II.

PRIMARY LAW AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. Read Article X, Section 9 and Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution

a.1 Article X, Section 10 – No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged abolished or its
boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
NOTE: Read the whole of Article X of the 1987 Constitution as well, as it refers to local, governments in general. It contains 21 sectors.
Also Prof. Ulep must have meant Season 10 and not 5 in his outline.

a. 2 Article XVIII, Sec. 8 - Unless otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be
composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila Area.

Article XVIII, Sec. 9 – A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular province or its component
municipalities are reverted to the mother province.

NOTE: There’s no point in reading all other sections of Article XVIII. See for yourself.

B. Read R.A. 7924(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)

This Act states the policy of the State to treat Metro Manila as a special development and administrative region and certain
basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro wide services more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised and
coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGU. Among its pertinent
provisions are:
1) Scope of MMDA (metro-wide) services: Development planning; transport and traffic management; solid waste disposal
and management; Flood control; Urban renewal; zoning and land use planning; health sanitation; Urban protection
and pollution control; pu8blic safety;
2) Creation of Metro Manila Council (MMC) consisting of all mayors in Metro Manila
3) Powers and Functions of MMDA, mainly to formulate, coordinate, and regulate implementation of above metro-wide
services
4) Functions of MMC, mainly to approve projects of MMDA
5) Function of MMDA chairman: Execute policies of MMC and manage operations of MMDA; appointment power; prepare
budget of MMDA; disciplinary power on subordinates; ex officio board member (or his representative) of departments
related to activities of MMDA such as DOTC, DOH, etc.
6) Institutional linkages of MMDA: NEDA, NGOs , accredited people’s organizations

b. 1 Lopez, Jr. v. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 633

Facts: Mel Lopez, et. Al. questioned the validity of P, D. 824 which provides for the creation of Metro Manila Commission
which shall hold sway over 4 cities (Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay) and 13 municipalities. P.D. He says it runs counter to Art.
11, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution which states that: “No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, abolished,
merged or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
subject to the approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.” No plebiscite was conducted to vote
for the creation of Metro Manila. He also claims the P.D. is a denial of the equal protection clause as other cities and municipalities
were not similarly organized into such. Also the President cannot exercise direct supervision and control over the Metropolitan Manila
Commission as it runs counter to the autonomy of local governments.

Held: Mel Lopez is incorrect. Reasons:

1. Although a plebiscite was not conducted, a referendum was held Feb. 27, 1975 wherein the residents of the Greater Manila
area authorized the President to reorganize the cities and municipalities under the Metro Manila Commission. The requirements for a
plebiscite were therefore deemed satisfied. Besides, at the time of the referendum, there was no Local Government Code in existence
then which provided the need for a plebiscite. By virtue of martial law and the absence of an interim Batasang Pambansa at that time,
the President had authority to enact said P.D.
2. There is reasonable classification in organizing said 4 cities and 13 municipalities into a metropolitan area
3. Article 8, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Constitution expressly recognizes the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila
4. There is presumption of constitutionality in the President’s power of direct supervision and control over the Metropolitan
Manila Commission. The presidential power of control can and should be constructed to mean that said control is limited to those that
may be considered national in character.

b. 2 MMDA v. Bel-Air Assn, Inc., 328 SCRA 836

Facts: Pursuant to R.A. 7924 which created the MMDA, MMDA issued a notice to the Bel-Air Village Assoc. (BAVA) that
the former will open Neptune Street owned by the latter in Bel-Air Village, as well as tear down a perimeter wall owned by said village.
Both actions, the MMDA said, is necessary for the decongestion of traffic along the said areas.
BAVA petitioned the trail court and later on the Court of Appeals to enjoin the implementation of MMDA’s proposed actions.
BAVA’s petition was granted. The MMDA thus now seeks recourse with the Supreme Court, claiming among others that its proposed
actions were in the exercise of the police power.
Held: MMDA is wrong. The reason is that R.A. 7924 did not expressly or impliedly delegate any police power to the MMDA,
most notably the power to enact ordinances necessary for the implementation of its plans, programs and projects aimed at the delivery
of metro-wide services in Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the LGUs concerning purely local matters (See. 2, R.A.
7924) MMDA’s proposed actions were not under the authority of any ordinance (What’s funny is that the MMC, the governing board
of the MMDA, is composed of the different mayors of Metro Manila, and these guys, as mayors per se, have the power or at least, the
political will to enact ordinances)

