first century is
to resume rapid economic growth while retaining the achievements of
reform and democratization won since the collapse of the New Order
government in 1998. This is no easy task. Short-run prospects for
major macroeconomic variables looked quite favorable at the end of
the first decade of the twenty-first century. Production capacity was
being enlarged as a result of new investment, the current account in
the balance of payments was improving, the exchange rate had
reached a stable level, inflation was slowing, and the government bud
get deficit had been significantly reduced. An average annual growth
rate in the 6 to 6.5 percent range appeared possible, with 6.2 percent
specified as the target for 2010. That would be sufficient to reduce
poverty and official unemployment to the levels laid down in the
long-run economic plans. But such positive prospects were offset by
external and internal uncertainties. Continued high oil prices in the
world economy could have an adverse effect on the prices of imports
in general and put an additional strain on foreign-exchange earnings if
Indonesia were indeed to stay a net importer of fuels. Another external
source of uncertainty was the excessive dependence of the Indonesian
capital market on short-run foreign portfolio investments with an
inclination toward high sensitivity to sudden fluctuations in expecta
tions. The most crucial internal source of uncertainty concerned the
government’s capability to create sound business conditions. Progress
was urgently needed in combating corruption and guaranteeing legal
security for both foreign and domestic firms. The administration of
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who took office in 2004 and
was reelected in 2009, initially enjoyed considerable credit for its
determination to tackle these huge problems, but signs of disappoint
ment with the slow pace of progress have been mounting.
The three chief trends in Indonesian economic development since
the late 1960s—increasing integration with the world economy, pro
found structural change, and intense diversification—remain rele
vant to an assessment of long-term prospects in the twenty-first
century. Further integration with the world economy is expected to
221
Indonesia: A Country Study
* * *
222
The Economy
223
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
A precolonial Javanese jong
PRESIDENT SUHARTO RESIGNED IN 1998, and Indonesia began
a transition to democracy, a process that has had the country strug
gling to establish a new political identity. This struggle has taken
place on four fronts: executive–legislative relations, center–region
relations, religion–state relations, and interethnic relations. A slow
but eventually successful process of constitutional reforms from 1999
to 2002 addressed the first three fronts. Political elites in the People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR; for this and other acronyms, see table
A) established a strongly presidential system with directly elected
national and local chief executives, stronger legislatures, and an inde
pendent judiciary, as well as a decentralized political system with sig
nificant local autonomy. They also maintained Indonesia’s identity as
a plural, tolerant, and moderate Muslim-majority society with signifi
cant non-Muslim minorities, but not an Islamic state. This vision was
sorely tested by the passage in some districts of local regulations
implementing parts of Islamic law—sharia, or syariah in Bahasa
Indonesia (see Glossary)—and by the Al Qaeda–linked terrorist
attacks in Bali and Jakarta from 2002 to 2009. Indonesian citizens
heartily endorsed these changes through their broad, enthusiastic, and
largely nonviolent participation in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 electoral
processes. The constitutional reform process indicated little on the
fourth front, interethnic relations, except that Indonesia was still to be
a state based on Pancasila (see Glossary), the five-point pan-religious,
pan-ethnic state ideology created by the first president, Sukarno (in
office 1945–67). Indonesians have struggled to overcome deadly
communal strife in Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, among other
places, but by 2009 much of this violence had receded.
Consolidation of the new democracy remains a significant chal
lenge. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century,
reforms in the national-security sector were only partial at best. The
military and police remained neutral in elections between 1999 and
2009, and they were stripped of their appointed seats in legislatures at
all levels. The system of secondment of military officers to the civilian
bureaucracy was also abolished. However, the roots of the military’s
political influence—the territorial system, business ventures, and the
lack of democratic civilian oversight—only began to be addressed
under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who
took office in 2004. The police were organizationally separated from
the military in 1999 and have done a respectable job of addressing the
threat of terrorism, but for most Indonesian citizens, daily interactions
227
Indonesia: A Country Study
with the police have not been reformed: overall, corruption and inef
fectiveness remain widespread. The implementation of decentraliza
tion, including revised autonomy laws passed in 2004 and the direct
election of regional chief executives (governors, mayors, and district
administrative heads or regents—bupatis) beginning in 2005, created
its own problems, as corruption also has been decentralized, and the
national government is confronted with a host of local regulations that
are inconsistent with national laws and the constitution. Executive–
legislative relations are frequently contentious, as the president and
the legislative branch establish a working relationship within the new
constitutional parameters and the legislature itself adjusts to the pres
ence of a new upper house, the Regional Representative Council
(DPD), established in 2004. Internal reform of these entities, to unclog
the process of enacting laws and strengthen institutional capacity, is a
pressing need.
Corruption has tainted every branch and level of the state: the civil
ian bureaucracy, the military and police, the legislatures, and the judi
ciary. Efforts to root out corruption, including the passage of new laws
and regulations and the establishment of an array of commissions,
have been only partially effective. Nonetheless, for ordinary citizens,
fighting corruption remains a matter of primary concern, particularly
the corruption they experience on a day-to-day basis at the village or
ward offices, schools, government offices, courts, and police stations.
Private investors, both domestic and foreign, are reluctant to commit
their capital to Indonesia because of the high cost of doing business
and the lack of consistent contract enforcement by a clean and impar
tial judiciary.
The new political system that President Yudhoyono inherited has
made dealing with these pressing issues more complex than previ
ously. Legislatures are more independent of the executive branch, and
there are now two legislative bodies at the national level. Provincial
and district governments are more powerful and have greater auton
omy vis-à-vis the central government. The judicial system is no longer
under the administrative and political control of the executive branch.
The military retains significant latent political influence. Nonetheless,
the success of the 2004 electoral process gave the new system broad
legitimacy, and, again in 2009, Yudhoyono enjoyed a strong popular
mandate from voters to move the country forward.
Foreign policy is frequently a significant issue in domestic politics,
particularly when it concerns relations with the United States, Austra
lia, or the complex tangle of problems in the Middle East. Yudhoyono
has had to navigate these political minefields, given his ties to the
United States from his prior military career and his cultivation of a
228
Government and Politics
229
Indonesia: A Country Study
230
Government and Politics
of the New Order, fostering simmering resentments that could one day
be tapped as a reservoir of opposition to democracy itself. Most
importantly, despite a number of successful high-level prosecutions,
rampant bureaucratic, military, legislative, and judicial corruption
remains the most significant factor keeping private foreign investors
on the sidelines. Their absence lowers economic growth rates, which
in turn hampers the performance legitimacy of the new democratic
regime. Whatever approach is used to describe and analyze Indonesian
government and politics, it requires an understanding of the legal basis
and institutional structures of the system.
231
Indonesia: A Country Study
232
The national coat of arms of Indonesia depicts the Garuda—an ancient
mythical bird—which symbolizes creative energy, the greatness of the
nation, and nature. The 8 feathers on the tail, 17 on each wing, and 45 on
the neck stand for the date of Indonesia’s independence (August 17, 1945).
The shield symbolizes self-defense and protection in struggle. The five
symbols on the shield represent the state philosophy of Pancasila (see
Glossary). The motto “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (“Unity in Diversity”) on
the banner signifies the unity of the Indonesian people despite their
diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds.
Courtesy of Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, DC
233
Indonesia: A Country Study
affecting the lives of most people shall be controlled by the state, and
that the state shall control natural resources for exploitation for the
general welfare of the people. An additional clause introduced in
2002 now states that the national “economic democracy” shall be
organized on the basis of such principles as togetherness, efficiency,
justice, sustainability, environmental perspectives, self-sufficiency,
and balance.
The political struggle from 1945 to 1959 over the constitutional
framework of the state stemmed not from the ambiguities of the 1945
document nor its heavy weighting of executive power, but over deep
disagreements about the nature of the state itself, particularly the
issues of federalism and the role of Islam. Once the common battle
against Dutch imperialism had been won, the passionate differences
dividing various nationalist groups about the future of Indonesia sur
faced. The possibility of a federation of loosely knit regions was
denied by the use of force, first in crushing the Republic of South
Maluku (RMS) in 1950, then in suppressing the Darul Islam insurgen
cies in Jawa Barat, Aceh, and Sulawesi Selatan between 1949 and
1962, and finally in defeating the Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and the Universal Struggle Charter
(Permesta) regional rebellions of 1957 to 1961. In subsequent decades,
the central government was always sensitive to the issue of separat
ism, and the existence of a unitary republic, expressed through a pri
mary “Indonesian” national identity, seemed secure. The difficulty of
integrating an Islamic political identity with the Indonesian Pancasila
identity was no longer of primary importance by the late 1990s and,
although hotly debated at times, was never a major stumbling block in
the constitutional-amendment process from 1999 to 2002 (see Pan
casila: The State Ideology, this ch.).
234
Government and Politics
235
JUDICIAL LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENT BODIES
236
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREME PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT BANK FINANCE
COURT COURT CONSULTATIVE VICE PRESIDENT INDONESIA AUDIT BOARD
ASSEMBLY (MPR)
CABINET PROVINCIAL PROVINCIAL
ISLAMIC TAXATION REGIONAL
REPRESENTATIVE COORDINATING BRANCHES BRANCHES
HIGH COURT REVIEW BOARD
COUNCIL (DPD) MINISTERS
PRESIDENTIAL
REGIONAL PEOPLE’S
MUNICIPAL ADVISORY
REPRESENTATIVE
MAYOR COUNCIL
DISTRICT COUNCIL (DPRD)
GOVERNMENT COMMANDER
REGIONAL PEOPLE’S
IN CHIEF,
REGENT REPRESENTATIVE
ARMED FORCES
COUNCIL (DPRD)
NATIONAL
SUBDISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
HEAD
SPECIALIZED
AGENCIES
VILLAGE VILLAGE VILLAGE Direct line of control
GOVERNMENT HEAD COUNCIL PROVINCIAL
OFFICES Joint approval of legislature
237
Indonesia: A Country Study
238
Main assembly building of Indonesia’s legislature, with the legislative office
complex to the right
Part of Indonesia’s legislative complex, including staff offices and meeting
rooms for the MPR, DPR, and DPD
Courtesy Yadi Jasin
239
Indonesia: A Country Study
meets on the same calendar as the DPR, which is required by the con
stitution to hold sessions at least once every year. Four members from
each province are elected directly by voters for the same five-year
term as the DPR. To be eligible for nomination for the 2004 election,
candidates could not be affiliated with political parties, must have
collected 1,000 to 5,000 signatures from verified registered voters
(depending on the size of the province), and must have resided in the
province for five years. The DPR tried to strip the nonpartisan and
residency requirements for the 2009 elections. However, the DPD
petitioned the Constitutional Court to overturn this decision as incon
sistent with the constitutional intent for the DPD; the court sided with
the DPD and restored the provincial-residency requirement but ruled
that it was constitutional to allow for partisan DPD candidates. Can
didates’ photographs appear on the ballot paper, and voters are eligi
ble to vote for one candidate; the four candidates with the highest
vote totals win.
The DPD is led by a speaker and two deputy speakers; one of each
of the three leaders represents western, central, and eastern Indonesia.
The DPD has divided itself into four committees, each of which deals
with a set of policy areas. Its role in the legislative process is more
indirect than and subordinate to the DPR’s. The DPD can propose
bills to the DPR in the areas of regional autonomy; center–region
relations; the formation, division, and merger of regions; the manage
ment of natural resources and other economic resources; and the
financial balance between the center and the regions. The constitution
also specifies that the DPD may participate in the deliberations
regarding bills in these areas, but it does not indicate how this should
happen, leaving that up to the two bodies to negotiate. The DPD must
also provide its opinion to the DPR on the state budget and on bills
regarding taxation, education, and religion. Finally, the DPD has
oversight authority related to all of these policy areas; however, it
cannot take action on the results of its inquiries, which go to the DPR
for further action.
One of the first acts of the DPD after its establishment was to
begin work on a constitutional amendment to increase its powers.
Passage of any amendments requires the support of a substantial por
tion of the DPR, and it is not likely that the DPR would support an
amendment that would require it to share legislative power. In the
2004 term, the proposal failed to garner sufficient support, but a
commission has been established to study the issue, and it was likely
the DPD would try again in the 2009 term.
240
Government and Politics
241
Indonesia: A Country Study
The Cabinet
The president appoints and is assisted by a cabinet of ministers. In
October 2009, Yudhoyono named his second “United Indonesia” cab
inet, with 34 ministers representing six parties (the five that formed
the nominating coalition for his presidential ticket plus Golkar).
Twenty departments were headed by ministers, and these departments
were grouped under three coordinating ministers: political, legal, and
242
Government and Politics
security affairs; economic affairs; and people’s welfare. The state sec
retary, who supports the president’s role as head of state, also was a
minister. There were 10 ministers of state, that is, ministers with port
folios but without full departments. Yudhoyono also revived the use
of vice ministers, a practice allowed by law since 2008, appointing 11
to ministries with particularly heavy workloads. Most of these vice
ministers were career bureaucrats rather than partisan or retired mili
tary appointees. In addition to the ministers, two high-ranking state
officials were accorded cabinet rank: the attorney general and the
cabinet secretary.
Specialized Agencies
Specialized agencies and boards at the central government level are
numerous and diverse. They include the National Development Plan
ning Board (Bappenas), the National Family Planning Coordinating
Agency (BKKBN), the Capital Investment Coordinating Board
(BKPM), and the Agency for the Study and Application of Technology
(BPPT). At lower levels there are regional planning agencies, invest
ment boards, and development banks under the aegis of the central
government.
243
Indonesia: A Country Study
The Judiciary
The Indonesian legal system is extraordinarily complex, the inde
pendent state having inherited three sources of law: customary or
adat law, traditionally the basis for resolving interpersonal disputes in
the village environment; Islamic law (sharia), often applied to dis
putes between Muslims; and Dutch colonial law. Adat courts were
abolished in 1951, although customary means of dispute resolution
are still in use in villages. The return to the 1945 constitution in 1959
meant that Dutch laws remained in force except as subsequently
altered or found to be inconsistent with the constitution. A criminal
code enacted in 1981 expanded the legal rights of criminal defen
dants. The government in 2009 was still reviewing its legacy of
Dutch civil and commercial laws in an effort to codify them in Indo
nesian terms. The types of law recognized in MPR Decree No. 3 of
1999 include the constitution, MPR decrees, statutes passed by the
DPR and ratified by the president, government regulations promul
gated by the president to implement a statute, presidential decisions
to implement the constitution or government regulations, other imple
menting regulations such as ministerial regulations and instructions,
and local (provincial and district) regulations. Obviously, the execu
tive enjoys enormous discretion in determining what is law.
Article 24 of the amended constitution states that judicial power shall
be vested in the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and subordi
nate courts established by law, and that the organization and competence
of courts shall be established by law. In Sukarno’s Guided Democracy,
the justice system became a tool of the revolution, and any pretense of
an independent judiciary was abandoned. Although in theory one of the
goals of the New Order was to restore the rule of law, in practice the
judiciary remained both corrupt and a means for suppressing political
dissent. Judicial reform was thus a key demand of the 1998 student
movement and remains one of the most important items on the political-
reform agenda. Important steps were taken in this regard as part of the
1999–2002 constitutional-amendment process. A new body, the Consti
tutional Court, was established to review the constitutionality of laws,
resolve disputes among the various branches and levels of government,
have final say in the dissolution of political parties, and decide disputes
over election results. The Constitutional Court also plays a role in the
presidential-impeachment process by issuing a verdict on an indictment
made by the DPR. The court has nine justices, three each nominated by
the Supreme Court, the DPR, and the president. Justices must be knowl
edgeable about the constitution and may not be state officials. The Con
stitutional Court chief justice and deputy chief justices are chosen by
and from among the justices.
244
Government and Politics
The judicial branch stands coequal with the executive and legisla
tive branches. Justices of the Supreme Court are nominated by the
independent Judicial Commission for approval by the DPR and for
mal appointment by the president. The chief justice and deputy chief
justice are elected by and from among the justices. Members of the
Judicial Commission must have a legal background or experience
and are appointed and dismissed by the president with the approval
of the DPR. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction in dis
putes between courts of the different court systems and between
courts located in different regions. It can annul decisions of high
(appellate) courts on points of law, not fact. On request, it can give
advisory opinions to the government and guidance to lower courts.
However, its powers of judicial review are limited to decisions on
whether administrative regulations and local regulations conform to
the laws as passed by the DPR. Another reform to strengthen the
system of checks and balances was the 2004 shift of administrative
and financial control over the lower courts from the Department of
Justice (now called the Department of Justice and Human Rights) to
the Supreme Court.
Four different court systems operate below the Supreme Court.
First, there are courts of general civil and criminal jurisdiction. Dis
trict courts are the courts of first instance. High courts (at the provin
cial level) are appellate courts. Following the Dutch legal system,
cases are decided by panels of judges rather than juries. Sources of
law on which parties to a dispute may base their claims include:
international law (to date rarely used); modern Indonesian civil law,
which has replaced but is often rooted in colonial-era Roman-Dutch
civil law; and adat (customary) law, which differs widely among
ethnic groups (see Tradition and Multiethnicity, ch. 2). The court
system remains highly corrupt, with verdicts in both civil and crimi
nal cases influenced by bribery by both plaintiffs and defendants.
Although judicial reform is key to consolidating democracy and
establishing a more favorable investment climate, efforts at judicial
reform have so far been half-hearted and largely ineffective.
Second, religious courts exist throughout Indonesia to resolve dis
putes between Muslims in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance,
and gifts. These district-level courts base their decisions on Islamic
law. As in the secular court system, religious high courts are appellate
courts at the provincial level. One of the persistent tensions between
Muslims and the state arises from efforts to expand the jurisdiction of
the religious courts.
Third, the state administrative court system resolves matters pertain
ing to the decisions of government officials. In addition, the Taxation
245
Indonesia: A Country Study
246
Government and Politics
247
Indonesia: A Country Study
248
Political grafitti, “We are forced
to cultivate on the moon,”
Yogyakarta, 2002
Courtesy Eric Stein
249
Indonesia: A Country Study
Aceh
The Special Region of Aceh (called Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam,
meaning the State of Aceh, Abode of Peace, from 1999 to 2009), in
northwestern Sumatra, is the area of Indonesia where the Islamic
character of the population is the most pronounced. The Acehnese
demand for autonomy, expressed in support for the 1950s Darul
Islam rebellion, was partially met by the central government’s accep
tance of a “special-region” status for the province in 1959, allowing
a higher-than-usual official Indonesian respect for Islamic law and
custom. This special-region status, together with growing prosperity,
brought Aceh into the Indonesian mainstream. Nevertheless, in the
early twenty-first century the idea of an independent state was kept
alive by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Thought to have been
crushed in the mid-1970s, the guerrilla campaign of the insurgents,
under the leadership of Swedish-based Hasan di Tiro and with Lib
yan support, renewed its hit-and-run warfare in the late 1980s, hop
ing to build on economic and social grievances. The military reacted
with crushing force but never was able to defeat the separatists fully.
