The Right To Bear Arms A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation (Stuart R. Hays, 1960)
The Right To Bear Arms A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation (Stuart R. Hays, 1960)
The Right To Bear Arms A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation (Stuart R. Hays, 1960)
Repository Citation
Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
381 (1960), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol2/iss2/6
Copyright c 1960 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
1960] THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
STUART R. HAYS
INTRODUCTION
Since the very dawn of time, man had weapons to protect
and defend himself. As primitive man learned the interplays of
the tribal order which required set standards, he also learned the
advantages of belonging to the tribe. The early tribes were
based on the inter-action of the group against those outside the
tribal group; not, against the members of the tribal group.
From this interplay evolved a system of early social law.
The petition was turned down, stressing the right of the individ-
ual to bear arms for the common protection of society and the
individual.
7 Ine 51.
8 See for general discussion: Burghal Hidage (circa 911-919); Chadwick, Anglo-
Saxon Institutions, 207 et seq.
9 McKechnie, Magna Charta, p. 243 (2nd ed.).
1960] THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
Thus the stage was set and the scene was Runnymede in 1215.
15 2 Edward III c. 3; Bishop, Star. Crimes, §§ 783, 784 (3rd ed.); 4 BI, Comm. 149;
Knight's Case, 3 Mod. 117; 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:381
The year 1688 brought the bill of rights which provided that
standing armies were a menace, and that the people should all
have the right to bear arms equally:
The earliest cases of the 13th Century declare that the party
was to be found guilty subject to the King's pleasure .2o This
usually meant a royal pardon for the offender. The Statute of
Gloucester (1278) provided that the King be notified in all cases
of defensive homicide.21 This position was later clarified by a
statute of Henry VIII (1532) which declared that the defendant
be found not guilty (of murdrum) of homicide. 22 This was
said to be declarative of the common law.2 3 Thus man by the
16th Century had the right of self-defense of his property and
kin. This is a portion of the American common law as inherited
from England.
REVOLUTION; CONFEDERATION;
and CONSTITUTION
25 The various royal charters and grants all provided for the common law, "...
not repugnate to the reline of Englande. . ."; Massachusetts (1626); Rhode
Island (1663); Connecticut (1662); New York (1664); New Jersey (charter
date is unknown); Pennsylvania (1681); Delaware (1701); Maryland (1701);
Virginia (1606); North Carolina (1663); South Carolina (1712); and, Georgia
(1732). N. B., The original boundaries of these colonies are not always the
boundaries of the present state, and in some instances composed several
present states. See also, Zenger's Case, I Chand. (N. Y.) Am. Crim. Trials,
151 (1734); Paxton's Case, Massachusetts (1761); In Re Stamp Act, Virginia
(1776).
26 Va. Code, § 1-11 (1950).
1960] THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
When the shot "was heard round the world" and the
Revolutionary War began, it was a war fought with musket
and powder belonging to the revolutionaries.28 With the
surrender at Yorktown the victorious colonies bound them-
selves together with the Artides of Confederation. They
were a series of weak and ineffective laws, based on the abso-
lute consent of all the colonies involved.29 The solution to
these weak Articles was the proposed Constitution of 1787.
It provided for a stronger central government, which could
provide for the self-preservation of the nation in time of
emergency and the posse comitatus to enforce the interior laws.
27 3 Henn. Star. 131 (Virginia); 3 Henn. Star. 338 (Virginia); 4 Anne § 23.
28 Longfellow, inscription on the base of the statue of The Minuteman, Concord,
Massachusetts.
2 U. S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cls.
10, 11, 15, and 16; art. 2, § 2.
30 Federalist Papers, no. 8 (Hamilton).
31 2 Story, Comm. 265 (1833 ed.).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:381
33 2 Story, Comm. 607 (1851 ed.). See also, 1 Tucker's Bi. Comm. App. 299, 300;
Rawle, On the Const., ch. 10, p. 125; 2 Lloyd's Debates, 219-220.
1960] THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
34 Virginia Bill of Rights of 12 May 1776, §13; 2 Poore, Const. 1909 (1877 ed.);
Note this provision is still carried in the Virginia Constitution to date: Va.
Const., 29 June 1776, 2 Poore, Const. 1911; Va. Const., 1850, 2 Poore, Const.
1920, 1931; Va. Secession Const., 1861; 2 Poore, Const. 1947; Va. Const.,
1864, 2 Poore 1947; Va. Const., 1870, 2 Poore 1954, 1968; Va. Const. 1902,
Va. Code v. 9.
35 5 Elliot, Debates, 127 (1845 ed.).
36 Id. 172.
37 Ibid.
38 Id., 205; See also, U. S. Const., Art I, §10, c. 3.
39 Id., 440.
40 Id., 443.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:381
45 Adams, A Defense of the Constitution, 296 (1797 ed.); U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10,
ci. 2.
1960] THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
Mr. Henry continued to say that the final power over the militia
should rest with the states; and, the federal government be
without the power to disarm the militia. Mr. Nicholas pointed
out that the states have at common law the power to arm the
militia and that the Constitution does not take this power away.