C. Read R.A. 6732 (Organic Act for ARMM [Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao])

Mindanao, encompassing 13 provinces and 9 cities, through a plebiscite for that purpose. This government shall operate
within the framework of the Regional Government. The executive power is conferred on the Regional Governor. The legislative power
is conferred in the Regional Assembly. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the lower courts shall continue to exercise their
power as mandated in the Constitution; however, there shall be a Shari’ah Appellate Court which shall also be learned in Islamic law
and jurisprudence. The Shari’ah Court’s decisions shall be final and executory subject to the original and appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Tribal Appellate Courts for cases dealing with tribal codes shall also be established.
The Regional Government shall have fiscal autonomy or the power to create its own sources of revenue, subject to the
limitations of the Constitution and this Organic Act. The Organic Act also provides for: Protection of ancestral lands, ancestral domain
and indigenous cultural communities; urban and rural planning and development; power to enact laws pertaining to the national
economy and patrimony responsive to the needs of the Regional Government; public order and security; education, science and
technology and sports development; social justice and services; and power to amend or revise the Organic Act, either by Congress
or by the Regional Assembly, the latter being subject to approval by Congress.

c. 1 Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287

Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on the following grounds:
1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesn’t say)
2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite as
provided in the Constitution
3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by all voters
residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says “by a majority or votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite and
only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the Autonomous Region.
R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution
4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage and other
relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM
5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions run counter
to the Koran
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to the
constitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite
7) R. A. 6734 says “…that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. This
provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, “No province city, municipality or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established with the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected.” (Art. 10, Sec. 10,
1987 Constitution)

Held: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:

1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law to the
Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it wouldn’t matter if R. A. 6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement)
2) The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess nobody reads the transitory provisions)
3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes must come from each of the
constituent units and not all the votes of the provinces and cities (I couldn’t understand how the justices arrived at this conclusion)
4) It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion of provinces and cities which
Abbas claims should not be included in a plebiscite
5) There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only a potential one
6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in the timely creation of the
ARMM
7) The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of general supervision over
local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political regions. Examples of administrative regions are
Regions I to XII and the NCR

c. 2 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

Facts: In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities, some of which did
not participate in the inclusion to the ARMM, to the reorganized to new regions (e.g. Misamis Occidental, which did not participate in
the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. O. pursuant ant R. A. 6734, which says:
“…That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in suitable plebiscites shall be included in the ARMM. The provinces and cities
which plebiscite no vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided however,
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman,
filed a certiorari prohibition to protest the E. O., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganize administrative regions
because said provision in R. A. 6734 1) also states that provinces, cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative regions 2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the
power to merge administrative regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of the Constitution (see II of your outline) prohibits this and 3) even
granting that the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting standard on how it is to be done.
 Held: Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons:
1) The sentence “…shall remain in the existing administrative regions, is further qualify by the phrase, “Provided however
that the President may, by administration determination merge the existing regions.”
2) Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize the different example departments including administrative regions. This shows that
traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has always been lodged in the President
3) The standard is found in R. A. 5345 which states “to promote simplicity, economic efficiency in the government to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with no goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve
service transaction of the public business.”

