Cost Allocation

Arnold Schwarzenegger
Governor
TRANSMISSION BENEFIT
QUANTIFICATION, COST ALLOCATION
AND COST RECOVERY
PIER FINAL PROJECT REPORT
Prepared For:
California Energy Commission
Public Interest Energy Research Program
Prepared By:
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Prepared By:
Vikram Budhraja, John Ballance, Jim Dyer, and Fred Mobasheri
Electric Power Group, LLC
Pasadena, California
Joseph Eto, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Principal Investigator
Commission Contract No. 500-05-001
Commission Work Authorization No: MR0606/MR-051
Prepared For:
Public Interest Energy Research (PIER)
Jamie Patterson
Contract Manager
Mike Gravely
Program Area Lead
ENERGY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
Mike Gravely
Office Manager
ENERGY SYSTEMS RESEARCH
Martha Krebs, Ph.D.

PIER Director
Thom Kelly, Ph.D.

Deputy Director
ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
Melissa Jones
Executive Director
DISCLAIMER
This report was prepared as the result of work sponsored by the California Energy Commission. It does not necessarily represent the views of the
Energy Commission, its employees or the State of California. The Energy Commission, the State of California, its employees, contractors and
subcontractors make no warrant, express or implied, and assume no legal liability for the information in this report; nor does any party represent
that the uses of this information will not infringe upon privately owned rights. This report has not been approved or disapproved by the California
Energy Commission nor has the California Energy Commission passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of the information in this report.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The PIER Research Manager for this project was Virgil Rose. A Technical Advisory
Committee (TAC) was established to review research results and offer guidance to the
research team. Two in-person TAC meetings were held along with other written and
oral communications as needed and appropriate. The Technical Advisory Committee
consisted of:
o Dede Hapner, Vice President, FERC and ISO Relations, Pacific Gas & Electric.
o Les Starck, Director of T & D Business Unit, Southern California Edison.
o Caroline Winn, Director of T&D Asset Management, San Diego Gas & Electric.
o Sean Gallagher, Director of Energy Division, California Public Utilities
Commission.
o Steve Ellenbecker, Energy Advisor to Wyoming Governor Freudenthal.
o Jim Bushnell, Research Director, UC Energy Institute.
The research team and key areas of research responsibilities were as follows:
o Project Management and Outreach – Joe Eto and Vikram Budhraja.
o Review of Technologies – John Ballance, Jim Dyer, and Jim Terpening.
o Industry and Regulatory Changes – Vikram Budhraja, John Ballance and Jim
Dyer.
o Review of other Regions and Industries – Alison Silverstein.
o CA ISO Transmission Planning Process and Comparison of ISO’s -- John Ballance
and Jim Dyer.
o Benefit Quantification, Cost Allocation, Cost Recovery – Vikram Budhraja and
Fereidoun (Fred) Mobasheri.
The research team wishes to thank the Virgil Rose, PIER Project Manager for his guidance,
support and encouragement throughout the project and the TAC members for their useful
insights to sharpen the research focus.
Budhraja, Vikram, John Ballance, Jim Dyer, and Fred Mobasheri, (Electric Power Group, LLC), 2008.
Transmission Benefit Quantification, Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery. California Energy Commission,
PIER Energy-Related Environmental Research Program. CEC-xxx-xxxx-xxx
Preface
The Public Interest Energy Research (PIER) Program supports public interest energy
research and development that will help improve the quality of life in California by
binging environmentally safe, affordable, and reliable energy services and products to
the marketplace.
The PIER Program, managed by the California Energy Commission (Energy Commission),
conducts public interest research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) projects to
benefit California.
The PIER Program strives to conduct the most promising public interest energy research
by partnering with RD&D entities, including individuals, businesses, utilities, and public
or private research institutions.
PIER funding efforts are focused on the following RD&D program areas:
Buildings End‐Use Energy Efficiency

Energy Innovations Small Grants
Energy‐Related Environmental Research
Energy Systems Integration
Environmentally Preferred Advanced Generation
Industrial/Agricultural/Water End‐Use Energy Efficiency
Renewable Energy Technologies
Transportation
Benefit Quantification and Cost Allocation/Recovery Research Project for Transmission is the
final report for the Cost Allocation Research project Contract Number 500-05-001, work
authorization number MR0606/MR-051 conducted by Consortium for Electric Reliability
Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, LLC. The information from this project contributes
to PIER’s Energy Systems Integration Program.
For more information about the PIER Program, please visit the Energy Commission’s
website at www.energy.ca.gov/pier or contact the Energy Commission at 916‐654‐5164.
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1

1.0 Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 5
2.0 Research Goals and Objectives .......................................................................................... 9
3.0 Review of Other Industries, Regions, Transmission Technologies, Industry and
Regulatory Changes ............................................................................................................ 11
3.1. Review of Other Industries ........................................................................................... 11
3.2. Lessons Learned From Other Regions ........................................................................ 11
3.3. Transmission Technologies........................................................................................... 12
3.4. Industry and Regulatory Changes. .............................................................................. 12
3.5. Implications for Transmission Projects ....................................................................... 13
3.5.1. Transmission as a Public Good .................................................................................... 13
3.5.2. Present Value of Future Benefits—Social Rate of Discount ..................................... 13
3.5.3. Application of Social Discount Rate ............................................................................ 14
3.5.4. Recommendation For Social Rate of Discount For Transmission Projects ............ 17
4.0 Current Methodologies For Benefit Quantification ........................................................ 19
4.1. Types of Projects ............................................................................................................. 19
4.2. Types of Benefits ............................................................................................................ 19
4.3. Benefits Assessment Approaches in Use .................................................................... 22
4.4. Review Of Benefit Analysis Of Some Recent Projects .............................................. 23
4.4.1. Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 ............................................................................................... 23
4.4.2. Tehachapi Transmission Project .................................................................................. 27
4.4.3. Frontier Line.................................................................................................................... 29
4.5. Benefit Analysis Observations And Conclusions ...................................................... 31
5.0 Benefit Quantification Methods ........................................................................................ 35
5.1. Assessment of Current Methods .................................................................................. 35
5.2. Methods to Improve Benefit Quantification of Transmission Projects................... 37
6.0 Application Of New Methods For Benefit Quantification ............................................ 41
6.1. Public Good – Long Asset Life Benefit—Use of Social Rate of Discount ............... 41
6.2. Fuel Diversity Benefit .................................................................................................... 42
6.3. Quantification of Reliability Improvement ................................................................ 44
6.4. Benefit of Market Risk Mitigation ................................................................................ 45
6.5. Dynamic Analysis .......................................................................................................... 46
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6.6. Delphi Method ................................................................................................................ 46
6.7. Resource Portfolio Analysis .......................................................................................... 47
6.8. Recommendation on Use of Research Results ........................................................... 49
6.9. Use of Improved Benefit Quantification Methods .................................................... 50
6.10. Recommendation on Additional Research ................................................................. 50
7.0 Cost Allocation And Cost Recovery ................................................................................. 53
7.1. Framework for Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery.................................................. 53
7.2. Cost Recovery ................................................................................................................. 54
7.3. Multiple Participants and Jurisdictions Project ......................................................... 54
7.4. Example of Auction Approach for Cost Allocation .................................................. 55
8.0 Framework For Incorporating Benefit Quantification Enhancements In
Transmission Planning ....................................................................................................... 59
9.0 Project Outreach and Briefings .......................................................................................... 61
10.0 Utilization of Research Results .......................................................................................... 63
11.0 Key Conclusions And Research Recommendations....................................................... 65
11.1. Recommendations for Benefit Quantification ............................................................ 65
11.2. Recommendations for Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery ..................................... 66
Glossary ............................................................................................................................................... 68
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 69
Appendix A, Literature Search and References
Appendix B, Benefit Assessment Methodologies
Appendix C, Cost Allocation Methodologies and Cost Recovery
Appendix D, Technology Options and Implications and Their Impacts
Appendix E, Alternative Approaches Utilized for Transmisison Project Approvals—
Transmission Planning and Review of Industry and Regulatory Changes
Appendix F, Existing Process for Transmission Project Approvals and Case Histories
Appendix G, Fact Sheet—Benefit Quantification and Cost Allocation Research project
Appendix H, Comparison of Electric Transmission with Gas and Telecommunications
Industries
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List of Figures
Figure 1. Summary of Benefit Analysis of Transmission Projects .................................................... 32
Figure 2. Present Value of Benefits Using Different Discount Rates—30-year life,
$50 million Annual Benefit ................................................................................................... 42
Figure 3. Example of Fuel Diversity Benefit Calculation ................................................................... 43
Figure 4. Quantification of Reliability Benefit Due to Reduced Vulnerability to Extreme Events

............................................................................................................................................................ 45
Figure 5. Stakeholder Consensus—Delphi Approach ........................................................................ 47
Figure 6. Recommendations to Augment Benefit Quantification Methods .................................... 50
Figure 7. Cost Responsibility of Transmission Projects ...................................................................... 53
Figure 8. Framework for Use of Benefit Quantification for Project Cost Effectiveness and Cost
Allocation ................................................................................................................................ 55
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Abstract
This project was commissioned to perform a scoping study to understand transmission benefit
quantification, cost allocation, cost recovery, and project approval processes with a particular
focus on recommending new methods for improved benefit quantification and cost allocation
that better fits the new electric industry structure and planning environment.
Research goals and objectives included:
1. Review methodologies currently being used for transmission project quantification.

2. Review and summarize benefit analysis that have been carried out for some recent
transmission projects in California.
3. Present and summarize research results to improve benefit quantification methods for new
transmission projects.
4. Outline approaches to apply improved benefit quantification method to: evaluate project
cost effectiveness, allocate project costs among participants, and develop framework for cost
recovery.
Key conclusions and research recommendations are:
 Use a social rate of discount to calculate the present worth of benefits of a new
major regional transmission projects rather than utility cost of capital to recognize
the public good and long life attributes of transmission.
 Calculate explicitly the fuel diversity benefit from integration of large renewable
resources.
 Utilize a stakeholder consensus approach, such as Delphi method, to assign value
to some of the strategic benefits such as risk mitigation against extreme reliability
and market volatility events.
 Initiate research into (a) dynamic analysis to evaluate the impact on generation
expansion in exporting regions (b) resource portfolios analysis to assess
performance of different combination of demand response, renewables and fuel
based generation, transmission and energy conservation programs, and (c)
quantification of extreme event benefits (Insurance Value) in terms of reliability
and reduced market volatility to estimate the benefits from the low
probability/high impact events.
Keywords: Benefit Quantification, Cost Allocation, Transmission Project Benefits and

Cost Allocation, Cost Recovery, Transmission Planning, Strategic Benefits of Transmission
Projects, Social Rate of Discount, Cost Allocation, Cost Recovery
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Executive Summary
This project was commissioned to perform a scoping study to understand transmission benefit
quantification, cost allocation, cost recovery and project approval processes with a particular
focus on recommending new methods for improved benefit quantification and cost allocation
that better fits the new electric industry structure and planning environment.
There is general policy consensus on the need for new transmission projects to advance the
policy objectives of renewables integration, reliability management, efficient market operations,
interconnect new load and generators, reduce transmission congestion and bottlenecks, and
expand access to regional power markets. Historically, major transmission projects were
sponsored and owned by utilities and generally proposed as part of new power plant
development by integrated utilities.
This landscape has changed with the separation of generation and transmission assets and
separation of transmission operations from ownership by shifting the responsibility of
transmission operations from utilities to Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission
Operators (ISOs/RTOs) such as California Independent System Operator (CA ISO). These
changes in industry structure, operations, and planning impact how new transmission projects
are planned, evaluated and approved. Approval of proposed major regional transmission
projects in this new environment has proved to be challenging, witness the difficulty in moving
forward with several California based projects such as the Palo-Verde Devers No.2 line,
Rainbow-Valley line and others. This difficulty has brought into focus the need for research on
benefit quantification and cost allocation methods to help with the approval of major regional
Utility efforts to develop new transmission projects that are local in nature, address well
documented reliability needs, and are required for interconnecting new load or generation are
generally supported and have been gaining regulatory approvals and stakeholder support.
However, major regional transmission projects that involve multiple jurisdictions and utilities
and are needed for integrating remote resources, reducing costs, improving market operations,
providing long term strategic benefits and improving operating flexibility, don’t have a clear
path forward. For a major regional transmission project involving multiple jurisdictions and
utilities to go forward, there needs to be a consensus on benefits, costs, and allocation of benefits
and costs that can be embraced by stakeholders and policy makers.
The research focus was to identify different benefit streams, outline methodologies to quantify
benefits including strategic benefits that have in the past been handled qualitatively, and outline
approaches for assessment of benefits and assignment of benefits that could be factored into
project cost allocation and cost recovery decisions of major transmission projects that may
involve multiple utilities and regulatory jurisdictions. The research is not directed at seeking
consensus among stakeholders or recommending cost allocation methodology for any specific
project but to serve as an analytic framework that could be adapted for use for major
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As part of the research, a review of other industries, planning methods, technology and
regulatory issues was also conducted. Key findings are summarized below:
o Planning Process—A consistent, transparent and predictable planning process is critical

to gain stakeholder and regulatory support. Traditionally, this was utility initiated and
managed. Utilities continue to play a key technical role in transmission planning. With
the regulatory and structural changes in the industry, the planning coordination within
the footprint of ISOs and RTOs has shifted from utilities to ISOs and RTOs with
stakeholder participation and hence benefit quantification, cost allocation and cost
recovery methods that worked in the past may not be applicable.
o Lessons from other industries—Electric transmission networks differ in some key
respects when compared to other networks such as gas and telecommunications. The
most important difference is property rights—electric networks are operated as open
access networks with financial rights but not physical property rights. Transmission
networks are a public good in that transmission owners cannot reserve use of
transmission for their exclusive use. The exception is non-network facilities such as DC
lines, radial lines, and point to point links. This finding was utilized to recommend use
of social rate of discount to estimate present worth of benefits rather than utility cost of
capital to better capture public good and long life attributes of transmission projects.
o Transmission technologies have an important impact on ratings, power flows, reliability
and, hence, the size and flow of benefits among network users. Choice of transmission
technologies alone does not resolve benefit quantification and cost allocation issues that
were the focus of this research project.
A review and evaluation of current benefit quantification methods utilized in the industry was
performed. By and large, current methods are production cost simulation model based and do
not adequately capture the full range of strategic and other benefits of major regional
A summary of key conclusions and recommendations for transmission project benefit

quantification based on this research project are outlined below.
1. Assessment of Model Based Traditional Benefit Quantification Methods Commonly

Used in the Industry
o Production cost simulation and present worth analysis methods are commonly
used to quantify benefits of transmission projects.
o Models understate benefits of long life assets (50+years) by discounting future
benefits using high interest rate based on cost of capital—essentially reducing the
impact of benefits beyond the first 10-years.
o Models utilize an expected value approach that tends to minimize the
consequences of high impact but low probability events.
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o Models are data intensive—requiring assumptions about future generation mix,
fuel prices, and transmission network.
o Models are static with no feedback—they assume no change in investment for
new generation resulting in a zero sum benefit distribution game, for example,
Devers-Palo Verde No. 2.
o Extreme market volatility and multiple contingency system events which can be
very costly and risky to society are not captured in current models.
 2001 California market dysfunction—$20–40 billion.
 2003 Northeast Blackout—$5–10 billion.
2. CA ISO TEAM Methodology is Comprehensive and Incorporates Many Enhancements
to Traditional Production Simulation Analysis
o CA ISO developed the Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology
(TEAM) for benefit analysis of major transmission projects.
o In the TEAM approach, benefits are measured separately for consumers,
producers, and transmission owners in different regions.
o TEAM incorporates bid-cost markup in the analysis to reflect functioning of
markets
o Uncertainties are considered through a wide range of future system conditions—
dry and wet hydro, demand scenarios, gas price scenarios, generation addition
scenarios.
o Expected range of benefits is computed. Insurance and strategic value of
transmission is discussed.
o CA ISO TEAM methodology is recognized as progressive and path breaking.
3. Research identified several areas that are amenable to advancement in existing benefit
quantification methods as well as quantification of strategic benefits including:
o Use a social rate of discount to present worth benefits rather than utility cost of
capital.
o Quantifying fuel diversity benefit by taking into account the price elasticity of
natural gas.
o Application of Delphi or other stakeholder consensus generation methods to
quantify benefits of mitigating low probability high societal impact events such
as major blackouts and market dysfunctions.
o Application of dynamic analysis.
o Application of portfolio analysis methods commonly used in the financial
services industry.
o Developing model based techniques to quantify extreme event benefits.
3
4. With acceptance by regulators and policy makers, CAISO TEAM Method and other
methods in use could be augmented to recognize additional strategic benefits in the
following three areas
o Public Good
Use a social rate of discount to calculate the present value of benefits for the new
transmission project.
o Fuel Diversity
Include the benefit from a potential decrease of natural gas price due to the
construction of a new transmission project that integrates a significant amount of
new renewable resources which also reduces natural gas consumption and
emissions.
o Low Probability / High Impact Events
Add risk mitigation benefit to society for low probability/high impact extreme
market events and extreme system multiple contingency events—scenarios or
Delphi method for stakeholder consensus.
5. Supporting Additional Research on Benefit Quantification Methods in the Following
Areas:
o Dynamic Analysis to recognize the impact of new transmission projects on
construction of new generation capacity in exporting regions.
o Portfolio Analysis to assess performance of different combination of demand
response, renewables and fuel based generation, transmission and energy
conservation programs. Portfolio analysis methods are utilized in the financial
industry but research is needed to adapt these techniques to transmission
expansion planning.
o Quantification of Extreme Event Benefits (Insurance Value) in terms of reliability
and reduced market volatility. Quantification methods to be researched include
application of Value at Risk, Option Value, and insurance premium concept.
Reliability benefits can be measured in terms of reducing blackout footprint due
to extreme (N-n) events and societal value of reduced risk and exposure to run
away market prices.
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1.0 Introduction
California’s more than 31,000 miles of electric transmission lines and 18,170 MW of
interconnection to neighboring states have been critical for efficiently meeting electricity needs
of California consumers with high degree of reliability.
There is general policy consensus that new transmission projects are needed to advance the
policy objectives of renewables integration, reliability management, efficient market operations,
interconnect new load and generators, reduce transmission congestion and bottlenecks, and
expand access to regional power markets. Historically, major transmission projects were
sponsored and owned by utilities and generally proposed as part of new power plant
development by integrated utilities.
This landscape has changed with the separation of generation and transmission assets and
separation of transmission operations from ownership by shifting the responsibility of
transmission operations from utilities to Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission
Operators (ISOs/RTOs) such as CA ISO. These changes in industry structure, operations, and
planning impact how new transmission projects are planned, evaluated, and approved.
Approval of proposed major regional transmission projects in this new environment has proved
to be challenging, witness the difficulty in moving forward with several California based
projects such as the Palo-Verde Devers No. 2 line, Sunrise, Rainbow -Valley, and others. This
difficulty has brought into focus the need for research on benefit quantification and cost
allocation methods to help with the approval of major regional transmission projects.
Utility efforts to develop new transmission projects that are local in nature, address well
documented reliability needs, required for interconnecting new load or generation are
generally supported and have been gaining regulatory approvals and stakeholder support.
However, major regional transmission projects that involve multiple jurisdictions and utilities
and are needed for integrating remote resources, reducing costs, improving market operations,
providing long term strategic benefits and improving operating flexibility, don’t have a clear
path forward. Projects cannot go forward without cost recovery certainty. Cost recovery
certainty requires allocation of costs through tariffs or contracts. For a major regional
transmission project involving multiple jurisdictions and utilities to go forward, there needs to
be a consensus on benefits, costs, and allocation of benefits and costs that can be embraced by
stakeholders and policymakers.
For example, due to lack of local consensus on benefits or cost allocation. San Diego Gas and
Electric’s Rainbow-Valley line was rejected by California Public Utility Commission (CPUC).
Also, Southern California Edison’s (SCE) initial Tehachapi transmission trunk-line proposal for
integration of wind resources and the proposed rate and cost recovery treatment was rejected
by the Federal Energy Resources Commission (FERC) notwithstanding the extensive
stakeholder review process and support from the CPUC, California Energy Commission
(Energy Commission) and CA ISO , although FERC did ultimately approve a hybrid approach
proposed by the CA ISO to address the ratemaking treatment of the trunk-line costs. Most
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recently, SCE’s proposed Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 to import additional energy into California
was rejected by Arizona’s Public Service Commission in part because the project did not
demonstrate benefits for Arizona.
The Tehachapi Transmission Project to integrate 4,500 MW of renewable wind energy has since
been approved after changes were made to the original filing. The estimated project cost is
$1.8 billion. The key features of this project include:
o Policy support – needed for Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).

o Stakeholder support – renewables development and integration.
o Single utility footprint – Southern California Edison.
o Single jurisdiction for cost recovery – CA ISO, FERC tariffs.
o Cost recovery backstop – CPUC.
o Cost allocation – network facilities rolled in CA ISO rates.
However, other transmission projects that have been proposed for California’s rapidly growing
transmission needs are facing difficulty in obtaining regulatory approvals due to challenges to
the type and quantity of benefits, cost recovery, and cost allocation. These projects include:
o San Diego 500 kV Sunrise Powerlink.

o Imperial Valley Transmission (Green Path).
o Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 500 kV Transmission.
o Path 26 Expansion.
o Trans-Bay Cable Project.
o Lake Elsinore Pumped Storage and associated transmission upgrades.
o Transmission Project from Wyoming to California and other states.
Over the next 10- to 30-year time horizon, additional transmission projects are going to
integrate renewables and to expand California transmission and interconnection to various
regions which may include for example, Baja-Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Utah-Wyoming, Pacific
Northwest and Western Canada. Additional new in-state and intra-state transmission projects
for reliability, deliverability and renewable resource integration are also likely to be needed, for
example, Pacific Gas & Electric proposed project to expand interconnections from Northern
California to British Columbia through Oregon and Washington.
Major regional transmission projects share some of the following characteristics:
o Multiple regulatory jurisdictions.

o Regional nature.
o Multiple utilities and control areas.
o Involvement by private and public utilities, as well as ISOs/RTOs.
o Non-traditional ownership and development (e.g., Transbay Cable and Lake
Elsinore).
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o Multiple benefit streams and beneficiaries with varying timing.
The challenge associated with benefit quantification, cost allocation, and approval of new
transmission projects was recognized in a September 2007 report prepared by The Blue Ribbon
Panel on Cost Allocation 1.
While the wholesale electricity market has changed fundamentally, the framework for
enabling and encouraging investment that will better enable the grid to serve growing
competitive markets has not yet fully emerged. One area still largely unresolved is how
the costs incurred in transmission expansion will be allocated among users. While it is
clear that many traditional cost-allocation approaches are no longer appropriate, new
principles governing the allocation of cost responsibility for new transmission
investment have yet to be fully articulated and implemented.
Traditional approaches for benefit quantification, cost allocation and rate recovery may not be
adequate for justification and development of these transmission projects. This research project
focuses on investigating new approaches for quantification of benefit streams over time that
may better inform project participants, stakeholders, and policymakers on issues related to
project benefits, cost allocation and cost recovery of transmission investments.
1. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Cost Allocation, Sept 2007, A National Perspective On Allocating the Costs
of New Transmission Investment: Practice and Principles, p 1.
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2.0 Research Goals and Objectives
For major regional transmission projects to go forward, there needs to be consensus on benefits,
costs, and allocation of benefits and costs that can be embraced by the multitude of players
impacted. Projects cannot go forward without cost recovery certainty. Cost recovery certainty
requires allocation of costs through tariffs or contracts. This requires an assessment of all of the
benefits, including strategic benefits, and then linking these benefits to beneficiaries. The
assignment of benefits could then be factored into project cost allocation and cost recovery
decisions.
To address these research issues, the project established the following research goals and
objectives:
o Review methodologies currently being used for transmission project benefit

quantification.
o Review and summarize benefit analyses that have been carried out for some recent
transmission projects in California.
o Present and summarize research results to improve benefit quantification methods
for new transmission projects.
o Outline approaches to apply improved benefit quantification methods to:
- Evaluate projects cost effectiveness.
- Allocate projects cost among participants.
- Develop framework for cost recovery.
To achieve goals stated above, the research team carried out review of benefit streams and
benefit quantification methods that have been used in recent transmission projects. The research
has addressed:
o Type of benefits from different transmission projects.

o Current state of assessment methodologies to quantify strategic and non-
traditional benefits.
o Assessment of benefit types received by different beneficiaries of a transmission
project.
o Types of benefits not adequately captured by current methods.
o Research approaches to improve benefit quantification.
With regard to cost allocation and cost recovery methodologies, the goals and objectives of this
study are:
o Review and describe the current methodologies being used for cost allocation
and cost recovery of transmission projects.
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o Develop a framework for linking cost allocation to different types of
o Summarize alternative models for cost allocation and cost recovery.
The key research result of this project is the development of a framework that could be utilized
to guide cost allocation and cost recovery of transmission projects based on the benefits from
the projects.
There are many key policy questions that came up as part of this research, for example impact
of transmission technologies, impact of industry and regulatory changes, and lessons from
other regions and industries. These topics were reviewed and are discussed in the next Section.
The literature and reference list relied upon in this research project are shown in Appendix A.
Research project Fact Sheet is provided in Appendix G.
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3.0 Review of Other Industries, Regions, Transmission
Technologies, Industry and Regulatory Changes
3.1. Review of Other Industries
Electric, gas, and telecommunication industries all rely on networks for transport. During the
1990’s, there was a tremendous expansion in telecom transport capacity. Also, gas pipeline
capacity has generally kept pace with demand as a result of new pipelines or expansion of
capacity of existing pipelines. All three industries rely on physical networks for transport, with
the exception that in the telecom industry where wireless technology is utilized for transmission
over short distances. While the 3 industries have a lot in common in terms of planning,
regulation, and network infrastructure, physical attributes of electric transmission networks
result in some important differences.
Electric transmission networks differ in some key respects when compared to other networks
such as gas and telecommunications. The most important difference is property rights—electric
networks are operated as open access networks with financial rights but not physical property
rights. The exception is non-network facilities such as DC lines, radial lines, and point to point
links. In addition, the transport capacity of an AC electric transmission line is often determined
by network characteristics and can change as a result of parallel network flows and system
configuration.
AC transmission lines have other major differences compared to the gas and telecom industries
– flows are not controlled (except by use of phase shifting transformers and other flow control
devices which can be costly), but determined by the physics of the network; transmission
delivery capacity is variable; and the use of transmission is subject to open access rules with
transmission owner (or contract right holder) being able to use the transmission on the same
terms and conditions for access as other market participants.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is considering long term transmission

contracts, but current open access rules provide no certainty of use of transmission to owners.
The owner could achieve financial neutrality through use of financial instruments.
These differences result in transmission networks being viewed more as a “public good” as
compared to other networks with property rights.
A summary report on Comparison of Electric Transmission with Gas and Telecommunication

Industries is included in Appendix H to this report.
3.2. Lessons Learned From Other Regions

The lessons from other ISOs and regions and research findings related to large regional
transmission projects point to some common elements for planning, regulatory, stakeholder
involvement and cost allocation and cost recovery processes. For large regional transmission
projects, the research findings are that successful transmission projects have the following
attributes:
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• Strong Project Proponent, generally a utility
• Early Involvement by Regulators and Stakeholders
• Collaboration Among Regulators and Stakeholders Around the Region Impacted by
Transmission
• Transparent Planning and Benefit Quantification Process
• Benefit Sharing Among All Affected Participants and Stakeholders
• Predictable Ratemaking Processes for Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery
3.3. Transmission Technologies

The selection of transmission technologies impacts the capacity or ratings, power flows, and
grid reliability. Selection of technologies can impact the size of the benefits and distribution
of benefits. Some of the key technology options are:
• AC vs. DC technology.
• Type of conductor – conventional, composite, superconductor.
• Application of flow control devices.
• Technology upgrades of existing transmission or construction of new lines.
• Underground vs. Overhead.
These technology choices are determined by economics and physics of the transmission grid.
However, the technology decisions are not the major factor in cost allocation, cost recovery
or benefit quantification.
A report on transmission technologies is provided in Appendix D to this report.
3.4. Industry and Regulatory Changes.

The electric power industry continues to transition from a vertically integrated cost of
service regulated model to a disaggregated mix of regulated and competitive model. These
changes are continuing and have impacted transmission planning. The most significant
change is that while utilities continue to play a major role in technical aspects of
transmission planning ISOs and RTOs have taken over coordination of transmission
planning functions within their footprints, including stakeholder participation. Also, the
generation development and transmission planning are no longer integrated. To learn from
history, the Industry and Regulatory changes are reviewed as part of this research project
and are discussed in Appendix E to this report. The key conclusion is that the planning
landscape has changed substantially and traditional utility integrated planning methods are
not applicable in the current environment, cost recovery certainty is a key element of
moving transmission projects forward, and strategic benefits were addressed qualitatively
but not quantified.
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3.5. Implications for Transmission Projects
The structure of the transmission industry has changed in the last few years. Historically,
utilities planned and constructed new transmission lines, obtained regulatory approvals,
invested capital, and received a return on and of the capital by adding the investment to its rate
base after the regulatory approval and collecting a regulatory approved revenue requirement
for the new transmission added to its rate base. In return, the ratepayers of the utility received
all the benefits of this new transmission line such as importing firm capacity and energy,
importing or selling economy energy and the transmission revenue from other utilities using
this new line. The utility that owned the project was involved in planning, design, permitting,
construction, and finally, the operation of the new line.
In the restructured market in California, the CA ISO coordinates the planning with strong
participation and input from the utilities on planning and technical issues and involvement by
stakeholders. The operational control for grid projects is turned over to the CA ISO. Access to
the transmission is open and available to all via FERC approved tariffs. The cost of the new high
voltage transmission project is paid through the Transmission Access Charge by all customers
using the CA ISO grid. All users have the right to use of the new transmission. The high voltage
transmission grid in CA ISO has the characteristic of a “public good,” in that owners of the grid
cannot reserve the use of the grid for their private benefits. The transmission grid provides
social benefits such as reliability, market efficiency, and access to regional markets for all users
through payment of the Transmission Access Charges.
3.5.1. Transmission as a Public Good

Two important criteria for a good to be a public good are: 1) that consumption by one party
does not foreclose consumption by another party; and, 2) that owners of property cannot
prevent consumption by others. Good examples are greenhouse gas reduction, air pollution
reduction, flood control, and highway systems.
However, there are public goods where consumption by one party creates congestion and
reduced benefit to other parties, such as highways. High voltage transmission is similar to
highways where the use by one party may create congestion at times, but that is not denial of
the usage for others. Everyone will end up paying for congestion or in a word, the benefit
decreases for everyone. Of course a party can reduce the negative impact of congestion by
financial hedging.
Costs of public good projects are spread over all potential users and beneficiaries. This is the
case for highways, dams, flood control, and other public good projects. Under FERC rules,
transmission projects costs are spread over all users or socialized.
3.5.2. Present Value of Future Benefits—Social Rate of Discount

Cost benefit analysis of public good projects have used a social rate of discount to present value
future benefits. The revenue requirement of projects is computed using the project cost and
opportunity cost of capital. The social rate of discount is lower than cost of capital and captures
the societal and public good aspects of benefits of investments which also tend to be long life.
13
The research rationale for the use of social rate of discount for new transmission projects is
listed below:
o Use of a social rate of discount to estimate present value of benefits of

transmission projects will recognize the “public good” nature of transmission
projects.
o A social discount rate, generally 3 to 5% is used to evaluate long life public works
and public goods projects.
o Public or societal benefits of transmission projects include fuel diversity,
common carrier use, integration of renewables, insurance against extreme events,
meeting public policy goals.
o Transmission projects are long life—50 plus years. Benefits start to accrue as use
of line increases over time. The use of a social rate of discount recognizes the
value of benefits that occur beyond the first ten years of project life in present
value analysis, while the use of a higher cost of capital would discount future
benefits beyond ten years to a point of being non-significant.
o The present value of benefits using a 4% discount rate is approximately 100%
higher than using a 10% cost of capital. With a 10% discount rate, total present
value of all benefits beyond ten years in a 50–year project life is discounted to
approximately 38% of total present worth of benefits. However, a review of
transmission projects confirmed that benefits of transmission projects continue to
accrue well beyond the first ten years of operation and generally increase over
time.
Application of a social discount rate does not require any change in benefit-cost analysis
methodology. However, regulatory and policy support for the concept is critical for its use and
application. At a minimum, project proponents should calculate the present value of benefits
using both a social discount rate and a traditional cost of capital to provide a sensitivity of
calculated benefits to the discount rate.
3.5.3. Application of Social Discount Rate

The question of the social discount rate has been discussed among economists and philosophers
for many decades. “In the early days of the field, many economists argued that policymakers
should be more patient than private citizens. Yet most of their arguments were paternalistic,
such as Ramsey’s (1928) 2 claim that it was “ethically indefensible” to discount the future.” 3 In an
essay published in 1950, Maurice Dobb repeated the same argument that, “clearly, for planning
purposes we are interested in tomorrow’s satisfaction as such, not in today’s assessment of
2. A Mathematical Theory of Saving, Frank P. Ramsey, Economic Journal 1928 (December)

pages 543-559.
3. The Social Discount Rate, Andrew Caplia and John Leaky, Journal of Political Economy,
2004, Vol 112, No. 6
14
tomorrow’s satisfaction. To discount later enjoyment in comparison with earlier ones is a
practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness in imagination.” 4
In the same article, he recommended that the rate of the increase of labor productivity should be
used as the basis for fixing the social rate of discount.
Social rate of discount has been recommended for economic evaluation of public projects in
sectors such as transport, agriculture, water resources development, and land-use. More
recently, there have been many reports and articles on the use of Social Discount Rate for
evaluation of projects for reducing the impact of global warming. This includes a 700-page
report, “The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change” in 2006, published by HM
Treasury, London. The Stern Review recommended using 0.1 percent for the social discount
rate and immediately we should invest 1% of the global gross domestic product to reduce the
impact of global warming. 5
Professor William D. Nordhaus of Yale, a noted economist, has a concern with the social
discount rate used by Sir Nicholas Stern, and recommends 3% as discount rate. 6
In a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Humberto Lopez estimates the social discount
rate for nine Latin American countries based on the recent track record in terms of growth. 7
These social discount rates are in the 3– to 4–percent range for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Columbia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Peru. The analysis is based on: i) pure time
preference rate, ii) the growth rate of per capita income/consumption; and, iii) the elasticity of
marginal utility of income/consumption.
Regarding pure time preference rate, there is long-standing debate in literature. On the low side
Stern Review uses 0.1%. On the other hand, some have suggested to put an upper bound of
3%. 8
Lopez, in his analysis for nine Latin America countries, sets the pure time preference rate at 1%.
Others have also used numbers around 1%. For example, Kula uses 1.2% for the United
Kingdom on the basis of the probability of death in 1975. 9 Scott estimates this rate at about 1.3%
4. Essay on Economic Growth, Maurice Dobb, Long, 1960 Chapter II

5. Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, Hal Varian, New York Times, December
14, 2006
6. OP.cit
7. The Social Discount Rate: Estimates for Nine Latin American Countries. Humberto Lopez,
Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region,
Office of the Chief Economist, June 2008
8. OP.cit
9. Social Interest Rate for Public Sector Project Appraisal in the UK, USA, and Canada, Kule E,
Project Appraisal, 2: 169-174, 1987
15
based on a century of data on United Kingdom savings behavior. 10 Kula, in his study of the
social rate of discount for India, uses a value of 1.3%. 11 Evans and Sezer use range between 1
and 1.5% for six developed countries (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and
United States). 12
There is a good literature review in Humberto Lopez study for the other two elements for
estimating Social Discount Rate, i.e., per capita consumption growth rates and the elasticity of
marginal utility of consumption.
A standard approach taken in much of the existing empirical literature relies on generating the
expectations of the future rate of growth on the basis of past per capita consumption growth
rates.
In a study on the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption in a 2004 study 13, Evans and Sezer
estimate it at between 1.3% and 1.7% in six developed countries and then Evans in a 2005 paper
finds an average of 1.4 % in 20 OECD countries. 14
The techniques and equations similar to the ones used by Evans and Sezer, and Kula are being
used by many economists to estimate the Social Discount Rate for different countries.
David Evans and Haluk Sezer calculate the social discount rate based on 15:
SDR = (1+g)lel (1/π)-1
whereas SDR = social discount rate
g = per capita real consumption growth rate
e = elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption
π = weighted probability of survival of the average consumer from

one period to the next, which is a measure to capture the pure
10. A Review of Economic Growth, M. Scott, Clarendon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1989
11. Estimation of a Social Rate of Interest for India, Kula E. Journal of Agricultural Economics,
55(1): 91-99, 2004
12. Social Discount Rates for Six Major Countries, Evans, D. and H. Sezer, Applied Economic
Letters, 11: 557-560, 2004
13. OP.cit
14. The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries” D.
Evans, Fiscal Studies, 26(2):197-224, 2005
15. A Time Preference Measure of the Social Discount Rate for the United Kingdom, David
Evans and Haluk Sezer. Applied Economics, 2002, 1026 P.34
16
time discount rate
Based on this study, the result for United Kingdom for the period 1967-1997 was SDR =
4.87%.
Erhan Kula, using similar formulation, using the data for the period 1954-1976 for the
growth rate of consumption and the elasticity of the marginal utility consumption and
for using 1946-1970 data the annual average survival probability for United States and
1945-1975 data for Canada estimated SDR for United States = 5.3% and SDR for Canada =
5.2%. 16
3.5.4. Recommendation For Social Rate of Discount For Transmission Projects