There is no pre-emption here that would be vested in the
Congress. Governor Randolph mentioned the evils attendant
where there is common defense without coercion as was the
47 See, 3 Elliot, Debates, 378-459 (1836 ed.). for a transcription of the debates.
48 The committee included: Geo. Wythe, Geo. Washington, Geo. Madison, Gov.
Randolph, andJohn Marshall; 3 Elliot, Debates 656.
49 3 Elliot, Debates 678 (1836 ed.).
50 New Hampshire ratified on June 21, 1788, three days before Virginia on June
24, 1788; 3 Elliot, Debates 657.
r- 3 Elliot, Debates 660, § 9.
52 3 Elliot, Debates 660, § 10.
After a strong fight the Constitution became law and the right
to bear arms, the Second Amendment, included in the Bill of
Rights.
Justice Story does not consider that the miltia is often con-
trolled by the faction in power and that even with the militia
usurpation may occur. The same usurpation cannot occur with
the people individually holding their own personal arms.
86 Presser v. Ill.,
116 U.S. 252, 256,6 S. Ct.580, 585,29 LEd. 615, 619.
87 People ex rel Darling v. Board of Wardens, City Prison, 154 N. Y. App. Div.
413 (1913). See also, Fredrich, Pistol Regulations, 23J.C.L.; C. & P.S. 531.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:381
88 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281, 17 S.Ct. 326, 329, 41 L.Ed. 715, 717
(1899).
89 1 Stat. 424 (1785); Martin v. Mort, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 19, 32 (1827).
92 Whiskey Rebellion of 1792, under 1 Stat. 264 (1792); Embargo Acts of 1808
under 1 Stat. 264 (1792), 1 Stat. 424 (1795), 2 Stat. 443 (1807); Lincoln's
Call of Apr. 15, 1861, 12 Stat. 281 (1861), 12 Stat. (App.) 1258 (1861).
93 Harrison And-Narcotics Act, held to be a constitutional grant of the taxing
power as a police power over interstate commerce in, U. S. v. Doremus, 249
U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. 214,62 L.Ed. 493 (1919).
94 National Firearms Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934); National Firearms Act
of 1938, 48 Stat. 1237 (1938); See also, 1939 Internal Rev. Code, 15 U. S. C.
§ 902 etseq.; See also, 1954 Internal Rev. Code, 26 U.S.C. § 5848.
95 The tax levied is at the rate of $200, to be paid by the transferor, both parties
are liable for the payment. Under certain exceptions where the weapon is in-
cluded within the meaning of the Act, but is deemed to be for collectors, the
tax is $1.
96 Generally included in the term "firearm" are all weapons capable of firing more
than one shot with each pull of the trigger (machine and sub-machine guns),
any rifle or shotgun with a barrel length of under 18 inches in length. Thus
mainly concealed rifles and shotguns are included in the term.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:381
CONCLUSION
Historically, society has recognized that man has the right
to preserve his own species. This is the right to repeal invasion
and to resist enemy activity. Secondly, society has recognized
the right of man to protect himself against his internal enemies
and to preserve his own life through the right of personal
self-defense. This basic ground has been enlarged to include
that which society has deemed super malum in se; that is to
include the prevention of certain felonies and the protection
of certain property rights. Thirdly, society has recognized
the right of man to revolt against the oppression of his political
leaders. This right, the sword of the Magna Carta, has been
preserved throughout the Anglo-American history of the last
five hundred years. When society is able to guarantee to
each member that he will have no fear of oppression, aggres-
sion, or bodily harm, then no longer will these rights be of
any real legal meaning. When the reason ceases the rule
should cease. Has the modern society met this responsibility?
It would seem that as long as there is danger to the life of
man that the society has not eliminated the right of self-de-
fense. As long as this right lives, then also should coexist
the right to bear arms, this is exoteric. Can we deny the right
of self-defense and remove the ability therefor? The United
States Supreme Court has admitted there are exceptions to
the right to bear arms; and, then refused to recognize the
right itself. Isn't this a recognition of the right, and also
perhaps an understanding that the Presser and Cruickshank
decisions were the children of the War Between the States and
"Black Republican Reconstructionism"?
Does it not follow that the state courts would not have
expended as much effort in defining the differences between a
weapon and a concealed weapon if they thought that the
Amendment referred only to the militia? Why did the legis-
latures before the Cruickshank decision expend so many
terms in defining their various statutes in terms of types of
weapons if they did not think that the Amendment might
include the people? Why did certain states outlaw all except
military handguns if they were not fearful of a declaration of
unconstitutionality? The logical result is that the terms
militia and people were thought to be separate in nature and
preserving two distinct rights.
Why does the state have the power to disarm the Federal
Government (militia) while the Federal Government does
not have the same right? Is it because the states could elimi-
nate the militia but not the right of the people to bear arms?
Is it to be considered that the reason this issue did not evolve
any sooner was because the "framers" of the Constitution
had no idea that the state and local governments would at-
tempt to disarm the people? That the bearing of arms for
self-defense was so common that it does need a constitutional
guarantee? The answer of yes to any of the above questions
is a recognition of the right of all people to bear arms for
their self-defense and to preserve their forms of government.