D. Read R. A. 6766 (Organic Act for Cordillera Autonomous Region of 1989)

This Act provides for creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) shall consist of the cities and provinces that shall
vote favorable in a plebiscite pursuant ant 10, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Those cities and provinces are Benguet, Ifugao, Muslim
Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio
The Act consists of the following pertinent articles:
1) Guiding principles and policies similar to that of Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution
2) Vesting of legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly; executive power Cordillera governor with a deputy governor
as well; creation of indigenous special courts whose decisions are final and executory but subject to the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
3) Creation of a Regional Commission on Appointments
4) Measures to protect and develop the ancestral lands and ancestral domains of indigenous cultural communities as
well as the national economy and patrimony
The rest of its provisions are roughly similar to the Organic Act for ARMM (see11-c) CAR never came to existence. Only
Ifugao province voted in favor of CAR, so the Supreme Court in Ordillo v. COMELEC ruled that Ifugao could no constitute
itself into the CAR>

d. 1 Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100

Facts: CAR Regional Assembly member Alexander Ordillo raised the question in his petition on whether the province of
Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR, can alone legally and validly constitute such region.
Held: Ordillo’s petition is meritorious. Reasons:
1) Statutory construction of Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word “region” is to be made up of more
than one constituent unit
2) Section 2 or R. A. 6766 says “The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper
governance and development of all provinces, cities, barangays and municipalities within the CAR.” Therefore,
Congress could not have intended that only a single province would constitute CAR
3) It would be illogical for Ifugao to have 2 sets of officials, one for Ifugao and one for the CAR, when Ifugao is the only
member of the CAR

d. 2 Cordillera Board Coalitions v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 495

Facts: Pending the convening of Congress after President Aquino was swept into power in 1986, she issued E. O. 220
which petitioner Cordillera Board Coalitions claimed created the CAR, thus preempting the constitutional mandate that Congress shall
be the one to pass an Organic Act providing for the creation of CAR. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of the CAR as it
runs contrary to Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution (See 11-1). Finally petitioner claims the CAR will interfere with the local
autonomy of individual cities and provinces in general.
Held: Cordillera Board Coalition is wrong. Reasons:
1. The presumption of constitutionality of laws shall be applied in the case. E. O. 220 was actually envisioned to consolidate
and coordinate the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the CAR
as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordillera. It was not intended to preempt Congress
2. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial or political subdivision. It is in the same genre as an administrative region
for the purpose of coordinating the planning and implementation of program and services in the covered areas. Thus no new territorial
or political subdivision was created or merged with another.
3. Local autonomy is administrative autonomy. In the case of CAR and Muslim Mindanao, they are granted both
administrative and political autonomy. Petitioner has failed to show specifically how the creation of administrative regions will interfere
with local autonomy.

d. 3 E.O. 459 dated May 17, 1991

This E. O. is entitled “Devolving to the Autonomous Region” Government of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao
Certain Powers of the DECS, the Control and Supervision Over Its Offices in the Region and for other Offices.
The E. O. aims to implement Sec. 1, Article XV of R. A. 6734 which states that, “The Autonomous Region shall establish,
maintain and support a complete and integrated system of quality education and adopt an educational framework that is meaningful,
relevant and responsive to the needs, aspirations and ideals of the people in the region.”
To this end, the Regional Government is made responsible for the regional educational framework of the ARMM, such as
formulating and implementing programs to improve education in general in the region.

E. Read R. A. 7901, dated Feb. 23, 1995 (Creating the CARAGA Administrative Region)
 This Act is entitled “An Act Creating Region 13 to be known as the CARAGA Administrative Region, and For Other
Purposes.” It consists of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur and the cities of
Butuan and Surigao. The Act also transfers Sultan Kudarat to Region 11.

H. Public Corporation defined

Definition 1: Those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State (Act 1459, Sec.2)
Definition 2: Those corporations created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public
works (Eliot, Mun. Corp. p. 1)

I. Essential Elements of a Municipal Corporation

1) A legal creation or incorporation
2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality or legal entity is known and in which all corporation acts are done.
3) Inhabitants constituting the population who are invested with the political and corporate powers which are executed
through duly constituted officers and agents;
4) a place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised (Martin, Pub. Corp.,
1971)

J. Two fold character of a municipal corporation; its significance

1) Government – the municipal corporation is an agent of the State for the government of the territory and the inhabitants
within the municipal limits. The municipal corporation exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State.
2) Private – the MC acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing functions not strictly government or
political. The MC stands for the community in the administration of local affairs w/c is wholly beyond the sphere of the public
purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred

K. What is Federalism?
Definition: A system in which political power is divided between a central (national) government and smaller government
units.
Supporting Definition: The central government is often called the federal government and the smaller units, states or provinces. In a
true federal system, citizens owe their loyalty directly to

the central government, even though they live in states or provinces. The central government has direct authority over the people
concerning powers granted to it in the constitution.

III. CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created divided, merged,
abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality or any
other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod concerned in the
case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.

A. Requisites for creation of Local Government Units

1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services
and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU concerned.
2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU
concerned.
3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU independent of the
other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities
to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the Land Management Bureau
of the DENR.

B. Decided cases:
b. 1 Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in Northern Luzon and
Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed
a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restraining him from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive order and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370, the Barrio
Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allow the president to interfere
in local government affairs.

Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:

1. The Barrio Charter Act states that “barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their names changed except
by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected and the
recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated” This implies that if the President cannot
create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argument coz it’s implying way too much).
2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement the statute and b)
Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is “as the public welfare may require” This
standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.
3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can create municipalities,
situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio
wherein the officials preside, thus said officials’ positions would suddenly becomes vacant. The power of control by the president over
local government is denied by the 1935 Constitution

b. 2 Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727

Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of Negros.
Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: “No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected”. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental were not allowed to participate in the plebiscite
for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims the proposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements
of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that a future province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner
avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sq km. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new province
of Negros del Norte was already proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling
under the jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province.

Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:
1) The phrase “subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must be
construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the said
plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to Negros del Norte, thus Negros Occidental’s land
area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are
directly affected by the diminution in land size of their province.
2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. “The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands”. The use of the word ‘territory” clearly reflects that the law refers only to the land mass
and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land
area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.

b. 3 Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6

Facts: By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to determine whether
they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredes et. al. however claimed that the
rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite by virtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973 Constitution
as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipality of Aguinaldo.

Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection of local
autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangays should be given
leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones who will constitute the new
municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56

b. 4 Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182

Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actually covered
barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. The RTC awarded Pagahat
to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia on the grounds that 1) applying the rule of
equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Alicia as defendant in the lower court, the
court must rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule states: “Where the scale shall stand upon equipoise
and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said
principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of
the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.” In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their claims that they
owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) if Candijay’s boundary line claim was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat but also other certain
barrios as well, which would as a result, certainly expand Candijay’s territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay
petitioned is review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that 1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of evidence rule and 2) the
municipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 of the RAC of
1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Audition General (See III-b 1).

Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:

1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by the CA
2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution of Alicia as one of
the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgement of the existence thereof.
Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991 which states “Municipal District organized pursuant to
presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in favor of
Alicia. The objection against it being a municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.
 b. 5 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182
NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of justice
Facts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of Misamis
Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Board that same year and later
on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because it was created under a void E.O. as
promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenez since in 1950 the municipalities entered into an
agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental back then which recognized Jimenez’s jurisdiction over the
disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacaban using as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991.
Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTC’s decision was null and void because it failed to decide the
case within one year mandated by the LGC of 1983 and the Constitution.

Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:

1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts through the years
after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the recognition by the state of
the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis
Occidental.
2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes and bounds
set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of the survey was not stated
in the case)
3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left would be to file
administrative sanctions against it.

b. 6 Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536

Facts: In 1954, the mayor of the municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as Chief of Police. Then, in 1959,
Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides that the position of
Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President. Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was appointed by
the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claiming that his position as chief of police was not
abolished when Legaspi was converted from a city to a municipality 2) Under R.A. 557 his employment status as Chief of Police may
not be abolished except in the manner specified in R.A. 557 and 3) The Civil Service Law guarantees his security of tenure.