Based on the above discussion and observation, the project team recommends that a social
discount rate for the United States should be calculated using more recent data on: per capita
growth rate of consumption, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, and the
probability of survival from one period to the next (an indicator of pure time preference rate).
The research team concludes that a social discount rate of 5% is a reasonable approximation for
use in calculating the present value of the stream of benefits from the high voltage transmission
projects. Also a 50–year economic life should be used in calculating the present value of benefits
of high voltage transmission lines.
16. Derivation of Social Time Preference Rates for the United States and Canada, Erham Kula
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1984, Vol 99, 11 P. 873-882
17
18
4.0 Current Methodologies For Benefit Quantification
4.1. Types of Projects
All transmission projects have attributes that relate to reliability, economics, and operations.
However, the processes that are used for economic evaluation and cost recovery of projects
varies depending on the type of project, and for this purpose, transmission projects are
generally grouped into four categories:
o Requested Upgrades.
o Generation Interconnection.
o Reliability (Base Plan Upgrades).
o Economic (Supplemental Upgrades).
Requested Upgrades are projects that meet specific request or requirements of a customer and
are usually paid by the customer.
Generation Interconnection is to connect a new power plant to the electrical system and is
usually paid by the generator. There may also be need for system upgrade as a new significant
generator is being added to the system.
Reliability projects are transmission improvement that may be required to satisfy the existing or
new reliability criteria. Without such a transmission, there is potential for reliability related
problems and failure to meet the established reliability criteria.
Research indicates that the first three types of projects—requested upgrades, generation
interconnection, and reliability projects have clear drivers or mandates and tend to go forward
with little or no opposition. However, economic projects (including projects that address
specific policy objectives such as renewables integration and debottle-necking) often get
stymied due to different perspectives on need, benefits, and cost responsibility.
The economic projects are proposed to reduce the total cost to society. This includes economic
projects that are used for reducing bottlenecks and congestion, expanding access to regional
markets, meeting policy goals such as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), and providing
insurance against multiple contingencies.
In this research, the emphasis is on methods that can be used to quantify benefits and allocate
costs of Economic (Supplemental Upgrade) transmission projects. The research results are
applicable to other types of projects and to projects that exhibit multiple dimensions of
economics, reliability, and operations.
4.2. Types of Benefits

The benefits from an economic transmission project can be grouped into:
o Primary Benefits (Traditional Benefits).

o Strategic Benefits.
19
o Extreme Event Benefits.
There are also secondary benefits from new projects. These include: economic development, tax
base increase, use of right-of-way, and impact on infrastructure development. These secondary
benefits are not addressed in this study.
Primary or traditional benefits can be defined as cost reduction, congestion reduction and
expansion of access to regional markets to take advantage of load and resource diversity.
Primary benefits improve network reliability and result in lower cost of energy and capacity
adjusted for transmission losses.
Strategic benefits can include:
o Access to new renewables resources to meet Renewable Portfolio Standard

(RPS).
o Promote efficient market operation and market power mitigation.
o Promote fuel diversity.
o Provide emission reduction/environment benefits.
o Improve deliverability.
o Insurance against contingencies.
o Meet policy goals such as Renewable Portfolio Standard.
These strategic benefits all contribute to lower cost electricity or risk for consumers, and if
properly quantifies, will show larger streams of benefits of transmission projects than what has
traditionally been quantified.
The types of benefits of new transmission projects depend on whether the region is at the
generation or exporting end or importing end of the transmission line. Benefits accruing to a
region are a function of location with respect to a transmission line as follows:
o Exporting Region Benefits

- Regional economic development.
- Increase tax base.
- Reliability Improvement.
- Expansion of generation resources.
o Importing Region Benefits
- Import of lower cost energy and capacity.
- Reliability improvement.
- Strategic benefits:
20
 Access to renewables.
 Fuel diversity.
 Emission reduction.
 Insurance against contingencies.
 Increased deliverability.
 Decrease Market Power.
o Exporting and Importing Region Benefits
- Seasonal exchange.
- Sales of surplus energy.
- Reserve sharing.
There are many uncertainties that impact the size of primary benefit and types of strategic
benefits from a new project. These uncertainties include load forecast, fuel prices, development
of new generation and retirement of existing power plants, regional prices for electricity, and
environmental regulation. Production cost-simulation, scenario analysis, stochastic modeling,
and other techniques have traditionally been utilized to estimate a base level of benefit and the
sensitivity analysis to take into consideration future uncertainties. These models tend to come
up with base case, sensitivity cases, and expected value of benefits.
Another category of benefits relates to extreme events. In recent years, the August 2003
Northeast Blackout and the California 2000–01 market dysfunction put a spotlight on the
significant economic (billions of dollars) and societal impact of such extreme events. The
challenge is that traditionally, there has been no attempt to quantify the benefit of mitigating
extreme events or when it is done, an expected value approach is utilized which understates the
societal value of mitigating these very low probability but very high impact events.
One of the research conclusions is that insurance against extreme events should be defined as
an additional societal benefit for reducing exposure to extreme market volatility and multi-
region-wide blackouts due to multiple contingencies. While there is general consensus on the
existence of these types of strategic benefits, they are not easily quantified or captured using
traditional models. For example, policymakers anecdotally acknowledge the value of
transmission projects as insurance against contingencies, but there is no definition or examples
of quantification of such values.
The above category of benefits can be defined as Extreme Event Benefits and are in addition to
the Primary and Strategic Benefits. The value of extreme event benefits can be put in context
when some of recent power system experiences are examined. For example:
o 2001 California market dysfunction and volatility with a cost of $20-40 billion.
o 2003 Northeast Blackout due to multiple contingencies with a cost of $5-
10 billion.
Extreme Event Benefits can be defined as:
21
1. Reliability—which is based on improved network load carrying capacity and ability to
reduce or mitigate impact of extreme events resulting from multiple contingencies (N-3,
4, 5, 6 events).
2. Market Volatility—which is based on the societal benefit of reduced vulnerability to

extreme price volatility which could result from extreme system events, market
dysfunction, or a combination of factors.
Society’s willingness to buy protection against extreme events is well established in the
insurance industry, for example hurricane insurance, life insurance, re-insurance against major
losses. In each of these examples, there is a well established actuarial data base that allows
valuation of such insurance. However, there is not a rich data base related to extreme events in
the electric power industry because major blackouts and market dysfunctions are infrequent
events. Hence, the research challenge is to come up with alternative approaches that address
these benefits rather than dismiss them due to difficulty in quantifying them.
4.3. Benefits Assessment Approaches in Use

The transmission project benefit quantification approaches in use include:
o Production Simulation Models.

o Decision Analysis Models.
o Screening Analysis Models.
o Tipping Point Analysis.
These approaches are discussed briefly in this section and in Appendix B.
For economic benefit quantification of new transmission projects, the basic approach is to utilize
a Production Simulation Model. The analysis includes two alternatives: one with and another
without the proposed new transmission project. Many commercial production simulation
models are available, such as PROSYM, GEMAPS, PROMOD, and PLEXOS. Using a least cost
dispatch principle, the models forecast production from different generation resources and
associated fuel consumption, and emissions. To have a balance between loads and resources,
additional generation resources are also introduced over time. Based on fuel prices, costs of
various emissions and variable O&M costs, the total production cost over time are calculated for
a given load forecast and associated load shape. The difference in the total production costs
from the two simulations defines the gross benefit for the new transmission project.
The net benefit of the transmission project is then calculated by subtracting the capital cost and
annual O&M of the transmission project from the estimated gross benefit. Benefit cost ratios and
internal rate of return can also be calculated from the information provided by the annual
production costs, capital, and O&M expenditure of the transmission project.
To take into consideration the uncertainty of factors such as fuel costs, load forecast, and capital
cost of the transmission project, Decision Analysis Models have been utilized to estimate the
expected value and the distribution of net benefit or benefit cost ratio. These may also utilize
22
Influence Diagrams that show the factors that have great impact on benefits and costs of the
project.
Carrying out detailed production cost simulation with and without the proposed project are
data intensive, time consuming, and expensive. This becomes more difficult when the detail of
transmission network is included in the model in addition to the generation system.
Furthermore, information on planned new generation development is based on market
economics and data is generally not available beyond 5 to 10 years, while transmission projects
are expected to last 50-years or more and deliver benefits during the entire period.
At the pre-feasibility level the use of a Spreadsheet Screening Analysis may facilitate studying
many transmission options quickly and at less time and expenditure than using detail
production simulation models. An example of this approach will be discussed later when the
benefit-cost analysis of Frontier Line is reviewed.
Spreadsheet Screening Analysis is useful when new generation resources at export region plus a
new transmission is compared with new generation resources at import region. This approach
allows comparison of many alternatives quickly. The results provide forecast of fuel
consumption, emission, and variable O&M and fixed O&M costs. Benefit and cost of a new
transmission is then calculated based on such information for different alternatives by including
capital costs of generation at export and import regions, fuel prices and capital cost of the
To concentrate the analysis on assumptions and relationships that greatly influence the project
benefits, the use of a Tipping Point Analysis method is sometimes utilized. In applying this
method, an economic criterion for the project is established. Potential tipping points which are
associated with key variables are listed and tested. The level of tipping point where benefit/cost
is less than one are determined and the potential for ending up with benefit/cost less than one
are evaluated and discussed for these tipping points.
4.4. Review Of Benefit Analysis Of Some Recent Projects

CA ISO’s existing and proposed transmission planning process and case histories of recent
projects are in Appendix F.
In this section, the analytical tools and benefits quantification methods for benefit analysis for
three different projects are discussed. The three projects are Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 (DPV No.
2), Tehachapi, and Frontier Line.
4.4.1. Devers-Palo Verde No. 2

Economic evaluation of Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 has been carried out and reviewed by many
parties, including CA ISO, SCE, Division of Ratepayer Advocates (CPUC), and Consortium for
Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group (CERTS/EPG) for Energy
Commission.
SCE’s objectives for proposed construction of DPV No. 2 are to:
o Increase California’s access to low-cost energy from the Southwest.
23
o Enhance competition among generating companies supplying energy to
California.
o Provide additional transmission infrastructure to support the development of
additional generation capacity that will sell energy into California market.
o Provide increased reliability and flexibility in operating California’s transmission
system.
SCE has used a production cost simulation model (PROSYM) to estimate energy cost saving
resulting from the construction of DPV No. 2. This project is estimated to decrease electricity
prices in California, which is the primary benefit of this project. There will also be additional
third party transmission revenue due to increased CA ISO wheeling through or out of the CA
ISO grid.
Southern California Edison evaluation shows a B/C ratio for DPV No. 2 at 1.7. Energy benefits
are based on production cost simulation for 2009–2015 and then escalated at GDP price index
(around 2.28% per year) for the rest of economic life of the project.
At the request of CA ISO, SCE has provided energy production cost for Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) for the years 2009 through 2014 with and without DPV No. 2.
Using the cost saving numbers provided by SCE for WECC, the present value of the quantified
benefits from energy and third party transmission revenue is less than the capital cost of DPV
No. 2, using a 5% discount rate.
The WECC regional benefit for this project is low, in part, because strategic benefits such as
insurance value during extreme system conditions, reduction in generators market power,
potential for development of new generation outside of California and environmental benefits
beside NOx reductions are not quantified in WECC regional benefit calculation.
CA ISO has used its Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM) approach and
PLEXOS cost production simulation model to quantify the benefits from DPV No. 2. Benefits
include cost saving in energy, transmission loss reduction, emissions reduction, market power
mitigation, and contingency. CA ISO’s proposed methodology for benefit quantification of the
transmission projects address the following major issues: modeling of market power;
development of a robust set of scenarios; selection of appropriate simulation tools or programs;
a detail representation of the transmission network and the assumptions of the future
generation system; and, selection of benefit tests. Detailed description of these elements is
provided in a report prepared by Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology
Solutions/Electric Power Group for the Energy Commission in June 2004 17.
Benefit tests examined by the CA ISO includes:
17. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004. Economic
Evaluation of Transmission Interconnection in a Restructured Market, California Energy Commission
(CEC-700-04-007), pages 10-12.
24
o The participant/ratepayer test (benefits to those entities that will be paying for
the new facility).
o The societal test (benefits to all consumers, producers, and transmission owners,
regardless of who pays for the upgrades).
o The modified societal test recognizing or excluding non-competitive revenues
(monopoly rent) collected by some producers.
The societal test is measured by the change in production costs across the entire interconnection
(in case of DPV No. 2 over the entire WECC). A transmission expansion project is deemed to
pass the benefit test if: 1) it benefits each participant, and 2) the entire societal or the modified
societal benefit exceeds the project cost.
The WECC base case data is the foundation of the CA ISO modeling. CA ISO’s PLEXOS model
of the entire WECC requires significant amounts of input data. Due to the limited available CA
ISO staff time for the collection of input data for each year, CA ISO modeling for the economic
analysis of DPV No. 2 was done only for two years—2008 and 2013.
CA ISO in its quantification of DPV No. 2 benefits included:
o Operational benefit—such as saving from generation unit commitment costs,

minimum load compensation and redispatch of units to address real-time
transmission congestion.
o Capacity benefit—such as utilization of some of the surplus capacity in Arizona.
o Loss savings – reduction in transmission losses as a result of DPV No. 2
operation, which were not captured in the DC Power Flow Model.
o Emission reduction—the emission were not directly modeled in the production
simulation model.
In the CA ISO evaluation, the above benefits were significant portion of the total benefits 18.
CA ISO’s goals in the development of Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology

(TEAM) have been 19:
o Development of a common methodology to evaluate economic need for

transmission upgrades.
o Presenting a framework that will be useful in making effective decision on
transmission investment.
o Providing transparency in methods, databases, and models so a variety of
stakeholders can understand the implications of a transmission upgrade.
18. CA ISO Department of Market Analysis and Grid Planning, February 2005, Economic Evaluation of
the Devers-Palo Verde No. 2.
19. Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM), Anjali Sheffrin, June 14, 2004. California
Energy Commission IEPR Workshop on 2004 Transmission Update.
25
CA ISO filed TEAM with CPUC in June 2004. CA ISO has demonstrated in actual studies the
use of TEAM for Path 26 and DPV No. 2. The methodology clearly indicates impacts of a new
upgrade at the participants’ level and also regional (WECC) levels.
Several new elements identified in this research could be added to TEAM to further expand
quantification of benefits, such as:
o Extreme event benefits such as improve network load carrying capacity under
multiple contingencies.
o Reduced vulnerability to extreme price volatility due to long term outages and
catastrophic events.
o Dynamic impact of a large transmission projects on the development and
construction of additional generation capacity in the exporting region.
By adding the above benefits to TEAM, the methodology will be able to capture the benefits
from risk mitigation of low probability/high impact extreme market events and the benefits of
development of new generation to both exporting and importing region. Without taking into
consideration such dynamic impacts, the analysis becomes a zero-sum game whereby there are
higher electricity prices in the exporting region with the implication that the investment in a
transmission line has negative impact on consumers of the exporting region. In fact, this factor
contributed to the recent rejection of DPV No. 2 by the Arizona Corporation Commission.
Division of Ratepayer Advocates at CPUC has also carried out a review of the DPV No. 2. This
report was prepared in three volumes that were published in November 2005. Volume 3 of this
study describes the Tipping Point Analysis for DPV No. 2 20.
As described by Dr. House in his DRA Testimony, Tipping Point analysis has gained popularity
in the social sciences since Gladwell’s 2000 book, How Little Things Can Make a Big
Difference 21. The analysis starts with defining the topology of the interactions (similar to the
Influence Diagram in Decision Analysis). Then through some analysis it is determined which
interactions are critical to the outcome (tipping points).
Dr. House’s analysis shows that tipping point variables for the DPV No. 2 project are:
o Natural gas price differential between Arizona and California.

o Generation resource plan in Arizona.
o Palo Verde Nuclear Plant outage.
o Wholesale natural gas prices.
Based on analysis performed, the following conclusions were reached:
20. Testimony of Lon W. House, November 22, 2005, Tipping Point Analysis and Attribute Assessment
for DPV No. 2, Office of Ratepayer Advocate’s Devers Palo Verde No. 2 Testimony Vol. 3 of 3.
21. Malcolm Gladwell, 2000, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, Little
Brown and Company, New York.
26
“In order for DPV2 to be cost effective, the natural gas price differential between
Arizona and California has to be greater than $0.50/MMBtu, the wholesale Topoc
price of natural gas has to be greater than $5.00/MMBtu and Palo Verde (Nuclear
Generation Station) has to be operating.” 22
Furthermore, DPV No. 2 is more valuable to California in the event of an outage of San Onofre
Nuclear Generation Station (SONGS).
Tipping Point Analysis provides clear information on critical variables and allows the analyst to
concentrate on high impact factors rather than spend a great deal of time and effort on elements
that do not materially change the outcome of the analysis.
4.4.2. Tehachapi Transmission Project

Tehachapi Transmission Project is designed to access wind generation resources in the
Tehachapi area along with associated system upgrades beyond the first point of
interconnection. SCE is the project sponsor. The goal is to develop transmission that will be the
least-cost solution to reliably interconnect 4,350 MW of generating resources in the Tehachapi
Area Generation Queue to the CA ISO grid.
In addition, the project also addresses the reliability needs of the CA ISO controlled grid caused
by load growth in the Antelope Valley area, as well as transmission constraints South of Lugo.
The main benefit of this project is to enable California utilities to buy power from wind
generation projects and to comply with the state mandated Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
program.
The project justification for Tehachapi is renewable resource integration and reliability. While
resource integration has an economic dimension, the project justification is based on meeting
state RPS mandates rather than benefit cost analysis. The Tehachapi project evolved from the
Tehachapi Collaborative Study Group, which was formed in 2004 at the direction of CPUC. The
goal was to develop a comprehensive phased transmission development plan for integration of
renewables planned for development in the Tehachapi area. Two reports were issued and
submitted to CPUC in March 2005 and in April 2006. The outcome was the identification of a
number of alternatives for the transmission infrastructure. A recommendation was made to
further study these alternatives by the CA ISO.
The CA ISO in full collaboration with SCE and stakeholders carried out the Tehachapi
Transmission Project study as part of its CA ISO South Regional Transmission Plan for 2006
(CSRTP-2006). A least-cost solution for the interconnection of planned generation was
developed by CA ISO.
The total cost of the Tehachapi Transmission Project is estimated at $1.8 billion in nominal
dollars. This cost excludes the cost of Interconnection Facilities (radial wind collector
transmission systems that will interconnect the individual generation projects to the grid and
22. Reference 5, Page 38.
27
will be the responsibility of generation developers). SCE is the Project Sponsor and the project is
subject to necessary regulatory approvals from CPUC and FERC, which have either been
received or expected.
The Tehachapi Transmission project phased development plan includes:
o Antelope - Pardee, 230 kV line and Antelope Substation Expansion.

o Antelope-Vincent 230 kV Line #1, 500 kV.
o WindHub Substation.
o Antelope-Wind Hub 230 kV line, 500 kV.
o Low Wind 500/230 kV Substation with loop-in of Midway-Vincent #3 500 kV line.
o Antelope-Low Wind 500 kV line.
o WindHub Substation 500 kV Upgrade.
One or more of the transmission line segments may be characterized as bulk-transfer gen-tie for
an interim period of time until additional lines and transmission interconnections are built. For
these lines, characterized as bulk transfer gen-tie lines, generators would be charged a pro-rata
rate for transmission service over the gen-tie line. The residual revenue requirement for any
unsubscribed portion of the gen-tie line would be recovered either from retail ratepayers under
CPUC-approved rate or from all transmission customers in FERC-jurisdictional Transmission
Access Charges (TAC) rates. If any of these bulk-transfer gen-tie lines are later converted into a
network facility, then generators would be relieved of their pro-rata share of the transmission
service charge respectively. 23
CA ISO has used the concept of clustering in the Tehachapi Transmission Project. Clustering
allows the study of the system impacts of a group of interconnection requests collectively,
rather than evaluating each potential generation project one at a time. This results in greater
efficiency in the design of needed network upgrades.
The clustering approach for the Tehachapi Transmission Project will result in substantial capital
cost saving compared to any piecemeal upgrade solution with a traditional project by project
approach.
However, in the Tehachapi Transmission Project, the CA ISO has deviated from a typical
clustered interconnection study. The CA ISO study considered only the network components or
network upgrades of the transmission system and excluded the radial wind collector
transmission systems. Furthermore, an element of clustering is the selection of a time window
for determining which generation projects in the queue will be included in the cluster (i.e., the
Queue Cluster Window). The Tehachapi Transmission Project defined the Queue Cluster
23. Armie Perez, Vice President of Planning and Infrastructure Development, January 18, 2007,
Memorandum to CA ISO Board of Governors, Page 6.
28
Window as the projects submitted from August 19, 2003 through April 2006, which exceeds
FERC limit of 180 days for the Queue Cluster Window.
Due to the specific circumstances presented by Tehachapi Project, CA ISO has filed a petition
with FERC for approval to proceed with the proposed study approach on a one-time basis.
CA ISO Board has approved the Tehachapi Transmission Project as the Network Upgrades
necessary to allow Generating Facilities in the Tehachapi Wind Resources Area to deliver their
output to CA ISO grid. The Board has directed SCE to proceed with the permitting and
construction of this project. FERC’s approval of the CAISO waiver request for provisions of
Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) allowed this project to move forward.
4.4.3. Frontier Line

The Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership (WRTEP) is proposing the
construction of Frontier Line, a large transmission project between Wyoming, Utah, Nevada,
and California.
To perform a screening level economic study, the Economic Analysis Subcommittee developed
a spreadsheet tool to quantify benefits and costs of multitude of possible alternatives and
scenarios. These alternatives included: a variety of load and resources scenarios, a myriad of
conceptual transmission links and configurations identified by the Transmission Subcommittee;
a wide range of natural gas prices and possible costs for new clean coal technology, including
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) and carbon dioxide sequestration; and a broad
spectrum of potential policy actions such as regional and/or national renewable portfolio
standards, state and federal tax incentives for preferred resources such as wind or solar or clean
coal, and regulatory regimes in greenhouse gas emissions.
To carryout these benefit-cost analysis in a transparent manner, the Economic Analysis

Subcommittee designed and constructed a unique analytical tool, the Frontier Economic
Analysis Screening Tool (FEAST). The intent was to develop an analytical tool to enable the
Economic Analysis Subcommittee to carryout analysis at a screening level which will provide
an understanding of the ranges of assumptions under which the development of the Frontier
Line will be cost effective and for which more detailed economic analysis using a detailed
system production cost simulation will be warranted.
FEAST is a simple tool for knowledgeable users. It considers incremental resource additions,
not a complete supply stack which would include all the existing generators.
For this screening analysis, the Gross Benefits ($) of the transmission project is based on the
following formula:
Gross Benefit = Energy Potential x Line Utilization x Regional Basis

MWh (%) $/MWh
Energy Potential is the rated capacity of the line multiplied by 8,760 hours. For example, if the
Frontier Line is rated 3,000 MW, then energy potential would be 3,000x8760 or 26,280 GWh per
year.
29
Line Utilization is a function of the quantity and characteristics of resources available to be
imported as compared to the line’s energy potential. (Basically, capacity of generation resources
installed in exporting region multiplied by assumed capacity factors for each resource and
subject to the transmission line and system constraints.)
Regional Basis is the energy cost difference between the exporting region and the importing
region. This Regional Basis is influenced by many factors, including the capital cost of new
generation resources, fuel costs (gas, coal, and others), environmental mitigation costs,
renewable energy price premiums, Green House Gas (GHG) adders, and others.
Benefits in addition to energy benefits include: capacity, losses, emissions, insurance value
against extreme events, economic impacts due to construction of transmission and generation
facilities, tax benefits, reliability improvement and others.
Many of the subcommittee members provided input on fuel prices, capital cost for generation,
ranges for Green House Gas adder, capacity factor for wind energy in different regions, and
other assumptions. The FEAST Spreadsheet Model was developed by staff of PG&E.
FEAST can handle several exporting regions (source options): Wyoming and Montana (coal and
wind), and several importing regions (sink options), including Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and
California. Resources considered for importing regions can be gas-fired CT or CCGT or IGCC
and renewables (for Utah coal, gas, renewables). For exporting regions, resources can be wind
and/or clean coal.
A mix of generation resources for exporting and importing regions are assumed. Taking into
consideration capacity and capacity factor of these generation resources, the amount of energy
going from source to sink is calculated.
FEAST is an energy focused analysis. Attempt is made to balance energy produced from the
generation resources in the sinks and sources. The installed capacity of generation ends up
being different for sinks and sources.
The Economic Analysis Subcommittee performed its work using a participatory stakeholder
process. Volunteers led the effort to create FEAST inputs. Individual subcommittee members
were able to perform their own analysis based on some of their own inputs.
The final report of this subcommittee was submitted to Western Regional Transmission
Expansion Partnership (WRTEP) on April 27, 2007 24. Two most important conclusions of the
report were:
1. The benefits of the Frontier Line appear greater than the costs under a variety of
plausible scenarios.
2. Uncertainty associated with key inputs results in a wide range of benefit-cost outcomes.
24. Economic Analysis Subcommittee for Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership, Final
Report April 27, 2007, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Frontier Line Possibilities.
30
The economics of the Frontier Line, as expected, are very sensitive to natural gas prices and the
values used for GHG adder. Economics of the Line are also somewhat sensitive to capital costs
for clean coal technologies, including IGCC and CO2 sequestration.
The primary focus of the analysis that was carried out by the Economic Analysis Subcommittee
was economic efficiency from a total societal point of view, i.e., the analysis produced the
overall benefit-cost ratio for the region as a whole. Of course, it is important that the Frontier
Line produces benefit for each individual jurisdiction participating in the project, i.e., benefit be
greater than cost for each state. The Economic Analysis Subcommittee did not analyze cost
allocation so that each jurisdiction participating receives a net benefit from the project.
However, FEAST enables each user to perform its own analysis and assess benefits and costs
allocated.
As stated in the Final Report of the Benefit-Cost Analysis of Frontier Line, FEAST is not a
substitute for production costing simulation tools. Analysis using FEAST may be a first step to
quickly sort through a multitude of possibilities. FEAST is a tool to perform quick what-if
screening analysis. It is a simple spreadsheet-based tool enabling and empowering
sophisticated users to carryout a variety of analyses quickly, with the aim of developing user
insight rather than producing overly precise numerical results 25.
4.5. Benefit Analysis Observations And Conclusions

The three projects reviewed for benefit analysis are representative of a wide range of potential
future large regional transmission projects. A summary of the projects analyzed is presented in
Figure 1.
25. Reference 9 p 8.
31
Summary of Benefit Analysis of
Transmission Projects
Project Description Purpose Comments
Palo-Verde  500 kV line between Arizona and Reduce California  Benefits to California estimated using
Devers California electricity costs production cost and sensitivity analysis
No. 2  Single utility and single rate  Strategic and regional benefits not
jurisdiction (CA ISO) addressed
 $500 million cost  Static analysis – assumed generation
 1,300 MW capacity capacity fixed
Tehachapi  Designed in several phases to Enable integration Least cost solution to meet RPS mandate.
interconnect 4,350 MW of new wind of new wind
generation generation in CA
 Required CA rate back-stop and ISO queue to meet
innovative CA ISO tariff to allocate RPS
costs
 $1.8 billion cost
 Costs allocation among generator
(gen-tie), CA ISO grid users, and CA
ratepayers for cost recovery back-stop
Frontier  500 kV Designed to enable  Benefits estimated using screening
Line  3,000 MW construction of new model – FEAST
 $2 billion cost
generation in  Benefits result from cost differential
Wyoming/Montana (capital and fuel) between resources
 Multi-state, multi-utility, multi-
for export to CA, developed in CA vs. WY/MT
jurisdiction NV, UT, AZ  Strategic benefits not quantified
 Strong state government support in
exporting regions
 No strong utility project sponsor
F igure 1. S ummary of B enefit Analys is of T rans mis s ion P rojec ts
Of the three projects, Tehachapi is moving forward. Palo Verde-Devers No. 2 was rejected by
the Arizona Commission and SCE, the project sponsor, is moving ahead to construct the
California segment of the transmission line and continuing to pursue approval from FERC for
the Arizona portion. Frontier Line is still in the conceptual planning stages.
From this review, the following observations and conclusions are presented.
1. Elements of successful projects, e.g., Tehachapi
o Strong project sponsorship.

o Extensive stakeholder participation.
o Clear objectives and benefits, whether quantifiable or not.
o Cost recovery certainty.
o Policy and regulatory receptivity.
2. Benefit quantification
o Primary methods used are production simulation or screen methods.

o Benefits are based on cost differentials for different options, i.e., project vs. no
project or comparison of different project options.
o Many strategic benefits were not quantified.
32
o Analysis required data intensive assumptions about future loads, resources, fuel
prices, and policies.
3. Problems encountered by projects
o Limited showing of benefits for key stakeholders, e.g., Palo Verde-Devers No. 2.
o Ambiguity about objectives and goals, including changing policies, e.g., Frontier
Line.
33
34
5.0 Benefit Quantification Methods
5.1. Assessment of Current Methods
Primary method to quantify the benefits of a transmission project is the use of a production cost
simulation model such as PROSYM, GEMAPS, PROMOD, and PLEXOS. The difference in the
total production cost for with and without the transmission project provides information on
gross benefit from such a project.
Key input variables in the production cost simulation models that impact the benefit of a new
transmission project are:
o Fuel prices at different regions.

o Generation development—type, location, and timing.
o Retirement of the existing generation resources.
o Operation cost and performance of existing and new generation.
o Emission rates and values.
The key conclusion of research review of recently approved or proposed transmission projects
to assess benefit quantification methods is that benefit quantification methods rely primarily on
production cost savings and do not quantify reliability and strategic benefits. Specifically,
current methods don’t capture the benefits of reducing vulnerability to extreme events or
dynamic impacts resulting from the interaction of the new transmission projects with base case
assumptions that are used to evaluate benefits, for example, the feedback impact on gas prices,
fuel diversity, addition of new capacity, and access to new markets.
For example, during California’s 2001 electricity crises, the electric markets were dysfunctional.
Market prices were persistently high and led to state government intervention on behalf of
California consumers. This electricity crises cost the California consumers $20-40 billion.
Additional transmission would have mitigated these impacts of market dysfunction but current
benefit quantification methods do not take such extreme events into account. Similarly, the
August 14, 2003 Northeast 26 blackout, another extreme event, cost between $5– to $10 billion,
and the impact would have been substantially less of additional transmission was in place by
reducing the footprint and magnitude of this extreme reliability event. This short-coming of
current methods was also recognized in a report prepared by the WECC Seams Steering
Group 27, which noted that:
26. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, April 2004, Final Report on the August 14,
2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations
27. “Framework for Expansion of the Western Interconnection Transmission System”, Seams
Steering Group – Western Interconnection (SSG-WI), Oct 2003. (Citation 57 from page 30), The
Battle Group International Review of Transmission Arrangements, Oct 2007
35
The real societal benefit from adding transmission capacity come in the form of
enhanced reliability, reduced market power, decreases in system capital and variable
operating costs and changes in total demand. The benefits associated with reliability,
capital costs, market power and demand are not included in this {type of production
cost} analysis.
Review of current methods used to quantify transmission project benefits leads to the following
conclusions:
o Models understate benefits of long life assets (50+years) by discounting future

benefits using high interest rate based on cost of capital—essentially discounting
the benefits beyond the first 10-years to a very small percentage of total benefits.
o Models utilize expected value approach that tends to minimize impact of high
impact but low probability events.
o Models are data intensive—require assumptions about future generation mix,
fuel prices, and transmission network.
o Models are static with no feedback—assume no change in investment for new
generation resulting in a zero sum benefit distribution game, for example,
Devers-Palo Verde No. 2.
o Extreme market volatility and multiple contingency system events which can be
very costly and risky to society are not captured in current models.
The understatement of the benefits of transmission projects using current methods is a serious
limitation in evaluation of transmission projects by policy makers. Transmission projects have a
long planning lead time (5 to 15-years). Transmission projects are also lumpy, typically
1,000 MW or more and it takes several years to fully realize the benefits. Current methods
generally estimate benefits by assuming a generation mix and load pattern during the first year
or first few years of project operation and calculate the gross annual benefit as the annual
difference in the total production cost with and without transmission project. To carry out
benefit-cost analysis, the present worth of the gross annual benefit is calculated using an
interest rate. For investor-owned utilities this interest rate is based on allowed weighted cost of
capital, generally 10% or higher.
However, use of cost of capital as the basis for discounting the future benefits tends to
understate the benefits of long life assets such as transmission. An alternative approach is to use
the social rate of discount instead of using a rate based on cost of capital. The social rate of
discount (around 5%) can be used to calculate the present value of benefits for the new
transmission projects since transmission system has become a public good with assets having
long life, and benefits occurring over a long period. 28
28. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004, Economic
CEC-700-04-007.
36
The impact of using the social rate of discount around 5% compared to the current weighted
cost of capital of 10% on present value of benefits is significant. For a project with uniform
benefit over 50-years of economic life, the use of 5% discount rate rather than 10% will increase
the present value of benefits by around 60% or more.
All of the production cost simulation models capture primary benefits from transmission
projects. They include energy, capacity, transmission loss reduction, and environmental values
(emissions). Strategic benefits such as access to new renewable resources, fuel diversity,
improved deliverability - reduced congestion and insurance against contingencies such as dry
hydro condition and performance of some major base load generation and intertie transmission
can also be quantified through scenario and sensitivity analysis or stochastic modeling.
Quantification of some of the strategic benefits, such as mitigation of market power is more
difficult, but procedures have been developed recently to capture these types of benefits. Effort
by CA ISO and the development of TEAM approach for benefit quantification of transmission
projects is a good example of the recent efforts.
In summary, current analytical models capture most of the primary and strategic benefits of the
new transmission projects. These models utilize the expected value approach and, therefore,
tend to average extreme low probability/high impact events. However, extreme market
volatility and system events can be very costly to society and the societal risk preference and
tolerance is not captured in current models. Furthermore, cost of such events multiplied by their
probability will under-estimate the financial and social significance of these events and their
long term financial dislocation. Extreme market volatility can be very costly to society, such as
2001 California market dysfunction with $20 to $40 billion cost. The value of transmission in
mitigating societal impact from these types of events is not captured in current production cost
simulation models.
Reliability benefits of new transmission in strengthening the grid and reducing the likelihood of
the impact of extreme multiple contingency events is also not considered or quantified in
benefit-cost analysis. A good example is the 2003 Northeast Blackout with $5 to $10 billion cost.
Another type of benefit that is not captured in the dynamic impacts of a large transmission
project is the natural gas price reduction when the transmission project provides access to
significant amount of renewable resources, or production from clean coal generation plants
with CO2 sequestration. Such projects may reduce the demand on natural gas significantly and
therefore reduce the price for this fuel. Another dynamic impact is the development of
additional generation capacity in the exporting region when a new transmission project is
constructed.
5.2. Methods to Improve Benefit Quantification of Transmission

Projects
The research identified several research methods that can augment existing benefit
quantification approaches to quantify the full range of transmission project benefits.
A summary of these methods is presented below.
37
1. Use of Social Rate of Discount for Calculating Present Worth of Benefits of
Transmission Projects.
o Transmission projects produce societal benefits and are a long life asset. Use of
transmission is subject to open access or common carrier rules such that
transmission owners cannot reserve transmission for their own exclusive use.
Transmission is hence a public good and use of social rate of discount as opposed
to the higher cost of capital is appropriate.
2. Fuel Diversity Benefit Quantification.
o The marginal fuel for electricity generation is natural gas. Addition of large
amounts of renewables will displace fossil fuels which, in turn, reduce cost of
natural gas (price elasticity) and reduced power costs (more efficient dispatch).
These benefits can be quantified and linked to large regional transmission
projects.
3. Extreme Reliability Event Mitigation—Reduced Vulnerability to Multiple System
Contingency Events.
o Power systems are generally designed to meet N-1 or N-2 criteria. Extreme
events, such as the August 2003 Northeast blackout and the 1996 Western
Interconnection blackout were all multiple contingency events. Additional
transmission projects would help mitigate the magnitude, duration, and
footprint of blackouts. This can be estimated by simulating the reduction in
blackout footprint from extreme events with addition of transmission.
4. Market Risk Mitigation Quantification.
o Market prices are volatile. Societal risk tolerance to runaway market prices or
market dysfunctions is limited. Individually and societally, insurance vehicles
help mitigate such risks. Additional transmission will help mitigate against
market dysfunction and runaway market prices.
5. Dynamic Analysis Application to Transmission.
o Use of dynamic analysis methods to recognize changing benefit streams over the
life a transmission asset can be used to quantify benefits of major new regional
The research also identified methods to generate stakeholder and policy consensus to value
strategic benefits of transmission projects. Such methods can be used in addition to or in
combination with quantification methods discussed above. The research project results
identified two methods for generating stakeholder consensus.
1. Application of Delphi or Other Methods to Generate Stakeholder Consensus on