President Habibie’s offer in 1999 to revive the railroad from
Medan in Sumatera Utara Province to Aceh’s capital, Banda Aceh,
and other economic-development projects in exchange for Acehnese
loyalty to Jakarta was seen as a continuation of the patronizing, cen
tralistic politics of the New Order. Habibie’s policy on East Timor
led to growing calls among Acehnese civilians for a similar referen
dum. In response, the central government hurriedly passed a new
law updating Aceh’s “special-autonomy” status, including particu
larly the right to incorporate elements of Islamic law into local legal
codes, which had not actually been a demand of most Acehnese.
President Wahid involved international participants in resolution of
the conflict for the first time by inviting the Geneva-based Henri
Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to help mediate a Cessa
tion of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). Although Vice President
Megawati was not particularly supportive of this policy, she allowed
the process to continue after she became president in July 2001, and
the COHA was signed in December 2002. Nonetheless, by May
2003 the agreement had broken down. President Megawati declared
martial law in Aceh and unleashed the military once again.
250
Government and Politics
Papua
Papua—formerly called at various times Irian Jaya, West Irian, West
Papua, Dutch New Guinea, and West New Guinea—remained under
Dutch control after Indonesian independence in 1949. A combination
251
Indonesia: A Country Study
252
Government and Politics
Political Culture
Following the constitutional amendments of 1999 to 2002, the
reformed Indonesian political system is characterized by a set of
institutions labeled a “difficult combination” in many other coun
tries: a powerful presidency and multiparty politics. There is a fixed
term for the president as well as separate popular elections, and thus
roughly equal democratic legitimacy, for the president and the
national legislature. Some of the dangers inherent in this system are
divided government, in which the presidency and the legislature are
controlled by different political parties, and the possibility of elect
ing as president a political outsider who has no experience forging
political compromises in the legislature. These dangers are exacer
bated in a multiparty polity, in which the likelihood of a single party
253
Indonesia: A Country Study
254
Government and Politics
255
Indonesia: A Country Study
Front and took all DPR leadership positions for themselves. The
exception proved the rule, however, as this maneuver was perceived as
inappropriate, and within weeks the committee leaderships had been
reshuffled to include all parties. In addition, Yudhoyono’s first cabinet
even included some figures affiliated with some of the National Front
parties, creating links “across the aisle,” even if these people tended to
be marginal within their parties and were not officially representing
their parties in the cabinet. Yudhoyono also worked assiduously to
bring more and more of those parties over into his camp, leaving the
PDI–P as the only steadfast opposition to his administration.
This inclusionary political culture was less prominent during the
2009 presidential elections but, after those elections, once again
returned to the fore. Despite Golkar’s position as the second-largest
party after Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party (PD), Yudhoyono decided to
jettison Muhammad Yusuf Kalla as his running mate for reelection.
Following the logic of the inclusionary political culture, all of Yud
hoyono’s presidential coalition partners expected him to choose one
of their leaders as his new running mate. Instead, Yudhoyono chose
the nonpartisan, technocratic economist Budiono, who had served as
his coordinating minister for economic policy before becoming gov
ernor of Bank Indonesia. Kalla and Megawati failed to form a coali
tion of the second- and third-largest parties, instead settling for
coalitions with Wiranto of the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura
Party) and Prabowo Subianto of the Great Indonesia Movement Party
(Gerindra Party), respectively. Nonetheless, after Yudhoyono won the
presidential election with exactly the same large majority as in 2004
(60.8 percent), he still turned to Kalla and Megawati to negotiate an
inclusionary cabinet. Megawati rebuffed him, and so the cabinet
formed in October 2009 did not include representatives from the
PDI–P, the Hanura Party, or the Gerindra Party, but it did include rep
resentatives from Golkar as well as the five parties that nominated the
Yudhoyono-Budiono ticket: the PD, PKS, National Mandate Party
(PAN), Development Unity Party (PPP), and PKB.
Consensus-Based Decision Making
One of the ironies of Indonesian political culture is that while
Suharto’s New Order paid lip service to the achievement of consen
sus through deliberation as being an integral part of “Pancasila
Democracy,” in reality the system was then highly centralized, auto
cratic, and nonparticipatory, and instead it is the new democracy that
has actually adopted consultative consensus. The preference for
deliberation and consensus is partly driven by the exigencies of
shifting inclusionary coalitions described above. However, even in
256
Government and Politics
257
Indonesia: A Country Study
influence the way the government appeals to and interacts with the popu
lation. Although the Javanese kingship model was particularly appropri
ate for understanding Suharto and the authoritarian New Order, it
continues to have relevance in democratic Indonesia (see Javanese, ch. 2).
Political power on Java historically was deployed through a patri
monial bureaucratic state in which proximity to the ruler was the key
to command and rewards. This power can be described in terms of a
patron–client relationship in which the patron is the bapak (father or
elder). The terms of deference and obedience to the ruler are con
ceived in the Javanese gusti–kawula (lord–subject) formulation,
which describes man’s relationship to God as well as the subject’s
relationship to his ruler. The reciprocal trait for obedience is benevo
lence. In other words, benefits flow from the center to the obedient.
By extension, government’s developmental activities are a boon to
the loyal. Bureaucratically, Javanese culture is suffused with an atti
tude of obedience—respect for those more senior, conformity to
hierarchical authority, and avoidance of confrontation—characteris
tics of the preindependence priyayi (see Glossary) class whose roots
go back to the traditional Javanese courts.
Javanism (kejawen) also has a mystical, magical dimension in its
religiously syncretic belief system, which integrates pre-Indian, Indian,
and Islamic beliefs. Its practices include animistic beliefs, which invest
sacred heirlooms (pusaka) with animating spirits, and rites of passage
whose antecedents are pre-Islamic. Javanism also encompasses the
introspective ascetic practices of kebatinan (see Glossary), mysticism
as related to one’s inner self, that seek to connect the microcosms of
the self to the macrocosms of the universe (see Islam, ch. 2). The poli
tics of Javanism have been defensive, seeking to preserve its particular
heterogeneous practices from demands for Islamic orthodoxy.
Islamic Political Culture
According to the 2000 census, 86.1 percent of the population (in
2009 an estimated 240.3 million people) identified themselves as
Muslim, making Indonesia the largest Muslim nation in the world,
united with the universal Islamic community (ummah) in the profes
sion and practice of the faith (see Religion and Worldview, ch. 2).
The appeal of Islam did not weaken when modern secular national
ism became the predominant basis for the independent Indonesian
state. In fact, given the prominence of Islamic proselytization and
reinvigoration, the people’s desire to maintain Islamic institutions
and moral values arguably is at an all-time high in Indonesia. There
is, however, a distinction between Islam as a cultural value system
and Islam as a political movement.
258
Government and Politics
259
Indonesia: A Country Study
260
Government and Politics
261
Indonesia: A Country Study
262
Government and Politics
263
Indonesia: A Country Study
Golkar Party
The Golkar Party is the revamped, democratic version of the New
Order authoritarian ruling party Golongan Karya (Golkar), the military-
backed organization of “functional groups.” The longer original name
has been dropped, and now the party is simply known as Golkar. Its tra
ditionally very close ties to the military and civil service no longer
exist, although many officers and bureaucrats have chosen to continue
to support the party rather than join another. However, this support is
now personal and private, as the election laws prohibit the use of state
resources to support any party, and individual military officers and gov
ernment officials must resign their positions in order to stand as politi
cal candidates. Despite these new restrictions on Golkar’s ability to tap
its traditional constituencies, the party enjoys advantages over its rivals
as a result of its national network, which extends to every village; its
experienced politicians; and its strong fund-raising capabilities. The
party no longer commands the electoral majorities of 60 to 70 percent
that it engineered under the New Order, but it still makes a strong
showing, winning 22.4 percent of the vote (120 of 500 DPR seats) to
come in second to the PDI–P in the 1999 legislative elections, the larg
est share of the votes in 2004 (21.6 percent, 128 of 550 DPR seats), and
in 2009 the second-largest share (14.5 percent of the vote, 106 of 560
DPR seats). Golkar has also won some of the direct elections for gover
nor, mayor, and bupati, and the party’s chair, Muhammad Yusuf Kalla,
held the vice presidency from 2004 to 2009.
264
A Yogyakarta storefront display, in June 2000, of portraits of Abdurrahman
Wahid (Indonesia's third president, 1999–2001), Sukarno (Indonesia's first
president, 1945–66), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (Wahid’s vice president,
1999–2001, Indonesia’s fourth president, 2001–4,and daughter of Sukarno)
Courtesy Florence Lamoureux, © Center for Southeast Asian Studies,
University of Hawai’i
265
Indonesia: A Country Study
266
Government and Politics
rival faction to forcibly eject Megawati and her supporters from party
offices. She responded by founding the PDI–P to distinguish it from
the New Order–backed PDI, which garnered only 3 percent of the
vote in the 1997 elections. Because the PDI–P was not allowed to run
in those elections, Megawati instructed her supporters to punish the
rump PDI by voting for the PPP, which grew enormously as a result.
Both the PDI–P and the rump PDI competed in the 1999 elections,
but with vastly different results. The PDI–P won the largest share
with 33.7 percent (153 DPR seats), while the PDI languished with
only 0.6 percent (two seats). Megawati became the frontrunner for
the October 1999 presidential selection process in the MPR but lost to
Abdurrahman Wahid, who then helped her get selected as vice presi
dent. When Wahid was removed from office in 2001, she became
president until 2004, when she was defeated in direct elections by
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The PDI–P’s vote in the 2004 legisla
tive elections suffered as well, losing almost half of its support to fall
to 18.5 percent (109 DPR seats), as a result of public disappointment
with her performance as president, her husband Taufik Kiemas’s rep
utation for corruption, and the party as a whole. Despite these set
backs, Megawati was reelected party chair at the 2005 congress,
prompting some disaffected leaders led by Laksamana Sukardi to bolt
and found the Democracy Renewal Party (PDP). In the 2009 legisla
tive elections, the PDI–P’s support dropped further to 14 percent (94
DPR seats) as a result of competition from the Democrat, Gerindra,
and Hanura parties. Megawati, this time running with Prabowo Subi
anto, was defeated in a rematch with Yudhoyono in the 2009 presi
dential election.
Democrat Party
The Democrat Party (PD) was founded by then-Coordinating Minis
ter of Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2001 to be
his political vehicle. He broke with the usual pattern in Indonesia, how
ever, and did not become the party’s chairman. The bulk of the party’s
initial cadres were mostly mid-level ex-Golkar and former military
leaders. Although the party’s local branch structure remained weak at
the time of the April 2004 legislative elections, the PD still managed to
capture 7.5 percent of the vote (57 DPR seats), and thus become one of
the seven largest parties, largely on the strength of Yudhoyono’s per
sonal popularity. Between 2004 and 2009, the success of the party and
Yudhoyono’s presidential bid attracted new cadres, who expanded the
party’s structure into a truly national presence. This expansion, com
bined with Yudhoyono’s continuing popularity, gave the PD the most
votes in the April 2009 legislative elections, with 20.9 percent of the
267
Indonesia: A Country Study
vote (148 of 560 DPR seats). The party’s prospects in 2014 and beyond
remain unclear, however, with Yudhoyono no longer eligible to run for
reelection at that time.
268
Supporters of the Indonesian Democracy Party–Struggle (PDI–P)
The banner, shown here in reverse, touts the No. 12 candidate on the ballot
among nearly all the major and some minor parties. Following the
geographic pattern of Nahdlatul Ulama’s organizational depth and
Wahid’s personal cachet, the PKB’s electoral strength is concen
trated in Jawa Timur and Jawa Tengah.
The PKB does not support the rigid implementation of Islamic law
and is an open party with support in parts of Indonesia with significant
Christian populations, such as in Sulawesi Utara, Kalimantan Barat, and
Papua. Because of Wahid’s personal control over the PKB, his and the
party’s fortunes moved more or less in tandem. He used the PKB’s per
formance in the 1999 legislative elections (third-largest party with 12.6
percent of the vote and 51 DPR seats) as a springboard to build a coali
tion behind his successful presidential bid that year in the MPR voting.
Wahid’s erratic administration reflected poorly on the PKB as well, and
the party lost some of its public support, as well as access to patronage
and the bully pulpit, when he was removed from office in July 2001. As
a result, in 2004 the PKB lost two percentage points of its 1999 vote
share, dropping to 10.6 percent in 2004. (Nonetheless, because all five
269
Indonesia: A Country Study
of the major parties from 1999 lost support in 2004, the PKB retained
the third-largest party share of the popular vote.) After Wahid lost the
presidency, the party began to splinter, and the 2004 election results
caused a major split, with both pro- and anti-Wahid factions claiming
the PKB’s mantle. At the outset of the new administration, the party
took an independent stance vis-à-vis President Yudhoyono, sometimes
supporting and sometimes opposing his policies. However, by 2007 the
PKB had swung around much more solidly in support of the administra
tion because of Yudhoyono’s success and Wahid’s complete loss of con
trol over the party. As a result of party splintering, reduced support
overall for Muslim and Islamist parties, and greater competition from
secular nationalist parties, the PKB vote share was more than halved in
2009 to 4.9 percent (28 DPR seats).
270
Government and Politics
hurt the PAN, for it reinforced the public perception of Rais as stri
dent, divisive, and having abandoned the reformasi movement for
sheer power politics. In addition, the PAN’s poor showing weakened
Rais’s position within the party, enhancing the ascendancy of the Isla
mist wing and leading to further defections by members of the secu
lar/Christian wing.
The Islamist wing’s hypothesis that a more focused albeit more
narrowly based party would attract more voters than a less focused,
but broader-based, party was proven wrong in the 2004 elections, in
which the PAN’s share of the popular vote shrank to 6.4 percent (52
DPR seats), making it the smallest of the seven major parties. (The
PAN’s support in 2004 was more evenly spread around the country
than in 1999, and so its share of DPR seats actually increased from
7.4 percent to 9.5 percent.) Although Rais tried his hand in the first
direct presidential election, he lost in the first round and subsequently
left the political scene after completing his term as MPR speaker in
October 2004. He was replaced as PAN chair by a much less well-
known figure, Sutrisno Bachir, and returned to his former life as an
academic at Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. With several of
its leaders holding cabinet posts in the Yudhoyono administration, the
PAN mostly supported the administration, although it has reserved
the right to criticize on occasion. In 2009 the PAN’s support declined
to 6.0 percent of the vote (46 DPR seats), because of waning overall
support for Muslim and Islamist parties as well as greater competition
from the DP, Gerindra, and Hanura parties.
Islamist Parties
271
Indonesia: A Country Study
The dominant partners were Nahdlatul Ulama and the PMI; the lat
ter was a resurrected but emasculated version of Masyumi, which had
been banned in the Sukarno era and continued to be proscribed under
Suharto. The return of modernist Islamic interests (represented by the
PMI) to mainstream politics was stage-managed by the government,
which apparently favored the PMI within the PPP to counterbalance
the appeal of Nahdlatul Ulama. In 1984 the government forced the PPP
to adopt Pancasila (as opposed to Islam) as its basic ideological princi
ple. The decline in Nahdlatul Ulama’s influence in the PPP, together
with constraints on the Islamic content of the PPP’s message, con
firmed the traditionalists’ perception that Nahdlatul Ulama should
withdraw from the political process and concentrate on its religious,
social, and educational activities. The theme of Nahdlatul Ulama’s
1984 congress was “Back to Nahdlatul Ulama’s Original Program of
Action of 1926.” While constitutionally accepting Pancasila as its sole
ideological principle, Nahdlatul Ulama opted out of the Pancasila polit
ical competition by holding that political party membership was a per
sonal decision and that individual Nahdlatul Ulama members had no
obligation to support the PPP.
Nahdlatul Ulama’s withdrawal from the PPP combined with Mega
wati’s rise in the PDI to shift some of the opposition votes from the
PPP to the PDI in the 1987 and 1992 elections. In the 1997 elections,
after her forcible ejection from the PDI offices in 1996, Megawati
instructed her supporters to vote for the PPP. This was called the
“Mega-Bintang” campaign (bintang means “star,” the party symbol
for the PPP, which after 1984 was no longer allowed to use the Kaaba
in Mecca as its symbol), and it greatly weakened the PDI, to the PPP’s
benefit. One consequence of these election results was that in late
1998 and early 1999, as the DPR debated the package of laws for the
1999 democratic elections, the PPP positioned itself as the voice of
the reformasi movement within the legislature and forced several
important changes to those laws. For instance, Golkar proposed an
electoral system it called “proportional plus” that would in essence
have established single-member districts in many parts of the country.
Given Golkar’s overwhelming resource advantage at the time, it
could have swept many of these seats and possibly maintained its grip
on power. Instead, the PPP was able to use its position in the DPR to
mobilize public opposition to this proposal, which was dropped in
favor of retaining proportional representation in order to encourage
political pluralism. In light of the founding of rival parties such as the
PKB and the PAN, this tactic helped save the PPP from fading into
political obscurity as has the PDI.
272
Government and Politics
In 1999 the PPP was allowed to restore Islam as its ideological basis
and the Kaaba as its symbol, and it won 10.7 percent of the popular
vote (58 DPR seats) to become the fourth-largest party. The PPP sup
ported Wahid for president and was rewarded with several cabinet
positions. During the constitutional-reform process following those
elections, the party supported the reinsertion of language calling for
Islamic law to be established for Indonesian Muslims, in part to protect
its right flank from smaller but harder-line Islamist parties. This is one
of the markers that distinguishes “Muslim” from “Islamist” parties: the
PKB and the PAN opposed this proposal, which eventually was
soundly defeated. Party leadership rivalries caused a faction to break
off and form the Reform Star Party (PBR). The PBR proved to be one
of the few splinter parties to gain any significant share of votes in the
2004 legislative elections, winning 2.4 percent (13 DPR seats). The
split, combined with voter disappointment with the performance of all
the major parties, caused the PPP’s vote share to drop to 8.2 percent
(58 DPR seats), but it still maintained its position as the fourth-largest
party by popular vote. The PPP supported a rival ticket in the first
round of the 2004 presidential election, although it threw its weight
behind Yudhoyono and Kalla in the second round and again garnered
several cabinet seats as a result. In 2009, although the PBR won only
1.2 percent of the vote and no DPR seats because of the electoral
threshold, the PPP vote share slid to 5.3 percent (38 DPR seats) as a
result of overall voter dissatisfaction with Muslim and Islamist parties.