Held: Mendenilla is incorrect Reasons:

1. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally different from the position of the Chief of Police of a city. Therefore, R.A.
2234 abolished the position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. In support of this contention, the
Supreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of the charter which provides that the City Mayor the Vice Mayor, etc. are allowed to continue
in office upon the effectivity of the charter until the expiration of their terms in office. Nowhere does it mention the Chief of Police in
the said list of officials. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

2. Notwithstanding both R.A. 557 and the Civil Service Law, it is within the legal competence of Congress to enact R.A. 2234. Congress
has the plenary power to make laws, meaning its power to make any kind of law is, in theory, unlimited.

Quiz: If the municipality of a municipal judge is converted into a city, can the judge continue to serve in the new city? Answer: Yes. A
judge is not a municipal official. He does not derive his power or his appointment from a city charter; he derives them from the
Constitution and other Laws.

b. 7 Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703

NOTE: Don’t confuse CSU with CSC
Facts: During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local
government of Quezon City. Simon’s authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretary of Justice rendered an Opinion,
stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the Tanada v. Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never became
law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the revocation of all appointments in the CSU. However, the effects of
such revocation were temporarily cushioned when the city council issued an ordinance creating the Department of Public Order and
Safety (DPOS). All present personnel of the CSU, the said ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.
However, the regular positions in the DPOS never got filled due to insufficient number of said positions and lack of funds.
Simon and later on his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation by offering the CSU personnel contractual
appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel complained to the CSC. The CSC replied by
issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now asserts that the CSC cannot order him to reinstate the said
personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he possesses, as city Mayor to the CSC.

Held: Mathay is correct. Reasons:

1) First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old LGC and not the LGC of 1991 since the material events of the case
took place during the time of the old LGC.
2) Under B.P. 337, the power to appoint rests in the local chief executive in the case the Mayor. When the city council issued
the ordinance allowing for the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made use of the wordings “Present
Personnel” and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointing power by dictating who shall occupy the DPOS
positions. Even in the local government level, the separation of powers must be respected.
3) The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by the city
council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and such they have gained the protection of the Civil Service Law. Such
reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they were never part of the Civil Service to begin with.
Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractual appointments, they were at the mercy of the appointing power of the
said mayors, as they have the option not to renew their appointments

b. 8 Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53

Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Quezon City
councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income, land area and
population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 8535 2) a certification attesting
to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of Novaliches city in terms of income,
land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of
Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A.
8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.

Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:

1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden of proof to
show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the
deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF, NSO, DENR and even
Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income, land area
and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law
2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of Novaliches, he
would be the first representative to do so. But he didn’t.
3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches
is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass media publicizing the creation of
the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation
4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a
government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can also serve as seats of government.
5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the ordinance
attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a
city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the different legislative
districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be forever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.
NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose

C. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces?

* Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or
ordinance effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes another date.

* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval
of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall
be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this code.
The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by the duly
elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit their own representative
shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified
The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June
30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of resulting
from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President.
The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite
mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly
created province through appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a
vice governor and other members of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their successors shall
have been elected in the next local election and qualified.
All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of their conversion
into regular provinces shall continue in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.

C 1. Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672

Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its mother province was
Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. The participants in the said
plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras. Surprisingly, the ballots issued in the
said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidate Simplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing
the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province
of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted for regular “provincehood” then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the
provincial officials of Iloilo. But what if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held for the 3
municipalities so that they can vote for the provincial official of Iloilo?

Held: Obviously, Grino’s petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regular province. Besides
it’s too late to undo what COMELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province, Grino’s petition would have been
meritorious.
D. Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city and reclassification (implementing Rules and regulations,
LGC).