Strategic Benefits.
o Transmission project strategic benefits, such as insurance against contingencies,
are not easily quantified. However, there is general acceptance that there are
strategic benefits resulting from transmission projects. Application of Delphi or
other methods can be used to develop consensus on level of strategic benefits
38
that should be assigned to transmission projects, as a percentage of total cost of
the project.
2. Resource Portfolio Analysis.
o Portfolio construction and analysis is commonly used in the financial industry to
develop investment portfolios that perform well under a variety of scenarios.
Portfolio analysis methods can be used to evaluate benefits of transmission
projects under a variety of future scenarios and hence better inform policy and
decision makers.
Methods to produce policy and stakeholder consensus such as application of Delphi and
Portfolio Analysis can be used instead of the more rigorous but resource intensive
quantification methods discussed above.
39
40
6.0 Application Of New Methods For Benefit Quantification
The methods listed in Section 5 above could be applied in the benefit quantification of new
transmission projects, as described in the following sections.
6.1. Public Good – Long Asset Life Benefit—Use of Social Rate of

Discount
Transmission projects have characteristics of providing public good. This can be attributed to
the benefits of transmission – reliability, market efficiency, access to regional markets, meeting
societal and public policy goals, and how transmission assets are used – common carrier, no
property rights. Hence, it is appropriate to use a social rate of discount to calculate the present
worth of benefits. Application of a social rate of discount does not require any change in
methodology. However, regulatory and policy support for the concept is critical to its use and
application. At a minimum, project proponents should calculate present value of benefits using
both social rate of discount and traditional cost of capital to provide a perspective on the
sensitivity of calculated benefits to selection of discount rate. Use of social discount rates to
calculate present worth of benefit streams of projects which provide a public good rather than
private property rights is well-accepted in other basic infrastructure industries, such as highway
construction, wastewater treatment, dams, flood control projects, and other public interest
investments.
Social discount rates more appropriately value the long term benefits that transmission projects
provide to society than does current practice of reliance on the utility weighted cost of capital.
This is due in part to the fact that current open access policies applicable to the transmission
system mean that the benefits of new transmission lines accrue to society as a whole as the lines
are now operated as common carriers. This is in stark contrast to the period prior to open access
when ownership of transmission also meant reservation of use of lines by owners for private
use. Today, the benefits to the transmission line owner are limited to a regulated return on
invested capital.
Transmission projects have useful operating lives in excess of fifty years and benefit society at
large, i.e., they are a public good. A summary of the research rationale for use of social rate of
discount for evaluating transmission projects is listed below:
o Currently benefits are present-worth using cost of capital, generally in the 10%
range.
o Adoption of a social rate of discount to estimate present value of benefits of
transmission projects will recognize the public good nature of transmission
projects.
o Transmission projects are long life—50 plus years. Benefits start to accrue as use
of line increases over time. Current methods discount future benefits that occur
beyond the first 10–years of project life to a point where they are not
consequential.
41
o With a 10% discount rate, total present value of all benefits beyond 10-years in a
50-year project life is approximately 38% present worth of benefits.
o A social rate of discount, generally 3 to 5% is used to evaluate long life public
works and public goods projects such as dams, roads, bridges.
o Public or societal benefits of transmission projects include fuel diversity,
common carrier use, integration of renewables, insurance against extreme events,
and meeting public policy goals.
o The present value of benefits using a 5% social discount rate are 60 to 70% higher
than using a 10% cost of capital.
The application of a social rate of discount can be illustrated by calculating present value of
benefits using different discount rates. If a project has annual benefits of $50 million, the present
value of benefits over a 30-year economic life using a 10% discount rate (cost of capital) is
$472 million. However, if a 5% discount rate is used (social rate of discount), the present value
of the same stream of benefits is $769 million or more than 60% higher. The present value of
benefits under different discount rate assumptions for a project with a 30-year life and
$50 million in annual benefits are shown in Figure 2 below.
769
Present Value 591

472
(Million $’s)
5% 7.5% 10%
Discount Rate
F igure 2. P res ent V alue of B enefits Us ing Different Dis c ount R ates —30-year life, $50 million
Annual B enefit
The social rate of discount is a function of per capita consumption growth, the elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption and the probability of survival of the average consumer from
one period to the next. For public works projects, discount rates of 3 to 5% have been used
historically. For U.S., the social rate of discount is around 5%.
6.2. Fuel Diversity Benefit

For fuel diversity benefit of a transmission project, assessment is needed to quantify the amount
of natural gas usage at a regional level with and without project. Then, taking into account both
the decrease in the amount of natural gas used in the power system and price elasticity for
natural gas, the impact of the transmission project in decreasing the price of the natural gas can
be forecasted. For example, the Tehachapi Transmission Project is for the development of
4,350 MW of wind generation. Assuming an average of 35% capacity factor, the annual
production from this much new wind power will be 13.3 billion kWh.
42
The California gross system power for 2006 shows that approximately 107 billion kWh was
produced from natural gas in-state 29. Therefore the Tehachapi Transmission Project has the
potential to reduce by 12.4% the gas consumption for power production. Furthermore, gas for
electric production is about 40% of total California natural gas consumption. Therefore, the
impact of 4,350 MW of new wind generation will be to reduce the total natural gas consumption
of California by about 4.8%.
In a recent study, the price elasticity for natural gas is estimated to be at 0.8 to 2.0%. 30 If we
make a conservative assumption of 1% price reduction for 1% demand reduction for natural
gas, then 4.8% reduction in natural gas consumption due to 4,350 MW of wind generation will
reduce the price for natural gas by 4.8%. Assuming a gas price of $6/MMBtu, this is a reduction
of $0.29/MMBtu. With wind providing 13B kWh to California and assuming no other change,
electricity produced by gas will reduce from 107 billion kWh to 94 billion kWh. Assuming a
heat rate of 9,000 BTU/kWh, the $0.29/MMBtu price reduction translates to an annual cost
saving of about $250 million.
Figure 3 presents the above example for calculation of fuel diversity benefit.
Example of Fuel Diversity

Benefit Calculation
 Integrate 4,500 MW of renewables (e.g., Tehachapi Wind)
 Estimated annual production ~ 13 Billion KWh (approximately 35% CF)
 Electricity production Using Gas in California
– Base case ~ 107 Billion KWh
– With Renewables ~ 94 Billion KWh
 Reduction in Gas for Power Plants ~ 12 %
 Price elasticity of natural gas 1% demand reduction equals 0.8 – 2%
price reduction*
 Gas for electric production as a % of CA gas ~ 40 %
consumption
 % Reduction in gas usage = .12 * .4 ~ 4.8%
 Gas Price Reduction = 4.8%
(assume 1% for 1% reduction)
 Gas Price
– Base Case $6/M2BTU
– With Renewables $5.70/M2BTU
 Cost Savings for remaining 94 Billion KWh = 94 Billion KWh * 9,000 BTU/KWh
assuming average 9,000 BTU/KWh X $0.30/M2BTU ~ $250 Million/year
Note: Including price impact on non-electric sector, benefit will be 2.5 times, or $625 million.
Illustration ignores timing and present value for simplicity.
*Wiser, Bolinger, and St. Clair, January 2005, Easing the Natural Gas Crisis: Reducing Natural Gas Prices through
Increased Deployment of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
F igure 3. E x ample of F uel Divers ity B enefit C alc ulation
29. 2006 Net System Power Report, 4/12/07, Energy Commission Publication CEC-300-2007-007
30. Wiser, Bolinger, and St. Clair, January 2005, Easing the Natural Gas Crisis: Reducing Natural Gas
Prices through Increased Development of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Ernest Orlando
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL-56756)
43
If the price reduction benefit is also assumed for gas consumed in other sectors, then this annual
benefit can exceed $600 million over 30-year life of Tehachapi transmission line. The present
value of this benefit using an annual discount rate of 10% will be over $6.2 billion, while the
total cost of the line is estimated to be $1.8 billion.
6.3. Quantification of Reliability Improvement

Transmission system performance is usually analyzed for N-1 and N-2 events, but not for
extreme cascading events. For reliability improvement from extreme multiple contingency
events, research is needed to assess impact of a new transmission project in mitigating multiple
cascading events contingency. This may be estimated, for example, by estimating network
carrying capacity under multiple contingencies, say N-5 or N-6, and estimating load and
customer loss with and without major new transmission projects.
To calculate the reliability benefit due to reduced vulnerability to extreme events, the analysis
steps are as follows.
a. Develop a base model including loads, resources, transmission.

b. Define an extreme event, e.g., loss of PACI, Montana-Oregon transmission, Four
Corners transmission, generation trip for a large base load unit such as Palo Verde
Nuclear Power Plant.
c. Simulate an extreme event with the base case model to estimate load shedding and
customer loss due to service interruptions or blackouts from extreme events.
d. Change base case by adding major new transmission lines (one or two or three).
e. Re-run model revised base case with new transmission lines and the same extreme
event.
f. Estimate blackout footprint in terms of load shedding, customer loss.
g. Calculate benefit of new transmission in terms of Reduction in Load Loss times
Economic Value of Load Loss.
This is a major analytic challenge in terms of data and resources needed for the modeling. There
are many modeling and data issues: data, resources for analysis, probability of occurrence.
This approach can also be utilized retrospectively, for example in the analysis of the 2003
Northeast blackout. The estimated cost of the blackout was $5 to 10 billion 31. If the network is
simulated assuming one or more major new transmission lines, for example, American Electric
Power’s proposed 765 kV line, then the impact on the blackout footprint can be estimated.
Assuming that the addition of major new lines reduces the simulated load loss by 40%, then, as
a first approximation, the reliability benefit will be a 40% reduction of the loss or $2 to 4 billion.
The steps in the application of this approach are enumerated in Figure 4.
31. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, April 2004, Final Report on the August 14, 2003
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations
44
Quantification of Reliability Benefit Due to Reduced
Vulnerability to Extreme Events – 2003 Blackout
Example
 2003 Eastern Interconnection Blackout cost $5-10 billion

 Network model of 2003 system
 Simulate blackout condition – N-n contingency
 Determine load loss and customer loss as determined by
model – correlate with actual experience
 Add major new transmission lines (one or two or three)
 Re-run model and estimate load loss and customer loss
 Benefit estimate = Load Loss Reduction Ratio times
Economic Loss Estimate of $5 to 10 billion
 If load loss reduced by 40%, benefit of $2 to 4 billion
Issues: Data, resources for analysis, probability of occurrence
Figure 4. Quantification of Reliability Benefit Due to Reduced Vulnerability to Extreme Events
This quantification approach focuses on network carrying capacity under multiple

contingencies with and without the new transmission project and the resulting impact of an
extreme event in terms of blackout footprint.
Alternatively, a policy or expert consensus approach can be used for this benefit as being equal
to a fixed percentage of project cost. This can also be estimated using the concept of reserve
margins in resource planning. Generation is generally planned to a reserve margin of 15%, that
is capacity should be 115% of peak load forecast. If one assumes a similar transmission reserve
margin as a means of insurance against multiple contingencies or extreme events, then 15% of
project costs can be assigned to benefits attributed to mitigation of extreme events. Such an
approach requires further analysis and policy acceptance for application to transmission
projects.
6.4. Benefit of Market Risk Mitigation

For estimating the benefit related to market volatility mitigation of a new transmission project,
the analysis methodology is conceptually similar to the one outlined to quantify extreme event
benefits for reliability. The analysis steps to estimate benefits of market risk mitigation due to
addition of major new transmission projects are:
(a.) Define base case and estimate locational margin prices (LMPs).
(b.) Define an extreme event and rerun base case to estimate locational margin prices
under extreme event.
(c.) Add new transmission lines in base case.
(d.) Estimate locational margin prices under same extreme event defined in (b) above
but with new transmission lines as defined in (c).
45
(e.) Estimate societal value due to reduced market price spikes as measured by LMPs
and resulting reduced societal cost of extreme events.
In effect, such a methodology quantifies the benefit of new transmission during extreme events
by reducing congestion, market power, and price volatility.
The insurance industry utilizes extreme event probability distributions for hurricanes and
earthquakes to determine insurance premium for such events. These analysis and approaches
are data dependent. In the absence of such data to calculate the insurance value of avoiding
extreme price volatility due to the construction of new transmission projects, a policy consensus
approach may be useful. Such policy consensus can be generated via polling of policy makers or
more formal approaches such as the Delphi method, value at risk and risk tolerance analysis.
Consensus may translate the insurance value of a transmission project to be equal to a
percentage of project cost.
6.5. Dynamic Analysis

In most production simulation models used for estimating the benefit from a new transmission
project, new generic generation is added to balance load and resources. However, this static
modeling of new generation does not take into consideration changes in generation
development due to the construction of the new transmission line. There is need for dynamic
planning models where the feedback from the construction of a new transmission project on the
location of new generation plants would be taken into account.
Without such feedback, the amount of new generation construction in the exporting region will
be underestimated and the benefit from a new transmission line understated. Furthermore,
transmission projects have long life. There is need to incorporate benefits from unanticipated
uses over the project life. This could be done based on historical experience from the
construction of older transmission projects and their impact on generation expansion and
interregional power trading.
For incorporating dynamic planning benefits of new transmission project, the analytical steps
are:
a. Define base case for studies.

b. Estimate benefits with proposed transmission project.
c. Modify future year base case to reflect dynamic impacts, for example new generation
capacity construction.
d. Estimate change in benefits.
e. Assess other dynamic factors either individually or using scenarios and weights.
6.6. Delphi Method

The challenge of addressing difficult to quantify variables has been addressed in the
management science and decision analysis fields. One approach that has been used is the
application of Delphi methodology. The Delphi method relies on a panel of experts to assign
46
weights and worth (out of a total of 100) to different decision criteria or variables. The results
are shared among the panel and they are offered an opportunity to reassign weights and worth
based on consensus and results from the first iteration. Generally, 2 to 4 iterations result in
views converging.
The Delphi approach could be adapted to assign values to different benefit categories by
stakeholders or constituent groups. Benefit categories could be pre-specified, for example
production costs, fuel diversity, reliability and market volatility. The stakeholders then assign
values out of a total of 100 and the process is repeated in an effort to narrow the differences and
move to a converged view that can be supported by stakeholders.
Delphi or other stakeholder consensus building could hence be utilized to incorporate societal
or strategic benefits. Figure 5 illustrate the application of Delphi and stakeholder consensus
approach for such an application. In the example shown in Figure 11, there is a consensus that
societal benefits for this transmission project under consideration should be valued at 26.25% of
the project cost. Therefore, the primary benefits from the project have to be equal or larger than
73.75% of the project cost, for this project to be economical and cost effective.
Stakeholder Consensus – Delphi

Approach
 Assemble stakeholders
 Define societal benefit % Cost Reduction of Transmission Project Due to
categories, e.g., Societal Benefits
1. Fuel Diversity Stakeholder
Benefit
2. Reliability – reduced Category 1 2 3 4 Average
vulnerability to extreme events 1 5 10 10 20 11.25
3. Market Volatility – reduced 2 5 5 10 10 7.5
3 5 10 10 5 7.5
incidence of runaway prices Total 15 25 30 35 26.25
 Each stakeholder to assign
Cost reduction due
value to each benefit category 100% to societal benefits
as % of project cost
26.25% 73.75%
 Share results and repeat
exercise until convergence
 Result – consensus on range of
societal benefits to offset
transmission project costs
Project Cost Project Cost Net of
Societal Benefits
F igure 5. S takeholder C ons ens us —Delphi Approac h
6.7. Resource Portfolio Analysis

Transmission provides resource diversity which should help mitigate risks over a wide range of
scenarios. Risk management using a portfolio approach is commonly used in financial markets.
47
It can be utilized in the electric power industry to develop a robust portfolio of resource options
that performs well under a wide range of future scenarios.
The value of portfolio diversification is implicitly recognized in the electric power industry, but
its application is generally through policy mandates such as RPS or load management goals.
The emphasis in this report has been on quantification of strategic benefits of a new
transmission project, rather than on portfolio approach to planning and resource development
that looks into diversification to reduce overall risk and prevent extreme costs. A portfolio
approach tested against a range of future scenarios and uncertainties could be applied to
generate policy consensus on need for transmission.
In the financial markets diversification and allocation of asset among different investment
categories to achieve a low level of risk correlation between asset classes is the underpinning of
portfolio construction to maximize risk adjusted returns. It is estimated that asset allocation can
account for up to 80 percent of investment returns with market timing and individual stock
selection contributing only the remaining 20 percent. This is why modern investment theory
calls for portfolios based on overall risk/reward characteristics instead of that of individual
stocks.
In the electric industry diversification of the supply resources has also become an important
element in planning for uncertainty. Utilities, instead of concentrating their supply on one or
two type of resources such as coal and oil/gas, nowadays have a portfolio of resources such as
demand side management, renewable resources, nuclear, coal, hydro, and gas. In addition, the
high voltage transmission system has enabled many utilities to import significant portion of
their need from other utilities and/or merchant plants. Seasonal power exchanges have also
provided benefit due to diverse load and resource patterns of different regions.
This resource diversification have decreased the risk due to fuel price uncertainty, performance
of different types of generation resources, load uncertainty, major generation failure, and
natural events such as fire, earthquake, etc. Tools used in planning for uncertainty has included
scenario planning, sensitivity analysis, decision analysis and of course various probabilistic
production simulation models. However, the basic element in evaluation and approval of new
transmission and generation projects has been benefit-cost analysis for a specific project.
There is need to carryout research on application of modern portfolio management to determine

the optimum allocation of resources into various asset categories such as demand side, different
type of generation and transmission projects for import/export of energy. Correct allocation into
different type of resources may be more important than precise quantification of benefit-cost of
individual projects in minimizing the overall risk of meeting the needs of customers. An
optimum allocation among different classes of resources, with low level of correlation, may
protect the customers in an uncertain future better than selecting projects with highest benefit-
cost and ending up with most of the resources being in one or two technology categories.
48
The primary goal in the resource planning may become the determination of optimum mix of
resources of different categories. Then, within this mix, select the best projects for each category,
to minimize the overall risk of the portfolio of resources.
A summary assessment of portfolio analysis as applied to the allocation of assets in an electric

system is presented below:
a. Other industries, such as insurance finance, use portfolio approaches for risk
mitigation.
b. Portfolio approaches depend on established historical data base to correlate variables
– application to transmission requires research and data. As we gain more
experience with market operations, data may becomes more available.
c. In planning for societal risk management, a diversified portfolio of resources may be
more important than the precise quantification of benefit-cost of an individual
project.
d. Portfolio resource diversification should be based on overall societal risk/reward
characteristics instead of benefit-cost analyses of individual projects.
e. There is a need to carryout research on the application of modern portfolio
management to determine the portfolio of resources such as demand side program,
various generation technologies including renewable resources, and transmission to
access resources from other regions.
f. Portfolio analysis steps
- Resource allocation – mix of demand, renewables, gas, coal, nuclear,
transmission
- Resource risk – price, performance, probability
- Portfolio performance under alternative futures.
The results of such analysis could then be used to generate policy consensus on need for new
transmission that could be mandated. This will have a result similar to what happened in the
case of Tehachapi transmission.
6.8. Recommendation on Use of Research Results

Figure 6 shows the areas that results from this research can be utilized. This includes:
strengthening current CAISO TEAM methods, outreach to policymakers, utilization of new
approaches to improve benefit quantification, support additional research on dynamic and
portfolio analysis, and policy acceptance, especially the use of social rate of discount to calculate
the present value of transmission projects.
Recommendation is made to augment TEAM’s benefit quantification in: using social rate of
discount, fuel diversity, and Delphi method for low probability/high impact and other strategic
benefits. Figure 6 lists these recommendations.
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Recommendations To Augment
Benefit Quantification Methods
Public Good
 Use of social rate of discount to calculate the present value of
benefits for the new transmission project
Fuel Diversity
 Include the benefit from potential decrease of natural gas price
due to the construction of a new transmission project that
integrates a significant amount of new renewable resources
Low Probability / High Impact Events
 Add risk mitigation benefit to society for low probability/high
impact extreme market events and extreme system multiple
contingency events – scenarios or Delphi method for
stakeholder consensus
Figure 6. Recommendations to Augment Benefit Quantification Methods
6.9. Use of Improved Benefit Quantification Methods

Improved benefit quantification can be useful for:
o Calculating and quantifying the distribution of benefits among project

participants and jurisdictions.
o Demonstrating and sharing benefits for direct and indirect participants and
critical stakeholders.
o Enabling each utility or jurisdiction to analyze benefits of projects (or package of
projects).
o Providing guidance on cost allocation among multiple participants and
jurisdictions.
o Selecting cost recovery methodology.
6.10. Recommendation on Additional Research

Additional research is needed to improve transmission benefit quantification. Research areas
include
a. Dynamic Analysis
o Recognize the impact of new transmission projects on the construction of new
generation capacity in exporting regions
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b. Portfolio Analysis
o Adapt portfolio analysis methods utilized in the financial industry to
transmission – construct and assess performance of portfolios including demand
response, new generation (renewables and fuel based), new transmission, energy
conservation
c. Quantification of Extreme Event Benefits (Insurance Value)
o Reliability – benefit of new transmission in reducing blackout footprint due to
extreme (N-n) events and the societal value of reduced vulnerability
o Market Volatility -- benefit of new transmission in reducing market volatility due
to extreme (N-n) events and the societal value of reduced vulnerability to run-
away market prices
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7.0 Cost Allocation And Cost Recovery
7.1. Framework for Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery
Cost responsibility for different types of transmission projects varies depending on the type of
transmission project. Figure 7 provides a framework for who should pay for new transmission
projects.
COST RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSMISSION PROJECTS

Type of Transmission Project Cost Responsibility
 Requested Upgrades Specific Requesting Party
 Generator Interconnection Generator Owner
 Reliability Customers of local utilities and RTO
 Economic Project Beneficiaries
F igure 7. C os t R es pons ibility of T rans mis s ion P rojec ts
For economic transmission projects, the goal should be to allocate costs to project beneficiaries.
The principle of beneficiaries should pay or that cost causers should be cost bearers applies.
For economic transmission projects, the ownership of the project could be: the utility in whose
service area the project is located, a merchant owner, or joint transmission owners when the
transmission line goes through several service areas and the line in each service area is owned
by the utility of that service area.
Cost recovery could be based on: transmission access charge, contract rights, subscription or
auction. In an RTO, if the transmission is a reliability upgrade and is needed to maintain the
integrity of the transmission grid, the costs are rolled in to the transmission charge. Costs can be
rolled-in: (a) fully, (b) partially with remaining costs allocated to zones or beneficiaries, and (c)
by using a voltage test and either 100% of the cost is rolled-in to an RTO wide rate or 100% into
zonal rate(s).
Alternatives for cost allocation of economic type transmission projects in an RTO could be:
1. The project sponsor pays for upgrade similar to requested upgrade.

2. RTO recommends the cost allocation; and if the beneficiaries agree to pay for the
upgrade, then the project is developed. In this method, cost responsibility among the
affected load serving entities could be in proportion to their respective benefits or to
their respective load shares in terms of energy or peak load.
3. RTO determines the cost allocation; and beneficiaries are obligated to pay for the
upgrade.
4. X% of the cost is rolled into RTO base rate and the remainder of cost allocated among
beneficiaries.
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5. 100% of the cost is rolled into RTO base rate.
As above alternatives for cost allocation shows, the size and distribution of the project benefits
may be utilized for cost allocation among beneficiaries. Therefore, improved benefits
quantification will be useful in: 1) providing guidance on cost allocation among multiple
participants and jurisdictions, and 2) selecting cost recovery methodology.
7.2. Cost Recovery

There are many ways to set rates for cost recovery of the transmission projects. The most
commonly used method is cost of service ratemaking. This method is used by FERC and almost
every state jurisdiction. The basic equation for cost of service ratemaking is:
Annual Cost = (Depreciated Rate Base x allowed + Expenses + Taxes

weighted cost of capital) +Depreciation
The cost of service is then allocated over billing determinants. Currently, there are three
alternative transmission rates used in different jurisdictions:
a. Energy—postage stamp.
b. Demand—annual or monthly peak demand.
c. Distance—Megawatt-mile.
Cost recovery is accomplished through rate cases that are submitted by the transmission owner
(TO) utilities to the commission in each state. In addition, FERC filing may also be required to
establish the rate for use of transmission. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over transmission
rates. To eliminate transmission rate pancaking (paying multiple wheeling charges for a path),
FERC has been encouraging formation of ISOs and RTOs.
To stimulate the construction of new transmission lines, FERC has indicated that it will allow
performance-based regulation proposals and consider innovative transmission pricing
proposals including a higher rate of return on equity, levelized rates, accelerated depreciation
and incremental pricing for new transmission projects.
7.3. Multiple Participants and Jurisdictions Project

Most large transmission projects provide benefits to multiple utilities that may be in single
jurisdiction or sometimes in multiple jurisdictions. For example, the Tehachapi Transmission
Project is being sponsored by SCE, however, all utilities in CA ISO jurisdiction will benefit from
this large project as they will be able to sign contracts with wind developers in the Tehachapi
area. On the other hand, the Frontier Line is likely to involve multiple utilities in multiple
jurisdictions.
Figure 8 shows a framework for the use of benefit quantification for both cost effectiveness and
cost allocation under single and multiple utilities and single and multiple jurisdictions.
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Framework for Use of Benefit Quantification for
Project Cost Effectiveness and Cost Allocation
Transmission Project
Single Utility Multiple Utilities
Single Jurisdiction Multiple Jurisdictions
COST Demonstrate  Demonstrate cost effectiveness  Demonstrate overall project

EFFECTIVENESS cost cost effectiveness
effectiveness  Demonstrate cost effectiveness
for each jurisdiction
COST Costs allocated  Costs allocated to all transmission  Costs allocated to each
ALLOCATION to utility customers within jurisdiction jurisdiction based on
participation or benefits
COST Costs Costs recovered via:  Costs recovered via rolled-in
RECOVERY recovered via a. 100% of the cost is rolled-in to an RTO rates within each jurisdiction, or
rolled-in rates wide rate x% rolled-in and remainder
b. X% of the cost is rolled-in to an RTO recovered from one or more
wide rate and the remainder to the rate zones that receive significant
of one or more zones that receive part of the benefits
significant part of the benefits
c. Using a voltage test, either 100% of the
cost is rolled-in to an RTO wide rate or
100% into zonal rates
F igure 8. F ramework for Us e of B enefit Quantific ation for P rojec t C os t E ffec tivenes s and C os t
Alloc ation
For multi jurisdiction projects, the preferred way for the cost allocation will be first to allocate
the cost to each of the jurisdictions and then allow each jurisdiction to allocate their share of cost
among utilities and other users based on that jurisdiction’s cost allocation methodology. Cost
allocation to the multiple jurisdictions could be based on the following alternatives:
a. Participation Ratio
- Allocate costs and MW capacity of the transmission according to participation
ratio or native load ratio.
b. Subscription Open Season
- Participation based on requested subscription (need and benefits assessment
by each utility), each subscriber performs individual benefit assessment. Cost
allocated based on the requested level of subscription.
c. Auction Methodology
- This method promotes MW allocations to participants who will get the
highest benefit from the utilization of the new transmission project.
7.4. Example of Auction Approach for Cost Allocation

One efficient way to allocate the use and cost of a new multi-participant or multi-jursidictional
transmission project would be the auction approach.
The project sponsor or RTO can establish an auction to allocate the capacity that becomes
available from a new transmission line. Participants, based on their own assessment of how
55
much benefit they will receive from the new project, can submit bids into the auction process.
Capacity of the line will be allocated to users who value this capacity most.
At least two auction methods can be designed for this capacity allocation. First is a round of
ascending price auction similar to CA ISO annual FTR auction. Second is the single price and
quantity bids auction.
In the first method, the auction starts for a given period with a $/MW-year payment at a level
close or just below the annual revenue requirement for the project. Each period could be one
year, or to encourage multi-year power contract and construction of new generation, it could be
multiple of 5-years for a total of say 30-years.
If the result from the first round of bids is a total MW of bids higher than the transmission line
capacity, the payment will be increased and the second round of the auction will be carried out.
The auction round will be repeated until there is a balance between total bids and the online
capacity available. This last round will determine the line capacity allocation amongst different
parties and the payment for each MW-year.
The same auction process will then be carried out for the next period (next year or next 5-year
period). This per period allocation could be repeated to cover the entire economic life of the
project (or the duration for repayment of entire capital cost of the project).
Total payments generated from the auction over the periods have to be equal or greater than
total revenue requirements to show that the project is cost effective. (Project sponsor has to
come up with fixed revenue requirement. The project cost has, therefore, to include reasonable
contingency cost. The allowed rate of return may be somewhat higher than normal allowed
rate to compensate for fixed cost for the construction of the line.)
If the total payments generated in an auction are higher than the fixed revenue requirements
and variable O&M cost, then the overpayments will be retained by project sponsor or RTO for
decreasing the cost of grid reliability improvement projects.
If the total payments generated in an auction are not sufficient to cover the revenue requirement
of the project then the project should not be developed, since the beneficiaries are not willing to
pay the total cost of the project.
In the second type of auction, each bidder submits a payment and quantity for each period.
Based on all bids received, a demand curve is developed for each period. The intersection of the
demand curve and the capacity of the transmission line would determine the payment level for
each MW and the amount of capacity to be allocated to each one of the winning bidders for this
period.
The auction process is repeated for each period until the last period. Again, if the total
payments are higher than the total revenue requirement, a process will be developed to use this
surplus fund.
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In both auctions, every participant pays the same market clearing price for a given period. The
auction provides a mean to allocate the line capacity to participants who value such capacity
most.
A description of the Cost Allocation Methodologies and Cost Recovery, and research
recommendations are in Appendix C.
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8.0 Framework For Incorporating Benefit Quantification
Enhancements In Transmission Planning
Current benefit quantification methods primarily focus on quantification through use of

production cost simulation type models. This tends to understate benefits as was also
concluded in an October 2007 report prepared for the Australian Energy Market Commission
by The Brattle Group 32.
Within the areas where cost-benefit tests are applied, there is a range of approaches
taken to the measurement of benefits. Most systems follow a “traditional” approach that
models only savings in production costs. However, it is increasingly recognised {sic}
that this approach underestimates the benefits of transmission upgrades, which can also
include increased reliability, enhanced competition, lower generation investment costs
and other factors. The most comprehensive cost-benefit framework formally specified
by a transmission planner we are aware of is the Transmission Economic Assessment
Methodology (“TEAM”) recently adopted by the California ISO.
While the TEAM approach is progressive as acknowledged above, it could be further
augmented to fully consider the full range of benefits of major new transmission projects.
To incorporate benefit quantification enhancements in transmission planning, the following

framework is proposed.
1. Strengthen current methods such as TEAM.
The CA ISO TEAM method has been developed over a period of time. This could be
strengthened as follows:
a. Incorporate use of social rate of discount in calculating present value of benefits.

This will more explicitly recognize the public good aspect of transmission
projects, including long asset life benefit.
b. Explicitly calculate fuel diversity benefit and reflect that in benefit calculations.
c. Pending research dynamic analysis and quantification of extreme event benefits,
utilize a stakeholder consensus approach to assign value to these strategic
benefits. Such a value could be developed using a formal Delphi approach, or
scenario analysis, or less formal stakeholder consensus.
2. Initiate research into use of dynamic analysis approaches that could then be used to
strengthen current methods.
3. Initiate research into development of resource portfolios that perform well under a wide
range of scenarios and contingencies. Results of resource attributes of the low risk
32. The Brattle Group, October 2007, International Review of Transmission Planning Arrangements, – A
report for the Australian Energy Market Commission, page 6.
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portfolio could be used to develop public policy consensus on need for new
transmission, for example to access renewables and other markets.
4. Initiate research on quantifying extreme event benefits (Value at Risk, Insurance
Premium, and other methods).
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9.0 Project Outreach and Briefings
The research project benefited from feedback and guidance received formally and informally
during the project. The following briefings and presentations were made during the project.
A. Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). The TAC was convened in-person twice during
the research project. These meetings took place January 19, 2007 and September 10, 2007.
In addition, TAC was consulted informally on key issues and provided briefings and
draft report for review, comment and feedback.
B. Briefings were made to the Frontier Line team twice during the research project.
C. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS) Industry Advisory
Board was briefed on the project at its regularly scheduled meeting on November 8,
2007.
D. The CA ISO management and staff briefing on February 27, 2008.
E. The CPUC briefing on April 23, 2008.
F. Briefing for Western Electricity Coordinating Council Transmission Expansion Planning
Policy Committee on June 12, 2008.
G. Briefing for the Energy Commission management and Commissioner Byron on July 2,
2008.
The CPUC has a current proceeding “Order Instituting Investigation (OII) on the Commission’s
Own Motion to actively promote the development of transmission infrastructure to provide
access to renewable energy resources in California. The CPUC’s Division of Ratepayers (DRA)
filed a motion in March 2008, to supplement the record in that proceeding to “…consider and
discuss the ongoing quantification analyses being done under the auspices of the Transmission
Research Program of the Public Interest Energy Research (PIER) Program administered by the
California Energy Commission (CEC), entitled Strategic Benefits Quantification of Transmission
Projects. The particular documents DRA wishes to make a part of the record are: (1) Project
Introduction Briefing, Strategic Benefits Quantification of Transmission Projects, presented by
Virgil Rose, Senior Advisor, at the California Public Utilities Commission, April 23, 2008; (2)
Consortium for Electric Reliability Solutions, Strategic Benefits Quantification for Transmission
Projects, Electric Policy (sic) Group, project briefing for the California Public Utilities
Commission, April 23, 2008.”
DRA’s motion can be viewed by clicking this link:

http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/MOTION/84041.pdf.
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10.0 Utilization of Research Results
The benefits of this research will be realized through use of research results. This can be done in
transmission projects being considered in California and the Western grid. There are three key
elements. The first is application of the research to strengthen benefit quantification methods
used in California, for example, CA ISO’s TEAM approach. Second is the wide spread sharing
of research results through outreach and participation in different transmission forums to
discuss, debate and refine the proposed methods. Third is additional research on benefit
quantification methods such as portfolio analysis, dynamic planning, and extreme event benefit
quantification. Fourth is to advocate more transparent, inclusive and predictable planning
processes. A summary of uses of research results is presented below:
1. Strengthen Current Benefit Quantification Models, for example, by augmenting CA

ISO TEAM and other methods.
2. Brief stakeholders on benefits quantification methods and how to utilize new
approaches for improved benefits quantification.
3. Initiate research to improve benefits quantification, recognition, and sharing.
4. Promote transparent planning processes, for example, by supporting CA ISO efforts
for more transparency stakeholder participation and to standardizing planning
process.
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11.0 Key Conclusions And Research Recommendations
11.1. Recommendations for Benefit Quantification
1. Social Rate of Discount:
Since the transmission system has become a public good, the use of a social rate of
discount, instead of allowed weighted cost of capital, to calculate the present worth of
benefits of a new transmission project is recommended.
2. Screen Tools:
In early stages of the project, the use of a screening tool similar to the one developed by
PG&E for application to the Frontier Line (FEAST) can be very productive. Simple
spreadsheet-based tools will enable and empower project participants to carryout a
variety of analyses quickly, with the goal of developing and testing the benefit of
multiple alternatives. Spreadsheet tools are useful screening devices but are not a
substitute for detail production costing simulation for detailed benefit analysis. They
are, however, useful to perform quick what-if screening analysis and can test the impact
of the various types of benefits and risks.
Screening and current production cost simulation tools are capable of quantifying
primary benefits and some of the strategic benefits of a new transmission project. The
main missing benefit quantifications are:
o Risk mitigation for low probability/high impact extreme market events.

o Reliability improvement from extreme multiple contingency events.
o Fuel diversity benefit due to impact of significant renewable resources
development upon price of natural gas.
o Dynamic impact of transmission projects in the development of new generating
plants in the exporting region.
i. Additional Research
Initiate research into development of resource portfolios that perform well under a wide
range of scenarios and contingencies. Results of resource attributes of the low risk
portfolio could be used to develop public policy consensus on need for new
transmission, for example to access renewables and other markets.
Initiate research into use of dynamic analysis approaches that could then be used to
strengthen current methods.
Furthermore, initiate additional research on quantification of societal benefits of

transmission in providing insurance value against extreme events that are low
probability/high impact events.
Strengthening current TEAM:
65
The CA ISO TEAM method has been developed over a period of time. This could be
strengthened as follows:
a. Incorporate use of a social rate of discount in calculating present value of benefits.