273
Indonesia: A Country Study
274
Government and Politics
275
Indonesia: A Country Study
(when most of the 48 parties won few votes or seats and began making
unfounded allegations of fraud and boycotting KPU meetings).
Since 2002 the KPU has consisted of nine nonpartisan commis
sioners selected by the DPR from a longer list of candidates nomi
nated by the president from civil society and academia. The 1999
elections continued the New Order practice of a closed-list propor
tional-representation system with the provinces as the electoral dis
tricts for the DPR; thus, the districts ranged in size from four seats
(in former Timor Timur Province, now independent Timor-Leste) to
82 seats (Jawa Barat). These were simultaneous elections for the
national DPR and the provincial and local DPRDs; each voter used a
nail to punch a hole in one of the 48 party symbols on each of the
three ballots. These legislative elections were followed by the presi
dential selection process within the MPR in October. Governors,
mayors, and bupatis were selected by their respective DPRD.
The 2004 and 2009 elections were more complicated than those in
1999. There were three electoral processes: legislative elections in
early April, the first round of the presidential election in early July, and
the second round in September (necessary in 2004 but not in 2009).
The vote for the legislative entities consisted of four separate and
simultaneous elections, not just three as in 1999 and throughout the
New Order. In addition to the DPR and the provincial and district
DPRDs, voters now also elected representatives to the new upper
house of the national legislature, the Regional Representative Council
(DPD).
Two reforms addressed the complaint that representatives in the
DPR and DPRDs had been too detached from their constituents. First,
electoral districts were limited to between three and 10 seats (for 2009;
in 2004 the upper limit was 12 seats). In the 19 least populated prov
inces, this rule meant that the province remained the electoral district.
The other 14 provinces were divided along municipality and regency
boundaries into between two and 11 electoral districts in order to fall
into the mandated seat range. (All of these electoral districts consisted
of more than one administrative district; in no case was an electoral
district made up of a single administrative district.) The average DPR
district across the 77 electoral districts nationwide had approximately
seven representatives. Second, voters could choose a candidate from
anywhere on the party’s list rather than just voting for a party. This
open-list proportional-representation system is designed to make rep
resentatives more beholden to voters than to party leaders for their
seats, and, in fact, nearly 20 percent of DPR members in 2009 (104 of
560) were chosen by voters from lower positions on the candidate
lists. This method does make election logistics incredibly compli
276
Ballot with party logos for 2004 elections
Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, DC
cated; ballots look like newspapers, and each electoral district has to
have a separate ballot listing its candidates.
A further complication for voters was that the election system for
the DPD was entirely different from that for the DPR and DPRDs.
DPD candidates, who represented entire provinces, campaigned
more as individuals, even if they were affiliated with a political party.
(DPD candidates had to have been residing in the province they rep
resented and obtain thousands of signatures of registered voters in
order to be nominated. For the 2004 elections, candidates were not
allowed to have a political-party affiliation, but for the 2009 elec
tions, candidates could be—but did not have to be—partisan.) Candi
dates’ names and photographs appeared on the ballot. Each voter
marked one candidate, and the four candidates with the most votes
were elected.
The DPR elections served as a sort of primary for the presidential
election. Parties or coalitions thereof with at least 20 percent of DPR
seats, or 25 percent of the national DPR vote, were eligible to nomi
nate presidential and vice-presidential tickets (this threshold was only
3 percent of DPR seats in 2004). In 2004 five tickets were nominated:
277
Indonesia: A Country Study
278
Government and Politics
Political Opposition
President Yudhoyono’s first term in office was marked by repeated
natural and other environmental disasters. These included the Aceh
earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, the Yogyakarta earth
quake in May 2006, the Lumpur Sidoarjo (Lusi) mud volcano in Jawa
Timur beginning in May 2006, the Pangandaran earthquake and tsu
nami in July 2006, forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan that caused
choking haze in Malaysia and Singapore in October 2006 and 2007,
massive floods in Jakarta in February 2007, and the Tasikmalaya and
Padang earthquakes in September 2009. Despite these and other chal
lenges, Yudhoyono remained quite popular; public-opinion polls gen
erally gave him an approval rating between 40 and 60 percent. His
continued popularity created problems for the formation of a sus
tained opposition, and he exploited this situation to shore up his legis
lative support. Having only Megawati as a strong challenger, he was
easily reelected in 2009.
The Yudhoyono-Kalla administration’s consolidation of its politi
cal position began within months of taking office. Golkar, the PDI–P,
the PKB, and the PBR had formed the National Front in opposition to
the new administration and had swept all DPR leadership positions.
At Golkar’s December 2004 congress, however, Kalla was elected to
be the new party chairman just days before the Aceh tsunami. This
broke up the National Front and brought the largest party solidly
behind the vice president (if not always the president himself).
Yudhoyono also managed to neutralize the PKB, PAN, and PPP so
that even though these parties were not solid supporters, neither were
they strident opponents. The PKB has suffered from internal rivalries
279
Indonesia: A Country Study
Islam
The reformasi period has witnessed a great debate among four
camps within Islam in Indonesia: extremists, conservatives, moder
ates, and liberals. These camps exist within both the traditionalist
and modernist streams of Islam in Indonesia. The smaller and more
marginalized of these camps are the extremists and the liberals on
the right and left fringes of the debate, respectively; the bulk of the
debate is thus in the center of this spectrum between the conserva
tives and the moderates.
The extremists are the groups and individuals that have been
involved in acts of terrorism, communal violence, and small-scale
thuggery and extortion; what sets them apart from the other three
camps is their use of violence. These groups and individuals partici
pate in the debate mainly through actions rather than words; surpris
ingly, their information campaigns have been limited. Terrorism has
mainly been associated with Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda’s South
east Asian affiliate, whose spiritual leader is Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
Jemaah Islamiyah has been associated with the five most prominent
terrorist bombings in Indonesia in recent years: in the Kuta tourist
district in southern Bali in October 2002 and October 2005, the JW
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, the Australian Embassy in
280
Government and Politics
281
Indonesia: A Country Study
Aceh governor Irwandi Yusuf, a former rebel leader, has vowed not to
enforce such regulations even if they are approved.
Moderates still represent the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims.
Although large organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muham
madiyah are internally diverse, including conservatives, moderates,
and liberals among their members, they remain dominated by moder
ates. Of the two, however, Muhammadiyah has tended to be more
conservative than Nahdlatul Ulama. As the dominant majority faced
with rising extremism and a newly resurgent conservative minority,
moderates have been put on the defensive. They have often struggled
to make their voices heard without being labeled lackeys of the West
or apostates. The main distinction between conservatives and moder
ates is that the former want Islamic law codified and enforced as part
of Indonesian law, whereas the latter see it more as a set of rules for
personal behavior, enforced only by one’s faith and self-discipline.
Moderates are also much more likely to engage with non-Muslims in
interfaith initiatives and to speak publicly of tolerance of differences
and the equality of believers of all faiths.
There is a small but highly visible group of mostly young intellec
tuals and activists from both the traditionalist and modernist streams
that can be characterized as liberals, pushing the envelope of ijtihad
(exegesis) with innovative and often highly controversial ideas. Con
sistent with this cutting-edge profile, the most prominent organiza
tional home for this group is virtual, the Liberal Islam Network
(JIL), an online discussion forum. The JIL’s physical headquarters is
in the Utan Kayu complex in East Jakarta. This complex was estab
lished in the late New Order period by Gunawan Mohammad (the
leading intellectual and journalist who helped found the news maga
zine Tempo) as an incubator for a wide range of creative, opposition-
minded young people. Many conservatives and extremists have a
visceral negative reaction to the liberals and have demonstrated at
the Utan Kayu complex, threatening to expel and shut down the JIL
and calling for the death of JIL leader Ulil Abshar Abdalla, who
temporarily fled the country for his own safety.
The Military
More than a decade after the beginning of the democratic transi
tion, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) retains the poten
tial for significant political influence. This latent influence is rarely
used in public, however, and may not even be that effective behind
the scenes. Nonetheless, it exists. The sources of this influence are
twofold: institutional and cultural. Although the military has been
stripped of many of the direct powers it enjoyed under the New
282
Government and Politics
283
Indonesia: A Country Study
Communal Violence
One of the greatest fears among the political elite in 1998 was that
Indonesia would break apart into smaller countries, as had happened
in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This did not happen, but in var
ious parts of the archipelago other developments did begin to mirror
events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Communities that had previously
coexisted in relative harmony rapidly spiraled into conflict, although
in Indonesia none of these tensions ever approached the scale of
communal violence in the former Yugoslavia.
Sporadic incidents had already begun in 1996 when the New Order
still appeared quite solid, with church burnings in such places as
Pasuruan (in Jawa Timur) and Tasikmalaya (in Jawa Barat). The scale
and geographic spread of violence ramped up significantly, however,
following Suharto’s resignation, as the national government became
preoccupied with the political transition and security forces could no
longer repress long-simmering local grievances. In January 1999, fol
lowing the expulsion of Ambonese gangs from Jakarta to Ambon, as
well as the breakdown of informal ethnic power-sharing agreements
in Maluku Province, a minor traffic accident in Ambon exploded into
terrible and sustained violence between Muslims and Christians in
that city. Over the next three years, several thousand members of both
communities were killed, and parts of the city became no-go zones
for one group or the other. Extremist Muslim groups such as Laskar
Jihad—allegedly supported by like-minded senior military officers—
flocked to Ambon and played a major role in the dramatic expansion
of violence in that city. The violence that erupted in Kalimantan Barat
was even more horrific, as indigenous (Christian) Dayaks in rural
Sambas District went on a rampage against Muslim Madurese in-
migrants who had taken a prominent role in local commerce and agri
culture. Hundreds were killed, some of their severed heads left on
poles as a warning to others, and many houses burned to the ground.
Sustained violence also erupted between Muslims and Christians in
Sulawesi Tengah around the cities of Poso and Tentena, where Laskar
284
Government and Politics
Jihad and the more sinister Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group had
established a training camp. At the end of the first decade of the
twenty-first century, this conflict continues to fester, with sporadic
incidents of violence by one community on the other.
Many of these conflicts appear, on the surface, to be between eth
nic or religious communities, particularly Muslims and Christians.
However, deeper analysis reveals that very localized struggles over
political and economic power are the underlying cause. Unfortu
nately, these political and economic struggles have often been framed
by conflict entrepreneurs as being rooted in ethnic or religious cleav
ages, making it easier to mobilize communities against one another.
External forces have also exacerbated such conflicts. In Ambon,
security forces were perceived as taking sides, the army with Muslim
communities and police mobile brigades with Christian communities.
Yusuf Kalla gained greater political prominence when, as coordi
nating minister of public welfare in President Megawati’s cabinet, he
helped mediate negotiations to resolve the longer-running of these
conflicts in Poso and Ambon. The resulting agreements were called
Malino I (for Poso) and Malino II (for Ambon), after the location of
the negotiations. Malino II has largely held, but peace has not yet
fully returned to Poso. Kalla trumpeted his role in these accords in
helping Yudhoyono win the 2004 presidential election and drew on
these experiences in dealings with Aceh as vice president.
Civil Society
Indonesia’s post–New Order democracy has a civil society that is
vibrant but that also has fairly shallow roots in the broader citizenry,
with certain important exceptions. Most Indonesian nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) are small urban organizations founded and
staffed by a handful of former student activists (see Civil Society, ch.
2). They tend to claim to speak on behalf of “the people” (rakyat)
broadly or of certain communities, but often they have not bothered
to reach out to, educate, or mobilize those communities. Many of
these organizations fail to attract significant support and are short-
lived; those with larger budgets are often dependent on foreign-donor
funding. This leaves them open to charges by conservative national
ists that they are puppets of foreign governmental interests.
The proliferation of NGOs since the late 1970s is an indicator of
the increased diversity of society, the growth of a modern middle
class, and the penetration of the political culture by issues of global
concern. These organizations raise issues ranging from human rights
and the rule of law to corruption and environmental degradation.
Despite the fact that most NGOs are small grassroots organizations
285
Indonesia: A Country Study
The Media
Indonesia’s new-found freedoms have been felt most strongly by
the media. Long suppressed and harassed by the New Order, the Indo
286
Government and Politics
nesian press is now among the freest and liveliest in Asia. The trend
toward somewhat greater pluralism and openness had begun in the
late New Order, when the regime allowed the founding of a number of
new television and radio stations. (The television stations all had to be
Jakarta-based at first.) Many of the new television stations enjoyed
penetration rates of around 70 to 80 percent of the population within a
few years. Although the television licenses were all given to various
Suharto family members, cronies, and other wealthy conglomerates,
competition for advertising revenue and a large potential national
audience meant that some of these stations were tempted to push the
boundaries, especially regarding the ban on news programs other than
those produced by the state-run Television of the Republic of Indone
sia (TVRI). These stations were very lucrative, so it became difficult
for the regime to punish its own cronies by shutting down a station if
it crossed the line by broadcasting independently produced news. Sun
Television (SCTV) and Hawk Television Indonesia (RCTI) news pro
grams, in particular, were very popular with viewers across the coun
try as an alternative, albeit still relatively tame, to the stultifying
TVRI (see Post and Telecommunications, ch. 3). Broadcasting is reg
ulated by the government through the Directorate General of Radio,
Television, and Film.
Thousands of new print publications and radio stations have started
up across the country, and more television broadcasters, including
regional stations, have licenses since the transition to democracy. The
government cannot revoke these publishing and broadcasting licenses
based on what the outlets write and say. President Wahid further weak
ened the government’s ability to control the media when he abolished
the Department of Information at the outset of his administration. The
censorship board for motion pictures remained in existence, however,
mainly to police “public morality” (nudity, sexuality) rather than polit
ical statements, and President Megawati reestablished the Department
of Information on her ascension to power. In the absence of significant
government repression, spurious defamation lawsuits by private indi
viduals have become the principal means of stifling media scrutiny.
The most prominent of these cases involved businessman Tomy
Winata, who sued Tempo editor in chief Bambang Harymurti. Hary
murti was convicted and given a one-year prison sentence, which the
Supreme Court overturned.
More than 50 principal daily newspapers are published throughout
the archipelago, the majority in Java. Those with the largest reader
ship are Kompas (Jakarta), circulation of 523,000; Suara Merdeka
(Semarang), circulation of 200,000; Berita Buana (Jakarta), circula
tion of 150,000; Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung), circulation of 150,000;
287
Indonesia: A Country Study
Foreign Policy
Political Considerations
The internal dynamics of Indonesian politics since independence
have been linked to an external environment perceived as inherently
dangerous. Indonesian foreign policy has had as its most important
goals security of the state and territorial integrity. The jurisdictional
boundaries of the state were greatly expanded with the incorporation
of the “archipelago principle” into the new international law of the
sea, a new regime codified as the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea in 1982. The archipelago principle effectively territorialized all
ocean space inside straight baselines drawn from the farthest points
of the most distant islands of Indonesia, thus giving new sanction to
the Indonesian doctrine of the political and security unity of archipe
lagic land and sea space (wawasan nusantara), first promulgated in
the 1950s (see National Territory: Rights, Responsibilities, and Chal
lenges, ch. 2).
Sukarno’s response to challenge was to attack the status quo, to
“live dangerously,” to cite his 1964 Independence Day address, “A
Year of Living Dangerously.” Beginning with Suharto, the approach
of subsequent governments has been one of cooperation and accom
modation in order to gain international support for Indonesia’s polit
ical stability and economic development while, at the same time,
maintaining its freedom of action. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s level of
engagement with the rest of the world has fluctuated, mainly depen
dent on domestic developments: it was high under Sukarno, in the
latter half of Suharto’s three decades in power, and again in the early
twenty-first century, but low in the first half of the New Order and in
the transitional period after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis.
Sukarno relished leading the “new emerging forces” against the
“old established forces,” whereas subsequent governments have
turned to the Western developed economies for assistance. From
1967 to 1991, countries aiding Indonesia organized as a consortium
in the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI—see Glos
sary), subsequently reorganized in 1992 without the Netherlands—
and with Japan as chair—as the Consultative Group on Indonesia
288
Government and Politics
289
Indonesia: A Country Study
290
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
president of Indonesia since 2004
Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia,
Washington, DC
291
Indonesia: A Country Study
First Summit, held in Bali, February 23–24, 1976, who was still head
of government in the early 1990s. In the meantime, Indonesia had
played a key role in resolving the Cambodian conflict, setting the
stage for ASEAN’s expansion to encompass nearly all of the region
by the end of the millennium.
292
Government and Politics
293
Indonesia: A Country Study
294
Government and Politics
Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste, the former Portuguese Timor and then East Timor,
was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976 as Timor
Timur Province, although Portugal never recognized what it saw as
forcible annexation. The status of East Timor also remained on the
UN agenda. Indonesia had invaded in December 1975 in reaction to a
chaotic decolonization process that had led to civil war. The human
cost of the civil war, Indonesian military actions, and the famine that
followed was heavy. Estimates of Timorese deaths between 1975 and
1999 because of the conflict range from 100,000 to 250,000, out of a
total population of less than 1 million. The ability of the Revolution
ary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin—see Glossary) to
mount a low-intensity resistance, the draconian countermeasures
adopted by Indonesian military forces against suspected Fretilin sym
pathizers, and charges of Indonesian aggression combined to make
the status of East Timor a continuing foreign-policy problem for
Indonesia through the late 1990s.
When President Habibie took over in May 1998, his advisers sug
gested bold initiatives to address the problem. In early 1999, Habibie
announced that Indonesia would allow the UN to administer a refer
endum in the province on August 30. Although formally the question
posed to the East Timorese was whether or not they supported having
295
Indonesia: A Country Study
296
Government and Politics
297
Indonesia: A Country Study
298
Government and Politics
Australia
The most problematic of Indonesia’s neighborly relations are those
with Australia. The tension inherent in the population differential
between the two countries in such close geostrategic proximity is
exacerbated by their very different political cultures. Criticism of
299
Indonesia: A Country Study
The Philippines
The Philippines is a contiguous state and an ASEAN partner, yet
Indonesia’s relations with it are more distant than with its other imme
diate neighbors. The Philippines’ aligned status with the United States
and its territorial dispute with Malaysia over the sovereignty of Sabah
inhibit a close relationship with Indonesia and other ASEAN members.