* Art 12 Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city

a) Requisites for conversion. A component city shall not be converted into a highly urbanized city unless the following
requirements are present:
1. Income latest annual income of not less than P50M based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasure. The
annual income shall included the income accruing to the general fund exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income
and
2. Population, which shall not be less than 200,000 inhabitants as certified by NSO.

b) Procedure for conversion:

1. Resolution. The interested component city shall submit to the office of the President a resolution of its Sanggunian
adopted by a majority of all it’s members in a meeting duly called for the purpose, and approved and endorsed by the city mayor. Said
resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as to income and population
2. Declaration of conversion. Within 30 days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifying that the
income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highly urbanized
3. Plebiscite. Within 120 days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, the COMELEC shall
conduct a plebiscite in the city proposed to the converted such plebiscite shall be preceded by a comprehensive information campaign
to be conducted by the COMELEC with the assistance of national and local government officials, media, NGO’s and other interested
parties.

c) Effect of conversion
The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where it is
geographically located

Reclassification (See cases below and III-e)

d. 1 Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763

Facts: on Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections on Jan 30, 1980.
Its section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:
xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accordance with standard established in the
LGC as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution. Any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall be classified as a highly urbanized
city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. xxx The registered voters
may be entitled to voter in the election of the official of the province of which that city is a component. If it’s charter so provides.
However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall no participate nor vote in the election of the official of the
province in which the highly urbanized city is geographical located.

Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu ad Mandaue assailing Sec. 3
Specially, they questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a
highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of the province in which the city is
geographically located. Ceniza and his fellow goons claim Sec.3 regulates the exercise of freedom of suffrage and violates the equal
protection of the law. Moreover, they attacked R.A. 5519 the law creating the City of Mandaue, which went to effect without the benefit
of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in the plebiscite or referendum. They particularly cited the charter’s provision denying
Mandaue the right to participate in provincial elections.

Held: Ceniza et. at. is mistaken. Reasons:

1. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of LGU’s Corollary to independence however, is the
concomitant loss of right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these
provincial officials have ceased to exercise any government jurisdiction and authority over said city.
2. Regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue of a city would show whether
or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent economic, social and political unit. Thus, the equal
protection of the laws in not violated.
3. Freedom of suffrage is not imperiled since the Constitution does not give the city voter the right to participate in provincial
elections for territorial reasons
4. The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the creation, alteration, etc. of a
city, province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being when the 1973 Constitution was enacted and therefore cannot be
applied retroactively.

d. 2 Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106

Facts: Robert Tobias, et. al. invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong City, assailed the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, known as “An act Converting the City of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized city known as the
City of Mandaluyong.” They cited, among others, Art. VIll, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675, which provides that “As a highly urbanized city, the
City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after
the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative
district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same region” Said provision Tobias claims is not germane to the
title of R.A. 7675 thus being contrary to the one title-one subject rule since it creates a legislative district whereas the title expressly
provides only for the conversion of Mandaluyong into highly urbanized city. Also, Tobias, et. al. contend that the people of san Juan
should have been made to participate in the plebiscite as the same involves a change in their legislative district.
 Held: Tobias, et.al. are grossly erroneous Reasons:
1. The creation of a new legislative district is a natural logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
2. The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. 7675 as the
same involved a change in their legislative district is benefit of merit. The reason is that the principle subject involved I the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they have nothing to do with the changed
in status of neighboring Mandaluyong. (This argument is rather strange for me).

d.3 Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603

Facts: On May 5, 1994 R.A. 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabel into an independent
component city. On Feb 14, 1998 R.A. 8528 was passed amending R.A. 7720 on 2 points: 1 Sec. 2 of R.A. 7720 is hereby amended
by deleting the words, “an independent” so that the municipality of Santiago will be converted into a component city only and 2) the
voters of Santiago could now vote again for the provincial officials of the province of Isabela. Jose Miranda, the mayor of Santiago
and other petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 8528. He says that said law lacks the provision requiring that the plebiscite
be held for its ratification. Alexander Aguirre, the Executive Secretary and other respondents on the other hand countered that (1)
Miranda et. al. had no standing to file their petition 2) the issue is a political question and 3) R.A. 8528 did not created divide, etc or
after any boundaries of Santiago it merely reclassified Santiago from an independent component city into a component city.