This will more explicitly recognize the public good aspect of transmission projects,
including long asset life benefit.
b. Explicitly calculate fuel diversity benefit and reflect that in benefit calculations.
c. Pending research dynamic analysis and quantification of extreme event benefits,
utilize a stakeholder consensus approach to assign value to these strategic benefits.
Such a value could be developed using a formal Delphi approach, or scenario
analysis, or less formal stakeholder consensus.
11.2. Recommendations for Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery

In economic transmission projects, the principle of beneficiaries pay should be the basis for cost
allocation.
Attempts should be made to quantify primary and strategic benefits of transmission projects in
a transparent way so that project participants and beneficiaries can agree on the level of benefits
and who gets what share of these benefits and who pays what share of the costs.
If there is too much uncertainty in forecasting the size and distribution of benefits and/or some
of the important strategic benefits are difficult to quantify, then it may not be possible to
develop a consensus amongst beneficiaries on size and distribution of benefits. This may be
especially true with projects where there are multiple utilities and multiple jurisdictions.
To solve this difficult problem, three alternative approaches could be utilized:
Alternative Description
b. Participation Ratio Costs and MW of transmission capacity are allocated according
to participation ratio or native load ratio
c. Subscription Open Season Participation is based on requested subscription. Each
subscriber performs individual benefit-cost assessment.
d. Auction It is based on willingness to pay approach and on benefits
assessment by each entity. May result in revenues in excess of
costs. Such excess revenues are used for reliability improvement
projects or reallocated among participants. Auction promotes
MW allocation to participants with highest benefit.
There may be cases that exporting region, owners of surrounding area of right-away, or some of
the participants are negatively impacted by the construction of a new transmission line. This
may happen even if strategic benefits are included in the analysis. In such cases, side payments
to negatively impacted parties may be justified. These side payments could be in from of
improvement/construction of some infrastructures such as roads, parks, sport facilities, and
electrical reliability improvement projects.
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If an auction is utilized to allocate the capacity of the new transmission project, the revenues
from the auction will usually exceed project costs if the benefits are larger than costs. Such
excess revenues can be utilized for side payments or the cost of new infrastructure as side
payments.
67
Glossary
CCGT Combined Cycle with Combustion Turbines
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
CT Combustion Turbine
CERTS Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions
CPUC California Public Utility Commission
CSRTP CA ISO South Regional Transmission Plan
DPV2 Devers-Palo Verde No. 2
DRA Division of Ratepayer Advocates, CPUC
EPG Electric Power Group
FEAST Frontier Economic Analysis Screening Tool
FERC Federal Energy Resources Commission
FTR Firm Transmission Rights
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHG Greenhouse Gas
IGCC Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle
ISOs/RTOs Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission Operators
LMPs Locational Margin Prices
PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric Company
RPS Renewable Portfolio Standard
SCE Southern California Edison
SONGS San Onofre Nuclear Generation Station
TAC Transmission Access Charges
TEAM Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology TEAM
TO Transmission Owner
WECC Western Electricity Coordinating Council
WRTEP Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership
68
Bibliography
1. 1. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Cost Allocation, Sept 2007, A National Perspective On Allocating the
Costs of New Transmission Investment: Practice and Principles, p 1.
2. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004.
Economic Evaluation of Transmission Interconnection in a Restructured Market, California
Energy Commission (CEC-700-04-007). pages 10-12.
3. CA ISO Department of Market Analysis and Grid Planning, February 2005, Economic Evaluation
of the Devers-Palo Verde No. 2.
4. Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM), Anjali Sheffrin, June 14, 2004.
California Energy Commission IERP Workshop on 2004 Transmission Update.
5. Testimony of Lon W. House, November 22, 2005, Tipping Point Analysis and Attribute
Assessment for DPV No. 2, Office of Ratepayer Advocate’s Devers Palo Verde No. 2 Testimony
Vol. 3 of 3.
9. Economic Analysis Subcommittee for Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership,
Final Report April 27, 2007, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Frontier Line Possibilities.
13. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004,
Energy Commission CEC-700-04-007.
Prices through Increased Development of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, Ernest
Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL-56756)
17. The Brattle Group, October 2007, International Review of Transmission Planning Arrangements,
– A report for the Australian Energy Market Commission, page 6.
69
18. A Mathematical Theory of Saving, Frank P. Ramsey, Economic Journal 1928 (December) pages
543-559.
19. The Social Discount Rate, Andrew Caplia and John Leaky, Journal of Political Economy, 2004, Vol
112, No. 6
21. Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, Hal Varian, New York Times, December 14,
2006
22. The Social Discount Rate: Estimates for Nine Latin American Countries. Humberto Lopez, Policy
Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Office of
the Chief Economist, June 2008
25. Estimation of a Social Rate of Interest for India, Kula E. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 55(1):
91-99, 2004
26. Social Discount Rates for Six Major Countries, Evans, D. and H. Sezer, Applied Economic Letters,
11: 557-560, 2004
27. The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries” D. Evans,
Fiscal Studies, 26(2):197-224, 2005
28. A Time Preference Measure of the Social Discount Rate for the United Kingdom, David Evans
and Haluk Sezer. Applied Economics, 2002, 1026 P.34
70
Appendices
Appendix A Literature Search and References
Appendix B Benefit Assessment Methodologies
Appendix C Cost Allocation Methodologies and Cost Recovery
Appendix D Technology Options and Implications and Their Impacts
Appendix E Alternative Approaches Utilized for Transmission Project Approvals—

Transmission Planning and Review of Industry and Regulatory Changes
Appendix F Existing Process for Transmission Project Approvals and Case Histories
Appendix G Fact Sheet—Benefit Quantification and Cost Allocation Research Project
Appendix H Comparison of Electric Transmission with Gas and Telecommunications

Industries
Appendix A
Literature Search and References

Literature Search and References
1. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Cost Allocation, Sept 2007, A National Perspective On Allocating the
Costs of New Transmission Investment: Practice and Principles, p 1.
2. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004.
Energy Commission (CEC-700-04-007), pages 10-12.
3. CA ISO Department of Market Analysis and Grid Planning, February 2005, Economic Evaluation
of the Devers-Palo Verde No. 2.
4. Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM), Anjali Sheffrin, June 14, 2004.
California Energy Commission IERP Workshop on 2004 Transmission Update.
5. Testimony of Lon W. House, November 22, 2005, Tipping Point Analysis and Attribute
Assessment for DPV No. 2, Office of Ratepayer Advocate’s Devers Palo Verde No. 2 Testimony
Vol. 3 of 3.
8. Economic Analysis Subcommittee for Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership,
Final Report April 27, 2007, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Frontier Line Possibilities.
11. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004,
Energy Commission CEC-700-04-007.
14. The Brattle Group, October 2007, International Review of Transmission Planning Arrangements,
– A report for the Australian Energy Market Commission, page 6.
15. A Mathematical Theory of Saving, Frank P. Ramsey, Economic Journal 1928 (December) pages
543-559.
16. The Social Discount Rate, Andrew Caplia and John Leaky, Journal of Political Economy, 2004, Vol
112, No. 6
APA-1
18. Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, Hal Varian, New York Times, December 14,
2006
19. The Social Discount Rate: Estimates for Nine Latin American Countries. Humberto Lopez, Policy
Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Office of
the Chief Economist, June 2008
22. Estimation of a Social Rate of Interest for India, Kula E. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 55(1):
91-99, 2004
23. Social Discount Rates for Six Major Countries, Evans, D. and H. Sezer, Applied Economic Letters,
11: 557-560, 2004
24. The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries” D. Evans,
Fiscal Studies, 26(2):197-224, 2005
25. A Time Preference Measure of the Social Discount Rate for the United Kingdom, David Evans
and Haluk Sezer. Applied Economics, 2002, 1026 P.34
28. System Analysis, Inc., Application Guides – Equipment Damage Curves Conductors, 2006,
www.skm.com
29. Electric Transmission Week, November 2004, “Two new transmission cables reaching market;
China seen as strong opportunity”
30. Composite Technology Corporation News Release August 30, 2004
31. Transmission & Distribution, August 1, 2006 “United States and Mexico Cross-Border
Connection” by Rob O’Keefe and David Kidd, American Electric Power, page 1
32. GE Energy, Variable Frequency Transformers – Grid inter-tie, www.ge-
energy.com/prod_serv/products/transformers_vft/en/downloads/vft_brochure.pdf
33. Transmission & Distribution World, October 1, 2004 “First VFT System in Service for
TransEnergie, a Unit of Hydro-Quebec,
http://license.icopyright.net/user/tag.act?tag=3.5531%3ficx_id=tdworld.com/mag/power_
united_states_mexico/index.html
34. Narain G. Hingorani in IEEE Spectrum magazine, 1996.
35. Donald Beaty et al, "Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers 11th Ed.", McGraw Hill, 1978
36. Shaping the Tools of Competitive Power http://www.tema.liu.se/tema-t/sirp/PDF/322_5.pdf
APA-2
38. Public Policy Institute of California www.ppic.org
39. Energy Information Administration - http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/0562.pdf
40. Derived from Edison Electric Institute, EEI Pocketbook of Electric Utility Industry Statistics
(1983), p. 21
41. CPUC web site - http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/aboutcpuc/puhistory.htm
42. FERC web site - http://www.ferc.gov/students/whatisferc/history.htm
43. NRC web site - http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html#aec-to-nrc
44. Energy Information Administration, "Fuel Choice in Steam Electric Generation: A Retrospective
Analysis," Volume 1, Overview, Draft Report, Table 2.
45. Edison Electric Institute, Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry Through 1970
46. Edison Electric Institute web site - Energy Policy Act of 2005 – Summary of Title XII – Electricity,
Title XVIII – Studies and Related Provisions
47. Energy Information Administration, 1983 Survey of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs,
DOE/EIA-0439(83) (Washington, DC, December 1983), p. 8.
48. http://www.nucleartourist.com/events/tmi.htm
49. http://infodome.sdsu.edu/about/depts/spcollections/collections/sdgesundesert.shtml
50. http://www.energyvortex.com/energydictionary/public_utility_regulatory_policies_act_of_1978_(
purpa).html
52. Energy Information Admin., Survey of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs 1984, DOE/EIA-
0439(84), pg. 13
53. SustainableFacility.com -
http://www.sustainablefacility.com/CDA/Archives_EPM/d554b6f99be38010VgnVCM100000f932a
8c0____
54. Peachtree Securities –
http://www.csb.uncw.edu/people/siglerk/classes/fin436/Fin%20436%20Cases/Case%207.doc
55. Document describing “What Public Power Utilities Must Know To Survive Under the Energy
Policy Act of 2005” by Duncan & Allen
56. Center for Study of Markets - University of California.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucei/csem/CSEMWP-103
http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucei/csem/CSEMWP-103,p. 21
58. History of CERS – http://wwwcers.water.ca.gov/pdf_files/about_us/cershistory.pdf
59. CNN story - http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0104/06/bn.06.html
60. The Commission’s Response to the California Electricity Crisis and Timeline for Distribution of
Refunds”, dated December 27, 2005 - http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/comm-response.pdf
61. Basics of MRTU - http://www.CA ISO.com/docs/2005/02/22/2005022208442727277.pdf
APA-3
62. CPUC - Procurement and Resource Adequacy -
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/hottopics/1energy/r0404003.htm
63. CPUC Renewable Portfolio Standard Program -
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/energy/electric/renewableenergy/index.htm
APA-4
Appendix B
Benefit Assessment Methodologies

1.0 Current Methodologies For Benefit Quantification
1.1. Types of Projects
All transmission projects have attributes that relate to reliability, economics, and operations.
However, the processes that are used for economic evaluation and cost recovery of projects
varies depending on the type of project, and for this purpose, transmission projects are
generally grouped into four categories:
o Requested Upgrades.
o Generation Interconnection.
o Reliability (Base Plan Upgrades).
o Economic (Supplemental Upgrades).
Requested Upgrades are projects that meet specific request or requirements of a customer and
are usually paid by the customer.
Generation Interconnection is to connect a new power plant to the electrical system and is
usually paid by the generator. There may also be need for system upgrade as a new significant
generator is being added to the system.
Reliability projects are transmission improvement that may be required to satisfy the existing or
new reliability criteria. Without such a transmission, there is potential for reliability related
problems and failure to meet the established reliability criteria.
Research indicates that the first three types of projects—requested upgrades, generation
interconnection, and reliability projects have clear drivers or mandates and tend to go forward
with little or no opposition. However, economic projects (including projects that address
specific policy objectives such as renewables integration and debottle-necking) often get
stymied due to different perspectives on need, benefits, and cost responsibility.
The economic projects are proposed to reduce the total cost to society. This includes economic
projects that are used for reducing bottlenecks and congestion, expanding access to regional
markets, meeting policy goals such as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), and providing
insurance against multiple contingencies.
In this research, the emphasis is on methods that can be used to quantify benefits and allocate
costs of Economic (Supplemental Upgrade) transmission projects. The research results are
applicable to other types of projects and to projects that exhibit multiple dimensions of
economics, reliability, and operations.
1.2. Types of Benefits

The benefits from an economic transmission project can be grouped into:
o Primary Benefits (Traditional Benefits).

o Strategic Benefits.
APB-1
o Extreme Event Benefits.
Primary or traditional benefits can be defined as cost reduction, congestion reduction and
expansion of access to regional markets to take advantage of load and resource diversity.
Primary benefits improve network reliability and result in lower cost of energy and capacity
adjusted for transmission losses.
Strategic benefits can include:
o Access to new renewables resources to meet Renewable Portfolio Standard

(RPS).
o Promote efficient market operation and market power mitigation.
o Promote fuel diversity.
o Provide emission reduction/environment benefits.
o Improve deliverability.
o Insurance against contingencies.
o Meet policy goals such as Renewable Portfolio Standard.
These strategic benefits all contribute to lower cost electricity or risk for consumers, and if
properly quantifies, will show larger streams of benefits of transmission projects than what has
traditionally been quantified.
The types of benefits of new transmission projects depends on whether the region is at the
generation or exporting end or importing end of the transmission line. Benefits accruing to a
region are a function of location with respect to a transmission line as follows:
o Exporting Region Benefits

- Regional economic development.
- Increase tax base.
- Reliability Improvement.
- Expansion of generation resources.
o Importing Region Benefits
- Import of lower cost energy and capacity.
- Strategic benefits:
APB-2
 Access to renewables.
 Fuel diversity.
 Emission reduction.
 Insurance against contingencies.
 Increased deliverability.
 Decrease Market Power.
o Exporting and Importing Region Benefits
- Seasonal exchange.
- Sales of surplus energy.
- Reserve sharing.
There are many uncertainties that impact the size of primary benefit and types of strategic
benefits from a new project. These uncertainties include load forecast, fuel prices, development
of new generation and retirement of existing power plants, regional prices for electricity, and
environmental regulation. Production cost-simulation, scenario analysis, stochastic modeling,
and other techniques have traditionally been utilized to estimate a base level of benefit and the
sensitivity analysis to take into consideration future uncertainties. These models tend to come
up with base case, sensitivity cases, and expected value of benefits.
Another category of benefits relates to extreme events. In recent years, the August 2003
Northeast Blackout and the California 2000–01 market dysfunction put a spotlight on the
significant economic (billions of dollars) and societal impact of such extreme events. The
challenge is that traditionally, there has been no attempt to quantify the benefit of mitigating
extreme events or when it is done, an expected value approach is utilized which understates the
societal value of mitigating these very low probability but very high impact events.
One of the research conclusions is that insurance against extreme events be defined as
additional societal benefit for reducing exposure to extreme market volatility and multi-region-
wide blackouts due to multiple contingencies. While there is general consensus on the existence
of these types of strategic benefits, they are not easily quantified or captured using traditional
models. For example, policymakers anecdotally acknowledge the value of transmission projects
as insurance against contingencies, but there is no definition or examples of quantification of
such values.
The above category of benefits can be defined as Extreme Event Benefits and are in addition to
the Primary and Strategic Benefits. The value of extreme event benefits can be put in context
when some of recent power system experiences are examined. For example:
o 2001 California market dysfunction and volatility with a cost of $20-40 billion.
o 2003 Northeast Blackout due to multiple contingencies with a cost of $5-
10 billion.
Extreme Event Benefits can be defined as:
APB-3
3. Reliability—which is based on improved network load carrying capacity and ability to
reduce or mitigate impact of extreme events resulting from multiple contingencies (N-3,
4, 5, 6 events).
4. Market Volatility—which is based on societal benefit of reduced vulnerability to extreme
price volatility which could result from extreme system events, market dysfunction, or a
combination of factors.
Society’s willingness to buy protection against extreme events is well established in the
insurance industry, for example hurricane insurance, life insurance, re-insurance against major
losses. In each of these examples, there is a well established actuarial data base that allows
valuation of such insurance. However, there is not a rich data base related to extreme events in
the electric power industry as major blackouts and market dysfunctions are infrequent events.
Hence, the research challenge is to come up with alternative approaches that address these
benefits rather than dismiss them due to difficulty in quantifying them.
1.3. Benefits Assessment Approaches in Use

The transmission project benefit quantification approaches in use include:
o Production Simulation Models.

o Decision Analysis Models.
o Screening Analysis Models.
o Tipping Point Analysis.
These approaches are discussed briefly in this section and in Appendix B.
For economic benefit quantification of new transmission projects, the basic approach is to utilize
a Production Simulation Model. The analysis includes two alternatives: one with and another
without the proposed new transmission project. Many commercial production simulation
models are available, such as PROSYM, GEMAPS, PROMOD, and PLEXOS. Using a least cost
dispatch principle, the models forecast production from different generation resources and
associated fuel consumption, and emissions. To have a balance between loads and resources,
additional generation resources are also introduced over time. Based on fuel prices, costs of
various emissions and variable O&M costs, the total production cost over time are calculated for
a given load forecast and associated load shape. The difference in the total production costs
from the two simulations defines the gross benefit for the new transmission project.
The net benefit of the transmission project is then calculated by subtracting the capital cost and
annual O&M of the transmission project from the estimated gross benefit. Benefit cost ratios and
internal rate of return can also be calculated from the information provided by the annual
production costs, capital, and O&M expenditure of the transmission project.
To take into consideration the uncertainty of factors such as fuel costs, load forecast, and capital
cost of the transmission project, Decision Analysis Models have been utilized to estimate the
expected value and the distribution of net benefit or benefit cost ratio. These may also utilize
Influence Diagrams that shows the factors that have great impact on benefits and costs of the
project.
APB-4
Carrying out detailed production cost simulation with and without project are data intensive,
time consuming, and expensive. This becomes more difficult when the detail of transmission
network is included in the model in addition to the generation system. Furthermore,
information on planned new generation development is based on market economics and data is
generally not available beyond 5 to 10 years, while transmission projects are expected to last 50-
years or more and deliver benefits during the entire period.
At the pre-feasibility level the use of a Spreadsheet Screening Analysis may facilitate studying
many transmission options quickly and at less time and expenditure than using detail
production simulation models. An example of this approach will be discussed later when the
benefit-cost analysis of Frontier Line is reviewed.
Spreadsheet Screening Analysis is useful when new generation resources at export region plus a
new transmission is compared with new generation resources at import region. This approach
allows comparison of many alternatives quickly. The results provide forecast of fuel
consumption, emission, and variable O&M and fixed O&M costs. Benefit and cost of a new
transmission is then calculated based on such information for different alternatives by including
capital costs of generation at export and import regions, fuel prices and capital cost of the
To concentrate the analysis on assumptions and relationships that greatly influence the project
benefits, the use of Tipping Point Analysis method is sometimes utilized. In applying this
method, an economic criterion for the project is established. Potential tipping points which are
associated with key variables are listed and tested. The level of tipping point where benefit/cost
is less than one are determined and the potential for ending up with benefit/cost less than one
are evaluated and discussed for these tipping points.
1.4. Review Of Benefit Analysis Of Some Recent Projects

CA ISO’s existing and proposed transmission planning process and case histories of recent
projects are in Appendix F.
In this section, the analytical tools and benefits quantification methods for benefit analysis for
three different projects are discussed. The three projects are Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 (DPV No.
2), Tehachapi, and Frontier Line.
1.4.1. Devers-Palo Verde No. 2

Economic evaluation of Devers-Palo Verde No. 2 has been carried out and reviewed by many
parties, including CA ISO, SCE, Division of Ratepayer Advocates (CPUC), and Consortium for
Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group (CERTS/EPG) for Energy
Commission.
SCE’s objectives for proposed construction of DPV No. 2 are to:
o Increase California’s access to low-cost energy from the Southwest.

o Enhance competition among generating companies supplying energy to
California.
APB-5
o Provide additional transmission infrastructure to support the development of
additional generation capacity that will sell energy into California market.
o Provide increased reliability and flexibility in operating California’s transmission
system.
SCE has used a production cost simulation model (PROSYM) to estimate energy cost saving
resulting from the construction of DPV No. 2. This project is estimated to decrease electricity
prices in California, which is the primary benefit of this project. There will also be additional
third party transmission revenue due to increased CA ISO wheeling through or out of the CA
ISO grid.
Southern California Edison evaluation shows a B/C ratio for DPV No. 2 at 1.7. Energy benefits
are based on production cost simulation for 2009–2015 and then escalated at GDP price index
(around 2.28% per year) for the rest of economic life of the project.
At the request of CA ISO, SCE has provided energy production cost for Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) for the years 2009 through 2014 with and without DPV No. 2.
Using the cost saving numbers provided by SCE for WECC, the present value of the quantified
benefits from energy and third party transmission revenue is less than the capital cost of DPV
No. 2, using a 5% discount rate.
The WECC regional benefit for this project is low, in part, because strategic benefits such as
insurance value during extreme system conditions, reduction in generators market power,
potential for development of new generation outside of California and environmental benefits
beside NOx reductions are not quantified in WECC regional benefit calculation.
CA ISO has used its Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM) approach and
PLEXOS cost production simulation model to quantify the benefits from DPV No. 2. Benefits
include cost saving in energy, transmission loss reduction, emissions reduction, market power
mitigation, and contingency. CA ISO’s proposed methodology for benefit quantification of the
transmission projects address the following major issues: modeling of market power;
development of a robust set of scenarios; selection of appropriate simulation tools or programs;
a detail representation of the transmission network and the assumptions of the future
generation system; and, selection of benefit tests. Detailed description of these elements is
provided in a report prepared by Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology
Solutions/Electric Power Group for the Energy Commission in June 2004 33.
Benefit tests examined by the CA ISO includes:
o The participant/ratepayer test (benefits to those entities that will be paying for
the new facility).
33. Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions/Electric Power Group, June 2004. Economic
(CEC-700-04-007), pages 10-12.
APB-6
o The societal test (benefits to all consumers, producers, and transmission owners,
regardless of who pays for the upgrades).
o The modified societal test recognizing or excluding non-competitive revenues
(monopoly rent) collected by some producers.
The societal test is measured by the change in production costs across the entire interconnection
(in case of DPV No. 2 over the entire WECC). A transmission expansion project is deemed to
pass the benefit test if: 1) it benefits each participant, and 2) the entire societal or the modified
societal benefit exceeds the project cost.
The WECC base case data is the foundation of the CA ISO modeling. CA ISO’s PLEXOS model
of the entire WECC requires significant amounts of input data. Due to the limited available CA
ISO staff time for the collection of input data for each year, CA ISO modeling for the economic
analysis of DPV No. 2 was done only for two years—2008 and 2013.
CA ISO in its quantification of DPV No. 2 benefits included:
o Operational benefit—such as saving from generation unit commitment costs,

minimum load compensation and redispatch of units to address real-time
transmission congestion.
o Capacity benefit—such as utilization of some of the surplus capacity in Arizona.
o Loss savings – reduction in transmission losses as a result of DPV No. 2
operation, which were not captured in the DC Power Flow Model.
o Emission reduction—the emission were not directly modeled in the production
simulation model.
In the CA ISO evaluation, the above benefits were significant portion of the total benefits 34.
CA ISO’s goals in the development of Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology

(TEAM) have been 35:
o Development of a common methodology to evaluate economic need for

transmission upgrades.
o Presenting a framework that will be useful in making effective decision on
transmission investment.
o Providing transparency in methods, databases, and models so a variety of
stakeholders can understand the implications of a transmission upgrade.
34. CA ISO Department of Market Analysis and Grid Planning, February 2005, Economic Evaluation of
the Devers-Palo Verde No. 2.
35. Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM), Anjali Sheffrin, June 14, 2004. California
Energy Commission IEPR Workshop on 2004 Transmission Update.
APB-7
CA ISO filed TEAM with CPUC in June 2004. CA ISO has demonstrated in actual studies the
use of TEAM for Path 26 and DPV No. 2. The methodology clearly indicates impacts of a new
upgrade at the participants’ level and also regional (WECC) levels.
Several new elements identified in this research could be added to TEAM to further expand
quantification of benefits, such as:
o Extreme event benefits such as improve network load carrying capacity under
multiple contingencies.
o Reduced vulnerability to extreme price volatility due to long term outages and
catastrophic events.
o Dynamic impact of a large transmission projects on the development and
construction of additional generation capacity in the exporting region.
By adding the above benefits to TEAM, the methodology will be able to capture the benefits
from risk mitigation of low probability/high impact extreme market events and the benefits of
development of new generation to both exporting and importing region. Without taking into
consideration such dynamic impacts, the analysis becomes a zero-sum game whereby there are
higher electricity prices in the exporting region with the implication that the investment in a
transmission line has negative impact on consumers of the exporting region. In fact, this factor
contributed to the recent rejection of DPV No. 2 by the Arizona Corporation Commission.
Division of Ratepayer Advocates at CPUC has also carried out a review of the DPV No. 2. This
report was prepared in three volumes that were published in November 2005. Volume 3 of this
study describes the Tipping Point Analysis for DPV No. 2 36.
As described by Dr. House in his DRA Testimony, Tipping Point analysis has gained popularity
in the social sciences since Gladwell’s 2000 book, How Little Things Can Make a Big
Difference 37. The analysis starts with defining the topology of the interactions (similar to the
Influence Diagram in Decision Analysis). Then through some analysis it is determined which
interactions are critical to the outcome (tipping points).
Dr. House’s analysis shows that tipping point variables for the DPV No. 2 project are:
o Natural gas price differential between Arizona and California.

o Generation resource plan in Arizona.
o Palo Verde Nuclear Plant outage.
o Wholesale natural gas prices.
Based on analysis performed, the following conclusions were reached:
36. Testimony of Lon W. House, November 22, 2005, Tipping Point Analysis and Attribute Assessment
for DPV No. 2, Office of Ratepayer Advocate’s Devers Palo Verde No. 2 Testimony Vol. 3 of 3.
APB-8
“In order for DPV2 to be cost effective, the natural gas price differential between
Arizona and California has to be greater than $0.50/MMBtu, the wholesale Topoc
price of natural gas has to be greater than $5.00/MMBtu and Palo Verde (Nuclear
Generation Station) has to be operating.” 38
Furthermore, DPV No. 2 is more valuable to California in the event of an outage of San Onofre
Nuclear Generation Station (SONGS).
Tipping Point Analysis provides clear information on critical variables and allows the analyst to
concentrate on high impact factors rather than spend a great deal of time and effort on elements
that do not materially change the outcome of the analysis.
1.4.2. Tehachapi Transmission Project

Tehachapi Transmission Project is designed to access wind generation resources in the
Tehachapi area along with associated system upgrades beyond the first point of
interconnection. SCE is the project sponsor. The goal is to develop transmission that will be the
least-cost solution to reliably interconnect 4,350 MW of generating resources in the Tehachapi
Area Generation Queue to the CA ISO grid.
In addition, the project also addresses the reliability needs of the CA ISO controlled grid caused
by load growth in the Antelope Valley area, as well as transmission constraints South of Lugo.
The main benefit of this project is to enable California utilities to buy power from wind
generation projects and to comply with the state mandated Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
program.
The project justification for Tehachapi is renewable resource integration and reliability. While
resource integration has an economic dimension, the project justification is based on meeting
state RPS mandates rather than benefit cost analysis. The Tehachapi project evolved from the
Tehachapi Collaborative Study Group, which was formed in 2004 at the direction of CPUC. The
goal was to develop a comprehensive phased transmission development plan for integration of
renewables planned for development in the Tehachapi area. Two reports were issued and
submitted to CPUC in March 2005 and in April 2006. The outcome was the identification of a
number of alternatives for the transmission infrastructure. A recommendation was made to
further study these alternatives by the CA ISO.
The CA ISO in full collaboration with SCE and stakeholders carried out the Tehachapi
Transmission Project study as part of its CA ISO South Regional Transmission Plan for 2006
(CSRTP-2006). A least-cost solution for the interconnection of planned generation was
developed by CA ISO.
The total cost of the Tehachapi Transmission Project is estimated at $1.8 billion in nominal
dollars. This cost excludes the cost of Interconnection Facilities (radial wind collector
transmission systems that will interconnect the individual generation projects to the grid and
APB-9
will be the responsibility of generation developers). SCE is the Project Sponsor and the project is
subject to necessary regulatory approvals from CPUC and FERC, which have either been
received or expected.
The Tehachapi Transmission project phased development plan includes:
o Antelope - Pardee, 230 kV line and Antelope Substation Expansion.

o WindHub Substation.
o Antelope-Wind Hub 230 kV line, 500 kV.
o Low Wind 500/230 kV Substation with loop-in of Midway-Vincent #3 500 kV line.
o Antelope-Low Wind 500 kV line.
o WindHub Substation 500 kV Upgrade.
One or more of the transmission line segments may be characterized as bulk-transfer gen-tie for
an interim period of time until additional lines and transmission interconnections are built. For
these lines, characterized as bulk transfer gen-tie lines, generators would be charged a pro-rata
rate for transmission service over the gen-tie line. The residual revenue requirement for any
unsubscribed portion of the gen-tie line would be recovered either from retail ratepayers under
CPUC-approved rate or from all transmission customers in FERC-jurisdictional Transmission
Access Charges (TAC) rates. If any of these bulk-transfer gen-tie lines are later converted into a
network facility, then generators would be relieved of their pro-rata share of the transmission
service charge respectively. 39
CA ISO has used the concept of clustering in the Tehachapi Transmission Project. Clustering
allows the study of the system impacts of a group of interconnection requests collectively,
rather than evaluating each potential generation project one at a time. This results in greater
efficiency in the design of needed network upgrades.
The clustering approach for the Tehachapi Transmission Project will result in substantial capital
cost saving compared to any piecemeal upgrade solution with a traditional project by project
approach.
However, in the Tehachapi Transmission Project, the CA ISO has deviated from a typical
clustered interconnection study. The CA ISO study considered only the network components or
network upgrades of the transmission system and excluded the radial wind collector
transmission systems. Furthermore, an element of clustering is the selection of a time window
for determining which generation projects in the queue will be included in the cluster (i.e., the
Queue Cluster Window). The Tehachapi Transmission Project defined the Queue Cluster
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Window as the projects submitted from August 19, 2003 through April 2006, which exceeds
FERC limit of 180 days for the Queue Cluster Window.
Due to the specific circumstances presented by Tehachapi Project, CA ISO has filed a petition
with FERC for approval to proceed with the proposed study approach on a one-time basis.
CA ISO Board has approved the Tehachapi Transmission Project as the Network Upgrades
necessary to allow Generating Facilities in the Tehachapi Wind Resources Area to deliver their
output to CA ISO grid. The Board has directed SCE to proceed with the permitting and
construction of this project. FERC’s approval of the CAISO waiver request for provisions of
Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) allowed this project to move forward.
1.4.3. Frontier Line

The Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership (WRTEP) is proposing the
construction of Frontier Line, a large transmission project between Wyoming, Utah, Nevada,
and California.
To perform a screening level economic study, the Economic Analysis Subcommittee developed
a spreadsheet tool to quantify benefits and costs of multitude of possible alternatives and
scenarios. These alternatives included: a variety of load and resources scenarios, a myriad of
conceptual transmission links and configurations identified by the Transmission Subcommittee;
a wide range of natural gas prices and possible costs for new clean coal technology, including
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) and carbon dioxide sequestration; and a broad
spectrum of potential policy actions such as regional and/or national renewable portfolio
standards, state and federal tax incentives for preferred resources such as wind or solar or clean
coal, and regulatory regimes in greenhouse gas emissions.
To carryout these benefit-cost analysis in a transparent manner, the Economic Analysis

Subcommittee designed and constructed a unique analytical tool, the Frontier Economic
Analysis Screening Tool (FEAST). The intent was to develop an analytical tool to enable the
Economic Analysis Subcommittee to carryout analysis at a screening level which will provide
an understanding of the ranges of assumptions under which the development of the Frontier
Line will be cost effective and for which more detailed economic analysis using a detailed
system production cost simulation will be warranted.
FEAST is a simple tool for knowledgeable users. It considers incremental resource additions,
not a complete supply stack which would include all the existing generators.
For this screening analysis, the Gross Benefits ($) of the transmission project is based on the
following formula:
Gross Benefit = Energy Potential x Line Utilization x Regional Basis
MWh (%) $/MWh
Energy Potential is the rated capacity of the line multiplied by 8,760 hours. For example, if the
Frontier Line is rated 3,000 MW, then energy potential would be 3,000x8760 or 26,280 GWh per
year.
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Line Utilization is a function of the quantity and characteristics of resources available to be
imported as compared to the line’s energy potential. (Basically, capacity of generation resources
installed in exporting region multiplied by assumed capacity factors for each resource and
subject to the transmission line and system constraints.)
Regional Basis is the energy cost difference between the exporting region and the importing
region. This Regional Basis is influenced by many factors, including the capital cost of new
generation resources, fuel costs (gas, coal, and others), environmental mitigation costs,
renewable energy price premiums, Green House Gas (GHG) adders, and others.
Benefits in addition to energy benefits include: capacity, losses, emissions, insurance value
against extreme events, economic impacts due to construction of transmission and generation
facilities, tax benefits, reliability improvement and others.
Many of the subcommittee members provided input on fuel prices, capital cost for generation,
ranges for Green House Gas adder, capacity factor for wind energy in different regions, and
other assumptions. The FEAST Spreadsheet Model was developed by staff of PG&E.
FEAST can handle several exporting regions (source options): Wyoming and Montana (coal and
wind), and several importing regions (sink options), including Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and
California. Resources considered for importing regions can be gas-fired CT or CCGT or IGCC
and renewables (for Utah coal, gas, renewables). For exporting regions, resources can be wind
and/or clean coal.
A mix of generation resources for exporting and importing regions are assumed. Taking into
consideration capacity and capacity factor of these generation resources, the amount of energy
going from source to sink is calculated.
FEAST is an energy focused analysis. Attempt is made to balance energy produced from the
generation resources in the sinks and sources. The installed capacity of generation ends up
being different for sinks and sources.
The Economic Analysis Subcommittee performed its work using a participatory stakeholder
process. Volunteers led the effort to create FEAST inputs. Individual subcommittee members
were able to perform their own analysis based on some of their own inputs.
The final report of this subcommittee was submitted to Western Regional Transmission
Expansion Partnership (WRTEP) on April 27, 2007 40. Two most important conclusions of the
report were:
1. The benefits of the Frontier Line appear greater than the costs under a variety of
plausible scenarios.
2. Uncertainty associated with key inputs results in a wide range of benefit-cost outcomes.
40. Economic Analysis Subcommittee for Western Regional Transmission Expansion Partnership, Final
Report April 27, 2007, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Frontier Line Possibilities.
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The economics of the Frontier Line, as expected, are very sensitive to natural gas prices and the
values used for GHG adder. Economics of the Line are also somewhat sensitive to capital costs
for clean coal technologies, including IGCC and CO2 sequestration.
The primary focus of the analysis that was carried out by the Economic Analysis Subcommittee
was economic efficiency from a total societal point of view, i.e., the analysis produced the
overall benefit-cost ratio for the region as a whole. Of course, it is important that the Frontier
Line produces benefit for each individual jurisdiction participating in the project, i.e., benefit be
greater than cost for each state. The Economic Analysis Subcommittee did not analyze cost
allocation so that each jurisdiction participating receives a net benefit from the project.
However, FEAST enables each user to perform its own analysis and assess benefits and costs
allocated.
As stated in the Final Report of the Benefit-Cost Analysis of Frontier Line, FEAST is not a
substitute for production costing simulation tools. Analysis using FEAST may be a first step to
quickly sort through a multitude of possibilities. FEAST is a tool to perform quick what-if
screening analysis. It is a simple spreadsheet-based tool enabling and empowering
sophisticated users to carryout a variety of analyses quickly, with the aim of developing user
insight rather than producing overly precise numerical results 41.
1.5. Benefit Analysis Observations And Conclusions

The three projects reviewed for benefit analysis are representative of a wide range of potential
future large regional transmission projects. A summary of the projects analyzed is presented in
Figure 1.
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Summary of Benefit Analysis of
Transmission Projects
Project Description Purpose Comments
Palo-Verde  500 kV line between Arizona and Reduce California  Benefits to California estimated using
Devers California electricity costs production cost and sensitivity analysis
No. 2  Single utility and single rate  Strategic and regional benefits not
jurisdiction (CA ISO) addressed
 $500 million cost  Static analysis – assumed generation
 1,300 MW capacity capacity fixed
Tehachapi  Designed in several phases to Enable integration Least cost solution to meet RPS mandate.
interconnect 4,350 MW of new wind of new wind
generation generation in CA
 Required CA rate back-stop and ISO queue to meet
innovative CA ISO tariff to allocate RPS
costs
 $1.8 billion cost
 Costs allocation among generator
(gen-tie), CA ISO grid users, and CA
ratepayers for cost recovery back-stop
Frontier  500 kV Designed to enable  Benefits estimated using screening
Line  3,000 MW construction of new model – FEAST
 $2 billion cost
generation in  Benefits result from cost differential
Wyoming/Montana (capital and fuel) between resources
 Multi-state, multi-utility, multi-
for export to CA, developed in CA vs. WY/MT
jurisdiction NV, UT, AZ  Strategic benefits not quantified
 Strong state government support in
exporting regions
 No strong utility project sponsor
F igure 9. S ummary of B enefit Analys is of T rans mis s ion P rojec ts
Of the three projects, Tehachapi is moving forward. Palo Verde-Devers No. 2 was rejected by
the Arizona Commission and SCE, the project sponsor, is moving ahead to construct the
California segment of the transmission line and continuing to pursue approval from FERC for
the Arizona portion. Frontier Line is still in the conceptual planning stages.
From this review, the following observations and conclusions are presented.
1. Elements of successful projects, e.g., Tehachapi
o Strong project sponsorship.

o Extensive stakeholder participation.
o Clear objectives and benefits, whether quantifiable or not.
o Cost recovery certainty.
o Policy and regulatory receptivity.
2. Benefit quantification
o Primary methods used are production simulation or screen methods.

o Benefits are based on cost differentials for different options, i.e., project vs. no
project or comparison of different project options.
o Many strategic benefits were not quantified.
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o Analysis required data intensive assumptions about future loads, resources, fuel
prices, and policies.
3. Problems encountered by projects
o Limited showing of benefits for key stakeholders, e.g., Palo Verde-Devers No. 2.
o Ambiguity about objectives and goals, including changing policies, e.g., Frontier
Line.
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Appendix C
Cost Recovery and Cost Allocation Methodologies

2.0 Cost Allocation And Cost Recovery
2.1. Framework for Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery
Cost responsibility for different types of transmission projects varies depending on the type of
transmission project. Figure 7 provides a framework for who should pay for new transmission
projects.
COST RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSMISSION PROJECTS

Type of Transmission Project Cost Responsibility
 Requested Upgrades Specific Requesting Party
 Generator Interconnection Generator Owner
 Reliability Customers of local utilities and RTO
 Economic Project Beneficiaries
F igure 10. C os t R es pons ibility of T rans mis s ion P rojec ts
For economic transmission projects, the goal should be to allocate costs to project beneficiaries.
The principle of beneficiaries should pay or that cost causers should be cost bearers applies.
For economic transmission projects, the ownership of the project could be: the utility in whose
service area the project is located, a merchant owner, or joint transmission owners when the
transmission line goes through several service areas and the line in each service area is owned
by the utility of that service area.
Cost recovery could be based on: transmission access charge, contract rights, subscription or
auction. In an RTO, if the transmission is a reliability upgrade and is needed to maintain the
integrity of the transmission grid, the costs are rolled in to the transmission charge. Costs can be
rolled-in: (a) fully, (b) partially with remaining costs allocated to zones or beneficiaries, and (c)
by using a voltage test and either 100% of the cost is rolled-in to an RTO wide rate or 100% into
zonal rate(s).
Alternatives for cost allocation of economic type transmission projects in an RTO could be:
6. The project sponsor pays for upgrade similar to requested upgrade.