Nonetheless, when President Ferdinand Marcos resigned in 1986,
Jakarta joined other ASEAN states in welcoming a peaceful transfer
of power to Corazon Aquino. Jakarta was the first capital visited by
the Philippines’ new president, unprecedentedly even before Wash
ington, and Suharto took the opportunity to press the urgency of
300
Government and Politics
China
Bilateral relations between Indonesia and China have warmed con
siderably since the resumption of diplomatic ties in 1990, although
residual suspicion remains about China’s ultimate security and eco
nomic goals in the region. Trade that once had to be transshipped
through Singapore or Hong Kong has become direct and has increased
exponentially. China has become an important market for Indonesia’s
natural gas and minerals. There have even been efforts to improve
bilateral defense and security cooperation through direct military-to
military ties. Nonetheless, Indonesia has largely preferred to contain
China’s regional expansionism via ASEAN rather than bilaterally, by
establishing forums such as ASEAN Plus Three in 1997 and support
ing China’s accession to the TAC in 2003.
Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with China were suspended in
1967 in the aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup d’état. Beijing was
suspected of complicity with the PKI in planning the coup and was
viewed by the new military-dominated government as a threat
through its possible support of a resurgent underground PKI, both
301
Indonesia: A Country Study
Japan
The quality of Indonesia–Japan relations is best measured by statis
tics on trade, investment, and the flow of assistance. In 2008 Japan
was the single-largest destination of Indonesia’s exports, the second-
largest source (after China) of its imports, the single-largest foreign
investor, and by far the most important donor of development assis
tance (see The Changing Nature of Trade and Aid, ch. 3). In return, as
the dominant foreign economic presence in Indonesia, Japan is subject
to all the expectations and resentments attendant on that status, for
example, Indonesia has sought greater technology transfer as part of
Japanese investment. The association of Japanese firms with politi
cally well-connected Indonesians has led to charges of exploitation.
With their memories of World War II and the anti-Japanese demon
strations during Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s 1974 visit, the Indo
nesian leadership was keenly sensitive to the possibility of a disruptive
anti-Japanese backlash (see Rise of the New Order, 1966–98, ch. 1).
However, the issues of Japan’s version of World War II history and of
comfort women, so critical to its relations with China and South
Korea, do not weigh as heavily in the relationship with Indonesia.
In the long term, the critical issue for Indonesia in the early
twenty-first century is access to Japan’s markets for manufactured
goods. Yet, Indonesia shares the ASEAN-wide concern about the
implications for Southeast Asia of Japanese remilitarization and was
302
Government and Politics
303
Indonesia: A Country Study
304
Government and Politics
* * *
305
Indonesia: A Country Study
306
Chapter 5. National Security
PC–40 type fast patrol craft underway
INDONESIA’S MILITARY AND NATIONAL POLICE have under
gone important changes since the Suharto era ended in 1998; how
ever, they retain a role in national society that is perhaps unique in
the world. Historically, the Indonesian military has been involved in
many affairs of state that elsewhere are not normally associated with
the armed forces. Since the Netherlands recognized Indonesian sov
ereignty in 1949, the military has been the dominant political institu
tion in Indonesia. In comparison with the armed forces of nations of
comparable background and state of development, the Indonesian
military is cautious in its exercise of traditional military authority
over society. However, until discarded in 1999, its doctrine of
dwifungsi (dual function) gave the military a role in virtually every
aspect of civil society, from village-level politics through the full
spectrum of security and intelligence missions. This legacy has been
a major factor in the military’s effort to define its role in the course of
the nation’s transition from autocracy to democracy in the post-
Suharto era.
From Suharto’s assumption of power in 1966 to his forced retire
ment 32 years later, the armed forces accepted and supported the ratio
nale behind his regime, namely, that economic and social development
was the nation’s first priority and that social and political stability was
absolutely essential if that goal were to be achieved. Regime protection
and maintenance of internal stability were the primary missions of the
Indonesian National Armed Forces (see Glossary). The armed forces
are currently called Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI but earlier ABRI;
for these and other acronyms, see Table A). They were eminently suc
cessful in this regard, leading the nation out of a period of political and
social upheaval in the mid-1960s into a period of relatively long-lasting
domestic order and unprecedented economic growth. The price paid by
society was tight control of the citizenry, intolerance of criticism or
other forms of opposition to the regime, and heavy censorship of the
news media.
Suharto’s resignation from the presidency in May 1998 came
amid a combination of regional economic recession and popular dis
content. The long-serving president’s removal gathered even greater
impetus from his inattentiveness to outbreaks of violence concen
trated mainly in Jakarta, and from the popular perception that he and
his family were involved in corrupt activities. The armed forces
establishment, Suharto’s primary instrument of political control for
more than three decades, was also a crucial element in his fall from
309
Indonesia: A Country Study
310
National Security
311
Indonesia: A Country Study
Historical Context
Independence and the Sukarno Period, 1945–65
The Indonesian armed forces grew out of the diverse experience of
the Dutch colonial period (the early seventeenth through the early
twentieth centuries), the Japanese occupation (1942–45) during
World War II, and the struggle for independence (1945–49). During
the colonial period, a small number of Indonesians were recruited
into the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). Subsequently, Japa
nese occupation forces recruited Indonesians, often former KNIL sol
diers, for use as military auxiliaries (heiho) and as supply and support
personnel attached to the Japanese army. These Indonesian enlisted
personnel frequently were sent to the front in the Pacific, the Philip
pines, and other war zones, such as Burma. The deteriorating military
situation in 1943 led the Japanese occupation authorities to organize
an indigenous volunteer self-defense force called the Defenders of
the Fatherland (Peta). In Java some 37,000 Peta recruits, including
officers, received training in combat tactics. The number of such
troops trained in Sumatra, where the forces were usually known by
their Japanese name—Giyūgun (volunteer army)—is unknown, but
knowledgeable sources estimate about one-third of the number
trained for Java’s Peta.
Along with former heiho and KNIL troops, Peta provided the
emergent Indonesian state with a ready source of trained military per
sonnel following Japan’s defeat in 1945. This force was supple
mented by large numbers of young people with experience in various
paramilitary youth corps that had been organized by the Japanese;
they mobilized the population and provided a recruiting base for Peta.
An embryonic military organization, with these elements as its
nucleus, the People’s Security Forces (BKR), was formed on August
22, 1945. Just five days earlier, on August 17, Sukarno and Moham
mad Hatta had proclaimed Indonesian independence. Thousands of
members of various local militias (laskar) also joined the newly con
solidated national armed forces. From the beginning, the Western
ideal of a politically neutral military had few proponents. Many of
those who joined the new force, called the Indonesian National
Armed Forces (TNI) from 1947 to 1962 (also APRIS—Armed
Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia—from 1949 to 1950
and APRI—Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia—in 1950),
were nationalists who sought both military victory and political
change for their nation.
The disparate forces fought a largely guerrilla-style war against the
returning Dutch troops. Commanded by the young and charismatic
312
Circa 1923 image of the
bodyguard of the
sultan of Yogyakarta
Courtesy Library of Congress
Prints and Photographs
Division, LC–USZ62–106137,
digital ID cph 3c06137
313
Indonesia: A Country Study
314
National Security
315
Indonesia: A Country Study
The military establishment, led by the army, has been the coun
try’s premier institution since 1966, when, in its own view, it
answered the summons of the people and moved to center stage.
Comprising the three military services and the police, the armed
forces operated according to the dwifungsi doctrine, enacted into law
in 1982, which gave the military a dual role—traditional responsibil
ity as defenders of the nation, plus duty as a sociopolitical force pro
moting stability, order, and national development. Under this very
broad charter, active-duty and retired military personnel were
assigned throughout the government to posts filled in most other
countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians. Military
personnel most frequently received postings as provincial governors,
district heads, members of legislative bodies, functionaries in a vari
ety of civilian governmental departments, and ambassadors. The
armed forces became a dominant factor in the social—including
even sports and entertainment—and political life of the country and
acted as a major executive agent of government policies.
To understand fully the role of the armed forces in contemporary
Indonesian society, one must understand the absolute priority the
government and the military leadership gave to internal security and
national stability during the New Order (1966–98). Having experi
enced attempted coups in 1948 and 1965, which they identified as
communist-inspired, as well as a number of regional separatist strug
gles and instability created by radical religious movements, the New
Order government had little tolerance for public disorder.
The Suharto government brought the nation unprecedented stabil
ity, remaining in firm control and without serious challenge from
1966 to 1998. The leadership remained alert to real or potential sub
versive threats, maintaining surveillance—and sometimes control—
over the activities and programs of a wide range of groups and insti
tutions. The government was acutely sensitive to any signs of oppo
sition to its policies. In general, it seemed to label as subversive
anything not supportive of the national ideology, the Pancasila (see
Glossary; Pancasila: The State Ideology, ch. 4). The extent of change
in the years after the fall of Suharto can be fully realized only by
comparing that environment of close control of society and repres
sion of dissent with the openness experienced in the period after
1998, with its robust free news media and aggressive debate in the
national legislature.
Separatist insurgencies have long been the most serious threat to
national security. The Suharto government referred to such insurgent
activity as a Security Disturbance Movement (GPK). Three such
movements, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
316
National Security
317
Indonesia: A Country Study
and the indigenous population (see Ethnic Minorities, ch. 2). In the
modern period, resentment has continued over Chinese Indonesians’
wealth and domination of the economy, including their roles as inter
mediaries for foreign investors and as advisers and silent partners for
senior armed forces personnel and civilian government leaders with
business interests. These ethnic Chinese businesspeople, known as
cukong (see Glossary), were particularly important in the Suharto fam
ily’s increasingly rapacious commercial arrangements.
Anti-Chinese feeling surfaced violently in the turmoil immedi
ately preceding Suharto’s May 1998 resignation, when large num
bers of ethnic Chinese homes and businesses were destroyed, and
dozens of ethnic Chinese women were raped by mobs of rioters. The
violence caused a major flight of ethnic Chinese capital from Indo
nesia, which worsened the economic depression that started in 1997.
The continued slow repatriation of that capital remains an important
reason for Indonesia’s delayed economic recovery (see Postcrisis
Reform, ch. 3).
The absence of a perceived external threat has been widely cred
ited with allowing Indonesia to concentrate on its internal defense
and national development priorities. Successive armed forces com
manders stressed military readiness and training even as economic
realities constrained new equipment purchases. Until 2007, when
new armored personnel carriers were purchased from France to sup
port Indonesia’s United Nations (UN) deployment to Lebanon, the
only major acquisition for the ground forces was the 1981 purchase,
through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, of new 105
millimeter towed howitzers. New acquisitions for the other services
during the late 1970s and early 1980s included F–5 fighter and A–4
ground-attack aircraft for the air force and used, but still serviceable,
ships for the navy. Twelve F–16 fighters, also purchased from the
United States, were not delivered until 1989. Over the years, the
armed forces had been seriously weakened by national spending pri
orities that stressed economic development and relegated defense
spending to a much lower priority than in most developing nations.
The low priority given to defense spending continued into the early
years of the twenty-first century. This situation has compromised the
military’s readiness posture even further, because income from the
military business empire is far less than in the past, as a result of the
1990s regional recession, corruption, and inept management (see Par
ticipation in the Economy, this ch.). In 2008, for example, the lower
house of the national legislature, the People’s Representative Council
(DPR), provided the TNI and Department of Defense (Dephan) with
less than one-third of the funding requested.
318
National Security
Post-Suharto Reforms
The military establishment was pilloried by both the press and the
populace over a series of revelations of human-rights abuses that
came out after the fall of Suharto in May 1998. Furthermore, the
armed forces leadership had become disillusioned by years of
demands by Suharto for unprofessional conduct, such as intervention
in most aspects of civil society and tight control over every aspect of
political activity. Indonesia’s military leaders responded to these
developments by embarking on a process of change. The armed
forces assumed a lower political profile and began a revision of doc
trine to meet some—but by no means all—of the calls for reform.
This process of change was a major part of national reformasi (see
Glossary), and both the process and the pace of change became sub
jects of analysis and criticism (see The Political Process, ch. 4).
The military introduced reforms in an attempt to meet the new
demands of a democratic society. The National Police, which had
been a coequal branch of the armed forces since 1960, was separated
from the military in 1999 and placed under the president. The name
of the military establishment was changed from Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) to Indonesian National Armed Forces
(TNI). The name change signaled a change in focus by which the
National Police took the country’s internal security as its primary
responsibility. The Department of Defense and Security (Hankam)
was redesignated simply the Department of Defense (Dephan), a
move that underscored how the military’s primary mission had
changed (see fig. 12).
319
Indonesia: A Country Study
MINISTER OF
DEFENSE
SPECIAL SECRETARY
ADVISERS GENERAL
INSPECTOR
GENERAL
320
National Security
321
Indonesia: A Country Study
322
National Security
323
Indonesia: A Country Study
Aceh
Aceh, on the northern end of the island of Sumatra, was for
decades the most troubled and insecure province of Indonesia, with a
history of opposition to outside rule from its time as an independent
sultanate. Acehnese maintained a broad range of grievances against
the central government that included a desire to keep a greater per
centage of the revenue from the rich natural resources in the prov
ince, resentment over brutal tactics by police and military forces, and
a desire for more native Acehnese to be employed in the lucrative
natural resources sector.
A small minority of Acehnese have demanded independence. The
separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began guerrilla warfare in
Aceh in the mid-1970s. Its political and military wings were distinct.
A succession of GAM military commanders had given allegiance to
the GAM’s political leader, Hasan di Tiro, a longtime refugee in
Sweden. However, years of separation and the resentment caused by
the relative safety of political leaders in Europe while GAM person
nel in Aceh faced daily danger, led to a split that persists to this day.
Attacks on public facilities and transportation, reprisal operations by
both sides, and a lack of skill in combating insurgency on the part of
the military and the police contributed to a high level of noncomba
tant casualties and insecurity throughout the province. By 2000 the
GAM had made extensive advances in the countryside and was pro
viding government services in several areas of the province.
The first three post-Suharto administrations attempted to negoti
ate a political settlement with the GAM. In early 2002, President
Megawati Sukarnoputri authorized negotiations for a political settle
ment while maintaining military pressure on the GAM. In December
2002, the two sides signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.
The situation on the ground was fragile from the start, and the agree
ment collapsed in May 2003 over the basic issue of the future of
Aceh—whether it should be a province of Indonesia or an indepen
dent state.
In May 2003, after the collapse of the agreement, the central gov
ernment implemented a year of martial law in Aceh, and combat
operations resumed immediately. The subsequent joint military–
324
Antiterrorism sign, Sulawesi
Courtesy Anastasia Riehl
325
Indonesia: A Country Study
Papua
Indonesia no longer faces a significant secessionist movement in
its easternmost provinces of Papua and Papua Barat. Rather, the
rapid changes at the start of the twenty-first century have exacerbated
the preexisting problems of poverty, high unemployment, environ
mental degradation, and the poor quality of many government ser
vices. The greatest threat to security is posed not by secessionist
violence but by increased social, ethnic, and religious tensions
between the indigenous Papuan population and the swelling tide of
non-Papuans from elsewhere in Indonesia, drawn by opportunities in
the commercial, agricultural, and extractive industries in the two
provinces.
The remaining small secessionist movement in Papua is remote
and fragmented. The Free Papua Organization (OPM) formed in
1969 and has been conducting a low-level armed insurgency since
326
National Security
327
Indonesia: A Country Study
328
National Security
329
Indonesia: A Country Study
330
Training in the field
Courtesy U.S. Defense
Attaché’s Office, Jakarta
Special forces troops in formation
Courtesy Indonesian
Department of Defense
331
Indonesia: A Country Study
role in keeping the armed forces from taking power even though
Suharto reportedly offered the presidency to General Wiranto, then
the armed forces commander in chief. Since then, the armed forces
have supported the transition to democracy, implemented a number of
reforms, displayed a more moderate face to the populace, and main
tained discipline and a leadership image in contrast to that of the
often corrupt and hapless post-Suharto civilian officialdom. The TNI
remains the most powerful element in Indonesian society and retains
significant influence over the country’s political life.
Political and Administrative Role
Indonesia’s transition from autocracy to democracy has been
lengthy and difficult, with various power centers vying for a role in
the new political environment. Enlightened leadership by Admiral
Widodo Adi Sucipto (appointed by President Abdurrahman Wahid
as the first naval officer to head the armed forces) and General
Endriartono Sutarto, whose tenure as TNI commander in chief
spanned the presidencies of Megawati Sukarnoputri and the early
months of the first Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, con
firmed the relatively restrained and more moderate role of the mili
tary at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The armed forces’
perception of their political role has developed into that of a national
institution above partisan interests and closely tied to the people,
with a duty to foster conditions of order and security in which the
habits of a stable and institutionalized political process can develop.
This self-perception identifies a force far different from the one that
fought for independence in the 1940s, evolved through the tumultu
ous political changes of the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequently
engaged in a complex process of give-and-take with the autocratic
Suharto during his long rule.
Participation in the Economy
The military has never been as dominant in the economic sphere
as in the political sphere. Total military expenditures as a percentage
of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) began a steady
decline in the 1960s, with the military share of the budget shrinking
from 29 percent in 1970 to just over 1 percent by 2009.
The military’s primary means of economic influence derives from
operation of a business empire, comprising both legal and illicit
enterprises, which had its beginnings in the struggle for indepen
dence. It expanded in December 1957, when Dutch enterprises and
agricultural estates were taken over by local trade unions and imme
diately put under direct military supervision. December 1958 legisla
332
National Security
333
Indonesia: A Country Study
334
Army medics on
civil-disaster duty
Courtesy Indonesian
Department of Defense
335
Indonesia: A Country Study
336
National Security
337
Indonesia: A Country Study
Personnel
The size of the armed services—approximately 302,000 in
2009—is small in relation to Indonesia’s large population. The mili
tary is also small in comparison to the forces of other nations of
comparable population, and in comparison to the forces of other
Asian countries. The army is by far the dominant branch of the Indo
nesian military, with approximately 233,000 personnel; the navy and
marine corps total about 45,000 and the air force, about 24,000.
The Indonesian constitution states that every citizen has the right
and obligation to defend the nation. Conscription is provided for by
law, but in light of limited civilian-sector employment opportunities,
the armed forces have been able to attract sufficient numbers to main
tain mandated strength levels without resorting to a draft. By 2008
almost all service members were volunteers who had met the criteria
set for conscription. However, officer specialists, such as physicians,
are occasionally conscripted for short-term service. Most enlisted
personnel are recruited in their own regions and generally train and
serve most of their time in units near their homes. Each service has
small women’s units (see Women in the Armed Forces, this ch.).
The combined officer corps for the three services was estimated to
total some 53,000 personnel in 2008. Until 2005 the mandatory retire
ment age for officers was 55, but a 2004 military act passed by the
DPR provided for a gradual extension to age 60. Virtually all career
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) serve 20 years and retire in their
mid-forties, thereafter often going into private business. With person
nel strength mandated to remain static, a steady balance between new
officer accessions and losses (through death, attrition, and retirement)
seems likely to be maintained.