Held: Aguirre and his cohorts are gravely mistaken. Reasons:

1. Miranda had standing, he field the petition in his capacity as mayor of Santiago.
2. The issue is justiciable, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8528, since it runs contrary to article X, Sec 10 of
the 1987 Constitution. The court has the power to decide the constitutionality of any law.
3. The reclassification will downgrade Santiago’s status from an independent component city into a component city. Far
reaching changes will then take place. Its political independence will diminish. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial governor. Ordinance and resolution passed by the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by
the Provincial Board of Isabel. Taxes collected by the city would then be shared with the province. All these changes merit the need
of a plebiscite so that the people at Santiago can air their side on the issue. Moreover, if a plebiscite can be held for the upgrading of
an LGU, should not a plebiscite be held for its downgrading as well?
NOTE: Mendoza’s strong dissent was anchored on Art. X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Said section refers to alteration
of boundaries of Santiago were substantially altered nor any of its income, population or land area been radically changes Santiago
was neither recreated into another LGU nor abolished, much less its boundaries alter. (This good justice is implying the reclassification
was administrative in nature.

E. Classification of provinces, cities and municipalities (Read E.O. 349)

This act is entitled “providing for a new income classification of provinces, cities and other municipalities” Pertinent provisions
include:

Sec. 1. Classification of provinces and cities. Provinces and cities except Manila and Quezon City, which shall be considered as
special class cities, are hereby divided into 6 main classes according to the annual average income they actually realized during the
last 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows: a) First class P30M or more b) Second class P20M-P30M; c) Third class
P15M-P20M; d) Fourth class P10M-15M, e) Fifth class P5M-10-M; f) Sixth class less than P5M

Sec. 2. Classification of Municipalities x x x according to the annual average income they actually realized during the last 4
calendar years immediately preceding as follows; a) First class, P15M or more b) second class, P10M-15M c) Third class, P5M-10M
d) fourth class P3M-P5M e) Fifth class, P1M-3M f) Sixth Class, less than P1M.

Sec. 3. Period of General Reclassification of Province, Cities and Municipalities. Upon the effectivity of this E.O. and for each
period of 4 consecutive calendar years thereafter, the Secretary of Finance shall reclassify the all provinces, cities, except Manila and
Quezon City, Which shall remain as special class cities, and municipalities, on the basis of the foregoing schedules of the average
annual income of each province, city or municipality derived during the last 4 consecutive calendar years immediately such
reclassification according to the provisions hereof.

Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. As used this E.O.

a. Annual Income revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the local general
and infrastructure funds including the internal revenue and specific tax allotments provided for in PDs 144 and 436, both as amended
but exclusive of non-recurring receipt, such as other national ads, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets
and similar others
b. Average annual income- sum of the “annual income”- sum of the “Annual Income” as herein defined actually obtained by a
province, cities and municipalities.

Sec. 5 Use of income classification of provinces, cities, and municipalities. xxx as basis for: a) Fixing of maximum tax ceiling
imposable by the local government b) Determination of statutory and administrative aids, Financial grants and other forms of
assistance to local government c) Establishment of salary scales and rates of allowances per diems, and other emoluments that local
government officials and personnel may be entitled to d) Implementation of personnel policies on promotions, transfers, details or
secondment, and related matters at the local government levels e) formulation and execution of local government budget policies and
f) Determination of the financial capability of local government units to undertake development programs and priority projects
NOTE: There are 7 more sections, mainly on salaries and taxes- you know, ways to put more money into the pocket of our
bureaucrats
- Classification
o Classification of corporations according to purpose:
 a. Public – is a corporation that is created by the state, either by general or special act, for purposes of
administration of local government or rendering of service in the public interest.
 b. Private – formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end
- 3. Public and Private Corporations, distinguished
o Public – organized for the government of a portion of the state
o Private – formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end
- 4. Public Corporation, classified
o Classes of public corporations:
 i. Quasi-public corporation – created by the state for a narrow or limited purpose; a private corporation created
pursuant to the Corporation Code that renders public service or supplies public wants
 Examples: Public utility companies, electric companies, water districts, telecommunication
companies
ii. Real public corporation/Municipal corporation – a body politic and corporate constituted by the
incorporation of the inhabitants for the purpose of local government