7. RTO recommends the cost allocation; and if the beneficiaries agree to pay for the
upgrade, then the project is developed. In this method, cost responsibility among the
affected load serving entities could be in proportion to their respective benefits or to
their respective load shares in terms of energy or peak load.
8. RTO determines the cost allocation; and beneficiaries are obligated to pay for the
upgrade.
9. X% of the cost is rolled into RTO base rate and the remainder of cost allocated among
beneficiaries.
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10. 100% of the cost is rolled into RTO base rate.
As above alternatives for cost allocation shows, the size and distribution of the project benefits
may be utilized for cost allocation among beneficiaries. Therefore, improved benefits
quantification will be useful in: 1) providing guidance on cost allocation among multiple
participants and jurisdictions, and 2) selecting cost recovery methodology.
2.2. Cost Recovery

There are many ways to set rates for cost recovery of the transmission projects. The most
commonly used method is cost of service ratemaking. This method is used by FERC and almost
every state jurisdiction. The basic equation for cost of service ratemaking is:
Annual Cost = (Depreciated Rate Base x allowed + Expenses + Taxes

weighted cost of capital) +Depreciation
The cost of service is then allocated over billing determinants. Currently, there are three
alternative transmission rates used in different jurisdictions:
d. Energy—postage stamp.
e. Demand—annual or monthly peak demand.
f. Distance—Megawatt-mile.
Cost recovery is accomplished through rate cases that are submitted by the transmission owner
(TO) utilities to the commission in each state. In addition, FERC filing may also be required to
establish the rate for use of transmission. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over transmission
rates. To eliminate transmission rate pancaking (paying multiple wheeling charges for a path),
FERC has been encouraging formation of ISOs and RTOs.
To stimulate the construction of new transmission lines, FERC has indicated that it will allow
performance-based regulation proposals and consider innovative transmission pricing
proposals including a higher rate of return on equity, levelized rates, accelerated depreciation
and incremental pricing for new transmission projects.
2.3. Multiple Participants and Jurisdictions Project

Most large transmission projects provide benefits to multiple utilities that may be in single
jurisdiction or sometimes in multiple jurisdictions. For example, the Tehachapi Transmission
Project is being sponsored by SCE, however, all utilities in CA ISO jurisdiction will benefit from
this large project as they will be able to sign contracts with wind developers in the Tehachapi
area. On the other hand, the Frontier Line is likely to involve multiple utilities in multiple
jurisdictions.
Figure 8 shows a framework for the use of benefit quantification for both cost effectiveness and
cost allocation under single and multiple utilities and single and multiple jurisdictions.
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Framework for Use of Benefit Quantification for
Project Cost Effectiveness and Cost Allocation
Transmission Project
Single Utility Multiple Utilities
Single Jurisdiction Multiple Jurisdictions
COST Demonstrate  Demonstrate cost effectiveness  Demonstrate overall project

EFFECTIVENESS cost cost effectiveness
effectiveness  Demonstrate cost effectiveness
for each jurisdiction
COST Costs allocated  Costs allocated to all transmission  Costs allocated to each
ALLOCATION to utility customers within jurisdiction jurisdiction based on
participation or benefits
COST Costs Costs recovered via:  Costs recovered via rolled-in
RECOVERY recovered via a. 100% of the cost is rolled-in to an RTO rates within each jurisdiction, or
rolled-in rates wide rate x% rolled-in and remainder
b. X% of the cost is rolled-in to an RTO recovered from one or more
wide rate and the remainder to the rate zones that receive significant
of one or more zones that receive part of the benefits
significant part of the benefits
c. Using a voltage test, either 100% of the
cost is rolled-in to an RTO wide rate or
100% into zonal rates
F igure 8. F ramework for Us e of B enefit Quantific ation for P rojec t C os t E ffec tivenes s and C os t
Alloc ation
For multi jurisdiction projects, the preferred way for the cost allocation will be first to allocate
the cost to each of the jurisdictions and then allow each jurisdiction to allocate their share of cost
among utilities and other users based on that jurisdiction’s cost allocation methodology. Cost
allocation to the multiple jurisdictions could be based on the following alternatives:
a. Participation Ratio
- Allocate costs and MW capacity of the transmission according to participation
ratio or native load ratio.
b. Subscription Open Season
- Participation based on requested subscription (need and benefits assessment
by each utility), each subscriber performs individual benefit assessment. Cost
allocated based on the requested level of subscription.
c. Auction Methodology
- This method promotes MW allocations to participants who will get the
highest benefit from the utilization of the new transmission project.
2.4. Example of Auction Approach for Cost Allocation

One efficient way to allocate the use and cost of a new multi-participant or multi-jurisdictional
transmission project would be the auction approach.
The project sponsor or RTO can establish an auction to allocate the capacity that becomes
available from a new transmission line. Participants, based on their own assessment of how
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much benefit they will receive from the new project, can submit bids into the auction process.
Capacity of the line will be allocated to users who value this capacity most.
At least two auction methods can be designed for this capacity allocation. First is a round of
ascending price auction similar to CA ISO annual FTR auction. Second is the single price and
quantity bids auction.
In the first method, the auction starts for a given period with a $/MW-year payment at a level
close or just below the annual revenue requirement for the project. Each period could be one
year, or to encourage multi-year power contract and construction of new generation, it could be
multiple of 5-years for a total of say 30-years.
If the result from the first round of bids is a total MW of bids higher than the transmission line
capacity, the payment will be increased and the second round of the auction will be carried out.
The auction round will be repeated until there is a balance between total bids and the online
capacity available. This last round will determine the line capacity allocation amongst different
parties and the payment for each MW-year.
The same auction process will then be carried out for the next period (next year or next 5-year
period). This per period allocation could be repeated to cover the entire economic life of the
project (or the duration for repayment of entire capital cost of the project).
Total payments generated from the auction over the periods have to be equal or greater than
total revenue requirements to show that the project is cost effective. (Project sponsor has to
come up with fixed revenue requirement. The project cost has, therefore, to include reasonable
contingency cost. The allowed rate of return may be somewhat higher than normal allowed
rate to compensate for fixed cost for the construction of the line.)
If the total payments generated in an auction are higher than the fixed revenue requirements
and variable O&M cost, then the overpayments will be retained by project sponsor or RTO for
decreasing the cost of grid reliability improvement projects.
If the total payments generated in an auction are not sufficient to cover the revenue requirement
of the project then the project should not be developed, since the beneficiaries are not willing to
pay the total cost of the project.
In the second type of auction, each bidder submits a payment and quantity for each period.
Based on all bids received, a demand curve is developed for each period. The intersection of the
demand curve and the capacity of the transmission line would determine the payment level for
each MW and the amount of capacity to be allocated to each one of the winning bidders for this
period.
The auction process is repeated for each period until the last period. Again, if the total
payments are higher than the total revenue requirement, a process will be developed to use this
surplus fund.
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In both auctions, every participant pays the same market clearing price for a given period. The
auction provides a mean to allocate the line capacity to participants who value such capacity
most.
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Appendix D
Technology Options and Implications and Their Impacts

Executive Summary
There are several options for transmitting energy from remote generation resources to the
various load centers within the Western Interconnection. The amount of energy to be
transmitted and the overall distance become key factors as to which of the options becomes
more desirable, as is the impact that a new transmission project will have on the existing WECC
grid. The following is a recap of the research findings:
• The use of new technology conductors appear to be best utilized and cost effective in the
integration of new or upgraded transmission lines into urban transmission networks.
• Superconducting cables appear to also be best utilized in urban areas, especially where
extremely high capacity underground transmission is required.
• The use of High Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) (765 kV) transmission would
allow for the movement of bulk power over great distances. This new technology is in-
service in the Eastern Interconnection and performing as anticipated. Because there is
no existing 765 kV infrastructure within the WECC, adding a single 765 kV line (to
deliver 3,000 MW) would have a negative impact on grid stability and unscheduled
flow. Developing the supporting infrastructure to integrate 765 kV into the western grid
would have some significant costs consequences.
• To use 500 kV AC (to deliver 3,000 MW), two lines would be required to carry large
amounts of energy (500 kV AC lines are typically rated at 1200-1600 MW/line). This
option will require additional Right-of-Way.
• Utilization of Variable Frequency Transformers (VFT) and Phase Shifting Transformers
has the ability to protect the rights of participants when AC transmission options are
used.
• Utilization of Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) is expected to be an essential
element of all future AC transmission lines to ensure grid reliability, and can assist in
managing the flow of power over specific lines in a transmission network.
• At this time, to transmit 3,000 MW of energy, or higher over long distances (over 400 to
500 miles), the most cost effective method is the implementation of a High Voltage
Direct Current (HVDC) line for the following reasons:
o HVDC affords the ability to explicitly control the power flow on the transmission
lines
o HVDC will not negatively impact unscheduled flow.
o HVDC is isolated from AC system faults.
o HVDC system multi-terminal converters could be utilized if multiple pick-up
and drop-off points are required. This technology is available and in-service
today.
HVDC can be integrated with the AC system to create a hybrid form of transmission. This
option provides a HVDC link over the longest line section to a central delivery facility at which
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point the project participant(s) can take delivery into their respective AC system. This option
eliminates the need for multi-terminal converters.
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1.0 Introduction
The need for investments in transmission infrastructure and new technologies has been
accepted for some time. In recent years, this has translated into policy support for new
transmission projects. Recently, there has been much discussion regarding the construction of
new EHV transmission lines in the Western Interconnection. The governors of California,
Nevada, Utah and Wyoming had proposed a new interstate EHV transmission line across the
Western U.S., from Wyoming with terminal connections in Utah, Nevada and California. Some
of the Arizona utilities and others are considering an EHV transmission project from Wyoming
to the Desert Southwest area, and PG&E has proposed an EHV project from British Columbia to
Northern California. Within California, projects in the various stages of planning and regulatory
approval include Palo Verde Devers No. 2, Tehachapi, Transbay cable, Greenpath, and Sunrise.
Such new transmission projects would provide the necessary links to new and diverse
generating resources, such as renewable and clean coal resources. The development of any of
these new transmission projects in the Western Interconnection would bring the following
benefits:
• Strengthen the reliability of the Western Interconnection.

• Better protect consumers from energy shortages and price spikes.
• Encourage a broader, diversified energy portfolio.
• Reduce reliance on foreign energy imports and enhances domestic energy security.
• Encourage the use of new generation technology that would accelerate the development
of renewable energy resources and reduce the cost of controlling emissions from the
West’s vast fossil fuel resources.
The Federal Energy Act signed August 8, 2005 has also encouraged several transmission
technological advancements (e.g., high ampacity conductors). Industry offerings and research
and development of new transmission technologies for flow control, voltage support, smart
grid, hybrid D.C., phase shifting transformers, superVar (synchronous condensers using
superconductors) are on the rise. With these new innovative products, the market has better
ways to transport energy to the consumers.
The purpose of this research is to review available technologies and assess implications on cost
allocation and cost recovery for new infrastructure investments.
Construction of new EHV transmission lines between the various sub-regions of the Western
Interconnection is being driven by the following four (4) needs:
• Demand for electricity in high-population states in the West is projected to grow

significantly in the coming decades. However, sitting generation near the load is
increasingly difficult and costly. Tapping into abundant renewable resources and clean
coal electricity in the Intermountain West will help keep the West’s economy growing
and will reduce price pressures on consumers.
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• California faces a significant need for new generation. Using a historic growth rate of
2% per year, California must add 1,000 MW of new capacity each year, net of
retirements, into the foreseeable future. New transmission lines into California are
essential in meeting that need. In addition, California needs to find new renewable
resource supplies to meet the State mandated Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).
• As a region, the West has seen load growth of more than 60 percent in the last 20 years,
but investment in high-voltage transmission lines increased less than 20 percent.
Investment in new EHV transmission, besides providing a pathway to new generation
resources, will ease existing transmission bottlenecks and enhance the overall reliability
of the region.
• New EHV transmission lines provide an insurance benefit that will help mitigate the
impacts of adverse hydro conditions, fuel price volatility, and potential market power
abuse and better ensure against catastrophic events like blackouts.
One of the key implications for cost recovery and cost and benefit allocation is the capability of
any proposed transmission project to dependably deliver power over the intended transmission
path(s). Electric power flows according to physical laws, not contract laws, and as such, power
moves over the transmission lines that offer the lowest resistance (impedance) between the
source generators and the load. The ability to manage and control new power deliveries to
travel over the facilities designed and installed to accommodate those deliveries is expected to
significantly affect the ability of the project developers to allocate costs and benefits among the
project participants, and to assure that the participants are able to recover their costs through
dependable power deliveries, while not adversely affecting adjacent transmission systems.
Technologies that can deliver the benefits of new investment to the owners are likely to
influence debates regarding cost allocation.
This review of transmission technologies examines the several options from the perspective of
their ability to increase power deliveries and manage the flow of power.
The U.S. electricity transmission system is an essential component to our nation’s economic
vitality.
Within the Western Interconnection, the investment in new transmission facilities has declined
over the past few decades, the customer demand is increasing and there is the continuing need
to operate a reliable grid. The expansion of the electricity delivery system is crucial to the
region’s economic and security. In addition, the transmission system is vital to supporting an
ongoing competitive wholesale electricity market and in achieving the states Renewable
Portfolio Standards.
The objective of this report is to identify how the use of new transmission technology may
impact the operation of new transmission facilities and cost allocation of a project. In order to
effectively discuss the role of advanced transmission technologies, consideration must be given
to how they can be deployed in the grid and their functionality.
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1.1. Conductors
Heat is the prime enemy of conductors. The more power that is pushed through them, the
more they heat and sag, and it is sag and clearance that ultimately determine maximum
conductor loading.
The manufacturers of conductors have, with the assistance of the 2005 Federal Energy Act,
developed new conductors that can be loaded to higher current levels by reducing the sag
component of their conductors.
The current carrying capacity or ampacity of a conductor is directly proportional to the cross-
sectional area of the conducting material. This cross sectional area is usually measured in
square inches. In the late 1800s, the U.S. electric industry standardized conductor sizing by
agreeing to use circular mils for measuring the cross-sectional area of conductors. A circular
mil is the area of a circle with a diameter of one mil (0.001 inch). The abbreviation of circular
mils is cmil. There are 1,273, 200 circular mils in one square inch. For conductors having a
cross-sectional area smaller than or equal to 211,600 circular mils, the industry elected to adopt
the Brown and Sharpe wire gage designated in 1857, what we now call American Wire Gauge
(AWG). The area of a large conductor is often designated in kcmil (thousand circular mils)
rather than cmil. For example, the cross-sectional area of 4/0 AWG is 211,200 cmil or 211.2
kcmil.
1.2. ACSR – Aluminum Conductor Steel Reinforced

Used as bare overhead transmission conductor and as primary and secondary distribution
cable, ACSR has been the industry standard overhead conductor for many decades. ACSR
offers optimal strength for line design variable zinc coated steel core stranding enable desired
strength to be achieved without sacrificing ampacity. This conductor consists of a solid or
stranded steel core surround by strands of aluminum. This conductor is available in a wide
range of steel content varying from as low as 6% to as high as 40%. The higher strength ACSR
conductors are used for long spans, overhead ground wires, etc. ACSR conductor can be
manufactured for a wide range of tensile strength as required. The principle advantage of this
conductor is high tensile strength, light weight and relatively low cost.
1.3. AAC – All Aluminum Conductor

This conductor is also known as aluminum stranded conductor. This conductor is
manufactured from electrolytic ally refined aluminum, having purity of minimum 99.5% of
aluminum. This conductor is used in urban areas where the spacing is short and the supports
are close. All aluminum conductors are made up of one or more strands of aluminum wire
depending on the end usage. This conductor is also used extensively in coastal areas because it
has a very high degree of corrosion resistance.
1.4. AAAC – All Aluminum Alloy Conductors

AAAC is a high strength aluminum alloy, concentric-lay-stranded conductor. It is similar in
construction and appearance to the AAC all aluminum conductor.
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This conductor is made from aluminum-silicon alloy of high electrical conductivity containing
enough magnesium silicide high strength aluminum alloy 42 to give it better mechanical
properties after treatment. These conductors are generally made out of aluminum alloy 6201.
This conductor as compared to the industry standard ACSR has the advantage of lower power
losses (the inductive effects of the steel core in the core is eliminated), excellent corrosion
resistance in environments conducive to galvanic corrosion, better strength to weight ratio,
improved electrical conductivity than ACSR of equal diameter and greater resistance to
abrasion than that for Type 1350 aluminum used for ACSR. The two conductor types (AAAC
and ACSR) are similar in that the fittings are the same and the sag characteristics are similar.
1.5. ACSS - Aluminum Conductor Supported Steel

This High Temperature, Low Sag (HTLS) Solution has a temperature operating range of up to
250°C (482°F) with reduced sag (compared to ACSR). This allows the line the capability of
transmitting 50 to 70% more current than conventional ACSR Transmission conductors. The
difference is in the temper of the aluminum wires. The aluminum wires used to make
conventional ACSR are in the fully work hardened temper; where as those used to make ACSS
are fully annealed 43. The ACSS trapezoidal conductor consists of concentric-lay stranded
products consisting of steel central cores that are multi-layered with 1350-0 aluminum wire.
The ACSS/TW conductors contain up to 25% more aluminum in the same diameter compared to
conventional ACSR cable, resulting in increased ampacity.
The ACSS conductor can operate continuously at high temperatures without any detriment to
its mechanical properties. It will sag significantly less at high temperatures than ACSR
conductors when the maximum tension is present under ice and wind loading. The sag-tension
performance of ACSS is not affected by long time creep of aluminum. This material has a high
capability for damping mechanical oscillations, such as those associated with wind vibration. It
also has a high degree of immunity to vibration fatigue.
The ACSS aluminum wire strands are annealed, giving them low yield strength. Because of
their low yield strength, inelastic elongation of the aluminum strands occurs quite rapidly when
tension is applied to the conductor, thereby forcing most of the load onto the steel core. The
designation “Aluminum Conductors – Steel Supported” derives from the fact that under most
normal operating conditions there is little or no stress in the aluminum wires and even under
maximum tension there is minimal reliance on the strength of the aluminum.
ACSS aluminum is soft; some additional emphasis must be given to normal precautions to
avoid scuffing of the surface during installation and maintenance. When used to replace the
same size ACSR this conductor is normally heavier and thus requires higher tension and can
result in tower modification. It is also higher cost than ACSR.
42. 6201 T81 aluminum alloy

43. http://www.generalcable.com/NR/rdonlyres/0F57D894-A202-4423-8750-BD348E7B9581/0/UTY0006R0603.pdf
APD-6
Both new ACSS products have a full line of sizes. ACSS sizes range from 266.8 kcmil to 2312
kcmil; ACSS/TW conductor sizes range from 477 to 2627 kcmil.
1.6. ACCR – Aluminum Conductor Composite Reinforced

3M Aluminum Conductor Composite Reinforced (ACCR) delivers two to three time the power
while utilizing the same tower configuration as today’s standard ACSR conductor . ACCR is
already in service at several locations in North America. This conductor provides two to three
times higher ampacity with less thermal expansion (sag) than conventional conductors of
similar size. The major difference between ACCR and other conductors are due to the
differences in the core materials. The outer strands portion of the 3M ACCR conductor relies on
aluminum-based materials. The core is a revolutionary aluminum matrix composite material
that has the strength and stiffness of steel with a lower coefficient of thermal expansion and less
weight.
3M ACCR’s core is composed of aluminum composite wires, surrounded by hardened

temperature-resistant aluminum-zirconium. ACCR has a continuous operating temperature
rating of 210°C and an emergency temperature rating of 240°C. In contrast, Aluminum
Conductor Steel Reinforced is rated to 100°C continuous, 150°C emergency. 44
Installation of the ACCR is similar to that of conventional ACSR conductor. Listed below are
the locations where this conductor is already installed or being installed.
The installation of this new family of conductors has a few differences in the methods of
installation as compared to the standard ACSR. The pulling of the conductor requires, in most
cases, larger rollers at the tower. For instance, in a recent installation of the 3M ACCR, 3M
provide the first roller from the pulling dolly, and recommended the use of larger rollers (28
inch) at each tower (note: the larger rollers are readily available). The splice is made with a
special process and splice kit. The kit is also provided by the manufacturer, as is an on-site
technical advisor.
1.7. ACCC – Aluminum Conductor Composite Core

The Composite Technology Corporation claims that its product doubles the current carrying
capacity of the conventional ACSR conductor. The conductor has a low sag ratio to heat as
compared to the standard conductor. This lighter material reduces the number of towers or
poles required. CTC claims “On average, a new (ACCC) line at the same height can eliminate
16% of the structures required.” 45 This product is cheaper than 3M’s ACCR conductor and not
as brittle as the ACCR. The splicing and pulling of this conductor is similar to the existing
ACSR conductor.
44. System Analysis, Inc., Application Guides – Equipment Damage Curves Conductors, 2006, www.skm.com
45. Electric Transmission Week, November 2004 “Two new transmission cables reaching market; China seen as strong opportunity
APD-7
Even though this material is new, it is making an impact in the industry since its introduction.
A 2004 news release reporting on a reconductor project indicated “This initial installation in the
city of Holland, Michigan utilized over three thousand feet of ACCC conductor.” 46
China is purchasing 175 miles of the ACCC to be delivered in the first quarter of 2007.
ACCC has a core made of a carbon fiber composite. The outer layer is softer aluminum with a
trapezoidal strand design. The rated operating temperature is 180°C, with a recommended
short term maximum operating temperature of 200°C. The glass transition temperature (Tg) 47
of the core is 215°C. At temperatures above the Tg, the properties of the core change and
strength is affected.
1.8. Superconducting Cables

Superconductivity was first discovered in 1911 in mercury, and regained notoriety in 1986 with
the discovery of new ceramic materials that could provide the benefits of superconductivity at
temperatures of liquid nitrogen. Superconductivity is now widely used in medical imaging
(MRI) today, and is also being deployed into the electric grid to solve local power problems.
High temperature superconductor (HTS) wire enables power transmission and distribution
cables with three to five times the capacity of conventional underground AC cables and up to
ten times the capacity of DC cables. They support general load growth, add controllability of
power over a meshed grid, and can be implemented with low environmental impacts.
Benefits of the technology include:
• High power with low loss, increased efficiency, reduced CO2

• No EMF emissions, no heating and no oil (for cooling) provides low environmental
impact
• Thermal independence, no backfill required and deep borings OK.
• Dis-location of step-down transformer from load bus.
• Small cross sections, retro-fitting ducts.
The central component of the superconductor power cable is HTS wire that can conduct 150
times the electrical current of copper of the same dimensions. Many strands of HTS wire are
wound onto the cable assembly in a coaxial configuration that produces essentially zero electric
and magnetic field emissions (EMF).
The inherently low impedance of this type of cable assembly enables control of power flows
over the surrounding grid network. Liquid nitrogen, the dialectic and coolant of choice to
46. Composite Technology corporation News Release August 30, 2004

47. Glass Transition Temperature (Tg) is that temperature where a polymer when cooled below that temperature the polymer becomes hard and
brittle like glass.
APD-8
maintain the HTS wire at its operating temperature, is inexpensive, abundant and
environmentally safe, eliminating the oil used in some conventional power cables.
Superconducting cables are ideal solutions for grid bottlenecks. In addition to enabling more
effective transmission and distribution of energy, superconducting cables are also inherently
able to regulate the power flow through the cable. As an HTS Cable overload begins, the
superconducting HTS wire begins to overheat, reducing its superconducting properties,
increasing its resistance, and hence reducing the power flow through the cable.
HTS Cables are “out of the lab” and being deployed in multiple projects in the grid, including 4
US projects (Albany, NY; Long Island, NY; and Columbus, OH; and Carrollton, GA) as well as
at other locations around the world.
The capabilities of HTS superconducting cables suggest that the most practical applications will
be in urban settings where greater underground power delivery capabilities are required than
can be supported by conventional cables.
In addition to its cable application, HTS superconductors are effectively used in dynamic
reactive power compensation modules, such as SuperVAR Synchronous Condensers, Dynamic
VAR Compensators, and Distributed Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage Systems (D-
SMES). These are devices that make use of superconducting windings in synchronous
condensers or superconducting magnets to provide technology that can dynamically inject or
absorb reactive power to regulate grid voltages and enhance grid stability. The first SuperVAR
Synchronous Condenser was installed in December of 2003 in the TVA system.
Superconducting motors and generators are also being developed and deployed.
Today, the application of superconducting VAR devices is primarily focused on the distribution
system, but these devices could be used to provide dynamic voltage support to the EHV grid to
enhance grid stability and power delivery capability.
1.9. Conclusion - Conductors

As with most electrical components, the conductor is rated based on heat. The ability of an
overhead conductor to dissipate the heat generated from the flow of electrons through the
strands of the conductor is an important element in rating the conductor. The heat generated
from the current flow is a squared function of current -- I2R. As the current doubles, the heat
generated increases by a factor of four. Another characteristic changed by heat in the conductor
is its length. A conductor will elongate as its temperature increases. The problem for a line
designer is that as the conductor elongates the amount of sag increases. For a typical line (336
ACSR with a 300 foot ruling sag), the elongation caused from heating a conductor from 95° F
(35° C) to 122° F (50° C) is 1.16 inches. This elongation results in an increase sag of 3.29 feet.
Using the same conductor and increasing the temperature from 122° F (50° C) to 167° F (75° C),
the elongation is 1.93 inches and the increase in sag is 4.25 feet. This elongation results in
additional slack in the span and less clearance to ground at the mid-point of the span, thereby
limiting the power rating of the line.
APD-9
The new higher temperature conductors could have a very significant impact on the utility
industry around the country and the world. It allows utilities to revisit their needs knowing
that there are feasible alternatives that can be implemented to tackle their demand. Even
though these new conductors have a greater current carrying capacity, they appear to be better
suited for upgrading transmission lines in urban areas than in new transmission line
construction, because of the high cost of the advanced conductors.
48 49 50 51 52 53
ACSR AAC AAAC ACSS ACCC ACCR
Core Galvanized Conductor Conductor Steel Carbon & Aluminum

Steel Glass Fiber Matrix
Composite
Outer Aluminum Aluminum Aluminum Annealed Aluminum Aluminum
conductor Alloy Alloy Alloy Aluminum Alloy Zirconium
795 kcmil 1094 lbs 745 lbs 865 lbs 1040 lbs 891 lbs 896 lbs
Weight/kFt
% -- -3% 0% 50-70% 100% 100%

Ampacity
Increase
over
ACSR
Operating 75 C 75 C 75 C 250 C 180 C 210 C

Temp. ° ° ° ° ° °
48. Aluminum Conductor Steel Reinforced

49. All Aluminum Conductor
50. All Aluminum Alloy Conductor
51. Aluminum Conductor Steel Supported
52. Aluminum Conductor Composite Core
53. Aluminum Conductor Composite Reinforced
APD-10
2.0 Unscheduled Power Flow
Generated power is scheduled to flow on transmission lines according to transaction schedules

between control areas. Typically, a schedule entails a point-to-point transfer of power or energy
over a specific transmission path. However, because of physical laws like Kirchhoff’s laws and
Ohm’s law, when there are parallel AC transmission paths between the source generation and
the load, the scheduled power may not flow on the transmission path designated in the
transaction schedule. This represents a deviation from the desired or scheduled flow. This
deviation between the actual power flow in a circuit and the scheduled flow is called
Unscheduled Flow (a.k.a. loop flow). Unscheduled flows are the flows occurring along a route
parallel to the scheduled path and can have adverse effects on the wide area system and the
owners of other transmission paths. Unscheduled flows are an unavoidable phenomenon in
wide area AC interconnected power networks. The issue of unscheduled flow has been
classified as the single most difficult problem of interconnected operations in the WECC
history. 54 Unscheduled flow essentially deals with the difference in real power in transmission
circuits and not the reactive power. It is common practice in the electric industry for each
participating utility to be directly responsible for their power flow associated with their
generation. The problem with unscheduled flow is that as hundreds or thousands of
simultaneous transactions are imposed upon the transmission system, mutual interference
develops, potentially producing congestion. This congestion may limit some entities from being
able to fully utilize their transmission assets and cheaper sources of energy.
Controlling power flow in one or more of the various parallel AC transmission lines would
permit more effective use of transmission resources. Conventional devices for power-flow
control include series capacitors to reduce line impedance, phase shifters, and fixed shunt
devices that are switched to the end of a line to adjust voltages. All of these devices employ
mechanical switches, which are relatively inexpensive and proven but also slow to operate and
vulnerable to wear, which means that it is not desirable to operate them frequently and/or use a
wide range of settings; in short, mechanically switched devices are not very flexible controllers.
Nonetheless, they are still the primary means use for stepped control of high power flows.
There could be several of types of unscheduled flows occurring in an interconnected system

and they can have certain potentially undesirable effects on system operation. There are flows
in the interconnection that do not manifest themselves in loops but exist as individual flow.
These are popularly termed as inadvertent power flows and occur when a balancing authority
fails to adequately balance its loads and resources on an ongoing basis.
The following sections will discuss the various transmission components and technology that
provides the capability for flow control on both AC and DC transmission grids.
54. http://www.ornl.gov/~webworks/cppr/y2001/misc/122375.pdf
APD-11
2.1. Phase Shifters
As discussed above, the fundamental characteristic that makes transmission planning and
investment so difficult is the lack of control of the power flows over the grid and the inability to
control the flow through individual transmission elements. Devices such as phase shifters and
direct current (DC) links allow control, but are much more expensive than traditional AC
transmission facilities. Each transmission element is part of a network that is a common
resource available to all. Phase shifters are used in many applications.
2.2. Phase Shifting Transformers

Existing transmission systems are often operated and stressed to the limit of their performance
capability. To ensure that under these conditions the economical, reliable and secure operation
of the grid is maintained, the need for various aspects of power flow management within the
power systems becomes evident. Phase-shifting transformers help control the real power flow
in transmission lines and systems interties. The main benefits of phase-shifting transformers
include the protection of lines and transformer from thermal overload and an improvement of
transmission system stability. They allow controlling the power flow between different
systems, for parallel long distance overhead-lines for parallel circuits.
Phase shifting transformers (PST) are used to control the flow of real power in transmission
lines by manipulating the phase angle difference. The phase angle shift is obtained by
combining the voltages from different phases in the PST. Phase-shifting transformers, when
combined with standard capacitors and reactors, can even provide control of reactive power
and fault current limitation.
The natural impedance and phase angle differences in a network often lead to unscheduled
flow. Phase-shifting transformers redirect the power flow, allowing existing lines to be loaded
closer to their thermal limits.
2.3. Variable Frequency Transformer

General Electric has developed a new Variable Frequency Transformer (VFT). The VFT is a
controllable, bidirectional transmission device that, similar to PST, can control the real power
flow in transmission lines and systems interties, but the greatest advantage is that it allows
power transfer between two networks that might not be synchronized. The VFT is essentially a
continuously variable phase-shifting transformer that can operate at any adjustable phase angle.
The core technology of the VFT is a rotary transformer with three-phase windings in both the
rotor and stator sides. Power flow is proportional to the magnitude and direction of the torque
applied to the rotor. This torque is applied to the rotor by a drive motor, which is controlled by
a variable-speed drive system. If torque is applied in one direction, then power flows from the
stator windings to the rotor windings. If torque is applied in the opposite direction, then power
flows from the rotor windings to the stator windings. If no torque is applied, then no real
power flows through the rotor transformer.
A closed-loop power regulator maintains power transfer according to the operator set point.
The regulator compares measured power with the set point and adjusts motor torque as a
APD-12
function of power error. The power regulator will respond quickly to network disturbances
and maintain stable power transfer. 55
Regardless of power flow, the rotor inherently orients itself to follow the phase angle imposed
by the two asynchronous systems, and will rotate continuously if the grids are at different
frequencies. The motor and drive system are designed to continuously produce torque while at
a standstill. If the power grid on one side experiences a disturbance that causes a frequency
excursion, the VFT will rotate at a speed proportional to the difference in frequency between the
two power grids. During such a disturbance, if the VFT is transferring power, it will continue
without interruption and at full-expected power. The VFT is designed to continuously regulate
power flow with drifting frequencies on both grids. Unlike power-electronic alternatives, the
VFT produces no harmonics and cannot cause undesirable interactions with neighboring
generators or other equipment on the grid. 56
VFT control system utilizes GE PowerLink Advantage™ HMI PC’s provide for superior user
interface & monitoring, multi-level dispatch, ramp rate setting and sequence of events
recording. The main control cabinet is based on GE D2000 substation automation platform for
multi-unit functions, SCDA interface for unmanned operation and data concentration for
individual protective devices and units. Individual unit control cabinet, for each 100 MW unit
utilizes GE Fanuc PLCs, GE’s Multilin Universal Relays, and GE’s Turbine Static Starter Control
for the fast power and torque regulators.
The first VFT completed commission testing at TransEnergie, Hydro Quebec’s Langlois
Substation in Quebec, Canada as reported in the October 2004 Transmission and Distribution
World. With the VFT in service Hydro-Quebec expects to transfer an extra 100 MW of power
between grids. The VFT’s 100 MW units can be combined for up to 400 MW in a single
installation. 57
2.4. Conclusion – Phase Shifters