For the first 20 years of independence, entry into the officer corps
was very competitive. According to both patriotic and traditional val
ues, a military education and military career were regarded as highly
desirable. Since the late 1970s, however, the armed forces have expe
rienced difficulty attracting a sufficient number of the best-qualified
candidates to the Armed Forces Military Academy (Akmil), the
national service academy at Magelang, Jawa Tengah Province. Field
commanders have long complained of not getting enough high-quality
young officers from Akmil. Improved job opportunities in Indonesia’s
advancing economy have persuaded many of the brightest and best-
qualified high-school graduates to attend civilian degree-granting uni
versities (Akmil does not grant academic degrees). In the late 1990s,
the armed forces began to expand their source of officers by institut
ing a program similar to the U.S. Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
338
National Security
339
Indonesia: A Country Study
PRESIDENT, SUPREME
COMMANDER OF THE
ARMED FORCES
COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
ARMED FORCES
ASSISTANT FOR
COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS
ASSISTANT FOR
INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT FOR
LOGISTICS
ASSISTANT FOR
OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT FOR
PERSONNEL
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF
340
National Security
341
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
342
KODAM
ISKANDAR
MUDA
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
IA
YS
LA VII
MA
SINGAPORE
VI
XVII
XII
I
Indonesia: A Country Study
XVI PAPUA
KODAM
II NEW
JAYA
GUINEA
III
IV V
IX
TIMOR-LESTE
AUSTRALIA
Boundary representation
not necessarily authoritative
343
Indonesia: A Country Study
Army
The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AD) historically
has been the dominant military service, headed by the army chief of
staff, a four-star general. His staff includes a vice chief of staff, an
inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, opera
tions, personnel, planning and budget, security, and territorial affairs.
Army strength in 2009 was approximately 233,000.
The chief of staff is responsible for personnel, training, administra
tion, and logistical support of the army. Commanders and staff of each
Kodam are responsible for administration, logistics, personnel, train
ing, and the general welfare of assigned and attached combat units.
Each Kodam is divided into successively smaller administrative units.
These include the Military Resort, or Garrison, Command (Korem);
Military District Command (Kodim); and Military Subdistrict Com
mand (Koramil). At the bottom of the structure, noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) are assigned to every village in the country, where
they are known as the village NCO (babinsa).
Military operations are rarely, if ever, conducted in any formation
larger than a battalion. Each Korem has control of at least one battalion,
and one or more battalions come under the direct control of the Kodam.
Army doctrine distinguishes between centrally controlled units and
regionally controlled units. Centrally controlled units are found in
Kostrad and Kopassus. Regionally controlled units by definition are
those assigned to the 12 Kodams. The battalions have a planned
strength of nearly 700 personnel, although many—those in the Kodams
in particular—are under strength. Each Kodam has at least one desig
nated quick-reaction force battalion; these are the best-trained and
equipped units in the territorial structure. Both types of battalions have
experienced frequent temporary deployments to areas of insecurity,
including East Timor (prior to 1999), Aceh (prior to 2005), and Papua.
The army has an aviation arm that performs liaison and limited
transport duties. The unit operates several rotary-wing squadrons
with helicopters of various national origins and one composite fixed-
wing squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small trans
ports, such as the domestically produced CASA–235.
344
National Security
Navy
The Navy of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AL) became a sepa
rate service in 1946, after the National Revolution began. Its vessels
come from a variety of countries, including the United States. The
fleet includes submarines from the Federal Republic of Germany,
light frigates from the Netherlands and Britain, and fast-attack craft
from South Korea. In 1992 the Indonesian government acquired 39
used ships of various types from the navy of the former Democratic
Republic of Germany (East Germany). The acquisition proved to be a
mistake of major proportions. The ships were in poor condition, not
suited for operations in the tropics, and difficult to staff and maintain.
By 2005 many of them had been mothballed. The Indonesian navy
itself produces numerous small coastal craft in national shipyards.
In 2009 the fleet consisted of more than 90 ships and numerous
smaller vessels. The newest warships are four Sigma-class corvettes
from the Netherlands, three of which were delivered by 2008 and the
fourth, by 2009. As newer warships and patrol craft entered the inven
tory, the navy decommissioned older vessels. Nevertheless, the navy
was underequipped and under strength for its mission of protecting the
nation’s huge maritime expanse against piracy, poaching, and smug
gling. Specifically, it needed a large infusion of fast-patrol craft to
cover its wide internal seas and coastlines, as well as increased sealift
345
Indonesia: A Country Study
capacity to move marine corps and army units and equipment to trou
ble spots across the archipelago.
Structurally, the navy comprises the headquarters staff at Jakarta
under the overall command of the navy chief of staff, two fleet com
mands (the Eastern Fleet at Surabaya and the Western Fleet at
Jakarta), the marine corps, a small air arm, and a military sealift
command (see fig. 15). About 45,000 uniformed personnel were
serving in the navy in 2009, including about 20,000 marines. The
marines are organized into two divisions (formerly designated as bri
gades), one stationed in Jakarta and the other in Surabaya. A third
independent brigade is planned to become the core of a third divi
sion, once funds and manpower become available. The marine corps
is equipped with light tanks, armored personnel carriers, and anti
aircraft guns. Most of the corps’ heavy equipment consists of badly
outdated former Soviet-origin armored vehicles.
The navy began maintaining a small air arm in 1958. Headquartered
at Surabaya, it had about 1,000 personnel in 2009. It is equipped pri
marily for naval reconnaissance and coastal patrol duties, flying three
squadrons of light airplanes, as well as several transports and helicop
ters. The military sealift command coordinates the navy’s logistical
support systems.
The navy’s missions include providing strategic sealift for the
army and marine corps and support for operations responding to natu
ral disasters. Other responsibilities include patrolling the strategic
straits through which a major portion of the world’s shipping passes
between the Pacific and Indian oceans, particularly the Strait of Ma
lacca. That crucial waterway carries an estimated 80 percent of com
mercial and military traffic between the Pacific and Indian oceans.
Formerly a haven for piracy, the Strait of Malacca is now patrolled by
the cooperative efforts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and
piracy incidents have declined. Another naval mission focuses on
halting smuggling and illegal fishing, both of which are especially
prevalent near the Natuna Islands and in the seas around Sulawesi
and Maluku. In support of this latter mission, the navy announced
plans in the late 1980s to construct a number of limited-role bases in
isolated areas in the eastern and western sections of the national terri
tory. Funding restrictions, however, have kept this project from ful
fillment. Some new bases have been built, including Tual in the
southeastern part of Maluku Province, and the naval stations on Biak
and Manokwari in Papua Barat Province have been upgraded. Patrol
activity in the Sulu Sea and Sulawesi Sea (Celebes Sea) has increased
as part of operations to detect and interdict movement by terrorists
and maritime criminal activities where the maritime borders of Indo
nesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines meet.
346
National Security
Air Force
The Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AU), like the navy,
was established as a separate service in 1946. The influence and capa
bility of the air force decreased sharply after the 1965 coup attempt. The
service was heavily purged because of the alleged involvement of its
chief of staff, General Omar Dhani, in the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI). Significant modernization did not get under way until the late
1970s, with acquisition of F–5 and A–4 aircraft from the United States,
and in the 1980s, with the acquisition of F–16 fighters from the United
States and Hawk fighters from Britain. The imposition in the late 1990s
of arms embargoes by the United States and other countries in response
to Indonesia’s human-rights violations, particularly in East Timor,
resulted in a very low readiness level in the air force. In the early 2000s,
Indonesia began to seek nontraditional suppliers, purchasing Sukhoi jet
fighters from Russia and obtaining jet trainers from Singapore (by dona
tion) and South Korea (primarily through countertrade). The United
States ended its arms embargo of Indonesia in 2005, and the air force
began a high-priority program to restore the readiness of its C–130
transport fleet and the F–16 fighter force.
Air force strength was about 24,000 in 2009. Approximately 4,000
of these personnel formed four battalions of “quick-action” paratroop
ers. Structurally, the air force consists of a headquarters staff in Jakarta
supporting the chief of staff; three operational commands: Ko-Op I/
West, Ko-Op II/East, and the National Air Defense Command; and two
support commands: the Air Matériel Command and the Air Training
Command (see fig. 16). The Air Matériel Command is headquartered
in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province, and the Air Training Command is in
Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. Air operations are covered by two
area commands, with the boundary between Jawa Tengah and Jawa
Timur provinces being the east–west dividing line. The largest of the
operational commands is Ko-Op II, headquartered in Makassar,
347
Indonesia: A Country Study
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
International
boundary
BRUNEI Fleet
MALAYSIA
boundary
IA
YS Armada
LA
MA headquarters
SINGAPORE
PAPUA
Jakarta NEW
Surabaya GUINEA
Boundary representation
not necessarily authoritative AUSTRALIA
THAILAND PHILIPPINES
International
boundary
BRUNEI Air force
MALAYSIA
region boundary
IA
YS Ko-Op
SINGAPORE LA
MA headquarters
I II PAPUA
Jakarta Makassar NEW
GUINEA
TIMOR-LESTE
Boundary representation
348
National Security
349
Indonesia: A Country Study
350
INDONESIAN LETNAN LETNAN LETNAN BRIGADIR MAYOR LETNAN
KAPTEN MAYOR KOLONEL JENDERAL
RANK DUA SATU KOLONEL JENDERAL JENDERAL JENDERAL
ARMY
T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I
AIR
FORCE
T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I
NAVY*
T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I T N I
REAR REAR
U.S. RANK LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CAPTAIN VICE ADMIRAL
ENSIGN LIEUTENANT ADMIRAL ADMIRAL
TITLE JUNIOR GRADE COMMANDER ADMIRAL
LOWER HALF UPPER HALF
*Marine insignia are same as for navy personnel; marine rank titles are same as for army personnel.
351
National Security
Indonesia: A Country Study
spots. Among other places, Indonesia has sent forces to the Suez
Canal–Sinai Peninsula area (1957 and 1973–79), Democratic Repub
lic of the Congo (1960–64), Iran–Iraq border (1988–90), Namibia
(1989–90), Kuwait–Iraq border (1991), Somalia (1991), Cambodia
(1991–93), Bosnia–Herzegovina (2000), and Lebanon (2006–8).
Indonesia was a founding member of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary), and although the organiza
tion was not established as a defense alliance, there is a history of mil
itary cooperation between Indonesia and its ASEAN partners. This
cooperation is manifested both frequently and bilaterally and includes
exchanges of military representatives at national defense institutions,
periodic security consultations, and a series of joint military exercises
with individual ASEAN states. ASEAN countries pledge their sup
port for the security of each of the other ASEAN nations but stop
short of discussing formation of a military alliance. The Indonesian
government stresses that defense cooperation among ASEAN nations
is a function of each nation’s right to protect itself and that bilateral
cooperation will not lead to any bilateral or ASEAN-wide defense
pact. Indonesia plays a leading role in the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), a non-treaty security umbrella organization that includes
nations and organizations as members—including the United States,
China, the EU, and Russia—that are not ASEAN states.
Indonesia also conducts combined military exercises with non-
ASEAN nations, including Australia, Britain, France, India, New Zea
land, and the United States. During the 1980s, defense officials sug
gested that joint border patrols might be set up with Papua New
Guinea, and the two countries signed a status-of-forces agreement in
January 1992. Indonesian troops sometimes cross the border from
Papua Province into Papua New Guinea in pursuit of armed insurgents.
Indonesia has maintained military-assistance agreements with sev
eral countries. It received funded security assistance from the United
States every year between 1950 and 1992 except 1965 and 1966,
when relations were at a low ebb. Most security-assistance programs
were restored after 2005. Grant aid for military equipment, which
ended in 1978, averaged US$13 million per year and was used mainly
to procure logistics equipment, communications systems, and combat
matériel for internal security. The United States also provided grant
aid training under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program from 1950 until 1992, when the U.S. Congress cut
the aid in reaction to the human-rights situation in East Timor. In that
42-year period, more than 4,000 Indonesian military personnel
received IMET training in the United States. The IMET program
resumed in 2005. U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits were
352
INDONESIAN PRAJURIT PRAJURIT PRAJURIT KOPRAL KOPRAL KOPRAL SERSAN SERSAN SERSAN SERSAN PEMBANTU PEMBANTU
RANK DUA SATU KEPALA DUA SATU KEPALA DUA SATU KEPALA MAYOR LETNAN DUA LETNAN SATU
T N I
T N I T N I
T N I T N I T N I
ARMY T N I T N I T N I
T N I
T N I T N I
INDONESIAN PRAJURIT PRAJURIT PRAJURIT KOPRAL KOPRAL KOPRAL SERSAN SERSAN SERSAN SERSAN PEMBANTU PEMBANTU
RANK DUA SATU KEPALA DUA SATU KEPALA DUA SATU KEPALA MAYOR LETNAN DUA LETNAN SATU
T N I
T N I T N I
AIR T N I T N I
T N I
FORCE T N I T N I
T N I
T N I
T N I T N I
SENIOR
U.S. RANK AIRMAN AIRMAN SENIOR STAFF TECHNICAL MASTER CHIEF MASTER
AIRMAN MASTER NO RANK NO RANK
TITLE BASIC 1ST CLASS AIRMAN SERGEANT SERGEANT SERGEANT SERGEANT
SERGEANT
INDONESIAN KELASI KELASI KELASI KOPRAL KOPRAL KOPRAL SERSAN SERSAN SERSAN SERSAN PEMBANTU PEMBANTU
RANK DUA SATU KEPALA DUA SATU KEPALA DUA SATU KEPALA MAYOR LETNAN DUA LETNAN SATU
T N I
T N I T N I
NAVY* T N I T N I
T N I
T N I T N I
T N I
T N I
T N I T N I
*Marine insignia are same as for navy personnel; marine rank titles are same as for army personnel.
353
National Security
Indonesia: A Country Study
354
National Security
355
Indonesia: A Country Study
356
National Security
flict in East Timor from the mid-1970s through 1999. The Explosive
Ordnance Devices Unit, formed in 1981, is part of the Mobile Brigade.
The exigencies of fighting separatist insurgents in Aceh and Papua
required the rapid expansion of the Mobile Brigade. Between 1998 and
2005, it grew from 7,500 to approximately 34,000 personnel. Such a
rapid expansion brought problems in training and discipline, and the
Mobile Brigade has come to be regarded by many observers as the
least disciplined and most brutal of all forces deployed against insur
gents. It is essentially a paramilitary organization trained and organized
along military lines. The brigade is used primarily as a deployable
combat force in emergencies, aiding in police operations requiring
quick action. It also works in domestic security and defense operations
and has special riot-control equipment. Elements of the force also are
trained for airborne operations.
The need to forge a capable police counterterrorism unit in response
to the spread of international terrorism resulted in the establishment in
2002 of another elite element, the National Police counterterrorism
unit, better known as Detachment 88. This unit was largely funded and
trained by the United States and graduated its first cadre in 2003. It has
the capability to conduct counterterrorism and modern forensic inves
tigations, and it includes a quick-reaction counterterrorist team.
Detachment 88 has been particularly successful in its counterterrorist
operations. Its personnel, supported by technical assistance and train
ing from the United States and Australia in particular, have captured or
killed many of the most-wanted terrorists in the country, including
those responsible for bombings in Bali and Jakarta, terrorism in
Sulawesi Tengah Province, and attacks against civilian targets else
where in Indonesia.
Rank-and-file police service is voluntary. Recruits must have at
least a sixth-grade education and pass a competitive examination.
Other qualifications include physical fitness and good moral character.
After three years’ service as ordinary police, personnel with only
junior secondary-school diplomas can enter training to become NCOs.
Those with three years’ experience as NCOs are eligible for further
training to enable them to become candidate officers and eventually
enter the officer corps. The majority of the police officer corps enters
the force as graduates of the National Police Academy, located near
Sukabumi, Jawa Barat Province. The Polri working and ceremonial
uniforms are dark brown.
Advanced training in vocational and technical subjects is available
to regular police, NCOs, and officers. Promotions often are based on
performance in advanced education. The Police Command and Staff
School at Semarang, Jawa Tengah Province, offers advanced training
357
Indonesia: A Country Study
358
National Security
359
Indonesia: A Country Study
360
The Attorney General’s Office, Jakarta
Courtesy Yadi Jasin
361
Indonesia: A Country Study
362
National Security
363
Indonesia: A Country Study
some time. This is due both to the slow development of viable civilian
institutions—repressed during the 32-year rule of Suharto—and the
military’s inherent power. Similarly, the National Police is evolving,
thanks to extensive international assistance and a core of reform-
minded police leaders determined to improve both the image of the
police force and its professionalism in maintaining law and order.
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority nation in the
world, and its practice of Islam the world’s most moderate. The
dynamic changes since 1998 have shown that democracy and Islam
can coexist peacefully in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society. The
world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia can play a major
role in international and regional political, economic, and social
affairs. By 2008 Indonesia had become a valued, long-standing par
ticipant in the war against international terrorism.
Neither the armed forces nor the police has implemented the full
range of reforms called for by their most vocal critics. Vested inter
ests remain in play, and resistance to change is as natural to the Indo
nesian security forces as to those of other countries. But a new
president and minister of defense, a newly empowered MPR, South
east Asia’s most free press establishment, and a civilian society anx
ious to realize its potential have combined to make continued change
in the security and military institutions inevitable. Greater civilian
control over military and police forces, realizable only when much
better budget control can be achieved, is a longer-term goal that
might take as long as 10 to 20 years to attain.
Many challenges remain. The military and, to a lesser degree, the
police have an ingrained culture of impunity that can be broken only
by implementation of clear accountability for misdeeds, successful
implementation of the rule of law, and reform of the national judicial
system. These are system-wide reform objectives not achievable by
the military and police alone.
* * *
364
National Security
365
Indonesia: A Country Study
366
Bibliography
Chapter 1
Andaya, Leonard Y. The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early
Modern Period. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1993.
Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation
and Resistance, 1944–1946. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.
Association for Asian Studies. Bibliography of Asian Studies, 2009. http://
quod.lib.umich.edu/b/bas/.
Aveling, Harry, ed. The Development of Indonesian Society: From the
Coming of Islam to the Present Day. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980.
Barrett Jones, Antoinette M. Early Tenth Century Java from the Inscrip
tions. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Foris, 1984.
Bellwood, Peter. Prehistory of the Indo-Malaysian Archipelago. Rev. ed.
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.
Benda, Harry J. “The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing
Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia.” Journal of Asian Studies 25, no. 4
(August 1966): 589–605.