PSTs and VFTs appear to be valuable pieces of equipment to help control the real power flow
on AC transmission lines and facilities, and in the case of the VFT the transfer of power from
one interconnection to another (e.g. Eastern Interconnection to the Western Interconnection).
Having the ability to control power flows is essential if a new line is going to be integrated into
55. Transmission & Distribution, August 1, 2006 “United States and Mexico Cross-Border Connection” by Rob O’Keefe and David Kidd,
American Electric Power page 1
56. GE Energy, Variable Frequency Transformers –

Grid inter-tie, www.ge-energy.com/prod_serv/products/transformers_vft/en/downloads/vft_brochure.pdf
57. Transmission & Distribution World, October 1, 2004 “First VFT System in Service for TransEnergie, aUnit of Hydro-Quebec,
http://license.icopyright.net/user/tag.act?tag=3.5531%3ficx_id=tdworld.com/mag/power_united_states_mexico/index.html
APD-13
the existing AC network, as it would provide some form of protection of the rights of the line
owner(s).
One major advantage of the VFT over PSTs is the absence of the tap changer, which historically
has caused maintenance issues and prevented the owner from achieving the maximum benefits.
The limiting factor of the VFT is the 400 MW limitation at each installation. The two
installations that will be using the VFT will be operating at 120 kV and 138 kV. Information for
units for higher voltages have not been found as of now.
APD-14
3.0 Multiple Phase Transmission Line
The use of more than three phases for electric power transmission has been studied for many
years. Using six or even 12 phases allows for greater power transfer capabilities within a
particular right of way, and reduced EMF’s because of greater phase cancellation. The technical
challenge is the cost and complexity of integrating such high-phase order lines into the existing
three-phase grid.
3.1. Six and 12 Phase Transmission Lines

In the mid-1960’s it was observed that rather than going to higher voltage, the number of phases
could be increased from three to six, twelve, or more, each step reducing impedance but
requiring no more transmission cross section area.
In the late 1970’s both six and twelve phase lines were built, tested, and shown to work as
predicted. Other theoretical work was done on compact line and the idea of suspending a
circuit as though it were insulated conductor bundle. It could, with the aid of ACCR, allow
some low voltage single circuit towers to carry three separate circuits.
A less dramatic but quite practical idea, now in use both in Russia and Brazil, greatly expands
mid span intra-bundle spacing thereby achieving very low reactance and higher than normal
reactive power generation. 58
This is new technology and still in the development stage. With the advancement of this
technology we will find several advantages. Research has been conducted in high phase order
(HPO) power transmission where in 6 or 12 phases are used to transmit power in less physical
space and with reduced environmental effects than conventional design.
If a three-phase circuit is replaced by a six phase circuit using the same conductor wire diameter
and material and operated at the same phase to neutral voltage, then for the same total power
transfer (MW), the six-phase conductors will carry only one-half the current of a three-phase
2
conductor line. Also, since the power loss is I R, the loss per conductor in the six-phase circuit
will be ¼ of that of the three-phase circuit, however, there will be twice as many conductors, so
the total line loss will be half of that of the corresponding three-phase line. 59
3.2. Conclusion – Multiple-Phase Transmission Line

Even though this new technology has promise it is still in its developmental stage and not
marketable on a wide scale. AC line configuration using multiple phases may in the future be a
viable solution to transmitting large quantities of power, but it will need additional work.
58. http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~electriconf/old2004/Barthold_The%20Future%20of%20Transmission%20Technology.pdf
59. http://www.patentstorm.us/patents/5070441-description.html
APD-15
APD-16
4.0 Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS)
Flexible Alternating Current Transmission System (FACTS) is a class of static equipment used
to enhanced controllability and increase the power transfer capability of AC transmission of
electrical energy. The FACTS devices are generally power electronics-based devices used for
the dynamic control of voltage, impedance and phase angle of voltage AC transmission lines.
The FACTS equipment can be connected in series with the power system (series compensation),
in shunt with the power system (shunt compensation), or both in series and in shunt with the
power system.
FACTS is defined by the IEEE as “a power electronic based system and other static equipment
that provides control of one or more AC transmission system parameters to enhance
controllability and increase power transfer capability.”
4.1. Series Compensation

Electrical transmission lines, in addition to conductor resistance, also contain series inductance
and shunt capacitance. The series inductance of a long transmission line, operated at high load
levels, will cause two things, 1) a significant voltage drop at the receiving end of the line and 2)
a phase angle increase between the source and receiving ends that may cause stability issues.
Series capacitors are utilized on these long transmission lines to mitigate the negative impacts of
inductive reactance and in effect, the series capacitors shorten the line electrically (as much as
70%) and allow for a greater power transfer levels.
Today, Thyristor Controlled Series Compensators (TCSCs) are an extension of conventional

series capacitors through adding a thyristor-controlled reactor. Placing a controlled reactor in
parallel with a series capacitor enables a continuous and rapidly variable series compensation
system. The main benefits of TCSCs are increased energy transfer, dampening of power
oscillations, dampening of sub synchronous resonances and control of line power flow. This is
a large improvement over the static synchronous series where metal oxide varistors (MOV).
4.2. Shunt Compensation

FACTS devices can provide shunt compensation to the power system, working as a controllable
current sources. Shunt compensation is of two types; shunt capacitive compensation and shunt
inductive compensation.
• Shunt capacitive compensation is used to improve the power factor on the transmission
line. Wherever an inductive load is connected to the transmission line, power factor lags
because of lagging load current. To compensate for this power factor lag shunt
capacitance is connected to the transmission system, which draws current leading the
source voltage and the net result is an improvement in power factor.
• Shunt inductive compensation is connected across the transmission line to prevent,
under some conditions, the receiving end voltage from becoming double the sending
end voltage. The device will limit high open end voltage when energizing a long
APD-17
transmission line or high voltage conditions at the receiving end of a long transmission
line, during periods light line loading.
4.2.1. Static Var Compensators (SVC’s)
These most important FACTS devices have been used for a number of years to improve
transmission line economics by resolving dynamic voltage problems. The accuracy, availability
and fast response enable SVCs’ to provide high performance steady state and transient voltage
control compared with classical shunt compensation. SVC’s are also used to dampen power
swings, improve transient stability, and reduce system losses by optimized relative power
control.
4.2.2. STATCOMS
STATCOMS are GTO (gate turn-off type thyristor) based on SVC technology. Compared with
conventional SVC’s they don’t require large inductive and capacitive components to provide
inductive or capacitive reactive power to high voltage transmission systems. This results in
smaller land requirements. An additional advantage is higher reactive output similar to a
synchronous condenser. Thus STATCOMs are able to provide dynamic voltage support to the
power system at the bus to which they are connected. The mitigation of voltage instability and
system transient stability issues are improved with the use of STATCOMs.
4.2.3. Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC)

These devices are connected with a STATCOM, which is a shunt connected device, with a series
branch in the transmission line via its DC circuit results in a UPFC. This device is comparable
to a phase shifting transformer. This solid state device has the advantage of correcting low
voltage, reducing overloads by adjusting the series line reactance and changing the phase angle.
The UPFC allows for faster network control and better load dynamics on the transmission
system.
4.3. Smart Grid

This concept involves utilizing distributed control and monitoring devices to monitor grid
status and adjust path flows through flow control devices or generation redispatch. In some
functions, the smart grid utilizes communications to coordinate control actions, while other
functions are performed autonomously. The smart grid concepts can be applied to all key
elements of the electric grid: generation, transmission, distribution, and end-use customers.
With a backbone communications system, overloads on key components of the grid can be
managed by readjusting generation, adjusting load, or “tuning” the transmission line
impedances to rebalance power flows.
One adaptation of the smart grid concept is the use of adaptive distributed FACTS devices
installed on several transmission or distribution lines. Devices such as Distributed FACTS (D-
FACTS) can either inject series capacitance to reduce the line impedance, inject series reactance
to increase the line impedance, or inject shunt series capacitance to support the grid voltage.
Another adaptation, called Smart Wire, is the use of autonomous distributed current limiting
conductor (CLiC) modules to control power flow, increase T&D system capacity, and enhance
APD-18
reliability. These devices (called distributed series impedance modules) can inject a small series
impedance into the line as the current in the line increases above a predetermined set-point.
With the goal of installing many CLiC modules in each phase of a transmission or distribution
line, the current (and power flow) can be tuned to increase the overall grid performance by
eliminating the first (and subsequent) thermal line limits by redirecting the power flows.
Because these devices operate based solely on the transmission line phase current, they can be
distributed and autonomous (requiring no communications system to coordinate their
operation). If a communications system is available, CLiC devices that can inject both series
inductance or series capacitance can be installed.
CLiC concept implementing devices are currently being developed for testing. Initial
development will focus on the lower transmission voltages of 161-230 kV, higher voltage
devices may be feasible. Because the CLiC concept relies on rebalancing power flows based on
line currents, it is useful only in transmission situations where thermal overloads are the basis
for limits. Simulation studies suggest that widespread application of CLiC devices can alleviate
line loading and congestion issues on complex transmission grids.
4.4. Conclusion - FACTS

It is highly likely that, all or most of the new long transmission lines that will be built in the
WECC will utilize several of these technologies, both at the new facilities and at adjacent
existing facilities. Their use will ensure grid reliability by providing dynamic power flow,
voltage, and phase angle response during transient conditions. The benefits of utilizing FACTS
devices in electrical transmission systems can be summarized as follows:
• Better utilization of existing transmission system assets

• Increased transmission system reliability
• Increased dynamic and transient grid stability
• Reduction of loop flows
• Improved power quality for sensitive industries
• No negative environmental impact
4.4.1. Better utilization of existing transmission system assets
In many countries, increasing the energy transfer capability and controlling the load flow of
transmission lines are of vital importance, especially in de-regulated markets, where the
generation sources with excess and the sinks (load centers) with the greatest needs can change
rapidly, frequently, adding new transmission lines to meet increasing electricity demands is
limited by economical and environmental constraints. FACTS devices help to meet these
requirements with the existing transmission systems.
4.4.2. Increased transmission system reliability and availability

Transmission system reliability and availability is affected by many different factors. Although
FACTS devices cannot prevent faults, they can mitigate the effects of faults and make electricity
supply more secure by reducing the number of line trips. For example, a major load rejection
APD-19
results in an over voltage of the line which can lead to a line trip. SVC’s or STATCOMS
counteract the over voltage and avoid line tripping.
4.4.3. Increased dynamic and transient grid stability

Long transmission lines, interconnected grids, impacts of changing loads and line faults can
create instabilities in transmission systems. These can lead to reduced line power flow, loop
flows or even to line trips. FACTS devices can stabilize transmission systems under transient
conditions, which result in higher energy transfer capability and reduced risk of line trips.
4.4.4. Increased quality of supply for sensitive industries

Modern industries depend upon high quality electricity supply including constant voltage and
frequency and no supply interruptions. Voltage dips, frequency variations or the loss of supply
can lead to interruptions in manufacturing processes with high resulting economic losses.
FACTS devices can help provide the required quality of supply.
4.4.5. No negative Environmental impacts

FACTS devices are environmentally friendly. They contain no hazardous materials and
produce no waste or pollutants. FACTS help distribute the electrical energy more economically
through better utilization of existing installations thereby reducing the need for additional
transmission lines.
APD-20
5.0 High-Voltage Direct Current
HVDC transmission systems contrast with the more common alternating-current systems as a
means for the bulk transmission of electrical power. The modern form of HVDC transmission
uses technology developed extensively in the 1930’s in Sweden by ASEA. Early commercial
installations include the USSR in 1951 between Moscow and Kashira, and a 10-20 MW system in
Gotland, Sweden in 1954 60
5.1. History of HVDC Transmission

An early method of high-voltage DC transmission was developed by the Swiss engineer Rene
Thury 61. This system used series-connected motor-generator sets to increase voltage. Each set
was insulated from ground and driven by insulated shafts from a prime mover. The line was
operated in constant current mode, with up to 5000 volts on each machine, some machines
having double commentators to reduce the voltage on each commutation. An early example of
this system was installed in 1889 in Italy by the Society Acquedotto de Ferrari-Galliera. This
system transmitted 630 kW at 14 kV over a distance of 120 km (approx. 74.5 miles) 62. Other
Thury systems operating at up to 100 kV DC operated up until the 1930’s, but the rotation
machinery required high maintenance and had high energy loss. Various other
electromechanical devices were tested during the first half of the 20th century with little
commercial success 63.
The grid controlled mercury arc valve became available for power transmission during the
period 1920 to 1940. In 1941 a 60 MW, +/- 200 kV, 115 km buried cable link was designed for the
city of Berlin using mercury arc valves (Elbe-Project), but owing to the collapse of the German
government in 1945 the project was never completed. 64 The equipment was moved to the Soviet
Union and was put into service there. 65
Introduction of the fully-static mercury arc valve to commercial service in 1954 marked the
beginning of the modern era of HVDC transmission. Mercury arc valves were common in
systems designed up to 1975, but since then HVDC systems use only solid-state devices.
60. Narain G. Hingorani in IEEE Spectrum magazine, 1996.

61. Donald Beaty et al, "Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers 11th Ed.", McGraw Hill,
1978
62. http://www.myinsulators.com/acw/bookref/histsyscable/
63. Shaping the Tools of Competitive Power http://www.tema.liu.se/tema-t/sirp/PDF/322_5.pdf
64. http://www.rmst.co.il/HVDC_Proven_Technology.pdf
65. http://www.ieee.org/organizations/history_center/Che2004/DITTMANN.pdf
APD-21
5.1.1. Advantages of HVDC over AC Transmission
In a number of applications the advantages of HVDC makes it the preferred option over AC
Transmission.
• Underwater cables, where high capacitance causes additional losses.

• Terminal to terminal long distance bulk power transmission.
• Power transmission between unsynchronized AC systems.
• Reduced profile of towers and lines for bulk power transmission.
• Termination at remote generating facilities
• Stabilizing AC power-grid, by being isolated from loop flow.
• Reducing Corona discharge as compared to HVAC transmission lines of similar
capacity.
• Reducing line cost since HVDC transmission requires fewer conductors (i.e. 2
conductors).
In general, a HVDC power line will interconnect two or more AC systems. Equipment to
convert between AC and DC power can add a considerable cost in power transmission. The
conversion from AC to DC is known as rectification and from DC to AC as inversion. Above a
certain break-even distance about 30 miles for submarine cables, and approximately 400-500
miles for overhead lines. 66
The conversion electronics also present an opportunity to effectively manage the power grid by
means of controlling the magnitude and direction of power flow. An additional advantage of
the existence of HVDC links, therefore, is potential increased stability in the transmission grid.
HVDC can carry more power per conductor, because for a given power rating the constant
voltage of a DC line is lower then the peak voltage in an AC line. This voltage determines the
insulation required and conductor spacing. This allows existing transmission line corridors to
be used to carry more power into an area of high power consumption, which can lower costs.
HVDC allows bulk power transmission between two asynchronous AC systems, thereby
improving system stability by preventing cascading failures from propagating from one part of
a wider power transmission grid to another, whilst still allowing power to be imported or
exported in the event of an AC failure. This has caused many power systems to contemplate
wider use of HVDC technology for its stability benefits alone.
5.1.2. Hybrid HVDC and AC

The combination of HVDC and AC is an option for bulk power on a long line with multiple
participants. In this option the first segment of the transmission line would be HVDC and at the
receiving end it would be integrated with the AC grid and be utilized to move the energy to the
different load centers.
66. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HVDC
APD-22
5.1.3. Disadvantages of HVDC
The required static converters (rectifiers and inverters) are expensive and cannot withstand
significant overloads. At shorter transmission distances the losses in the static converters may
be higher than in an AC power line, and the cost of the converters may not be offset by
reductions in line construction cost. Recent economic assessments suggest that for deliveries of
3,000 MW of capacity, HVDC is economical compared to 500 kV AC when the delivery distance
exceeds 400 to 500 miles.
In contrast to AC systems, realizing multiterminal systems is complex, as is expanding existing

schemes to multiterminal systems. Controlling power flow in a multiterminal DC system
requires good communication between all the terminals: power flow must be actively regulated
by the control system instead of the inherent properties of the transmission line.
5.1.4. Back to Back HVDC Terminals

A back to back station is a HVDC plant in which both converters are in the same area, usually in
the same building. The length of the DC line is only a few feet. These back to back DC stations
are used for:
• Coupling of electricity systems of different frequency

• Coupling two systems of the same nominal frequency giving isolation to the AC
systems.
The DC voltage in the intermediate circuit can be selected freely at HVDC back-to-back stations
because of the short conductor length. The DC voltage is as low as possible, in order to build a
small valve hall and avoid parallel switching of valves. For this reason at HVDC back to back
stations valves with the highest current rating are used.
5.1.5. System with DC Transmission Lines

The most common configuration of an HVDC link is a station-to-station link, where two
inverter/rectifier converter stations are connected by means of a dedicated HVDC link. This is
also a configuration commonly used in connecting unsynchronized grids, in long-haul power
transmission and in undersea cables.
Multi-terminal HVDC links, connecting more than two points, are rare. The configuration of
multiple terminals can be series, parallel, or a mixture of series and parallel. Parallel
configuration tends to be used for large capacity stations, and series for lower capacity stations.
An example is the 2000 MW Quebec-New England transmission system commissioned as the
first large multi-terminal facility in 1992 67.
The Garabi station power rating is a 2,200 MW configuration. The AC transmission systems in
Brazil and Argentina consist of a 500 kV network. The DC voltage between the two valve
groups is +/- 70 kV. The main reason for choosing HVDC is the fact that Argentina operates at
67. ABB HVDC Transmission Québec - New England
APD-23
50 cycles and Brazil at 60 cycles. The control system utilizes ABB’s Capacitor Commutated
Converters (CCC). The first phase was placed in service in 2000 and the second in 2002.
The chart below shows the cost broken down for line, station and losses for both AC voltages
and DC voltage options. 68
68..http://www02.abb.com/global/seitp/seitp202.nsf/0/5392089edc1b3440c12572250047fd78/$file/800+kV+DC+technology.pdf
APD-24
6.0 Extra-high Voltage Transmission Lines
The four popular transmission AC voltages used in the United States is 230, kV, 345 kV, 500 kV
and 765 kV. The WECC utilizes 500, 345 and 230 kV as the primary voltages for shipping large
quantities of power. This technology is well established. The use of 765 kV extra-high AC
transmission voltage has enhanced the Eastern Interconnection’s ability to move massive
amounts of energy from source to customer. With the 765 kV transmission lines, several times
the power of lower voltage lines can be transmitted over long distances with only 200 feet of
right of way.
Transmission at 765 kV also offers greater reliability due to its line design. With only one line
outage per 100-mile year, 765 kV reliability surpasses all other voltage classes. 69 In addition, 765
kV faults are usually momentary and involve only one of three phases, allowing application of
single-phase tripping.
Station equipment for 765 kV has matured and transformer bank sizes up to 3,000 MVA have
been demonstrated throughout the world. The necessity of using banks of single-phase
transformers allows spare units to be used easily achieved with a fourth single-phase
transformer connectable to any phase without physical moves, reducing outage duration.
A 765 kV system is an alternating current (AC) transmission, which lends itself to ready
integration with existing and future infrastructure. Direct current (DC) transmission is also
useful over long distances, but cannot be integrated well without significant cost.
Assuming the need to transport 3,000 MW, one 765 kV line with six bundled conductors per
phase would be required. Using 500 kV would require two circuits, each carrying 910 MW, and
six 345 kV lines would be required. The Eastern Interconnection is utilizing 765 kV transmission
lines and have found that the cost per mile is acceptable for their systems. This is not true for
the Western Interconnection, since there is no 765 kV infrastructure is this region. A recent
study conducted by the participants of the TransWest Express Transmission Project evaluated
the costs of several transmission alternatives related to a 3,000 MW transmission system (AC vs
DC) from the Wyoming Region to the Desert Southwest Region. The cost of a two line 500 kV
system was approximately $4.5 billion, the cost of a two line 765 kV system was approximately
$5.3 billion and the cost for a single bi-polar DC line was approximately $2.3 billion. Note: the
cost for the 765 kV option is higher, due to additional infrastructure requirements (e.g.
transformers), but the facilities could ultimately be utilized to transfer up to 5,000 MW.
69. Electric Light and Power, Jan 2007 – The Next Interstate System: 765 kV Transmission
APD-25
Appendix A of Appendix D
HVDC Systems
Systems that use (or used) mercury arc rectifiers
Length
Length of
Converter Converter of overhead Transmission
Name Station 1 Station 2 Cable line Voltage power Inauguration Remarks
Dessau, Berlin- - 60 MW 1945 Never

Germany Marienfelde, 100 +/- placed in
Elbe-
Germany km/ 200 service,
Project
62 kV dismantled
miles
Moscow, 100 - Built parts
Russia Kashira, Russia km/ 200 30 MW 1951 of HVDC
Moscow-
62 kV Elbe-
Kashira
miles Project
Gotland 1 Vaestervik, Ygne, Sweden 98 - 200 20 MW 1954 Shut down
Sweden km/ kV 2/86
61
miles
HVDC Echingen, Lydd, UK 64 - +/- 160 MW 1961 Shut down
Cross- France km/ 100 in 1984
Channel 40 kV
miles
Vester Replaced
Hassing, Stenkullen, 87 89 km/ 250 250 MW 1964 in 8/06
Konti-Skan
Denmark Sweden km/ 55 miles kV with
1
54 Thyristors
miles
HVDC Volzhskaya, Mikhailovskaya,
Volgograd- Russia Russia _ 475 km/ +/- 750 MW 1964
Donbass 295 400
miles kV
APD-26
Length
Length of
Upgraded
Benmore Haywards, in 1991.
HVDC
Dam, New New Zealand 40 km/ 570 km/ +270 1200 MW 1965 Pole 1 is
Inter-
Zealand 25 354 miles kV still
Island
miles -350 kV Mercury
Arc. Pole
2 is
Thyristors
HVDC Replaced
back to Sakkuma, Sakuma, - - +/- 125 300 MW 1965 in 1993
back Japan Japan kV with
station Thyristors
Sakuma
Suvereto, Lucciana, Replaced

Italia Corse: 304 118 km/ 200 kV 200 MW 1965 in 1986
SACOI 1
Codrongianos, km/ 73 miles with
Sardinia 189 Thyristors
miles
HVDC Delta, North 42 km/ 33 km/ 260 kV 312 MW 1968
Vancouver British Cowican, 26 21 miles
Island 1 Columbia British miles
Columbia
Mercury
Celilo, Sylmar, - 1362 km/ +/- 500 3100 MW 1970 arc valves
Pacific
Oregon California 846 miles kV replaced
interties
in 2004
Nelson Gillalm, Rosser, - 895 km/ Converted
River Canada Manitoba 556 miles +/- 450 1820 MW 1971 to
Bipole 1 kV Thyristors
1993,
2004
APD-27
Length
Length of
Name Station 1 Station 2 Cable line Voltage power Inauguration
HVDC Kingsnorth, Lindon-
Kingsnorth UK Beddington, 85 km/ - +/- 266 640 MW 1975
UK: 53 kV
London- miles
Willesden,
UK
Systems that used Thyristors from first power-on
Length
Length of
HVDC New New
back to Brunswick, Brunswick, - - 80 kV 320 MW 1972
back Canada Canada
station Eel
River
Cross- Tjele, Kristiansand, 30 km/ 100 km/ +/- 250 1000 MW 1977
Skagerrak Denmark Norway 64 62 miles kV
1&2 miles
HVDC Delta, North 33 km/ 42 km/ 1977

Vancouver, British Cowichan, 21 26 miles 280 kV 370 MW
Island 2 Columbia British miles
Columbia
Square Center, Arrowhead, - 749 km/ +/- 250 500 MW 1977
Butte North Minnesota 465 miles kV
Dakota
APD-28
Length
Length of
HVDC Shin, Shin, 600 MW 1977
back to Shinano, Shinano, - - +/- 250
back, Shin Japan Japan kV
Shinano
CU Coal Creek, Dickinson, _ 710 km/ +/- 400 1000 MW 1979

North Minnesota 441 miles kV
Dakota
HVDC Hakodate, Kamikita, 44 km/ 149 km/
Hokkaido- Japan Japan 27 93 miles 250 kV 300 MW 1979
Honshu miles
Cabora Songo, Apollo, - 1420 km/ +/- 533 1920 MW 1979

Bassa Mozambique South 882 miles kV
Africa
Inga- Kolwezi, Inga, - 1700 km/ +/- 500 560 MW 1964
Shaba Zaire Zaire 1056 kV
miles
HVDC Acaray, Acaray, _ _ 25.6 kV 50 MW 1981
back to Paraguay Paraguay
back
Acaray
HVDC Vyborg, Vyborg, - - +/- 85 1065 MW 1982

back to Russia Russia kV
back
Vyborg
HVDC Dunrohr, Dunrohr, _ _ 145 kV 550 MW 1983

back to Austria Austria
back
Durnrohr
HVDC Vastervik, Yigne, 92.9 6.6 km/ 150 kV 130 MW 1983

Gotland 2 Sweden Sweden km/ 4 miles
58
miles
APD-29
Length
Length of
HVDC back
to back Artesia, New Artesia, New - - 82 kV 200 MW 1983
Artesia, New Mexico Mexico
Mexico
HVDC back Chateauguay Chateauguay

to back Saint- Saint- - - 140 kV 1000 MW 1984
Chateauguay Constant Constant
HVDC Foz do Sao Roque, _ 785 km/ +/- 600 3150 MW 1984
Itaipu 1 Iguacu, Sao Paulo 488 miles kV
Parana
HVDC Foz do Sao Roque, - 805 km/ +/- 600 3150 MW 1984
Itaipu 2 Iguacu, Sao Paulo 500 miles kV
Parana
HVDC back Oklaunion Oklaunion - - 82 kV 200 MW 1984
to back
Oklaunion
HVDC back Blackwater, Blackwater,

to back New Mexico New Mexico _ _ 57 kV 200 MW 1984
Blackwater,
New Mexico
HVDC back Highgate, Highgate,

to back Vermont Vermont - - 56 kV 200 MW 1985
Highgate,
Vermont
HVDC back Madawaska Madawaska _ _ 140 kV 350 MW 1985

to back
Madawaska
APD-30
Length
Length of
HVDC back Miles City Miles City _ _ +/- 82 200 MW 1985
to back Miles kV
City
Nelson River Sundance, Rosser, - 937 km/ +/- 500 1800 MW 1985
Bipole 2 Canada Canada 582 miles kV
HVDC Cross- Les Sellingge, 72 km/ - +/- 270 2000 MW 1986

Channel Mandarins, UK 45 kV
France miles
HVDC back Broken Hill Broken Hill - - +/- 8.33 40 MW 1986
to back kV
Broken Hill
Intermountain Intermountain Adelanto, - 785 km/ +/- 500 1920 MW 1986

California 488 miles kV
HVDC back Uruguaiana, Uruguaiana, - - +/- 17.9 53.9 MW 1986
to back Brazil Brazil kV
Uruguaiana
HVDC Vastervik, Yigne, 98 km/ - 150 kV 130 MW 1987

Gotland 3 Sweden Sweden 61
miles
HVDC back Sidney, Sidney,
to back Nebraska Nebraska - - 55.5 kV 200 MW 1988
Virgina Smith
Konti-Skan 2 Vester Stenkullen, 87 km/ 60 km/ 285 kV 300 MW 1988

Hassing, Sweden 54 37 miles
Denmark miles
APD-31
Length
Length of
Converter Converter of overhead Transmissi
Name Station 1 Station 2 Cable line Voltage on power Inauguration
HVDC Mc Neill, Mc Neill, Canada - - 42 kV 150 MW 1989
back to Canada
backMc
Neill
HVDC Vindhyachal, Vindhyachal, - - 176 kV 500 MW 1989

back to India India
back
Vindhyach
al
HVDC Sileru, India Barsoor, India - 196 km/ +/- 200 400 MW 1989
Sileru- 122 miles kV
Barsoor
Fenno- Dannebo, Rauma, Finland 200 33 km/ 400 kV 500 MW 1989

Skan Sweden km/ 21 miles
124
miles
HVDC Gezhouba, Nan Qiao, China - 1046 km/ +/- 500 1200 MW 1989
Gezhouba- China 650 miles kV
Shanghai
Nicolet, Quebec:
Radisson, Des Cantons, - 1100 km/ +/- 450 2000 MW 1991
Quebec-
Quebec Quebec; 684 miles kV
New
Comerford, New
England
Hampshire;James
Bay, Mass.
HVDC Rihand, Dadri, India - 814 km/ +/- 500 1500 MW 1992
Rihand- India 506 miles kV
Delhi
APD-32
Length
Length of
SACOI 2 Suvereto, Lucciana, 118 304 km/ 200 kV 300 MW 1992
India France km/ 189 miles
Codrongianos, 73
Italy miles
HVDC Benmore Haywards, 40 km/ 570 km/ 350 kV 640 MW 1992
Inter-Island Dam, New New Zealand 25 354 miles
2 Zealand miles
Cross- Tjele, Kristiansand, 130 100 km/ 350 kV 500 MW 1993

Skagerrak 3 Denmark Norway km/ 62 miles
81
miles
Lubeck- Kruseber, 250 12 km/ 450 kV 600 MW 1993
Herrenwyk, Sweden km/ 7 miles
Baltic-Cable
Germany 155
miles
HVDC back Etzenricht, Etzenricht, - - 160 kV 600 MW 1993
to back Germany Germany
Etzenricht
HVDC back
to Vienna, Vienna, - - 142 kV 600 MW 1993
backVienna- Austria Austria
Southeast
HVDC Haenam, Jeju, South 101 - 180 kV 300 MW 1996

Haenam- South Korea km/
Cheju Korea 63
miles
Kontek Bentwisch, Bjaeeverskov, 170 - 400 kV 600 MW 1996
Germany Denmark km/
106
miles
APD-33
Length
Length of
HVDC Hellsjoen, Graengesberg, - 10 km/ 180 kV 3 MW 1997
Hellsjon- Sweden Sweden 6 miles
Grangesberg
HVDC back Welch- Welch- 1998

to back Monticello, Monticello, - - 162 kV 600 MW
Wesch- Texas Texas
Monticello
HVDC Orno, Leyton Ormoc, Luzon 21 km/ 430 km/ 350 kV 440 MW 1998
Leye-Luzon 13 267 miles
miles
HVDC Nas, Sweden Visby, Sweden 70 km/ - 80 kV 50 MW 1999
Visby-Nas 43
miles
Swepol Starno, Slupsk, Poland 245 - 450 kV 600 MW 2000
Sweden km/
152
miles
HVDC Italy- Galatina, Italy Arachthos, 200 110 km/ 400 kV 500 MW 2001
Greece Greece km/ 68 miles
124
miles
Kii Channel Anan, Japan Kihoku, Japan 50 km/ 50 km/ +/- 500 1400 MW 2000
HVDC 31 31 miles kV
miles
HVDC Auchencrosh, Ballycronan 63.5 - 250 kV 250 MW 2001
Moyle UK More, UK km/
39
miles
HVDC Khlong Ngae, Gurun, - 110 km/ 300 kV 300 MW 2002
Thailand- Thailand Malaysia 68 miles
Malaysia
APD-34
Length
Length of
HVDC back to Minami- Minami- 125 kV 300 MW 1999
back Minami- Fukumitsu, Fukumitsu, - -
Fukumitsu Japan Japan
HVDC three Longquan, Zhengping, - 890 km/ +/- 500 3000 MW 2003
Gorges- China China 553 miles kV
Changzhou
HVDC Jingzhou, Huizhou, - 940 km/ +/- 500 3000 MW 2003

Gorges- China China 584 miles kV
Guangdong
Basslink Loy Yang, George 298 72 km/ 400 kV 600 MW 2005

Australia Town, km/ 45 miles
Australia 185
miles
Vizag II Gazuwaka, Gazuwaka, - - 176 kV 500 MW 2005
India India
HVDC back to Sharyland, Shareyland, - - +/- 21 150 MW 2007
back Texas Texas kV
Sharyland
Imera Power
HVDC Wales- Leinster, Anglesea, 130 - +/- 400 500 MW 2008
Ireland, East Ireland Wales km/ kV
West 81
Interconnector miles
SAPEI Latina, Fiume 435 - +/- 500 1000 MW 2008/9

Italy Santo, km/ kV
Sardinia 270
miles
APD-35
Length
Converter Converter of Transmission
Name Station 1 Station 2 Cable Voltage power Inauguration
NorNed Feda, Norway Eemshaven, 580 +/- 450 700 MW 2010
Netherlands km/ kV
360
miles
HVDC back to Vishakapatinam, Vishakapatinam,
back India India -
Vishakapatinam
Systems that used IBT’s
Length
Length of
HVDC Tjaereborg, Tjaereborg, 4.3 km/ - +/- 9 kV 7.2 MW 2000 Wind
Tjaereborg Denmark Denmark Power
3 miles
HVDC Eagle Pass, Eagle Pass, - - +/- 15.9 36 MW 2000

back to Texas Texas kV
back Eagle
Pass, Texas
Directlink Mullumbimby, Bungalora, 59 km/ - +/- 80 kV 180 MW 2000 Land Cable

Australia Australia
37 miles
Cross New Haven, Shoreham, 40 km/ - +/- 150 330 MW 2002 Underwater
Sound Connecticut Long kV cable
25 miles
Cable Island
Murraylink Berri, Red Cliff, 177 km/ - +/- 150 220 MW 2002 Land
Australia Australia kV CableHVDC
110
miles
Kolsnes, Offshore Power for

Norway platform offshore gas
HVDC 70 km/ - +/- 60 kV 84 MW 2005
Troll A compressor
Troll
43 miles
APD-36
Estlink Espoo, Finland Harku, 105 km/ - +/- 150 350 MW 2006
Estonia kV
65 miles
HVDC Lista, Norway Valhall, 292 km/ - 150 kV 78 MW 2009

Valhall Offshore
181
platform
miles
APD-37
Appendix E
Alternative Approaches Utilized for
Transmission Project Approvals—Transmission
Planning and Review of Industry
and Regulatory Changes

List of Figures
Figure 1. Golden Era—The 50’s and 60’s ....................................................................................... APE-9
Figure 2. Roadblock Years—The 1970’s ....................................................................................... APE-11
Figure 3. Muddle 80’s ..................................................................................................................... APE-15
Figure 4. U.S. Total Average Revenue Per kWH ........................................................................ APE-16
Figure 5. Restructuring 90’s ........................................................................................................... APE-18
Figure 6. Meltdown—2000/2001 ................................................................................................... APE-23
Figure 7. Energy Policy Act 2005 .................................................................................................. APE-27
List of Tables
Table 1. Generation Ownership by Fuel Type ............................................................................ APE-21
Table 2. California Wholesale Electricity Prices – Monthly Means ($/MWh)......................... APE-24

Abstract
California’s electric industry went through a growth spurt in the 1950’s, 60’s, and early 70’s.
Many of the major transmission interconnection projects were built, planned, or conceived
during this time period. These projects were planned and built by vertically integrated utilities
with the primary purpose of connecting new generation or accessing new or surplus energy and
capacity.
The picture today is much different. Open access transmission rules separate ownership of
transmission from rights to transmission. Transmission planning has shifted to California
Independent System Operator for at least the investor-owned utilities. It is no longer possible
for utilities to simply plan new transmission and expect cost recovery.
This research effort has focused on the changes that have taken place within the electric
industry over the past five decades in an effort to better understanding their impacts on the
transmission planning process. The key impacts on the transmission planning process:
1. The traditional utility planning process transitioned from vertically integrated to

disaggregated planning for transmission and generation.
2. Utility-led to ISO-led transmission planning with stakeholder participation.
3. Utility footprint planning to regional planning with stakeholder participation.
4. Utility transmission usage rights to open access policy.
5. Separation between the generation and transmission functions—no information sharing
or planning coordination.
Keywords: Electric industry changes, regulatory change, transmission planning process,

California electric industry, evolving market in California, CA ISO, transmission
APE-1
APE-2
Executive Summary
California’s electric industry went through a growth spurt in the 1950’s, 60’s, and early 70’s.
Many of the major transmission interconnection projects were built, planned, or conceived
during this time period. These include for example, transmission into California from:
• Four Corners Power Plant, New Mexico.