Bernet Kempers, August J. Ageless Borobudur: Buddhist Mystery in
Stone, Decay and Restoration, Mendut and Pawon, Folklife in Ancient
Java. Rev. trans. Wassenaar, Netherlands: Servire, 1976.
Booth, Anne. The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998.
Bosma, Ulbe, and Remco Raben. Being “Dutch” in the Indies: A History
of Creolization and Empire, 1500–1920. Athens: Ohio University Press,
2008.
Boxer, Charles R. The Dutch Seaborne Empire: 1600–1800. New York:
Knopf, 1965.
Breman, Jan, ed. Imperial Monkey Business: Racial Supremacy in Social
Darwinist Theory and Colonial Practice. Casa Monographs, no. 3.
Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1990.
Brown, Colin. A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation? Crow’s
Nest, New South Wales, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2003.
Carey, P. B. R. The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End
of the Old Order in Java, 1785–1855. Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV
Press, 2007.
367
Indonesia: A Country Study
368
Bibliography
369
Indonesia: A Country Study
370
Bibliography
371
Indonesia: A Country Study
Miksic, John N., ed. Ancient History. Indonesian Heritage Series, vol. 1.
Singapore: Archipelago Press, 1996.
Miksic, John N., and Endang Sri Hardiati Soekatno, eds. The Legacy of
Majapahit. Singapore: Singapore National Heritage Board, 1995.
Miksic, John N., and Marcello Tranchini. Borobudur. Golden Tales of the
Buddhas. Boston: Shambala, 1990.
Miller, George. Meta-Guide to Indonesia: Annotated Bibliography of Post
1990 Bibliographies on Indonesia. Version 1.5. August 20, 2004. http://
coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVLPages/IndonPages/Meta-Bibliography.html.
Moertono, Soemarsaid. State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the
Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century. Rev. ed. Ithaca: Cornell
Modern Indonesia Project. 1981.
Mortimer, Rex. Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and
Politics, 1959–1965. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974.
Morwood, M. J., et al. “Archaeology and Age of a New Hominin from
Flores in Eastern Indonesia.” Nature (London) 431, no. 7012 (October
28, 2004): 1087–91.
Mrázek, Rudolf. Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell
University, Southeast Asia Program, 1994.
Multatuli [Eduard Douwes Dekker]. Max Havelaar: Or the Coffee Auctions
of the Dutch Trading Company [1860]. Trans., Roy Edwards. Library of
the Indies Series. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982.
Munoz, Paul Michel. Early Kingdoms of the Indonesian Archipelago and
the Malay Peninsula. Singapore: Didier Millet, 2006.
Naerssen, F. H. van. The Economic and Administrative History of Early
Indonesia. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1977.
Nagazumi Akira. The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years
of the Budi Utomo, 1908–1918. I.D.E. Occasional Papers Series, no.
10. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economics, 1972.
Noer, Deliar. The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Noorduyn, J. “Majapahit in the Fifteenth Century.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-,
Land-, en Volkenkunde (Leiden, Netherlands) 134, nos. 2–3 (1978):
207–74.
Oppenheimer, Stephen, and Martin Richards. “Fast Trains, Slow Boats, and
the Ancestry of the Polynesian Islanders.” Science Progress (London)
84, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 157–81.
Post, Peter, ed. The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War. Hand
buch der Orientalistik. Section 3, Southeast Asia, 0169–9571, vol. 19.
Leiden: Brill, 2009.
372
Bibliography
Pluvier, Jan M. Historical Atlas of South-East Asia. New York: Brill, 1995.
Prapañca, Mpu. Desawarnana (Nagarakrtagama) [1365]. Trans., Stuart
O. Robson. Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV Press, 1995.
Raben, Remco, ed. Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia:
Personal Testimonies and Public Images in Indonesia, Japan, and the
Netherlands. Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation,
1999.
Ravesteijn, Wim, and Marie-Louise ten Horn-van Nispen. “Engineering
and Empire. The Creation of Infrastructural Systems in the Netherlands
East Indies, 1800–1950.” Indonesia and the Malay World (London) 35,
no. 103 (November 2007): 273–92.
Reeve, David. Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Reid, Anthony J. S. Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia.
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
Reid, Anthony J. S. The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950. Mel
bourne: Longman, 1974.
Reid, Anthony J. S. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680.
2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988 and 1993.
Reid, Anthony J. S., ed. Early Modern History. Indonesian Heritage Series,
vol. 3. Singapore: Archipelago Press. 1996.
Resink, Gertrudes J. Indonesia’s History Between the Myths. Selected
Studies on Indonesia, vol. 7. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1968.
Riantiarno, N. Time Bomb and Cockroach Opera: Two Plays. Trans., Barbara
Hatley and John H. McGlynn. Jakarta: Lontar, 1992.
Ricklefs, Merle C. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200. 4th ed.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Ricklefs, Merle C. Mystic Synthesis in Java. A History of Islamization
from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries. Norwalk, Con
necticut: EastBridge, 2006.
Ricklefs, Merle C. The Seen and Unseen Worlds in Java, 1726–1749.
Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998.
Ricklefs, Merle C. War, Culture and Economy in Java, 1677–1726. Sydney:
Allen and Unwin, 1993.
Robison, Richard, and Vedi Hadiz. Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The
Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets. London: RoutledgeCurzon,
2004.
Robson, Stuart O. “Java at the Crossroads: Aspects of Javanese Cultural His
tory in the Fourteenth and Fifteen Centuries.” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-,
en Volkenkunde (Leiden, Netherlands) 137, nos. 2–3 (1981): 259–92.
373
Indonesia: A Country Study
Roosa, John. Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement
and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia. New Perspectives in Southeast
Asian Studies Series. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.
Sato Shigeru. War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java under the Japanese
Occupation. 1942–1945. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994.
Schwarz, Adam. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview, 1994.
Sedyawati, Edi. “The State Formation of Kadiri.” Pages 7–16 in G. J.
Schutte, ed., State and Trade in the Indonesian Archipelago. Working
Papers, Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 0923–
5418, no. 13. Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV Press, 1994.
Setten van der Meer, N. C. van. Sawah Cultivation in Ancient Java:
Aspects of Development During the Indo-Javanese Period, Fifth to Fif
teenth Centuries. Canberra: Australian National University, 1979.
Shiraishi Takashi. An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–
1926. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Simanjuntak, Truman, Bagyo Prasetyo, and Retno Handini, eds. Sangi
ran: Man, Culture, and Environment in Pleistocene Times. Proceed
ings of the International Colloquium on Sangiran, Solo–Indonesia,
21st–24th September 1998. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2001.
Slametmuljana. A Story of Majapahit. Singapore: Singapore University
Press, 1976
Sneddon, James N. The Indonesian Language: Its History and Role in
Modern Society. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004.
Soekmono, R., J. G. de Casparis, and Jacques Dumarçay. Borobudur:
Prayer in Stone. Singapore: Archipelago Press, 1990.
Suharto. Soeharto: My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds: An Autobiography.
Trans., Sumadi. Ed., Muti’ah Lestiono. Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung
Persada, 1989.
Sukarno. Indonesia Accuses! Soekarno’s Defense Oration in the Political
Trial of 1930. Trans., Roger K. Paget. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1975.
Sukarno. Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism [1926]. Trans., Karel H.
Warouw and Peter D. Weldon. Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia
Program, 1969.
Sukarno. Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
Sutherland, Heather. The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial
Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi. Singapore: Heinemann, 1979.
Swift, Ann. The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of
1948. Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1989.
374
Bibliography
Swisher, Carl C., III, et al. “Age of the Earliest Known Hominids in Java,
Indonesia.” Science 263, no. 5150 (February 25, 1994): 1118–21.
Syahrir, Sutan. Out of Exile. Trans., Charles Wolf. New York: Greenwood
Press 1969.
Tanter, R., and K. Young, eds. The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia. Mel
bourne: Monash University, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1990.
Taylor, Jean Gelman. Indonesia: Peoples and Histories. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2003.
Tur, Pramudya Ananta. This Earth of Mankind [Bumi Manusia] [1980].
Rev. ed. Trans., Max Lane. New York: William Morrow, 1991.
Van Niel, Robert. Java Under the Cultivation System: Collected Writings.
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volk
enkunde, no. 150. Leiden, Netherlands: KITLV Press, 1992.
Van Niel, Robert. The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. The
Hague: Van Hoeve, 1960.
Veur, Paul W. van der. The Lion and the Gadfly: Dutch Colonialism and
the Spirit of E. F. E. Douwes Dekker. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk
Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, no. 228. Leiden, Nether
lands: KITLV Press, 2006.
Vickers, Adrian. A History of Modern Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
Vos, J. de, and P. Sondaar. “Dating Hominid Sites in Indonesia.” Science
266, no. 5191 (December 9, 1994): 1726–27.
Wertheim, Willem Frederik. Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of
Social Change. 2d rev. ed. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1959.
Wicks, Robert S. Money, Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia:
The Development of Indigenous Monetary Systems to A.D. 1400. Stud
ies on Southeast Asia Series. Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia
Program, 1992.
Wild, Colin, and Peter Carey, eds. Born in Fire, The Indonesian Struggle
for Independence. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986.
Wolters, O. W. Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of
Srivijaya. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967.
Zoetmulder, Petrus J. Kalangwan: A Survey of Old Javanese Literature.
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Translation
Series, no. 16. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
Zurbuchen, Mary S., ed. Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indone
sian Present. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005.
375
Indonesia: A Country Study
(Various Web sites and issues of the following publications also were used in
the preparation of this chapter: Bijdragen tot Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Leiden)
(http://www.kitlv-journals.nl); Indonesia (http://cip.cornell.edu/Indonesia); Jour
nal of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) (http://journals.cambridge.org/action/
displayJournal?jid=SEA); and South East Asia Re-search (London) (http://
www.ingentaconnect.com/content/0967-828X).)
Chapter 2
Akita, T. “Income Inequality in Indonesia.” World Bank Development
Report, April 2002. http://www.iuj.ac.jp/research/wpdv02-2.pdf.
Arustiyono. Promoting Rational Use of Drugs at the Community Health
Centers in Indonesia. Boston: Boston University, School of Public
Health, Department of International Health, September 1999.
Atkinson, Jane. “Religions in Dialogue: The Construction of an Indone
sian Minority Religion.” Pages 171–86 in Rita Smith Kipp and Susan
Rodgers, eds., Indonesian Religions in Transition. Tucson: University
of Arizona Press. 1987.
Beatty, Andrew. Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological
Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Beeby, C. E. Assessment of Indonesian Education. Education Research Series,
no. 59. Wellington: New Zealand Council for Educational Research, 1979.
Bemmelen, R. W. van. The Geology of Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1970.
Bjork, Christopher. Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Cen
tral Bureaucracy. East Asia Series. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Blackwood, Evelyn. “Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriliny in
West Sumatra.” Ethnos (London) 64, no. 1 (March 1999): 32–56.
Bos, Eduard, et al. Asia Region Population Projections, 1990–91 Edition.
Working Paper Series, no. 599. Washington, DC: World Bank, Popula
tion and Human Resources Department, February 1991.
Brenner, Suzanne. “Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim
Women and ‘The Veil.’” American Ethnologist 24, no. 4 (November
1996): 673–97.
Chambert-Loir, Henri, and Anthony Reid. The Potent Dead: Ancestors,
Saints, and Heroes in Contemporary Indonesia. Honolulu: University
of Hawai’i Press, 2002.
Cohen, Sarah. “When the Earth Flexes its Muscles.” Atlantic Unbound, July
10, 2003. Interview with Simon Winchester. http://www.theatlantic.com/
doc/200307u/int2003-07-10.
376
Bibliography
377
Indonesia: A Country Study
378
Bibliography
379
Indonesia: A Country Study
380
Bibliography
381
Indonesia: A Country Study
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Centers for Dis
ease Control and Prevention. “Indonesia Situation Update—May 31.”
Atlanta, 2006. http://www. pandemicflu.gov/news/indonesiaupdate.html.
United States. Department of the Interior. Geological Survey. Earthquake
Hazards Program. Washington, DC, 2004–10. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
earthquakes/.
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor. International Religious Freedom Report, 2009. Washing
ton, DC, 2009. http://www.state. gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127271.htm.
United States. Smithsonian Institution. Global Volcanism Program. Wash
ington, DC, 2000–10. http://www.volcano.si.edu/world/.
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. “Internally Displaced Persons.”
Washington, DC, 2006. http://www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id=1315.
Vickers, Adrian. The City and the Country. Working Paper Series, no. 56.
Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, Southeast Asia Research
Center, 2003.
Volkman, Toby Alice. Feasts of Honor: Ritual and Change in the Toraja.
Illinois Studies in Anthropology, no. 16. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1985.
Weinstock, Joseph A. “Kaharingan: Life and Death in Central Borneo.”
Pages 71–97 in Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rodgers, eds., Indonesian
Religions in Transition. Tucson; University of Arizona Press, 1987.
Widodo, Amrih. “Consuming Passions: Millions of Indonesians Must
Watch Soap Operas.” Inside Indonesia: Bulletin of the Indonesia
Resources and Information Programme (Northcote, Australia), no.72
(October–December 2002): 8–10.
Wolf, Diane L. Factory Daughters: Gender, Household Dynamics, and
Rural Industrialization in Java. Berkeley: University of California
Press, June 1994.
Wolters, Willem. “The Making of Civil Society in Historical Perspective.”
Pages 131–49 in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah, eds.,
Indonesia in Search of Transition. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002.
World Bank. Indonesia Office. Indonesia Environment Monitor: Special
Focus, Reducing Pollution. Jakarta: World Bank Research Reports,
2003.
World Bank Group. “World Development Indicators Online: Indonesia Data
Profile,” 2004. http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=
64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&
entityID=000160016_20040608153404.
382
Bibliography
(Various issues of the following publications also were used in the preparation
of this chapter: Indonesia, Central Statistical Office, Statistik Indonesia (Jakarta)
(http://www.bps. go.id), 2001–6; New York Times, 2003; United Nations, Statisti
cal Year Book, 1996–2005; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact-
book (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html),
1991–2009; and Washington Post, 2006.)
Chapter 3
Alisjahbana, Armida S., and Chris Manning. “Survey of Recent Develop
ments.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Canberra) 38, no. 3
(December 2002): 277–306.
Arndt, H.W. “Banking in Hyperinflation and Stabilization.” Pages 359–95
in Bruce Glassburner, ed., The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Read
ings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971.
383
Indonesia: A Country Study
384
Bibliography
385
Indonesia: A Country Study
386
Bibliography
387
Indonesia: A Country Study
388
Bibliography
Pearson, Scott, and Eric Monke. “Recent Policy Influences on Rice Pro
duction.” Pages 8–21 in Scott Pearson, et al., Rice Policy in Indonesia.
Ithaca: Cornell University, 1991.
Prawiro, Radius. Indonesia’s Struggle for Economic Development: Prag
matism in Action. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Ramstetter, Eric D. “Survey of Recent Developments.” Bulletin of Indo
nesian Economic Studies (Canberra) 36, no. 3 (December 2000): 3–47.
Ray, David J. “Survey of Recent Developments.” Bulletin of Indonesian
Economic Studies (Canberra) 39, no. 3 (December 2003): 245–72.
Robinson, Ross. “Regional Ports: Development and Changes since the
1970s.” Pages 133–69 in Thomas R. Leinbach and Chia Lin Sien, eds.,
South-East Asian Transport. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Robison, Richard. Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. Southeast Asia Publications
Series, no. 13. Canberra: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1986.
Sadli, Muh. “The Indonesian Crisis.” Pages 16–27 in Heinz W. Arndt and
Hal Hill, eds., Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons, and
the Way Forward. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.
Satō, Yuri. “The Palm Oil Industry.” Pages 63–94 in Mari E. Pangestu and
Yuri Satō, eds., Waves of Change in Indonesia’s Manufacturing Industry.
ASEDP Series, no. 42. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1997.
Soesastro, Hadi. “The Political Economy of Deregulation in Indonesia.”
Asian Survey 29, no. 9 (September 1989): 853–69.
Soesastro, Hadi, and M. Chatib Basri. “Survey of Recent Developments.”
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Canberra) 34, no. 1 (April
1998): 3–54.
Soesastro, Hadi, and Peter Drysdale. “Survey of Recent Developments.”
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Canberra) 26, no. 3 (December
1990): 3–44.
Syahrial, Syarif. “Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: The Case of
Indonesia.” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia/Economics and Finance
in Indonesia (Jakarta) 53, no. 2 (2005): 177–94.
Tabor, Steven R. “Agriculture in Transition.” Pages 161–203 in Anne Booth,
ed., The Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Policy and Perfor
mance in the Soeharto Era. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Tambunan, Tulus. “The Role of Small-Scale Industries in Economic
Development: A Case of Indonesia.” Social and Economic Studies
(Mona, Jamaica) 40, no. 3 (September 1991): 115–52.
Thee Kian Wie. “The Indonesian Economic Crisis and the Long Road to
Recovery.” Australian Economic History Review (Sydney) 43, no. 2
(July 2003): 183–96.
389
Indonesia: A Country Study
(Various Web sources and issues of the following publications also were
used in the preparation of this chapter: ASEAN Secretariat (http://
www.aseansecr.org); Asian Development Bank (http://www.adb.org); Asian
Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong); Bank Indonesia (http://www.bi.go.id),
Report for the Financial Year, 1984–99; Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Stud
ies (Canberra); Capital Investment Coordinating Board (http://www.bkpm.go.
id); Central Statistical Office (http://www.bps/go.id); Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (http://csis.or.id); Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong
Kong); National Development Planning Board (http://www.bappenas.go.id);
University of Indonesia (http://www.ni.ac.id); and World Bank, World Devel
opment Indicators, 1998–99.)
Chapter 4
Abuza, Zachary. Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. Asian Security
Studies Series. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Alagappa, Muthiah. Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Southeast
Asia. ISIS Research Note. Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Strategic and
International Studies Malaysia, 1987.
390
Bibliography
Alves, Dora, ed. Cooperative Security in the Pacific Basin: The 1988
Pacific Symposium. Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1990.
Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. Language and Power: Exploring Political
Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Anderson, Benedict R. O’G., and Audrey R. Kahin, eds. Interpreting Indo
nesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate. Ithaca: Cornell
University, Southeast Asia Program, Modern Indonesia Project, 1982.
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian
Control of the Indonesian Military. Honolulu: East–West Center, 2001.
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, and Harold A. Crouch. Indonesia: Foreign Policy
and Domestic Politics. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies,
2003.
Aspinall, Edward. Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for
Peace in Aceh? Policy Studies, no. 20. Washington, DC: East–West
Center, Washington, DC, 2005.
Azra, Azyumardi. Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a
Global Context. Jakarta: Solstice, 2006.