• Navajo Power Plant, Arizona.
• Palo Verde Nuclear Plant, Arizona.
• Southwest Power Link, Arizona.
• Mohave Power Plant, Nevada.
• Pacific Intertie, Pacific Northwest.
• Intermountain Power Plant, Utah.
• Federal Electricity Commission’s (CFE’s) Cerro Prieto Plant, Baja Mexico.
All these projects were planned and built by vertically integrated utilities with the primary
purpose of connecting new generation or accessing new or surplus energy and capacity.
Projects were rate-based; customers paid for transmission as part of the bundled rate; and
customers enjoyed the benefits of ownership through exclusive or primary rights to use the
transmission system.
The picture today is much different. Open access transmission rules separate ownership of
transmission from rights to transmission. Utilities are no longer integrated—generation and
transmission functions are separated. Transmission planning has shifted from the utilities to
California Independent System Operator (CA ISO) for at least the investor-owned utilities. In
many cases an Independent Power Producer (IPP) is the project sponsor for new power plants
and, in some instances, an Independent Transmission Company (ITC) will sponsor a new
transmission line (e.g. Path 15 upgrade).
These changes are the culmination of 50-years of changes in the electric industry—regulatory,
legislative, and structural. California’s electric industry evolution in terms of time period, policy
issues, and transmission planning changes are described throughout the various sections of this
report. These evolutionary changes in the electric industry have had a significant impact on
planning for new transmission, cost allocation, and cost recovery. It is no longer possible for
utilities to simply plan new transmission and expect cost recovery. The consequences of these
changes can be summarized as follows:
Pre 80’s  Major new utility planned transmission primarily to connect new generation or access
surplus energy or capacity.
 Project planned by vertically integrated utilities based on long term (20-years or
longer) resource plans.
80’s & 90’s  Few transmission interconnections built due to capacity surpluses, environmental
APE-3
opposition, regulatory uncertainties, industry restructuring, and changing
transmission business landscape due to advent of open access and non utility
generation.
Post  New transmission planning processes start to take shape.
California  Transmission planning more open and collaborative with heavy stakeholder
Energy Crisis involvement.
in 2001  Planning focus shifted from utilities to CA ISO
 Projects starting to be approved.
 Issues regarding project sponsorship, analysis methodologies, cost recovery
evolving.
Research Findings and Conclusions:

This research effort has focused on the changes that have taken place within the electric
industry over the past five decades in an effort to better understanding their impacts on the
transmission planning process. The key findings from the research are that industry changes
have impacted the transmission planning process in the following five key areas:

2. Utility led to ISO led transmission planning with stakeholder participation.
or planning coordination, making transmission planning more difficult.
The following sections of this report are a historical review of the California Electric Power
Industry and the changes it underwent over the past five decades.
APE-4
1.0 Background
This project was commissioned to provide research and background information for a research
project on the broader topic of Benefit Quantification and Cost Allocation. As part of the Benefit
Quantification and Cost Allocation Research Project, the research team performed a scoping
study to understand transmission benefit quantification, cost allocation, cost recovery, and
project approval processes with a particular focus on recommending new methods for
improved benefit quantification and cost allocation that better fits the new electric industry
structure and planning environment. There were many key policy questions that came up as
part of this broader research, for example impact of transmission technologies, lessons learnt
from other regions and industries and the subject of this report impacts of industry and
regulatory changes.
APE-5
APE-6
2.0 Introduction
As indicated above, this research project was used to provide information to the broader subject
of Benefit Quantification and Cost Allocation. As part of that project it was determined that, for
the most part, utility efforts to develop new transmission projects that are local in nature,
address well documented reliability needs, are required for interconnecting new load or
generation are generally supported and have been gaining regulatory approvals and
stakeholder support. However, major regional transmission projects that involve multiple
jurisdictions and utilities and are needed for integrating remote resources, reducing costs,
improving market operations, providing long term strategic benefits and improving operating
flexibility, don’t have a clear path forward….. Why? In an attempt to help answer this question,
the project team was asked to research the electric industry and regulatory changes that
occurred over the past five decades and determine the impacts they had on the transmission
planning process.
The following section of this report covers the time span from the 1950’s through 2005+ and
provides a non-technical summary of the industry changes that were occurring each decade,
changes or shifts in the state and federal regulatory process, and a recap of the utility and
regional transmission planning process during each decade.
APE-7
3.0 Project Approach
The research approach used for this project included the following components:
• Information Collection
o Compiled data from various industry web sites.
o Reviewed and processed data for pertinent information and time lines.
• Conducted interview with Electric Power Group Team members and other industry
leaders with first-hand knowledge of industry changes and planning processes.
Produce report of research findings.
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4.0 History Of The California Electric Power Industry—Time
Periods, Issues, And Transmission Planning
4.1. Golden Era – The 50’s and 60’s
F igure 11. G olden E ra—T he 50’s and 60’s

The era following the end of World War II, due to the development of the defense industry on
the west coast and job opportunities for the returning troops, marked a time of tremendous
prosperity for the electric utility industry. The demand for electric energy grew rapidly,
consistently, and predictably, with declining electricity rates. The state’s utilities started the
transition from somewhat isolated utilities to a fully interconnected region. The utilities were
challenged to keep up with the need to construct new power plants and transmission
infrastructure to meet growing electricity needs.
There were several drivers to a healthy and robust electric industry during this time period:
• Electrification—the conversion from gasoline and natural gas use to an expanded use of
electric energy to improve industry production and efficiency (e.g., steel mills,
agricultural irrigation).
• Double digit growth—during the 50’s and 60’s the population in California doubled
from approximately 10 million to 20 million 70 requiring significant utility investment in
both power plants and transmission/distribution infrastructure in an effort to keep up
with the growing energy demand. Also, the average household started to increase in
size (1950 average was 850 square feet 71) which required more heating and cooling and
also bigger and more appliances and equipment.
• Declining Rates—a major contributor to the reduction in electric rates during these two
decades was the construction of new and larger fossil fuel power plants that provided
significant improvements in plant efficiency. The power plants built prior to the 50’s
consisted of units that varied in size from 30 to 90 megawatt (MW) and, between the 50’s
and 60’s, the plants consisted of units growing in size from 130 MW to 800 MW. In
addition, the plants implemented the use of new technology that included automated
controls and computers allowing the conversion from drum type boilers to super-critical
boilers for improved efficiency. The heat rates of the new plants were approximately
70. Public Policy Institute of California www.ppic.org

71. Energy Information Administration - http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/0562.pdf
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10,800 British thermal unit (Btu) per kilowatt-hour 72, almost a 30% improvement over
the pre-1950 vintage plants that had a heat rate in excess of 15,000 Btu per kilowatt-hour.
This era was also the beginning of nuclear generation in California. In 1968, San Onofre
Unit 1 went into operation, the first of six nuclear plants to be built in California.
4.1.1. Regulation and Planning Process for the Investor-Owned Utility (IOU),
during the 50’s and 60’s:
State of California:
• CPUC—The CPUC reviewed and approved generation and transmission projects and
established retail rates.
In 1912, the Legislature passed the Public Utilities Act 73, expanding the Railroad Commission's
regulatory authority to include natural gas, electric, telephone, and water companies, as well as
railroads and marine transportation companies. In 1946, the Commission was renamed the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
Federal:
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly FPC) - FERC reviewed and approved
hydro plant licensing, wholesale power and transmission service rates.
In 1920, Congress established the Federal Power Commission (FPC) 74 to coordinate
hydroelectric projects under federal control. The Federal Power Act of 1935 and the Natural Gas
Act of 1938 gave the FPC the power to regulate the sale and transportation of electricity and
natural gas.
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly AEC) 75 - NRC reviewed and approved

nuclear plant licensing.
Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was created, nuclear regulation was the
responsibility of the AEC, which Congress first established in the Atomic Energy Act of
1946. Eight years later, Congress replaced that law with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
which for the first time made the development of commercial nuclear power possible. The
act assigned the AEC the functions of both encouraging the use of nuclear power and
regulating its safety. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 created the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; it began operations on January 19, 1975.
Transmission Planning:
72. Derived from Edison Electric Institute, EEI Pocketbook of Electric Utility Industry Statistics (1983), p.
21
73. CPUC web site - http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/aboutcpuc/puhistory.htm
74. FERC web site - http://www.ferc.gov/students/whatisferc/history.htm
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• 50’s—The transmission planning process consisted of vertically integrated planning and
review process with some coordination with adjacent utilities.
• 60’s—The transmission planning consisted of vertically integrated planning and review
process and extensive coordination and review with sub-regions of the Western
Electricity Coordinating Council (e.g. Pacific Northwest and Desert Southwest) and
adjacent utilities. During the late 60s, as a result of the 1965 Northeast blackout, the
North American and regional reliability councils (NERC/WECC) were in the early
formation stages. Several major new transmission lines were built—almost all designed
to integrate new generation power plants, including for example, Mohave, Four
Corners, and Navajo coal plants.
4.2. Roadblock Years - The 1970’s
F igure 12. R oadbloc k Y ears —T he 1970’s

In general, the decade of the 1970s was not great for the electric utilities in California. The trend
indicated a move from decreasing unit costs and rapid growth to increasing unit costs and
slower overall growth. The major driving factors affecting the industry were:
• Environmental concerns.
• Drastic increases in fossil-fuel prices and double digit inflation.
• Conservation.
• Problems in the nuclear power industry after the Three Mile Island event.
4.2.1. Environmental Concerns
By the early 1970’s, there was a much greater emphasis being put on the environmental issues
and that had a noticeable impact on the electric industry in the form of environmental
requirements and electric utility costs, including the cost of building and operating power
plants.
The Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA, P.L. 91-604) and its amendments in 1977 (P.L. 95-95) required
utilities to reduce pollutant emissions, particularly SO2, causing increases in capital, fuel, and
operating costs.
• Air Quality and Environmental Impacts—In the early 1970, the primary fuel being
burned at generating plants within California was oil. Natural gas was reserved for the
gas company’s core residential, commercial and industrial customers and was only
available to the electric power industry on an interruptible basis. This high dependency
on oil and the associated air quality issues required the utilities, with poor air quality in
their service territory (e.g., Southern California Edison) to do two things: 1), to
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implement nitrogen oxides (NOX) dispatch programs for their fossil fuel generation
resources as opposed to least cost dispatch; and, 2) procure only low sulfur oil to burn in
the boilers.
• The new coal-fired power plants in the Desert Southwest, that the California utilities
participated in, were experimenting with emission control equipment to decrease the
amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emitted into the atmosphere. In addition, the flue gases
were passed through precipitators that removed much of the particulate matter and the
gas was sent up tall emission stacks to better disperse the SO2.
• The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, P.L. 91-190) required utilities
seeking Federal permits for new power plants to prepare and defend environmental
impact statements (EIS) as a part of the permit process.
4.2.2. High oil prices and double digit inflation
In the 1970’s the cost of imported oil rose sharply. Petroleum costs more than doubled in 1974
alone and increased an average of over 26% a year for the period 1970-1980. Coal price increases
averaged almost 16% a year. For the first time in the history of U.S. electric power, electricity
prices rose consistently, with nominal price increases averaging 11% a year. 76
4.2.3. Conservation of Fossil Fuels and Energy Use

During the 70’s there were several pieces of federal legislation that impacted both its future fuel
sources and energy sales. The conservation legislation effectively barred utilities from future
use of natural gas and petroleum. The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of
1974 (ESECA, P.L. 93-319) allowed the Federal Government to prohibit electric utilities from
burning natural gas or petroleum. The 1978 Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFUA,
P.L. 95-620) succeeded ESECA and extended Federal prohibition powers. The National Energy
Conservation Policy Act of 1978 (NECPA, P.L. 95-619) required utilities to provide residential
consumers free conservation services to encourage slower growth of electricity demand. 77
4.2.4. Nuclear Power

During the decade of the 70’s the commercial nuclear power industry was expanding rapidly
throughout the nation. In California, there were two major nuclear units operating (Sacramento
Municipal Utility District’s Rancho Seco and Southern California Edison’s San Onofre Unit 1).
By the late 70’s, PG&E had completed construction on the two Diablo Canyon units (1,100 MW
each), but was precluded from operating them due to potential earthquake issues (later resolved
during the 80’s). In addition, SCE was in the early stage of construction on San Onofre Units 2
and 3 (1,100 MW each).
Inflation and real labor and materials cost increases quickly affected construction costs of
nuclear power plants, while high interest rates raised financing costs. Capital costs rose from
76. Energy Information Administration, "Fuel Choice in Steam Electric Generation: A Retrospective
Analysis," Volume 1, Overview, Draft Report, Table 2.
77. Edison Electric Institute, Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry Through 1970
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about $150 per kilowatt in 1971 to over $600 after 1976. Utilities building commercial nuclear
facilities faced financial difficulties in justifying and meeting these increased costs 78. Costs of
nuclear power plants increased to over $2,000/kilowatt (kW) and coal plants to over $1,200/kW.
In March 1979, an event occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania)
that resulted in the first case of melted fuel in a full scale commercial nuclear power plant.
There had been prior cases of small scale fuel melting (e.g., the Fermi 1 reactor near Monroe,
Michigan). Three Mile Island Unit 2 was the Nation's most significant commercial nuclear
accident 79.
During the 70’s, the climate between nuclear power advocates and environmentalists was
confrontational. While voters failed to pass a 1972 proposal placing a 5-year moratorium on
nuclear plant construction, conservation and environmental groups worked throughout the
decade to stop construction of several proposed plants, especially along the coast and near fault
lines.
In 1976, Governor Brown passed three nuclear safeguard laws; one of which included the
provision that the Resources Conservation and Development Commission of California and the
Legislature determine at least one method of disposing of radioactive waste material safely 80.
These safeguard laws, in essence created a moratorium on new nuclear power plant
construction in California.
4.2.5. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and Power Plant
Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFUA-1978)
PURPA and PIFUA, both passed in 1978 ushered in non-utility generation and limited use of
gas in utility power plant due to a concern about a gas bubble and diminishing gas supplies.
The PURPA law was a direct response to the increased concern over U.S. dependency on
foreign oil in the wake of the OPEC oil embargos of the 70’s and was also intended to encourage
more energy-efficient and environmentally friendly commercial energy production. PURPA
defined a new class of energy producer called a qualifying facility (QF). Qualifying Facilities
(QFs) were defined as non-utility power wholesalers that were either co-generators, or small
power producers using specified renewable energy resources. When a facility of this type met
the FERC's requirements for ownership, size and efficiency, a utility company was obliged to
purchase the energy from these facilities based on their avoided cost rates, established by the
Public Utility Commissions. In California, these rates tended to be highly favorable to the
producer, and were intended to encourage more production of this type of energy as a means of
78. Energy Information Administration, 1983 Survey of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs,
DOE/EIA-0439(83) (Washington, DC, December 1983), p. 8.
79. http://www.nucleartourist.com/events/tmi.htm
80. http://infodome.sdsu.edu/about/depts/spcollections/collections/sdgesundesert.shtml
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reducing emissions and dependence on other sources of energy 81. In the late 70’s and early 80’s
the CPUC took the next step in an attempt to break-up the utilities’ monopoly over generation.
The CPUC established four Standard Offer contracts (based somewhat on the various resource
technologies) for QFs. The pricing structure was front loaded with high capacity payments and
the avoided fuel cost was developed based on a forecast of oil being at $100 per barrel by 1990.
The utility was required to accept energy from all QFs who signed a Standard Offer contract
and could deliver or have it delivered to the investor-owned utility.
In combination, PURPA and PIFUA resulted in significant development of cogeneration

facilities utilizing CCGT technology, development of independent non-utility owned power
plants, development of renewables, and utility obligation to interconnect non-utility QF
generation.
4.2.6. Regulation and Planning Process for the Investor-Owned Utility during
the 70’s
• CPUC–the CPUC reviewed and approved generation and transmission projects and
established retail rates. In stakeholder proceedings they also established avoided costs
pricing for QFs.
• The California Energy Commission is the state's primary energy policy and planning
agency. Created by the Legislature in 1974 (Warren-Alquist Act) and located in
Sacramento, the Energy Commission has five major responsibilities:
o Forecasting future energy needs and keeping historical energy data.
o Licensing thermal power plants 50 megawatts or larger.
o Promoting energy efficiency through appliances and building standards.
o Developing energy technologies and supporting renewable energy.
o Planning for and directing state response to energy emergency.
Federal:
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission—FERC reviewed and approved hydro plant

licensing, wholesale power and transmission service rates.
• The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was chartered as a result of the Department
of Energy Organization Act of 1977, signed by President Carter on August 4, 1977 and
established within the Department of Energy.
81.
http://www.energyvortex.com/energydictionary/public_utility_regulatory_policies_act_of_1978_(purpa).
html
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• Nuclear Regulatory Commission 82—NRC reviewed and approved nuclear plant
licensing.
• 70’s—The transmission planning process consisted of:

o Vertically integrated planning and review process.
o Extensive coordination and review between sub-regions of the WECC.
o WECC transmission project review for compliance with new planning standards.
o While PURPA and PIFUA set in motion non-utility generation, it did not affect
transmission planning until the mid-80’s.
4.3. Muddle 80’s
F igure 13. Muddle 80’s

The 80’s started off the way the 70’s ended; it was marked by high inflation, Iranian oil crises,
escalating costs due to nuclear plant construction, almost no load growth, and high electric bills
for the consumer.
Excess Capacity:
Starting in 1982 through 1988, there were seven nuclear units that came on-line that the
California utilities either owned or participated in. These seven units added approximately
8,000 MW of capacity in the California and Desert Southwest region, with 5,400 MW of that
capacity in California. The nuclear plants were:
• Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2—each 1,100 MW (PG&E owner).

• San Onofre Units 2 and 3—each 1,100 MW (SCE, SDG&E, Anaheim and Riverside
project participants).
• Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3—each 1,200 MW (LADWP, Southern California Power
Authority and SCE—participants).
As stated earlier, PURPA was passed in 1978 and required a FERC jurisdictional utility to offer
their avoided costs as payment for energy from a QF. As a result of this Act and the CPUC
established high avoided costs, the California IOUs were obligated to contract for over
10,000 MW of QF energy and capacity, prior to the suspension of the Standard Offer contracts,
in the late 80’s. The net impact of the nuclear plants and the QFs additions, during a period of
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slow load growth, left the utility with excess capacity. In some cases the installed capacity
reserves were in the 30% range.
High Rates
The causes for the high consumer rates were a continuation of the high power plant fuel costs,
sky rocketing construction costs for nuclear plants, high payments for QF energy and the
continued double digit rate of inflation that was driving all operating costs higher within the
utility. As an example of prices getting out of hand was nuclear construction cost. During the
mid-70’s the cost for a nuclear plant was approximately $600/per kilowatt and by early 80’s the
cost had doubled to approximately $1,200/per kilowatt 83. The requirements and modifications
coming out of the Three Mile Island event were significant drivers in the higher nuclear
construction costs.
84
F igure 14. U.S . T otal Average R evenue P er kW H
83. Energy Information Admin., Survey of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs 1984, DOE/EIA-
0439(84), pg. 13
84. SustainableFacility.com -
http://www.sustainablefacility.com/CDA/Archives_EPM/d554b6f99be38010VgnVCM100000f932a8c0____
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Slow Growth and Conservation:
The bottom line of all the above higher costs meant annual double digit rate increases for the
consumer and as a result they continued their energy conversation efforts, with a net result of
either a slowing or a negative load growth at the utilities.
Utility Diversification:
In the mid-1980’s, there was much uncertainty as to the future direction of the electric industry
partially as a result of FERC’s PURPA and many industrial customers wanting to or converting
from being a customers to cogeneration. To head off some of this uncertainty the electric
utilities ventured into diversification, or expansion into non-regulated industries. This was
made possible for some utilities because of large cash flows being available following
completion of major plant construction programs in the early 1980's, the cash flows exceeded
their immediate needs. Industry officials believe that usage of these cash flows to diversify into
non-regulated industries would smooth out the financial risks of the regulated business, while
providing companies an opportunity to earn returns above those allowed by regulation. To
facilitate diversification, many electric utilities, formed holding companies under which the
parent company holds both regulated and non-regulated subsidiaries 85.
There was mixed results from utilities venturing into diversification, those utilities that stayed
in areas close to their core competence (power plant ownership and operations) were normally
very successful, but for those who ventured far from their core competence (e.g., banking, small
retail food stores, roofing, security services) it proved somewhat disastrous.
4.3.1. Regulation and Planning Process for the Investor Owned Utility during
the 80’s
• CPUC—the CPUC reviewed and approved generation and transmission projects and
established retail rates. In stakeholder proceedings they also established avoided costs
pricing for QFs.
agency. During the 80’s there primary focus was on licensing thermal QF power plants
50 megawatts or larger.
Federal:

licensing, wholesale power and transmission service rates.
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission—NRC reviewed and approved nuclear plant licensing.
85. Peachtree Securities –

http://www.csb.uncw.edu/people/siglerk/classes/fin436/Fin%20436%20Cases/Case%207.doc
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• 80’s - The transmission planning process consisted of:
o Vertically integrated planning and review process.
o Extensive coordination and review between sub-regions of the WECC.
o Transmission projects reviewed at WECC for compliance with planning
standards and transfer capability ratings.
o Transmission interconnections for QF power plants.
4.4. Restructuring – 90’s
F igure 15. R es truc turing 90’s

During the decade of the 80’s several large industries in the U.S. underwent restructuring (e.g.,
airlines, gas, trucking and telecommunications) and appeared to be benefiting from less reliance
on traditional regulation in favor of more reliance on market forces. In addition, in California,
electric rates were too high and with the economy in recession, and the state looking for
opportunities to bolster its competitive climate and attract new industry and jobs, it seemed
eminently sensible to at least consider the idea of electricity restructuring at this time. At the
federal level, there was support for further promoting non-utility generation through exempt
wholesale generators which were exempted from state regulation, and further opening up
access to utility transmission system. This was accomplished by the landmark Energy Policy
Act of 1992.
4.4.1. Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992)

Similar to the PURPA legislation of the 70’s, EPAct 1992 was enacted in response to concerns
about America’s oil dependence, raised by the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The purpose of EPAct
1992 was to create new energy regulations that would promote open access to transmission and
increase competition in the wholesale energy markets 86.
The EPAct of ‘92 authorized FERC to require a jurisdictional entity, owning transmission, to
provide transmission services, including any upgrades and expansion of transmission capacity
necessary to provide transmission services to any one making such a request that is an electric
utility, Federal Power marketing agency, or any other person generating electric energy for sale
or resale.
86. Document describing “What Public Power Utilities Must Know To Survive Under the Energy Policy
Act of 2005” by Duncan & Allen
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EPAct 1992 reformed PUHCA and created a new category of power producers called Exempt
Wholesale Generators who would be exempt from PUHCA, subject to the FPA, not required to
be a co-generator or renewable resource (PURPA QF requirements) and jurisdictional entities
were not mandated to purchase power from them (which was a requirement under PURPA).
To ensure the marketing of EWGs, the EPAct of 1992 instructed FERC to require jurisdictional
utilities to make transmission service available at just and reasonable rates.
Following EPAct 1992, FERC issued Order Nos. 888 and 889 which identified the specific details
and requirements for wholesale electricity transactions and established the requirement for
entities to implement a real-time transmission trading system designed to better facilitate open
access transmission service.
• Order 888 requirements:

o Allow all electricity providers to have access to the transmission grid on equal
terms for both point-to-point and network transmission services, including
ancillary services.
o Transmission Owner to file with FERC an open access transmission tariffs that is
non-discriminatory.
o Transmission Owners to take service under their filed tariff rates for their own
wholesale electricity purchases and sales.
o Transmission service to others shall be on terms comparable to how the utility
served its native load and the obligation to offer ancillary services.
o Reciprocity for public power and municipal entities.
• Order 889 requirements:
o Implement an Open Access Same-time Information System (OASIS) that would
provide all transmission customers with standardized electronic information on
transmission capacity, prices, and other essential market information.
o Transmission operations personnel at utilities function independently of
generation and wholesale trading personnel.
o Encourages the creation of FERC’s jurisdictional ISOs.
4.4.2. CPUC’s Blue Book - 1994 87
On April 20, 1994, the CPUC issued its Blue Book, which announced the CPUC’s intention to
restructure the electric industry, and to begin the process of deciding formally how to go about
it. CPUC had decided to create a future in which customers would have choice among
competing generation providers and in which traditional cost-of-service regulation would be
replaced by performance-based regulation. The issuance of the Blue Book marked the beginning

http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucei/csem/CSEMWP-103
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of a formal process to consider how the CPUC restructuring vision could be accomplished.
Below are some of the desired attributes and issues related to a restructured electric industry:
• No customers would be forced to participate in direct access, if desired they could

continue to receive bundled service from their local utility.
• The IOUs would be obligated to provide transmission and distribution services on a
nondiscriminatory basis to direct access consumers.
• Development of energy markets vs. direct access—The CPUC had spent some time in
the United Kingdom and liked the concept of a real-time market known as the Pool,
The CPUC was fearful that direct access in the early stages of restructuring would
possibly be a threat to the system reliability.
• Should the IOUs be ordered to divest themselves of their generating plants?
• Development of a non-bypassable competitive transition charge. To cover the IOUs
generation assets that was uneconomic in a competitive market.
• All continuing utility services would be regulated under new performance-based
regulatory systems based on either a revenue or price cap framework.
4.4.3. State Legislation—AB1890
To fully implement restructuring of the electric industry required changes in legislation. The
CPUC Blue Book approach polarized the utility industry and stakeholders to favor different
approaches to deregulation. These competing visions were harmonized via a coalition of major
interest groups (IOUs, large customers, environmental and consumer organizations) with
support from the Governor of California, Pete Wilson. The chair of the Senate Energy, Utilities
and Communication Committee (Steve Peace) held public stakeholder sessions to work on a
single bill together. On August 31, 1996, the state legislature passed with complete unanimity
the restructuring bill known as AB 1890, and the Governor signed it shortly thereafter.
The bill used the CPUC Policy Decision as a starting point. There were, however, several
important provisions that either modified or redirected the CPUC in a few areas. Primary
among these were:
• Going beyond the CPUC’s call for a retail rate freeze it mandated a 10% rate cut during
the four-year transition period that allowed for stranded asset cost recovery.
• Public purpose programs, most of which had been legislatively mandated, required
modification in a restructured environment.
• Creation of the California Power Exchange (PX) to operate a day-ahead hour-by-hour
spot market, in which generators could sell and retailers could buy power.
o The IOUs, to ensure that the market would be liquid, were required to meet the
energy demands of their native loads with energy purchases from the Power
Exchange.
o The IOUs were required to sell all the energy from their remaining generation
assets through the Power Exchange.
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• Creation of The California Independent System Operator to manage the IOU’s
transmission assets and to:
o Maintain grid reliability.
o Congestion management.
o Providing ancillary services.
o Real-time balancing between demand and generation.
4.4.4. California’s Competitive Market
On April 1, 1998, the Power Exchange and CA ISO commenced operation. It was hoped that the
creation of the Power Exchange and CA ISO would establish the necessary foundation for a
successful competitive market. In addition, the three IOUs had divested themselves of their gas-
fired generation and by 1999 the generation ownership in the CA ISO’s control area was as
indicated in Table 1 below:
Table 1. Generation Ownership by Fuel Type
The divested generation was purchased by five independent power producers (AES, Duke,
Dynegy, Reliant, and Mirant), each purchasing roughly a fifth of the divested plant.
4.5. Regulation and Planning Process for the Investor-Owned Utility

during the 90’s:
• CPUC—the CPUC reviewed and approved generation and transmission projects and
established retail rates.
o Identified the need for and foundation for a competitive electric market in
California.
o Implemented a cost recovery program for un-economical generation in a
competitive market.
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o Established retail rate caps.
agency.
Federal:

licensing, wholesale power, and transmission service rates.
o Implemented EPAct 1992 action items related to electric industry.
o Implemented OATs.
o Implemented open access transmission same-time information system (OASIS).
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission—NRC reviewed and approved nuclear plant licensing.
• Transmission Planning:
• 90’s - The transmission planning process consisted of:
o Mandated and enforced separation between the utility merchant and reliability
functions in both planning and operations.
o IOU transmission proposals for new EHV lines or upgrades for the most part
were rejected, e.g., Palo Verde Devers No. 2, third AC line.
o New transmission interconnections built were almost exclusively by municipally
owned utilities, e.g., 3rd AC Line, Mead-Adelanto, DC Upgrade.
o Transmission upgrades were only developed, with internal approval, to meet
reliability requirements and those significant RMR costs that were internalized
by the transmission owners.
o Transmission Owner projects had to be reviewed and approved by the CA ISO
Planning Department.
o WECC:
 Extensive coordination and review between sub-regions of the WECC.
 Post 1996 outage—WECC established rule –if you have not studied a
condition you can’t operate in that condition.
 Developed and implemented Reliability Management Program in the
WECC–mandatory standards.
 Transmission projects reviewed at WECC for compliance with planning
standards and transfer capability ratings.
• NERC—started initial process of establishing mandatory compliance with reliability
standards.
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4.6. Meltdown – 2000/2001
F igure 16. Meltdown—2000/2001

4.6.1. Dysfunctional Market
During the spring of 2000 the California energy market began to collapse. In June the monthly
mean energy price (see
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Table 2 for the PX was almost $100 /megawatt-hour (MWh) higher than any previous month,
going back to the start of the market. There were also numerous price spikes. Prices reached the
CA ISO’s $750/MWh price cap in either the real-time or ancillary service markets 23 times. In
June the wholesale prices averaged $132/MWh. Wholesale price caps were lowered to
$500/MWh in July and $250/MWh in August but average wholesale prices remained high
during the summer. Wholesale prices eased somewhat during the fall but then spiked
dramatically in December. By the end of January, the collapse was complete. Blackouts occurred
on eight days during the winter and spring even though demand was far below the summer
peak. The Power Exchange suspended operations, and the CA ISO, SCE, and PG&E were all
insolvent.
All these long-term or external factors served to expose and amplify design flaws in an overly
complex deregulatory scheme. The design flaws, notably a massive over-reliance on spot
markets and capped retail prices, are often cited as the main reasons for California's problems,
but all of the ingredients listed above contributed to creating the crisis 88.

http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucei/csem/CSEMWP-103,p. 21
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T able 2. C alifornia W holes ale E lec tric ity P ric es – Monthly Means ($/MW h)
4.6.2. California Energy Crises

By the beginning of 2001, the energy issues had progressed to a point that the CA ISO and two
of the state’s investor-owned utilities were deemed un-creditworthy and unable to purchase the
necessary power to meet the customer demand. On January 17, 2001, then Governor Gray
Davis proclaimed a State of Emergency in response to California’s energy shortage. Following
the Governor’s Executive Order, and the signing of Senate Bill 7X two days later, a series of
events occurred that would keep electricity flowing to Californians through the critical summer
months and thereafter. On February 1, the governor signed legislation (AB1X) that gave the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR) the authority to purchase energy on behalf of
the retail customers of the Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs). The California Energy Resources
Scheduling (CERS) division was set up within DWR take on this responsibility. The role of
CERS later developed from the emergency mandate to include responsibility for gas
management planning, procurement and administration of short-term and long- term power
contracts, and continued power supply planning and resource scheduling 89.
4.6.3. Pacific Gas & Electric Bankruptcy

On Friday, April 6, 2001, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), after accumulating about $9 billion in
debt, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. PG&E’s bankruptcy filing was a result of them being
caught by the high cost of energy they purchased from energy suppliers and the fact they could
not recover those costs through their authorized rates. The Governor had proposed a plan that
89. History of CERS –

http://wwwcers.water.ca.gov/pdf_files/about_us/cershistory.pdf
APE-25
he would allow retail rates to increase, but only after PG&E (as well as SCE) sold the state their
transmission assets as payment for the debt and, in addition, agreed to provide energy for ten
years. This plan was unacceptable to PG&E and they elected to seek protection under Chapter
11, allowing them to continue operations, until they could get things worked out with the state
and their creditors 90.
4.6.4. Accounting and Market Gaming

In FERC’s report, The Commission’s Response to the California Electricity Crisis and Timeline
for Distribution of Refunds, dated December 27, 2005, they concluded there were several factors
contributed to the energy crises in California between January of 2000 and June of 2001, such as:
• Flawed market rules.

• Inadequate addition of generating facilities in the preceding years.
• A drop in available hydropower due to drought conditions.
• A rupture of a major pipeline supplying natural gas into California.
• Strong growth in the economy and in electricity demand.
• Unusually high temperatures.
• An increase in unplanned outages of extremely old generating facilities.
• Market manipulation by some sellers.
As of the date of the above mentioned report, FERC had completed all but one of the 60
investigations regarding market manipulation and that their staff had facilitated settlements
resulting in over $6.3 billion for issues regarding allegations of market manipulation in the West
during the period, as well as settlements involving whether prices were justness and
reasonableness 91.
4.6.5. Regulation and Planning Process for the Investor-Owned Utility, during
the Energy Crisis
State of California
• CPUC—Focus shifted to control damage from the energy crises:

o Restore IOUs creditworthiness.
o PG&E bankruptcy.
o Adequate supplies to meet customer loads.
• Governor’s Office—Worked with legislators, state commissions, IOUs and industry
stakeholders to develop a strategy to:
90. CNN story - http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0104/06/bn.06.html

91. The Commission’s Response to the California Electricity Crisis and Timeline for Distribution of
Refunds”, dated December 27, 2005 - http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/comm-response.pdf
APE-26
o Get sufficient generation resources under long-term contracts.
o Stabilize a dysfunctional market.
o Establish a portfolio management organization and an energy purchasing agent
for the IOUs.
agency.
Federal
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission—One of their primary roles and responsibilities

for FERC in the development of competitive wholesale markets should have been to
provide:
o Oversight and market monitoring functions.
o Take the necessary corrective action when a market became dysfunctional.
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission—NRC was very concerned regarding the financial
health of the three California IOUs and the implications it could have on the safe
operation of San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear units.
Transmission Planning
• Energy Crisis Years—the transmission planning process remained the same as in the
90’s, but due to the utilities financial situation and a need to conserve scarce capital, the
mode of operation was to perform fix-and-repair work only. No major new transmission
projects were built due to financial constraints and regulatory focus on the energy crises.
4.7. 2005 +
92
F igure 17. E nergy P olic y Ac t 2005
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) was signed into law on August 8, 2005. The purpose
of the EPAct 2005, as it relates to the electric industry, was in response to the many weaknesses
resulting from the disparate changes associated with electric industry restructuring. The
industry restructuring had its roots with the passage of Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the
subsequent FERC Order Nos. 888 and 889. Under 888 and 889, the FERC jurisdictional utilities
92. EEI’s web site - Energy Policy Act of 2005 – Summary of Title XII – Electricity, Title XVIII – Studies
and Related Provisions
APE-27
transitioned from the traditional vertically integrated utility to the unbundling of generation,
transmission, and distribution. In addition, as a result of the EPAct 2002, FERC was driving the
jurisdictional utilities to put their transmission assets under the control of an Independent
System Operator (ISO) and later a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO).
EPAct 2005 addresses the following topics and issues:
• Grid reliability—the formation of an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) and making

electric reliability standards mandatory on all users, owners, and operators of the
nation’s transmission system.
• Transmission siting rules—the EPAct grants FERC, for the first time, the authority to
approve the siting of electric transmission facilities located in national interest electric
transmission corridors if states cannot or will not act in a timely manner to approve the
siting. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was established as the lead federal agency
for purposes of coordinating all federal approvals and related environmental reviews
related to siting transmission facilities. In addition, DOE is required, every three years,
to identify national interest electric transmission corridors (a.k.a. congested or
constrained transmission paths).
• Native Load Service Obligation – a new Section 217(b)(4) of the FPA requires FERC to
exercise its FPA authority to facilitate planning and expansion of transmission facilities
to satisfy LSEs obligations to retail customers and their ability to secure firm
transmission rights to meet such obligations.
• Markets—establish rules that addresses market transparency and market manipulation.
• PUHCA—repeals the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 to encourage
investment in the nation’s electricity infrastructure.
• Transmission technology—requires FERC to encourage advanced transmission
technologies that increase the capacity, efficiency or reliability of existing or new
transmission facilities.
• Non-jurisdictional Entity—FERC may require, with a few exceptions, an unregulated
transmitting utility to provide transmission service at rates that are comparable to those
it charges itself and on terms and conditions (not relating to rates) that are comparable to
those under which the unregulated transmitting utility provides transmission service to
itself and that are not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
• Transmission Infrastructure Investment—requires the FERC establish rules, for utilities
under an ISO/RTO, that provide transmission rate incentives to benefit consumers by
ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission
congestion.
California Market Redesign 93
APE-28
On June 24, 2004, the CA ISO Board of Governors approved a market redesign and technology
upgrade program for the CA ISO in order to gain economic and technical efficiencies. The
program will be operational in 2008:
• Market improvements to assure grid reliability and more efficient and cost effective use
of resources. The CA ISO to conduct a Day-Ahead Market that combines three services;
energy, ancillary services (operating reserves) and congestion management to better
match what really happens when the electricity flows. The Day–Ahead Market will
determine the best use of resources available and identify the least cost method of
procuring required components.
• New Market Rules—the market redesign introduces new market rules and penalties that
prevent gaming and manipulation. Through revised tariffs the CA ISO has been granted
new authority by the FERC to assess financial penalties on market participants that do
not comply with instructions from the ISO control room. The new market design also
determines the deliverability of all schedules, rejecting requests that are physically
impossible.
• Locational Marginal Prices (LMP)—LMP will identify the cost of producing power as
well as the cost of delivery. This information gives the CA ISO and market participants a
clearer picture of the true cost of getting power to areas that may not have enough local
generation or where transmission capacity is lacking.
• Technology upgrades to strengthen the entire CA ISO computer backbone. The
technology upgrades will provide a more precise model of the grid using the latest
computer technology to allow the CA ISO to better predict how energy scheduled a day-
ahead of time will flow in real-time. The CA ISO will be able to see all potential
transmission congestion a day-ahead of time, rather than waiting until real-time.
CPUC - Procurement and Resource Adequacy (RA) 94
California’s RA policies have been under development for several years, but the first active
compliance period commenced in June 2006. The purpose of the program is for the review and
approval of:
• Plans for the utilities to purchase energy.