Barron, Patrick, Samuel Clark, and Muslahuddin Daud. Conflict and
Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options
for Supporting the Peace Process. Jakarta: World Bank, 2005.
Bertrand, Jacques. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Blaustein, Albert, and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds. Constitutions of the Countries
of the World, 7. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1990.
Boland, B.J. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
Bresnan, John. Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Bresnan, John, ed. Indonesia: The Great Transition. Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
Brundige, Elizabeth, et al. Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West
Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indone
sian Control. New Haven: Allard K. Lowenstein International Human
Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, 2003.
Budiman, Arief, ed. State and Civil Society in Indonesia. Clayton, Victoria,
Australia: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990.
Butt, Simon “‘Unlawfulness’ and Corruption under Indonesian Law,”
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (Canberra) 45, no. 2 (August
2009): 179–98.
391
Indonesia: A Country Study
Chandler, David P., and Merle C. Ricklefs, eds. Nineteenth and Twentieth Cen
tury Indonesia: Essays in Honour of Professor J. D. Legge. Clayton, Victo
ria, Australia: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986.
Crouch, Harold A. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Rev. ed. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988.
Djiwandono, J. Soedjati. Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapons–Free
Zone. Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Strategic and International Studies,
Malaysia, 1986.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute for
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.
Eldridge, Philip J. NGOs in Indonesia: Popular Movement or Arm of the
Government? Working Paper, no. 55. Clayton, Victoria, Australia:
Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989.
Eldridge, Philip J. Non-government Organizations and Democratic Par
ticipation in Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Emmerson, Donald K. “Indonesia in 1983: Plus Ça Change...” Asian Sur
vey 24, no. 2 (February 1984): 135–48.
Emmerson, Donald K. “Invisible Indonesia.” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2
(Winter 1987/1988): 368–87.
Emmerson, Donald K. “Power and Pancaroba: Indonesia in a Changing
World of States.” International Journal (Toronto) 46, no. 3 (Summer
1991): 449–74.
Emmerson, Donald K., ed. Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy,
Society, Transition. Armonk, New York: Sharpe, 1999.
Federspiel, Howard M. “Muslim Intellectuals and Indonesia’s National
Development.” Asian Survey 31, no. 3 (March 1991): 232–46.
Federspiel, Howard M. “The Position and Role of Islam in Soeharto’s
Indonesian New Order at the 21st Year Mark.” Paper presented at the
Southeast Regional Conference, Association of Asian Studies, Char
lotte, North Carolina, January 1988.
Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.
Forrester, Geoff, and Ronald J. May, eds. The Fall of Soeharto. Singapore:
Select Books, 1999.
Geertz, Clifford. The Religion of Java. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960.
Gunn, Geoffrey L. “Ideology and the Concept of Government in the Indo
nesian New Order.” Asian Survey 19, no. 8 (August 1979): 751–69.
Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf. Decisive Moments: Indonesia’s Long Road
to Democracy. Jakarta: Ilthabi Rekatama, 2006.
392
Bibliography
393
Indonesia: A Country Study
394
Bibliography
395
Indonesia: A Country Study
396
Bibliography
(Various Web sites and issues of the following publications also were used
in the preparation of this chapter: Asian Survey; Asian Wall Street Journal
(Hong Kong); Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); Indonesia gov
ernment Web sites, many of which are listed at http://www.indonesia.gov.id/
en/; and Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore).)
Chapter 5
Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report, 1991. New York,
1991.
“The Blood Sweet Flower Ceremony at Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili.”
Editor (Jakarta), November 23, 1991, 27–33.
Bruce, Robert H. “Paramilitary Police as Political Resources in Civil–Mili
tary Crisis: The Mobile Brigade Between Sukarno and the Army in
Indonesia.” Asian Profile (Hong Kong) 14, no. 5 (August 1986): 471–78.
Conboy, Kenneth J. Elite: The Special Forces of Indonesia 1950–2008.
Jakarta: Equinox, 2008.
Conboy, Kenneth J. Intel: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Services.
Jakarta: Equinox, 2003.
Conboy, Kenneth J. Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces. Jakarta:
Equinox, 2003.
Cribb, Robert B., and Audrey R. Kahin. Historical Dictionary of Indone
sia. 2d ed. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2004.
Crouch, Harold A. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Rev. ed. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988.
Crouch, Harold A. “Military–Civilian Relations in Indonesia in the Late
Soeharto Era.” Pages 61–66 in Viberto Selochan, ed., The Military, the
State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific. Westview Studies in
Regional Security. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
Crouch, Harold A. “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia.”
World Politics 31, no. 4 (July 1979): 571–87.
Durch, William J. “UN Temporary Executive Authority.” Pages 285–98 in
William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Stud
ies and Comparative Analysis. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.
397
Indonesia: A Country Study
398
Bibliography
399
Indonesia: A Country Study
400
Bibliography
401
Indonesia: A Country Study
402
Bibliography
403
Indonesia: A Country Study
(Various Web sites and issues of the following publications also were
used in the preparation of this chapter: Amnesty International (http://
www.amnesty.org/en/region/indonesia); Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong
Kong); “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite,” published in Cor
nell University’s journal Indonesia (http://cip.cornell.edu/indonesia); Indo
nesian Department of Defense, Defense Media Centre (http://www.dephan.
go.id); Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong); Human Rights Watch
(http://www.hrw.org/en/asia); International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance; U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security
Assistance Agency, Congressional Presentation; and Van Zorge Report on
Indonesia: Commentary and Analysis on Indonesian Politics and Econom
ics (Jakarta) (http://www.vanzorgereport.com/report/index.cfm).)
404
Glossary
405
Indonesia: A Country Study
406
Glossary
407
Indonesia: A Country Study
408
Glossary
409
Indonesia: A Country Study
Following two devaluations in 1983 and 1986, the rupiah was gradually
depreciated at an average rate of about 5 percent per year up to the
financial crisis in 1997–98, when the Indonesian currency was floated,
and the exchange rate fell dramatically. During the recovery after the
crisis, the rupiah stabilized at a level of about Rp11,000–12,000 per
US$1, and in the early twenty-first century it improved to about Rp8,000–
9,000 per US$1. At the end of July 2011, the interbank exchange rate was
valued at Rp8,481.76 per US$1, or Rp1 = US$0.00012. The rupiah is
issued in 1, 25, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1,000 coins and 1,000, 5, 000,
10,000, 20,000, 50,000, and 100,000 notes.
santri—Orthodox Muslims. In the Javanese context, the santri are also
sometimes referred to as putihan (white ones), an allusion to their
purity, especially as contrasted to abangan (q.v.) in Javanese.
sharia (Arabic; syariah in Bahasa Indonesia, q.v.)—Islamic canon law.
Among Shia (q.v.) Muslims, the sharia includes the Quran and the
authenticated sayings of the Prophet (hadith) and the Twelve Imams.
Shia (or Shiite)—A member of the smaller of two great divisions of Islam.
The Shias supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right
to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this
issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.) in the first great schism of
Islam. Later disagreements have produced further schisms among the
Shias. Shias revere 12 imams, most of whom are believed to be hidden
from view.
Sufi—From suf, the Arabic word for “wool.” The term derives from the
practice of wearing a woolen robe, a sign of dedicating oneself to the
mystical life, known in Islam as becoming a Sufi. Sufis, who seek
mystical union with God, have been condemned by some Sunni (q.v.)
legal schools.
Sunni—From the Arabic sunna meaning “custom,” with the connotation of
orthodoxy or tradition based on the Prophet Muhammad’s example. One
of the two great divisions of Islam, the Sunnis supported the traditional
method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line. On
this issue, they divided from the Shia (q.v.) discipline in the first great
schism within Islam.
Supersemar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret)—The Letter of Instruction of
March 11, 1966, in which Sukarno signed over his executive authority,
in the wake of the September 30, 1965, coup attempt, to General Suharto.
Transmigration Program—A voluntary rural resettlement plan that sought
to move large numbers of Javanese to Indonesia’s underpopulated
Outer Islands (q.v.); transmigrasi in Bahasa Indonesia (q.v.).
410
Glossary
411
Index
249, 251
All-Indonesian Workers’ Union Federation (FSPSI),
196
Alor, 122
Dutchman), 44
142
Alwi, Des, lx
Agama Hindu (see also Balinese Hinduism),
Amamapare, 214
123, 143
Amangkurat I, 26–27
agama Jawa (a syncretistic religion), 120
Ambalat Island, 105
Agency for the Study and Application of Tech American Federation of Labor, 194
413
Indonesia: A Country Study
archipelagic land and sea space (wawasan Association of Southeast Asian Nations
nusantara), 105, 288 (ASEAN), 160, 191–92, 251, 288, 290–95,
archipelago (nusantara), 15 297, 299–302, 352; aims and endeavors of,
Archipelago Aircraft Industry (IPTN), 173, 290–93, 295; ASEAN Economic Community,
176, 209, 337 192, 222, 294; ASEAN Free Trade Area
Ariel. See Irham, Nazril (AFTA), 192, 222; ASEAN Plus Three (China,
Arifinto, lv Japan, and South Korea), 293, 301; ASEAN
arisan (credit association), 132 Regional Forum (ARF), 294, 352; ASEAN
Armadas. See Navy of the Republic of Indo Security Community, 293; ASEAN Socio-Cul
nesia (TNI–AL) tural Community, 294; Charter, 294; economic
Armed Forces Military Academy (Akmil), investment from member countries, lix; Indo
338, 343 nesia as chair, lix; military cooperation, 352;
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Roadmap for Financial and Monetary Integra
Indonesia (APRIS), 312 tion of ASEAN, 294; Summit, First (1976),
Armed Forces of the Philippines, 301 292; Summit, Third (1987), 301; Summit,
Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia Fourth, (1992), 291, 294
(APRI, then ABRI; see also Indonesian Nat Astra International, 168, 170, 209
ional Armed Forces—TNI), 66, 68, 69–70, 72, Asyari, Kiyai Haji Hasyim, 43
81, 83, 86, 314, 319, 355; antecedents of, 312; Attorney General’s Office (AGO), xlvii, lvi,
and civil conflict, 85; and corruption, 64, 318– 360–61
19; in East Timor, 82, 321; economic role of, Australia, 52, 55, 57, 293; armed forces of, 54;
333; Latihan Gabungan (LatGap exercise), and East Timor, 82, 296, 337; embassy of,
335; matériel, 318; and politics, 63–65, 74, bombing, 280–81, 300; military aid and rela
330; role of, 316, 330–33 tions with, 228–29, 253, 299–300, 323, 352,
Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Body 354, 357; territorial disputes with, 105
(Bais), 355 Austria-Hungary, 44
Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI–AD), Austronesian people and languages, 5, 97, 128
344–45; Army Special Forces Command Automated Logistics Management System
(Kopassus), 330; education in, 338, 343; and (ALMS), 348
human rights, 283; matériel, 344–45; person automotive industry, 209
nel, 338, 345; and politics, 282–84; ranks and avian influenza, 160, 202, 303
uniforms, 350–51, 353; recruitment, 338–39; Awaluddin, Hamid, 106
territorial system, 283, 334, 341–42, 344; Azhar, Antasari, xlvii
women in, 349–50
Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus), Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar, lvii, 88, 275, 280
268, 341, 343; Unit 81, 330 babinsa (village NCO), 344
Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), Babullah, Sultan, of Ternate, 21
69, 341 Bachir, Sutrisno, 271
Asahan Hydroelectric and Aluminum Project, “Back to Nahdlatul Ulama’s Original Program
207 of Action of 1926,” 272
asas tunggal (underlying principle), 76, 262 Badawi, Abdullah, 299
ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Badung, 34
Nations Bagansiapiapi, 148
Asia–Africa Conference (1955), 66–67, 289 Bahasa Indonesia, 9, 97, 126, 128, 129, 130,
Asian Development Bank, 289 136, 149, 260
Asian financial crisis (1997–98), xl, 85, 113, bajaj (three-wheeled, multipassenger motor
115, 133, 150, 165, 174–77, 181–82, 187, cycle), 216
189, 191, 193, 197, 207, 215–16, 288, 290, Bakrie, Aburizal, 266
294, 298, 310, 318 Bali, 14, 68, 99, 115, 132, 137, 158, 160, 220,
Asmat, 147–48 363; agriculture on, 138; bombings (2002–5),
as-salaf as salih (Islam of the righteous ances lvii, 88, 90, 117, 137, 154, 227, 280, 290, 300,
tors), 119 303, 329–30, 357; and population issues, 109;
414
Index
and religion on, 123–24; resistance of, to col Bekasi (see also Jabodetabek), lviii, 112, 194
219 Belgium, 57
Balikpapan, 217
“Bengawan Solo,” liii
Balinese Hinduism, 123–24 Bengkulu, 48, 140
137–38
Berita Buana, 287
Banda Neira, 48
Beureueh, Muhammad Daud, 81
Bangka, 212
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity),
Bangka-Belitung, 212
15, 132, 233
Bangkok, 216
bhumi (land or realm), 11
Banjarmasin, 25, 33
bintang (star), 272
Hezbollah), 52
Borobudur, 9, 13, 126
Bashir, Abu Bakar. See Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar Bosch, Johannes van den, 34–35
Batak, people and language, 128, 140, 252
Bosnia–Herzegovina, 352
Beatles, the, 66
Britain, 29, 68, 323, 345, 347, 352, 354
415
Indonesia: A Country Study
(1966), 73
Central Statistical Office (BPS), 97, 193, 197,
Buddhism, 8–9, 16–18, 25, 118, 125–26; Bud 2002), 106, 250, 324
278
chiefs (datu), 8
252
8, 10
Bukittinggi, 50
China, People’s Republic of, 63, 64, 72, 78, 293;
204–5
wealth of, 196, 257
Cantonese, 148
Cikarang, 216
CASA–235, 344
cinema, 129–30
castes (varna), 124
Cirebon, lvii, lix, 49
178
clothing, 129
censorship. See media, censorship of cloves trade, 6, 19, 21, 24, 173, 206
416
Index
417
Indonesia: A Country Study
281, 305
Dieng temples, 13
Germany
drugs, illegal, 333, 363
Timor-Leste
159
Dutch Antilles, 56
Dutch guilders, 36
Department of National Education (Depdik dwifungsi (dual function), xli, 73, 76, 309, 313,
142, 150
East Asian Miracle, The, 174
Desawarnaña [Nāgarakertāgama], 15
East Indonesia, 64
418
Index
East Timor (see also Timor-Leste), xl, xlii, Ethical Policy, 38–39
82–83, 86, 99, 105, 249–50, 255, 268, 295– Ethicists, 38–39, 41
96, 300, 304, 310, 321–23, 337, 343, 344, ethnic groups and languages, 127, 130–50, 159,
352, 354, 357 257; Balinese, 137–38; Chinese, 148–50;
East Timorese, 105, 295–96, 300 conflict among, 83; Javanese, 130, 132–37,
Easter Island, 128 257–58; Madurese, 130; Malay, 130; of
Eastern Europe, 337 minorities, 142–50; Sumatran, 139–42; Sun
Eastern Fleet. See Navy of the Republic of danese, 130
Indonesia (TNI–AL) ethnic tensions, xl, 284–85, 317, 328–29
economic development (pembangunan), 72, Eurasians, 33, 40, 43, 46–47, 55
73, 76, 78, 165, 167 Europe, 19
economic reforms, 165, 172, 177–80 European Union (EU), 251; relations with, 82,
economy (see also Asian financial crisis), lix, 207, 337; trade with, 191
61–62, 68, 73, 83, 85, 87; Chinese in, 16–19, Europeans, 30, 39–41
30, 39, 43, 149; in the Dutch colony, 30, 34– exclusive economic zone, 99, 202
38; early commerce in the, 19, 21–22; govern executive branch, 241–43
ment intervention in, 165, 166–67; growth in, exports, 64, 174, 180, 186–89, 191–92, 199–
77; at independence, 60; in the Japanese occu 201, 206, 210–12
pation, 50, 52; role of armed forces in, 310,
332–34; the VOC in the, 23–30 Facebook, xlviii, xlix
Ecstasy, 363 Family Health International, 160
education, 98, 150–56, 240, 305; availability of, family life, 109–10, 133–34, 159; on Bali, 138;
152–53; in colonial period, 41–43, 51, 60; on Kalimantan, 144; on Sulawesi, 142–43;
expenditure, 150, 180, 183; of girls, 151; on Sumatra, 139, 140
higher, 154–56; Islamic, 150–51, 153–54; in family planning, 83, 98, 109, 180
kindergarten, 152; and literacy, 60, 150; policy, Far Eastern Economic Review, 173
80; primary, 150–53; secondary, 151–53; and Fasseur, Cees, 39
teachers, 151–52; vocational, 151 Fatu Sinai (Pulau Batek), 105
Effendi, Sofian, 330 Fealy, Greg, 119
eight-year development plan (1959), 166 Federal Republic of Germany. See Germany,
El Niño, 199 Federal Republic of
election laws, 264, 272, 275, 278 Federal Republic of Indonesia (RIS), 59–60,
Election Oversight Commission (Panwaslu), 62, 231, 247
279 federalism, 56, 59, 80, 232, 234, 247–48
elections, xlii, xliii, xlvi, 73, 80, 230, 234, 259, Federation of Malaysia. See Malaysia, Federal
264, 266–79, 305; in 1955, 60, 63; in 1971, Republic of
75; in 1992, 266–67; in 1999, 86, 275–76; in “50 percent + 1 democracy,” xli, 63
2004, 89, 255, 269, 277–78; in 2009, 256, Finance Audit Board (BPK), 238, 246
267–68, 276–77; local, 248, 251, 255, 275 financial crisis. See Asian financial crisis
electric power, 220–21 (1997–98)
Elson, Robert E., 44 Finland, 325
Emmerson, Donald K., 76, 288 fiscal year, 180
employment patterns, 193, 198, 206, 209–10, fishing industry, 98, 202–4, 346
215 five-year plan. See Repelita
Ende, 48 Flores, 34, 122
Eng, Pierre van der, 77 Foja Mountains, lii
environmental concerns (see also deforesta food (see also nutrition), 129
tion), 104–5, 214, 326; air pollution, 104; pre- food processing, 165
independence, 23, 25; water pollution, 104, Ford Foundation, 159
107 Ford Motor Company, liv
Ertsberg Mountain, 214 foreign direct investment (FDI), 206–7, 209,
Estrada, Joseph, 301 212, 214, 302, 304
419
Indonesia: A Country Study
Foreign Military Financing. See United States “global war on terrorism,” 88, 301
foreign reserves, 61
“The Golden Girls,” xlv
213–14, 327–28
Greater Indonesia, 53
Friend, Theodore, 72
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 103
Front Pembela Islam. See Islamic Defenders’ gross domestic product (GDP), liii, 61, 77, 158,
Garuda, 233
Guided Democracy (demokrasi kerpimpin),
Garut-Tasikmalaya region, 57
Guided Economy, 66, 166–67
Gatra, 288
Gujarat, 16
321
Gusmão, José Alexandre (Xanana), 82
Gesang, liii Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.), 83, 85, 86,
315
249–50, 268, 275, 286, 295, 310, 320, 322,
Giyūgun, 312
hadis (hadith), 120
420
Index
hajj, 136
Hitler, Adolf, 49
Hakka, 148
Hitu, 24
Harjoyudanto, Sigit. See Suharto, Sigit Har hukum adat (adat laws), 131
Hartarto, 167
60
Hatley, Barbara, 84
328, 337, 352
heliports, 219
independent state institutions, 246–47
Helsinki, 325–26 India, xl, 54, 78, 293; influence of, 7; trade
logue, 250
Indian Ocean, 16, 101, 128
16–18, 25
43
Hinduization, 7
Indonesia merdeka (free Indonesia), 49
Hirata, Andrea, 91
“Indonesia Raya” (Great Indonesia), 50
Hiroshima, 53
Indonesia Stock Exchange, 172
421
Indonesia: A Country Study
422
Index
280–82; proselytizing, 22; radical, 117, 119, Java, 49–52, 54–59, 68, 77, 79, 86, 115, 132,
311, 317, 323, 328–29; role of, 232, 234, 364; 151, 158, 257–58, 329; agriculture on, 198–
Shia, 118–19; Sufism and, 121; Sunni, 118– 200; climate on, 102–3; Dutch expansion on,
19; traditional, 119 24, 27–29; early records of, 8–18; earthquakes,
Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII), 57 lii, 101; Japanese on, 312; and migration, 148,
Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam), 43, 45 328; minerals on, 212; politics on, 64, 97; pop
Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), ulation issues on, 109, 132, 192; religion on,
271 120, 122, 124; transport on, 215–19; separat
Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), lvii, lviii, 119, ism on, 57–58, 314; volcanoes on, lx, 99, 101
281 Java Bank, 185
Islamic Educational Movement (Perti), 271 Java Sea, 212
Islamic law (see also sharia), 244–45, 250, Java War (1825–30), 30–31, 33
254, 273, 275, 281–82, 358 Javanese, 50–51, 126, 129, 257; language, 128,
Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), 58, 59 134, 136; people, 111, 125, 130, 132–37,
Islamic Trade Association (Sarekat Dagang 252, 257
Islam), 43 Javanism (kejawen), 120, 136, 257–58
Islamic University Student Association (HMI), Jawa Barat, lviii, 101, 111, 117, 132, 156, 160,
265–66 194, 234, 276
Islamization, 18, 229 Jawa Hōkōkai (Java Service Association), 51,
Isma’il, Nur Mahmudi, 273–75 54
Israel, 87, 290 Jawa Tengah, lvii, 99, 124, 132, 160, 194, 206,
Iswahyudi Air Base, 349 211, 216, 269, 347
Jawa Timur, 68, 115, 117, 124, 132, 194, 212,
Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, 216, 269, 347, 349
and Bekasi), 112, 194, 206 Jay, Robert, 132
Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Jayakerta, 24
Bekasi), 194 Jayapura, 52, 253, 327
Jak TV, 220 Jayawijaya Mountains, 147
Jakarta, 69–70, 128, 156, 157, 194, 220, 247, Jemaah Islamiyah (Congregation of Islam), l,
249, 274–75, 279, 347–48; bombings, l, 88, lvii, 88, 117, 119, 275, 280, 285, 324, 329–
357; in colonial period, 24, 26, 31, 34; impor 30
tance of, 63, 64, 290; pollution in, 104, 161, Jepara, 206
216; population of, 112–13; Stock Exchange, Jesuits (Society of Jesus), 122
171–72, 329; transport links, 215–19; violence Jews, 119, 273
in 117–18, 227, 268, 280–81, 290, 300, 329 jihad, 31, 328
Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta, June 1945), jilbab (woman’s head scarf), l, 111, 129
53, 65, 261, 281 Jinarakkhita, Bhikku Ashin, 126
Jakarta Globe, 288 JJFM (radio station), 220
Jakarta Initiative, 177 Johor, 298
Jakarta Message (1992), 290 Joint Exercise (LatGap), 335
Jakarta News, 220 Jonge, Bonafacius B. de (B. B.), 48
Jakarta Post, xl, 288 Joyohadikusumo, Sumitro, 64, 167, 268
Jambi (Melayu), 14 Juanda, 219
Japan, 9, 41, 174; aid from, 191, 293; exports Judicial Commission, 238, 245
to, 191, 210, 212, 302; imports from, 191, judicial system, 228, 244–46; reform of, lv
302; investment by, 76; relations with, 207, Justice Party (PK), 273–74, 281
302–3 JW Marriott (hotel in Jakarta), l, 117, 280–81
Japanese Imperial Army, 50, 356; Sixteenth
Army, 50; Twenty-fifth Army, 50 kabizu (patrilineal clan), 146
Japanese Imperial Navy, 50 kabupaten (regency), 112, 235, 247–48
Japanese wartime occupation, 48, 49–53, 133, kafir (pagan), 142
312; conditions under, 61 Kaharingan, 124, 144, 146
423
Indonesia: A Country Study
Kahuripan, 12
Kiemas, Taufik, 267
Kai Islands, 34
klandestin (clandestine apparatus), 322
Kamaruzaman,“Syam,” 70
191, 207, 212, 337, 345, 347, 349
Karimun, 207
Korean War (1950–53), 61
58
kretek cigarettes (clove-scented), 129, 173,
110
kraton (royal court), 12, 249
11
Kuncoro-Yakti, Dorojatun, 177, 182
Kedu Plain, 9
Kutai, 8
kemerdekaan (freedom), 45
Laakso-Taagepera Index, 254, 263
Kendari, 49
labor force (see also employment patterns),
Kenpeitai, 50
192–93
kepercayaan (faiths), 120–21 ladang (dryland, nonirrigated), 198
212, 214
Lakalena, Melki, lvi
keris (asymmetrical dagger), liii Lampung, 201
Kertanagara, 14
Lamreh, 16
Kia, 174
laskar (militia forces), 57, 58, 312
424
Index
Lawangan, 144
Mahmud, Sultan, of Melaka, 18
Leiden, 45
Warriors’ Council), 119
Li Peng, 302
291; economy of, lii; Ministry of Tourism of,
liquefied natural gas (LGN). See gas, natural liii; relations with, 72, 105, 298–99, 346
Lisbon, 321
Malino I (for Poso), 285
livestock, 202
Malino II (for Ambon), 285
logging. See forestry Maluku Islands (or the Moluccas), 6, 12, 14–15,
Lubis, Zulkifli, 64
Manado Tua, 103
279,
Mandan, Arief Mudatsir, 280
Lutherans, 122
Mandar, Sultan, of Ternate, 24
Mangkunegaran, 27
Maanyan, 144
Mangunkusumo, Cipto, 44
Madagascar, 128
Manokwari, 346, 347
Madura, 14, 25, 56, 99, 109, 130, 215; agricul Mansur, Sultan, of Tidore, 21
425
Indonesia: A Country Study
Marshall Plan, 58
mineral industries, 210–14
martial law, 64, 87, 106, 232, 250–51, 314,
mining, 148; coal, 212; copper, 214; gold, 213–
324
14; illegal, 333; nickel, 214; tin, 212, 214
Max Havelaar, 36
Mohammad, Gunawan, 78, 282
Morotai, 52
Mount Sinabung, lx
Melayu (Jambi), 14
Mentawai Islands, lx
Muhammad (Prophet), 120, 273
282, 286
Muis, Abdul, 43
Merauke, 327
Miharja, Akhdiat, lx Muslims (see also Islam), 30, 136; politics of, 45,
military courts, 246, 361–62 and religious tensions, 137, 144, 281, 284–85,
354
Myanmar. See Burma
Milone, Pauline D., 112
Myristica fragrans, 19
Mimika, 327
Vereniging Minahasa), 44
Nagasaki, 53
426
Index
Namibia, 352
nationalization, 62, 332–33
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD; see also
Natsir, Mohammad, 64
Napoleon, 29
field in, 81
313–14
see also marine corps), 345–47; command
National Air Defense Command (Kohanud structure, 340–41; education and training in,
National Development Planning Board (Bap Netherlands East Indies, 23, 30–38, 48, 49, 53
(BKKBN), 243
Netherlands Trading Association (NHM), 35
75, 354
liii, lvi, 3, 72–88, 111, 130, 131, 165, 166–69,
199
286–88, 315–19; characteristics of, 118, 230–31;
180
New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru), 320
Ngandong, 4
44
Nine Saints (wali songo), 17
427
Indonesia: A Country Study
428
Index
Pasai, 15
Piper nigrum (black pepper), 19, 22
Pasisir, 16, 26–27 pisis or picis (Chinese copper and lead coins),
Patek, Umar, lvii plantations, 57, 198; coffee, 30; land in, 198;
320, 333
117
125
ports, 217–18
pergerakan (movement for freedom from
Portugal, 82, 295, 321; early involvement of,
Dutch rule), 45
18, 19–22, 122
Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Associa Portuguese Timor (see also East Timor), 53,
tion), 47
295
Persatuan Perjuangan. See Struggle Coalition posyandu (service post or posts), 157
126
Prapañca, Mpu, 15
Petition of 50 (1980), 76
prehistory, 3–6
Petrus (mysterious killings, or shootings, cam Presidential Advisory Council, 243
paign), 317
Priangan, 130
429
Indonesia: A Country Study
P. T. Pindad, 337
religious courts, 245
Purwokerto, 158
Repelita I (1969–73), 157, 166, 180
59
Republic of Indonesia, 60
in Mataram), 9
Riau (see also Kepulauan Riau Province),
of Rama), 124
99; harvest, 133; price of, 198; planting, 203;
430
Index
Roti, 122
Saudi Arabia, 119
211
42–43, 44
Rukmana, Siti Hardiyanti. See Suharto, Tutut Sea and Air Police, 356
rukun kampung (village mutual assistance asso Security Disturbance Movement (GPK), 316
ciation), 132
sekolah desa (vernacular village primary
132
Selamat Pagi Indonesia (Good Morning Indo
rupiah (Rp), xl, lix, 85, 168, 172, 174–76, 186–
nesia, TV program), 130
88, 189
Selat Malaka. See Strait of Malacca
Russia (see also Soviet Union), xl, 293, 337,
selendang (item of attire), 129
347
semangat (charisma), 11
Semaun, 43
gram), 130
Sailendra, 9
Seram, 98
Salafism, 119
Samanhudi, 43
Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (SBI), 186, 188
Sampit, 328
shadow puppet theater (wayang kulit), 136
Sangiran, 4
Shastri, Pandit, 123
sanitation, 161
Shell, 211
Sanjaya, 9, 12
Shia, Shiite, 118–19
Sanskrit, 7–8, 124
shipping, 217–19
Santa Cruz Massacre (1991), 82, 304, 322
Shivaist Hinduism, 9
Sarasamuccaya, 123
Siam (see also Thailand), 40
Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Associa Sidoarjo mud volcano. See Lumpur Sidoarjo
tion), 43
(Lusi) mud volcano
Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), 43, 45
SIJORI (Singapore, Johor, Riau), 298
129
Sinar Indonesia Baru, 288
Satelindo, 220
sinetron (television drama or dramas), 130
431
Indonesia: A Country Study
Singhasari, 12, 14
subak (agricultural society), 138
Siti Hediati Hariyadi. See Suharto, Titiek subpuskesmas (health subcenters), 157
Situbondo, 117
subsidies, 90
Sneevliet, Hendrik, 43
Sudharmono, 265
Sudirohusodo, Wahidin, 43
Somalia, 352
Sonara, 220
Sufism, 121
Soputan, 99
sugar, 30, 34, 199
South Korea. See Korea, Republic of Suharto (see also New Order), li, xli, xlii, xliv,
354
266–67, 284, 309–10, 315–19; and armed
237
270, 287, 309, 318; foreign policy under, 229,
Special Region of Aceh. See Aceh, Special 290–93, 300–302; and Golkar, 265–66; as
Special Region of Nanggru. See Nanggroe hero,” lvi–lvii; and Pancasila, 261; and vio
Aceh Darussalam; Aceh, Special Region of lence, 118
Sri Lanka, 7
84
211
Sukabumi, 357
156
Order), xxxix, xli, lvi, 54–56, 58, 63–72, 73,
211–12
51–53, 54; and Pancasila, 52–53, 260–61, 266;
4
Sukarno–Hatta International Airport, 216, 219
432
Index
Sukarnoputri, Megawati, xlii, 177, 241–42, 250– Surabaya, 12, 25, 45, 48, 55, 194, 206, 220,
51, 255, 266–67, 270, 272; and 2004 elections, 343, 347; Stock Exchange, 172; transport
278; and 2009 elections, xxxix, xlvi, 256; as links, 217, 219
president, 182, 252, 287, 324; as vice presi Surakarta (Solo), 27, 29, 30, 58, 132, 216
dent, 87, 179, 297 Suriname, 56
suku (female lineage unit), 141 Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV), 287
Sulaiman, Sultan, of Lamreh, 16 Suryajaya, William (Tjia Kian Liong), 170
Sulawesi, 64, 86, 99, 142–43, 192, 201, 215, Suryaningrat, Raden Mas Suwardi (Ki Hajar
303, 346; Christianity on, 122; colonial era on, Dewantara), 44–45, 48
32, 49; early records of, 8, 12, 14, 21, 30; sepa Suryaputra, Raden Mas Sonder, 44–45
ratist movements on, 64–65, 314; urbanization Sutarjo Petition (1936), 48
on, 111; violence on, 117, 118, 227; volcanic Sutarto, Endriartono, 332
activity on, lx, 99 “Sutasoma,” 15, 132
Sulawesi Barat, 142 Sutomo, Dr., 46
Sulawesi Sea (Celebes Sea), 105, 346 Sutowo, Ibnu, 79
Sulawesi Selatan, 124, 142, 156, 194, 234, 266 Swaragama (radio station), 220
Sweden, 324
Sulawesi Tengah, 122, 124, 142, 281, 284,
Switzerland, lix, 44
324, 328, 357
Syahrir, Sutan, lx, 47, 48, 51, 53, 57, 58
Sulawesi Tenggara, 158, 214
syariah. See sharia
Sulawesi Utara, 99, 122
Syria, 6
Sulu Sea, 303, 346 Syzygium aromaticum, 19
Sumatera Barat, lii, lx, 101, 140–41, 212
Sumatera Selatan, 8, 206, 212 Tabanan, 34
Sumatera Utara, 99, 122 Tabuni, Buchtar, 107
Sumatra (see also Aceh, Special Region of), 64, Taiwan, lix, 174, 191, 204, 207, 212
99, 158, 160, 192, 329; agriculture on, 199, Taman Mini, 131
201; colonial era on, 33, 49–50, 54–56; early Taman Siswa (Student Garden; schools), 44,
records of, 8–12, 14–16; environmental prob 48
lems on, 205, 279; fishing on, 202; Hinduism Tambunan, Gayus Halomoan, liv
and, 124; migration and, 112; oil production Tamil, 12
on, 49, 211–12; peoples on, 139–42; separatist Tan Malaka, 45, 56, 59
movements on, 64–65, 314; transport on, 215, Tanah Merah (Red Earth), 46
217–19; tsunamis and earthquakes on, 101, Tanaka Kakuei, 302
139 Tangerang, 112, 194
Sumba, 117, 145–46 Tangguh natural gas field, 212
Sumbawa, 101, 137 Tanjung, Akbar, 265–66
Sun Television (SCTV), 220, 287 Tanjung Perak, 217
Sunata, Abdullah, l Tanjung Priok, 217
Sunda, 14, 130 Tanjung Priok riots (1984), 76
Sunda Kelapa, 24 Tantular, Mpu, 15, 132
Tarakan, 49
Sunda Shelf, 4, 99
Taruma, 8
Sunda Strait, 102
Tasikmalaya, 117, 279, 284
Sundanese people and language, 128, 130
Tasikmalaya earthquake (2009), 279
sunna (Islamic custom), 118, 120 Taxation Review Board, 245–46
Sunni, 117, 118–19 taxes, 9, 30, 61, 80, 178, 240, 248; oil, 181; rev
Supersemar (Letter of Instruction of May 11), enues from, 182–83, 184–85, 186
72 tea, 34
Supreme Advisory Council, 243 teak, 26
Supreme Court, li, lv, lvii, 235, 238, 244–45, Technical College, Bandung, 46
287, 358, 362 tegalan (rain-fed agricultural land), 199
433
Indonesia: A Country Study
434
Index
156
Universitas Gadjah Mada, 156, 271
ity, 252
opment, 159
69, 70
56–58
tion, 363
village (desa), 132
323, 354
volcanoes, lx, 99, 101
344
293, 300–301, 321, 357; aid from, 352; invest Wahhabism (see also Islam), 33, 119
11, 322–23, 329, 345, 347–48, 352, 354; rela 117, 177, 179, 241–42, 250, 252, 255, 267,
(ROTC), 338
wali (Muslim saints), 17, 121
435
Indonesia: A Country Study
Wallace’s Line, 4
World Health Organization (WHO), 157, 158,
Yani, Ahmad, 69
Yasadipura I, 29
Western Fleet. See Navy of the Republic of Young Sumatrans’ Association (Jong Suma
Indonesia (TNI–AL) tranen Bond), 44
330
227–28, 251, 255–56, 262, 283, 325; and elec
Wiranto, General, xlii, 242, 255–56, 268, 278,
tion campaigns, xxxix, xlii, 255, 267–68, 270,
Wonosobo hoard, 11
237
Zaire. See Congo, Democratic Republic of
World Bank, xlvii, 68, 77, 79, 114, 174, 177,
Zheng He, 16
191, 289
Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOP
World Economic Forum (Davos), lix FAN), 293
436
Contributors
Blair A. King is a foreign service officer at the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
437
Published Country Studies
Burma Ghana
Cambodia Greece
Cameroon Guatemala
Chad Guinea
Chile Guyana and Belize
China Honduras
Colombia Hungary
Commonwealth Caribbean, India
Islands of the Indian Ocean
Congo Indonesia
Costa Rica Iran
439
Iraq Philippines
Israel Poland
Italy Portugal
Japan Romania
Jordan Russia
Malawi Sudan
Malaysia Syria
Mauritania Tanzania
Mexico Thailand
Mongolia Tunisia
Morocco Turkey
Mozambique Uganda
Nepal and Bhutan Uruguay
Nicaragua Venezuela
Nigeria Vietnam