• Policies that address utility cost recovery for energy purchases.
• Programs that ensure that the utilities maintain a set amount of energy above what they
estimate they will need to serve their customers (called a reserve margin).
• Implements a long-term energy planning process.
California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 95
94 CPUC - Procurement and Resource Adequacy -

95. CPUC RPS Program - http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/energy/electric/renewableenergy/index.htm
APE-29
In 2002, Senate Bill 1078 (SB 1078, Sher, Chapter 516) established the RPS program, which
requires an annual increase in renewable generation by the utilities equivalent to at least 1% of
sales, with an aggregate goal of 20% by 2017. The CPUC accelerated the goal, requiring the
IOUs to obtain 20% of their power from renewables sources by 2010 (Senate Bill 107 codified
this goal in state law). Currently, the Commission is considering ways to achieve 33 percent
renewable energy by 2020.
RPS - Actual renewable deliveries in 2005:
• PG&E – 13.5 % (9,801 GWh).

• SCE – 17.7% (13,195 GWh).
• SDG&E - 5.5% (830 GWh).
New Transmission Projects Being Proposed
Recently, there has been much discussion regarding the construction of new EHV transmission
lines in the Western Interconnection. The governors of California, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming
had proposed a new interstate EHV transmission line across the Western U.S., from Wyoming
with terminal connections in Utah, Nevada and California. Some of the Arizona utilities and
others are considering an EHV transmission project from Wyoming to the Desert Southwest
area, and PG&E has proposed an EHV project from British Columbia to Northern California.
APE-30
APE-31
Appendix F
Existing Process for Transmission Project
Approvals and Case Histories

List of Figures
Figure 1. CA ISO’s Old Transmission Planning Process ............................................................. APF-3
Figure 2. CAISO’s New Interactive Transmission Planning Process ........................................ APF-4
Figure 3. Path 15 (source CA ISO) .................................................................................................. APF-6
Figure 4. Tehachapi Renewable Project (source SCE) .................................................................. APF-6
Figure 5. Devers-Palo Verde #2 500 kV line (source CA ISO)..................................................... APF-7
Figure 6. Trans Bay Cable Project (Source Babcock and Brown) ............................................. APF-8
Figure 7. Sunrise Powerlink (source SDG&E)............................................................................... APF-8
Figure 8. Green Path Project (Source Imperial Irrigation District) ............................................. APF-9
Figure 9. PG&E’s Proposed Central California Clean Energy Transmission Project (source
PG&E) ....................................................................................................................................... APF-11
List of Tables
Table 1. Recap of Changes and the Impacts on Transmission Planning for the California IOUs
................................................................................................................................................... APF-12
The historical CA ISO transmission planning process consisted of:
1. The Participating Transmission Owners (PTOs) submitted yearly transmission

assessment and expansion plans to the CA ISO covering the next five years in detail plus
a tenth year. The CA ISO reviewed the assessment to ensure it was adequate. The
expansion plans were reviewed to determine if the proposed projects: (1) solved an
identified problem; (2) were the best alternative from a system point of view; and, (3)
were the most economical alternative.
2. CAISO management approved projects that met the CAISO evaluation criteria and had
an estimated cost below $20 million or submitted the project for CA ISO Board approval
if they had an estimated cost exceeding $20 million.
California Market Redesign96
On June 24, 2004, the CA ISO Board of Governors approved a market redesign and technology
upgrade program for the CA ISO in order to gain economic and technical efficiencies. The
program will be operational in 2008:
• Market improvements to assure grid reliability and more efficient and cost effective use
of resources. The CA ISO to conduct a Day-Ahead Market that combines three services;
energy, ancillary services (operating reserves) and congestion management to better
match what really happens when the electricity flows. The Day–Ahead Market will
determine the best use of resources available and identify the least cost method of
procuring required components.
• New Market Rules—the market redesign introduces new market rules and penalties that
prevent gaming and manipulation. Through revised tariffs the CA ISO has been granted
new authority by the FERC to assess financial penalties on market participants that do
not comply with instructions from the ISO control room. The new market design also
determines the deliverability of all schedules, rejecting requests that are physically
impossible.
• Locational Marginal Prices (LMP)—LMP will identify the cost of producing power as
well as the cost of delivery. This information gives the CA ISO and market participants a
clearer picture of the true cost of getting power to areas that may not have enough local
generation or where transmission capacity is lacking.
• Technology upgrades to strengthen the entire CA ISO computer backbone. The
technology upgrades will provide a more precise model of the grid using the latest
computer technology to allow the CA ISO to better predict how energy scheduled a day-
ahead of time will flow in real-time. The CA ISO will be able to see all potential
transmission congestion a day-ahead of time, rather than waiting until real-time.
APF-1
CPUC - Procurement and Resource Adequacy (RA) 97
California’s RA policies have been under development for several years, but the first active
compliance period commenced in June 2006. The purpose of the program is for the review and
approval of:
• Plans for the utilities to purchase energy.

• Policies that address utility cost recovery for energy purchases.
• Programs that ensure that the utilities maintain a set amount of energy above what they
estimate they will need to serve their customers (called a reserve margin).
• Implements a long-term energy planning process.
California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 98
In 2002, Senate Bill 1078 (SB 1078, Sher, Chapter 516) established the RPS program, which
requires an annual increase in renewable generation by the utilities equivalent to at least 1% of
sales, with an aggregate goal of 20% by 2017. The CPUC accelerated the goal, requiring the
IOUs to obtain 20% of their power from renewables sources by 2010 (Senate Bill 107 codified
this goal in state law). Currently, the Commission is considering ways to achieve 33 percent
renewable energy by 2020.
RPS - Actual renewable deliveries in 2005:
• PG&E – 13.5 % (9,801 GWh).

• SCE – 17.7% (13,195 GWh).
• SDG&E - 5.5% (830 GWh).
New Transmission Projects Being Proposed
Recently, there has been much discussion regarding the construction of new EHV transmission
lines in the Western Interconnection. The governors of California, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming
had proposed a new interstate EHV transmission line across the Western U.S., from Wyoming
with terminal connections in Utah, Nevada and California. Some of the Arizona utilities and
others are considering an EHV transmission project from Wyoming to the Desert Southwest
area, and PG&E has proposed an EHV project from British Columbia to Northern California.
Maturing CA ISO Transmission Planning Process
In a letter, date 8/01/05, from Armie Perez, at that time Director of Transmission Planning, he
described the historical CA ISO planning process as follows 99:
97. CPUC - Procurement and Resource Adequacy -

98. CPUC RPS Program - http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/energy/electric/renewableenergy/index.htm
99. A. J. Perez Letter, dated 8/01/05 –
APF-2
1. The Participating Transmission Owners (PTOs) submitted yearly transmission
assessment and expansion plans to the CA ISO covering the next five years in detail plus
a tenth year. The CA ISO reviewed the assessment to ensure it was adequate. The
expansion plans were reviewed to determine if the proposed projects: (1) solved an
identified problem, (2) were the best alternative from a system point of view, and (3)
were the most economical alternative.
2. CA ISO Management approved projects that met the CA ISO evaluation criteria and had
an estimated cost below $20 million or submitted the project for CA ISO Board approval
if they had an estimated cost exceeding $20 million.
3. Additionally, the CA ISO combined the individual PTOs plans submitted into one and
performed an independent and comprehensive analysis to make sure that “nothing fell
through the cracks”.
4. Finally, the CA ISO conducted studies to determine Reliability Must Run (RMR)
Generation requirements.
In 2005, CAISO revamped its transmission planning process to be more proactive. As a result of
the CA ISO’s reassessment of their transmission planning process the following Figure 1 and
Figure 2 will show how the new process is more interactive and involved all stakeholders:
Figure 1. CA ISO’s Old Transmission Planning Process
http://www.CA ISO.com/docs/2005/08/01/2005080111170126493.pdf
APF-3
Figure 2. CA ISO’s New Interactive Transmission Planning Process
4.7.1. FERC Becomes Project Backstop

EPAct 2005 granted FERC limited backstop authority to site electric transmission facilities
located in national interest electric transmission corridors if states cannot or will not act 100.
4.7.2. Regulation and Planning Process for the Investor-Owned Utility 2005
and Beyond
• CPUC – Planning for the future:

o Long-term Planning—Implemented resource procurement proceedings.
o Resource Adequacy and Local Area Requirements—Work with the CA ISO to
identify zonal and local area resource requirements and LSE’s reserve
requirements.
o Work with the Energy Commission to implement renewable procurement
standards.
100. FERC Press Release - http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/statements-speeches/kelly/2006/06-15-06-

kelly-C-1.asp
APF-4
o Governor’s Office—through the Western Governors Association, establish a
vision for EHV transmission projects in the Western Interconnection.
• The California Energy Commission
o Primary organization for long-term growth forecast.
Federal:
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

o Implement EPAct 2005 requirements.
o Backstop authority for transmission projects.
o Enforcement agency for mandatory reliability.
o Expanded authority over jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities.
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission
o Continue oversight of nuclear plant operations.
o Review request for proposed new nuclear plant construction.
• Maturing CA ISO transmission planning process that is highly dependent on

stakeholder input and interactions.
• Greater interaction and coordination with California agencies (e.g., CPUC and Energy
Commission).
• Significant interaction with WECC sponsored regional transmission planning groups.
Recent Transmission Projects
1. Path 15 – Completed. Path 15 is an 84-mile stretch of electrical transmission lines in the

Central Valley connecting Southern California with the northern part of the state. The
existing transmission system in this area was insufficient to transmit the necessary
energy in a south-to-north direction. Building a third 500 kilovolt (kV) transmission line
and other upgrades provided an additional 1,500 megawatts of transfer capability (s-to-
n) for a cost of approximately $250 million
APF-5
Figure 3. Path 15 (source CA ISO)
2. Tehachapi – Several phases approved. The purpose of the project is to interconnect and
integrate forecast development of renewable energy projects totaling 4,500 MW. The
project will be built in eleven (11) phases with a total cost of approximately $1.8 billion.
Figure 4. Tehachapi Renewable Project (source SCE)
APF-6
3. Palo Verde Devers No. 2 – Approved. A second 500 kV transmission line that extends 230
miles along the existing right-of-way between SCE's Devers Substation near Palm
Springs and the Palo Verde Generating Station switchyard west of Phoenix, Ariz. This
project would facilitate the delivery of new merchant generation from the Palo Verde
area to California. The project is expected to add an additional 1,200 MW of transfer
capability between Arizona and Southern California, for a cost of approximately $680
million.
Figure 5. Devers-Palo Verde #2 500 kV line (source CA ISO)
4. Major System Reliability Upgrades on IOU Systems - Implemented
5. Trans Bay Cable – Final Stages of Licensing - The project is being developed to supports the
energy import requirements into the San Francisco peninsula. The line consists of a HVDC cable
(+- 500 kV) with a transfer capability of approximately 400 MW, at a cost of $300 million.
APF-7
Figure 6. Trans Bay Cable Project (Source Babcock and Brown)
Projects Proposed and Under Discussion

6. Sunrise Powerlink and the Green Path. The project consists of approximately 100 miles of
500 kV as well as some new 230 kV lines. The projects would achieve three objectives, 1)
ensure in-area reliability, 2) ability to import renewable resources and 3) reduce fuel cost
from increased energy imports. The cost of the project ranges from $1 billion to $1.5
billion.
Figure 7. Sunrise Powerlink (source SDG&E)
7. Green Path. The Green Path Project will improve the grid reliability within the IID
service area and facilitate exporting the geothermal energy from the Imperial Valley to
APF-8
the rest of the state. Cost of the project is approximately $430 million. The project
participants have agreed to link the Green Path Project with SDG&E’s Sunrise Powerlink
at Imperial Substation.
Figure 8. Green Path Project (Source Imperial Irrigation District)
8. Frontier Line. The Governors of California, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming agreed to
support developers seeking to build the $5 billion Frontier Line transmission project,
which will allow access to the State of Wyoming’s vast coal resources and potential
development of renewable resources.
9. British Columbia to Northern California. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) has
initiated the WECC Regional Planning Project Review of electric transmission
alternatives to connect Canada and the Pacific Northwest to Northern California.
Potential project alternatives would include both 500 and 765 kilovolt (kV) alternating
APF-9
current (AC) and high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines, via overhead or undersea
routes.
The proposed line is intended to provide three main benefits:
o Access to significant incremental renewable resources in Canada and the Pacific

Northwest.
o Improved regional transmission reliability.
o The potential capacity for a line(s) is up to 3000 MW (1600 – 2000 MW for the DC
submarine cable option).
10. Central California Clean Energy Transmission Project 101. Pacific Gas & Electric Company
has proposed a new 150-170 mile 500 kV line between Midway Substation and the
Fresno area on new R/W. The project would increase the Path 15 transfer capability by
approximately 1,250 MW. The project has an operating date of 2013 at a cost of $0.7 to 1
billion. Benefits of the project are:
o Helps integrate southern California renewables with northern California.
o Increase utilization of the Helms PSP to enhance the value of off-peak generation.
o Increase reliability to Yosemite/Fresno area.
o Reduce Fresno Area local capacity requirement.
101. Central California Clean Energy Transmission Project -

http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007_energypolicy/documents/2007-05-
14_workshop/public_comments/PG+Es_2007-05-14.PDF
APF-10
Figure 9. PG&E’s Proposed Central California Clean Energy Transmission Project (source PG&E)
4.8. Current Transmission Planning in California

For the three investor-owned utilities in California, the focus of transmission planning has
shifted to CA ISO. The CA ISO transmission planning process is maturing. The key issues are:
• Renewables integration.
• Stakeholder participation.
• Transmission project economic evaluation methodology.
• Market information on new generation for use in transmission planning.
• Coordination and collaboration with CPUC, Energy Commission, and other state
agencies.
To the extent that new transmission is within the CA ISO footprint and transmission costs are
rolled into the CA ISO TAC, the issue of cost allocation and cost recovery is moot. However, for
transmission projects involving multiple jurisdictions or where the project does not receive
rolled in rate treatment, the issue of cost allocation among jurisdictions and participating
utilities and associated tariff-based cost recovery becomes critical.
APF-11
4.9. Research Findings and Conclusions
As the research team reviewed the many industry changes over the past five decades they
found the changes have impacted the transmission planning process in the following five (5)
key areas:

2. Utility-led to ISO-led transmission planning with stakeholder participation.
or planning coordination, making transmission planning more difficult.
Table provides a recap of the changes that have occurred in the various phases of the California
transmission planning process.
Table 1. Recap of Changes and the Impacts on Transmission Planning for the California IOUs
Function Historical Current

Planning - Local Utilities CA ISO with stakeholder participation
Planning – Regional Footprint Utilities WECC utilities with regional stakeholder participation
Industry Vertically Integrated Separation of Generation & Transmission Functions
Generation Siting Utility IPP or Utility
Project Sponsorship Utility Utility, ITC, Stakeholders

and Ownership
Project Purpose Integrate New Meet market needs and policy mandates –
Generation and Access renewables, generation, reliability, congestion
to Resources
Usage Rights Owners Open Access
Cost Recovery CPUC Approved Rates FERC approved rates – rolled into CA ISO TAC
Transmission Siting CPUC CPUC or other lead environmental review agency
Project Approval CPUC CA ISO, CPUC, FERC (Backstop Authority)
Rate Recovery FERC – Transmission FERC – Transmission; CPUC – retail & backstop
CPUC – Retail Rates authority for renewable transmission
Reliability Good Utility Practices National and WECC Mandatory Standards
Requirements
APF-12
Appendix G
Fact Sheet
TRANSMISSION RESEARCH PROGRAM
June 2008
B E N E F IT Q U A N T IF IC A T IO N A N D C O S T A L L O C A T IO N R E S E A R C H P R O J E C T
There is general policy consensus on the need quantification, cost allocation, cost recovery and
for new transmission projects to advance the project approval processes with a particular focus on
policy objectives of renewables integration, recommending methods for improved benefit
reliability management, efficient market quantification and cost allocation that better fits the
operations, interconnect new load and new electric industry structure and planning
generators, reduce transmission congestion environment.
and bottlenecks, and expand access to regional
The research focus was to identify different benefit
power markets. Historically, major transmission
streams, outline methodologies to quantify benefits
projects were sponsored and owned by utilities
including strategic benefits that have in the past
and generally proposed as part of new power
been handled qualitatively, and outline approaches
plant development by integrated utilities.
for assessment of benefits and assignment of
This landscape has changed with the separation benefits that could be factored into project cost
of generation and transmission assets and allocation and cost recovery decisions of major
separation of transmission operations from transmission projects that may involve multiple
ownership by shifting the responsibility of utilities and regulatory jurisdictions.
transmission operations from utilities to
Independent System Operators/Regional
Transmission Operators (ISOs/RTO’s) such as Background
CA ISO. These changes in industry structure, Utility efforts to develop new transmission projects
operations, and planning impact how new that are local in nature, address well documented
transmission projects are planned, evaluated reliability needs, are required for interconnecting
and approved. Approval of proposed major new load or generation are generally supported and
regional transmission projects in this new have been gaining regulatory approvals and
environment has proved to be challenging, stakeholder support. However, major regional
witness the difficulty in moving forward with transmission projects that involve multiple
several California based projects such as the jurisdictions and utilities and are needed for
Palo-Verde Devers No.2 line, Sunrise, integrating remote renewable resources, reducing
Greenpath, and others. This difficulty has costs, improving market operations, providing long
brought into focus the need for research on term strategic benefits and improving operating
benefit quantification and cost allocation flexibility, don’t have a clear path forward. Projects
methods to help with the approval of major cannot go forward without cost recovery certainty.
regional transmission projects. Cost recovery certainty requires allocation of costs
through tariffs or contracts. For a major regional
transmission project involving multiple jurisdictions
Problems Addressed and utilities to go forward, there needs to be a
This project was commissioned to perform a scoping consensus on benefits, costs, and allocation of
study to understand transmission benefit
APG-1
benefits and costs that can be embraced by part of the project research and key conclusions
stakeholders and policymakers. include:
The challenge associated with benefit quantification,  Transmission Technologies – How do they
cost allocation, and approval of new transmission impact benefits, influence cost allocation, impact
projects was recognized in a September 2007 report stakeholders?
prepared by The Blue Ribbon Panel on Cost - Technologies Impact Line Capacity or
Allocation 102. Ratings, Power Flows, Grid Reliability
While the wholesale electricity market has changed - Selection of technologies impacts size of
fundamentally, the framework for enabling and benefits and distribution of benefits
encouraging investment that will better enable the  Industry and Regulatory Changes – How have
grid to serve growing competitive markets has not things changed and what does it mean for large
yet fully emerged. One area still largely unresolved regional transmission projects?
is how the costs incurred in transmission expansion - Shift from utility centric integrated planning
will be allocated among users. While it is clear that to regional planning with stakeholder
many traditional cost-allocation approaches are no participation
longer appropriate, new principles governing the  Review of Other Regions and Industries – What
allocation of cost responsibility for new transmission can we learn and apply for transmission in
investment have yet to be fully articulated and California and the Western Interconnection?
implemented.
- ISOs have similar planning processes
- Jointly owned multi-jurisdictional projects
Project Goals are almost exclusive to the west
A summary of the goals of this project are: - ISOs moving towards postage stamp
1. Assess current methods and develop (everybody pays) approaches with FERC
recommendations to improve benefit quantification
encouragement
methods.
2. Describe benefit quantification and cost allocation - Transparency in transmission planning,
approaches and how they may be utilized to inform predictable cost allocation/cost recovery
policy discussions, regulatory proceedings and methods, and length of experience with
stakeholder processes related to transmission planning process is important for acceptance
projects.
by stakeholders
3. Identify areas for research to improve the state-of-the
art for benefit quantification. - Telecom and gas industries are indeed
different – property rights
The project is not attempting to achieve stakeholder
The research focused on assessment of Benefit
consensus with respect to research findings and
recommendations on benefit quantification or to suggest a Quantification, Cost Allocation, and Approval
specific methodology for any proposed transmission Processes and Recommendations for improvements
project. The research is focused on developing a in methods.
framework for use in transmission planning and approval
processes.
Topics Researched and Addressed

There are many key policy questions that came up
as part of this research, for example impact of
transmission technologies, impact of industry and
regulatory changes, and lessons from other regions
and industries. The full range of topics addressed as
102. The Blue Ribbon Panel on Cost Allocation, Sept 2007, A

National Perspective On Allocating the Costs of New
Transmission Investment: Practice and Principles, p 1.
APG-2
Benefits of the Project Task 1: Benefit Streams, Quantification Methods,
The investigation identified seven research methods Cost Recovery, Recent Transmission Projects
that can augment existing benefit quantification Task 2: Framework to Evaluate Future Transmission
approaches to quantify the full range of
Projects and Benefits
transmission project benefits – these seven methods
are: Task 3: Research Cost Recovery and Cost Allocation
1. Public Good – long asset life benefit–use of Methodologies
social rate of discount Task 4: Review Technology Options and Impact on
2. Fuel Diversity Benefit–renewable resource System Utilization and Cost Allocation
integration
Task 5: Review and summarize examples of
3. Reliability Improvement from Extreme System
Multiple Contingency Events–new concepts alternative approaches that have been utilized for
transmission project approvals.
4. Risk Mitigation for Low Probability/High
Impact Extreme Market Events–new concepts Task 6: Review existing process for transmission line
5. Incorporate societal or strategic benefits through approval, rate determination and cost recovery.
processes that lead to stakeholder consensus
Task 7: Reports and Briefings
6. Resource Portfolio Analysis
7. Dynamic Analysis (impact of new transmission Task 8: Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)
on construction of new generation in the A TAC was formed to serve as a sounding board for
exporting region)
the research project and provide feedback on
research direction. The TAC is comprised of:
Application of Improved Benefit Quantification  Dede Hapner, Vice President, FERC and ISO
Approaches Relations, Pacific Gas & Electric.
Utilizing the seven proposed research methods to  Les Starck, Director of T&D Business Unit,
quantify the benefits of transmission projects will Southern California Edison.
enable policymakers, utilities, and stakeholders to
 Caroline Winn, Director of T&D Asset
quantify the benefits for projects, understanding
Management, San Diego Gas & Electric.
distribution of benefits among participants, and
enabling each utility or jurisdiction to evaluate the  Sean Gallagher, Director of Energy Division,
impacts on their individual constituency. The California Public Utilities Commission.
different uses of the benefit quantification methods  Steve Ellenbecker, Energy Advisor to Wyoming
for proposed new transmission projects include: Governor Freudenthal.
 Calculating and quantifying the distribution of
 Jim Bushnell, Research Director, University of
benefits among participants and jurisdictions.
California Energy Institute.
 Demonstrating and sharing benefits for direct
and indirect participants and critical
stakeholders.
 Enabling each utility or jurisdiction to analyze
benefits of projects (or package of projects)
 Providing guidance on cost allocation among
multiple participants and jurisdictions
 Selecting cost recovery methodology.
Project Objectives and Work Scope

This research project included the following tasks.
APG-3
Project Schedule Program Contact Information
The project was approved and commissioned in California Institute for Energy and the Environment
October 2006. The TAC workshops were held in
(CIEE, for the California Energy Commission)
January and September 2007. A total of four project
briefings at several forums have been made. A Bonderson Building, 901 P Street, Suite 142A
briefing at CAISO was held in February 2008.
Sacramento, CA 95814-6424
Project Team http://ciee.ucop.edu/trp.html

The research project team consists of the Vikram
Budhraja, John Ballance, Jim Dyer, and Fred
Mobasheri of Electric Power Group, Joseph Eto, Virgil Rose, Project Manager, PIER Transmission
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and Alison Research Program, (650) 572-8005
Silverstein, Alison Silverstein Consulting. Virgil
Rose provided invaluable vision, guidance, and
encouragement for this research project.
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor
Chairman: Jackalyne Pfannenstiel
Commissioners: James D. Boyd, Jeffrey Byron, Karen Douglas, Arthur H. Rosenfeld 3.01.08
APG-4
Appendix H
Comparison of Electric Transmission
With Gas and Telecommunication Industries

1.0 Introduction
Electric, gas, and telecommunication industries all rely on networks for transport. During the
1990’s, there was a tremendous expansion in telecom transport capacity. Also, gas pipeline
capacity has generally kept pace with demand as a result of new pipelines or expansion of
capacity of existing pipelines.
Electric transmission investments, however, have lagged development in new generation

supplies, load growth, and power trading or interregional power transfer volumes. A key policy
question that gets asked is, “why do transmission investments lag and are there some lessons
from other industries that may inform policymakers with respect to development of new
transmission projects, cost allocation, and cost recovery?”
This section provides a comparative assessment of the three industries and summarizes key
differences between electricity and the Gas and Telecom industries that have a bearing on
development of new capacity, cost allocation, and cost recovery.
APH-1
2.0 Industry Comparison
All three industries rely on physical networks for transport, with the exception that in the
telecom industry where wireless technology is utilized for transmission short distances 103. The
key characteristics of the three networks can be compared in terms of:
 Planning
 Infrastructure Characteristics
 Approvals, Cost Recovery and Rate Making
A comparative summary of the three industries is provided in Table 1.
Table 1 - COMPARISON OF GAS AND TELECOM WITH ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION
PLANNING Gas Telecom Electricity
Planning for New Gas pipeline Telecom Utilities, independent

Projects companies companies transmission companies,
ISOs/RTOs, stakeholders
Planning Process Open season Commercial Planning and economic

decision studies – resource planning,
 Market analysis
load flows, economic
 Subscription for
analysis of costs and
capacity
benefits, stakeholder and
regulatory acceptance
Project Justification Demonstration of Commercial Review of need, reliability,

public interest, Decision economics, alternatives,
economic feasibility environment impacts –
and no significant before different state,
environmental federal, industry and
impact in FERC Filing stakeholder groups
Lead Times 2 - 5 years 1 - 3 years 5 - 10 years
INFRASTRUCTURE
CHARACTERISTICS Gas Telecom Electricity
Transport Function Gas molecules Voice and data Electricity
Transport Medium Pipelines Fiber, copper, Conductors

microwave or
satellite
103. For this discussion, satellite-based telecommunications is not considered.
APH-2
Amount of Known Known Variable in an AC network
Transport Capacity due to parallel flows and
lack of flow control
Rated Capacity Determined by Determined by Determined by studies and

equipment equipment. approvals by WECC, ISO
Schedules Yes Yes Yes
Flow Control Yes Yes Limited in AC, expensive

Yes, for DC lines.
Storage Yes No Limited (pumped storage

hydro)
Inadvertent Flows No No Yes
Cost/Mile $1 to 2 million Low $2 to 10 million
User Rights Contracted firm Contracted firm Subject to Open Access

Rules
ROW  Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated easements or

easements or ROW easements ROW acquisition, (eminent
acquisition domain for acquisition),
designated corridors over
federal lands
ROW Requirements  Buried or over-  Buried or  Overhead lines

land pipelines overhead.  Specific or dedicated use
 Multiple use  Some  100-300’ wide ROW,
 Pipelines 16-48” dedicated use access roads, and
with 40’ clearance (e.g. MW substations
for above ground towers)
pipes; 5-6 feet  Multiple use of
underground gas, railroad or
other ROWs
Approvals, Cost
Recovery & Rate
Making Gas Telecom Electricity
Approvals for New  FERC  Commercial  Approvals by ISO,

Projects  State & local siting decision WECC, state and federal
 Some state and regulatory bodies
local siting  Environmental
APH-3
approvals – lead agency
 Construction permit –
utility commissions
Cost Responsibility Subscription Owner’s risk Negotiated solution
contracts based on amongst project
open season or participants subject to
owner’s risk regulatory approvals
Cost Recovery FERC approved tariff Market FERC approved ISO tariff
Rate Making Cost of service or Market Cost of service

market
2.1. Planning
In the gas industry, interstate pipeline companies develop plans for new pipelines or expansion
of existing pipelines. The need for such facilities is demonstrated through an “open-season”
subscription process. Lead times are generally 2– to 5–years and the project justification is
generally based on meeting market need as evidenced by subscriptions for capacity.
Telecom industry planning decisions are generally based on individual company commercial
decisions and lead times are short ranging from 1– to 3–years.
Electric transmission planning involves multiple levels of review and stakeholder participation.
Traditionally, planning was carried out by utilities. Now, the planning function has shifted to
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs).
However, transmission projects may also be planned by new entrants or stakeholders. The
planning process now involves utilities, RTOs/ISOs and stakeholders, and ultimately Western
Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) (in the west) for review of proposed transmission
project for reliability and to establish a rating. The lead time is 5– to 10–years.
2.2. Infrastructure Characteristics

Gas infrastructure is a system of pipes, valves, and compressor stations. It may also include
storage facilities. Pipelines can be as large as 48” in diameter, with required right-of-ways of up
to 50 feet. Pipes can be above ground or underground. The physical transport capacity is based
on the equipment size – pipe size and compressor stations.
Telecom infrastructure consists of copper, microwave, satellite or fiber lines. The copper and
fiber are often buried along existing rights-of-ways of railroad tracks, gas pipelines or other
infrastructure (e.g. cables over electric transmission lines). As in the case of gas, the transport
capacity for voice and data is fixed based on equipment (for example, number of lit fibers in the
case of fiber to transport voice and data). Microwave repeater facilities are typically located at
the tops of prominent geographic features, such as mountains, to achieve the greatest distance
between repeaters (microwave communication depends on a line-of-sight between repeater
stations). In urban areas, repeaters are frequently mounted on towers atop buildings. Satellite
APH-4
antennas may be placed at ground level or on building roofs where clear line-of-sight to the
communications satellite is available.
Electric transmission lines require much larger rights-of-ways (100 to 300’) and offer limited
opportunities for multiple uses. Rights-of-way (ROW) costs are one reason why transmission
line costs can be several times greater than gas or telecom for the same distance. In addition, the
transport capacity of an AC electric transmission line is often determined by network
characteristics and can change as a result of parallel network flows and system configuration.
AC transmission lines also have other major differences compared to the gas and telecom
industries – flows are not controlled (except by use of phase shifting transformers and other
flow control devices which can be costly), but determined by the physics of the network;
transmission delivery capacity is variable; and the use of transmission is subject to open access
rules with transmission owner (or contract right holder) being able to use the transmission on
the same terms and conditions for access as other market participants.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is considering long term transmission

contracts, but current open access rules provide no certainty of use of transmission to owners.
The owner could achieve financial neutrality through use of financial instruments.
2.3. Approvals, Cost Recovery and Rate Making

Gas pipelines require FERC approvals for construction, as well as applicable environmental,
local siting and land use permits. FERC review of need is based on “subscriptions” or other
equivalent evidence. Cost recovery is based on FERC approved rates including a rate of return
component.
Telecom approvals are primarily a commercial decision with some FCC licensing requirements
Transmission projects require approvals by:
 WECC For compliance with reliability standards and

ratings
 Utility Project sponsor – need and benefits

 ISO (or equivalent) Planning – need, benefits and alternatives
 Certificate of Public Convenience and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) or

Necessity (CPCN) other lead environmental agency
 Tariffs – Cost Recovery FERC
These different levels of approvals also involve stakeholders and the process can be time
consuming, expensive, and uncertain.
A summary of the key differences between Electricity and Gas/Telecom that Impact Cost
Allocation and Cost Recovery are presented in Table 2.
APH-5
Table 2
Key Differences between Electricity and Gas/Telecom

That Impact Cost Allocation and Cost Recovery
1. Greater ROW Requirements

2. Higher Cost Per Mile
3. Longer Project Lead Time
4. Uncertain and Changing User Rights
5. Expensive and Limited Flow Control for AC Networks
6. Multiple Layers of Stakeholder Involvement in Planning Process
7. State Jurisdiction Over Transmission Siting
8. Multiple Levels of Approvals – ISO, WECC, State, FERC
9. Eminent Domain Rights of Utilities – results in need to obtain footprint
utility support or participation
APH-6
3.0 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The open season subscription approach used in the gas industry could be used in the electric
industry. In a sense, if a new project is proposed and approved by the California ISO for
integration into the CAISO system with rolled in rates, it is the equivalent of full subscription by
CAISO on behalf of CAISO users. The subscription approach is more directly applicable to DC
lines (or AC with flow control). In any event, certainty about cost recovery including a return on
investment is key for transmission projects to move forward.
It is unlikely that transmission will be built by investors taking on “commercial risk” as is the
case in telecom due to the regulatory and rate approval processes that govern transmission.
APH-7

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Arnold Schwarzenegger

PIER FINAL PROJECT REPORT

Joseph Eto, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Martha Krebs, Ph.D.

Thom Kelly, Ph.D.

Buildings End‐Use Energy Efficiency

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1

Figure 1. Summary of Benefit Analysis of Transmission Projects .................................................... 32

Figure 2. Present Value of Benefits Using Different Discount Rates—30-year life,

$50 million Annual Benefit ................................................................................................... 42

Figure 3. Example of Fuel Diversity Benefit Calculation ................................................................... 43

Figure 4. Quantification of Reliability Benefit Due to Reduced Vulnerability to Extreme Events

Figure 5. Stakeholder Consensus—Delphi Approach ........................................................................ 47

Figure 6. Recommendations to Augment Benefit Quantification Methods .................................... 50

Figure 7. Cost Responsibility of Transmission Projects ...................................................................... 53

Research goals and objectives included:

1. Review methodologies currently being used for transmission project quantification.

Keywords: Benefit Quantification, Cost Allocation, Transmission Project Benefits and

o Planning Process—A consistent, transparent and predictable planning process is critical

A summary of key conclusions and recommendations for transmission project benefit

1. Assessment of Model Based Traditional Benefit Quantification Methods Commonly

o Policy support – needed for Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).

o San Diego 500 kV Sunrise Powerlink.

Major regional transmission projects share some of the following characteristics:

o Multiple regulatory jurisdictions.

o Review methodologies currently being used for transmission project benefit

- Allocate projects cost among participants.

- Develop framework for cost recovery.

o Type of benefits from different transmission projects.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is considering long term transmission

A summary report on Comparison of Electric Transmission with Gas and Telecommunication

3.2. Lessons Learned From Other Regions

3.3. Transmission Technologies

A report on transmission technologies is provided in Appendix D to this report.

3.4. Industry and Regulatory Changes.

3.5.1. Transmission as a Public Good

3.5.2. Present Value of Future Benefits—Social Rate of Discount

o Use of a social rate of discount to estimate present value of benefits of

3.5.3. Application of Social Discount Rate

2. A Mathematical Theory of Saving, Frank P. Ramsey, Economic Journal 1928 (December)

4. Essay on Economic Growth, Maurice Dobb, Long, 1960 Chapter II

SDR = (1+g)lel (1/π)-1

whereas SDR = social discount rate

g = per capita real consumption growth rate

e = elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption

π = weighted probability of survival of the average consumer from

3.5.4. Recommendation For Social Rate of Discount For Transmission Projects

4.2. Types of Benefits

o Primary Benefits (Traditional Benefits).

Strategic benefits can include:

o Access to new renewables resources to meet Renewable Portfolio Standard

o Exporting Region Benefits

2. Market Volatility—which is based on the societal benefit of reduced vulnerability to

4.3. Benefits Assessment Approaches in Use

o Production Simulation Models.

4.4. Review Of Benefit Analysis Of Some Recent Projects

4.4.1. Devers-Palo Verde No. 2

SCE’s objectives for proposed construction of DPV No. 2 are to:

o Increase California’s access to low-cost energy from the Southwest.